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Abstract(
Gilles Deleuze tells us that philosophical problems ‘compelled’ him to 
look to the cinema for answers, but he doesn’t tell us what those problems 
are. In this thesis I argue that the problems in question turn on the 
foundational role that Henri Bergson’s critique of the cinematographic illusion 
(as it impacts on philosophy) plays in the development of Deleuze’s 
ontological conception of difference – specifically in his 1956 essay 
“Bergson’s Conception of Difference.” The consequence of Bergson’s 
characterisation of human thought, perception and language as 
cinematographic in their orientation is that any philosophy that seeks to grasp 
being in its own terms must overcome or surpass the human to do so. This 
necessity plays itself out across the Deleuzian oeuvre in diverse formulations 
(most obviously, but by no means only) in relation to the Nietzschean themes 
therein. In doing so, however, the human is ‘left behind,’ such that Peter 
Hallward is able to contend that the human and properly human concerns 
have no place in Deleuzian philosophy.  
My argument is that Deleuze turns to the cinema to think through the 
question of the human relation to being (the thought of the world), on the 
basis of difference as such. Deleuze argues that the essence of the cinema is 
to be free of the cinematographic illusion - it ‘thinks’ in terms of real difference 
first of all. On that basis, it is able deduce the genesis of that illusion, and of 
the cinematographic orientation of human being and thought. The classical 
cinema dramatises the history of philosophy insofar as it remains subject to 
the cinematographic illusion and subordinates time to movement, but the 
modern cinema reverses this subordination in terms that do not ‘overcome’ or 
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‘surpass’ the human, but rather constitute its exposure to being as real 
difference. The modern cinema dramatises in turn the experience of what 
Kant calls the “fractured I,” which experiences its own thought not as 
spontaneity or power, but as time as the form of change. Deleuze’s Cinema 
books can thus be read as a response to the demands laid out in Solomon 
Maimon’s critique of Kant (it deduces the genesis of human thought and its 
relation to being on the basis of difference), locating the Cinema books and 
their treatment of the history of philosophy firmly in the context of Deleuze’s 
post-Kantian project. At the same time, the Cinema books thereby map out 
the relation of the human and properly human concerns to the difference of 
being as a creative and productive force that bears on those concerns without 
being reduced to them (without being reduced or collapsed to the 
cinematographic or the human) – the thought of being as the event of thought. 
 
 1. Introduction: The Problem of Cinema 
1.1 Transcendental Empiricism and the “Cahiers Axiom” 
Gilles Deleuze’s two-volume work on the cinema1 poses its would-be 
reader a formidable task. Its proliferation of cinematic references and 
analyses would stretch the capacities of all but the most dedicated cinephile 
(of Deleuze’s love for cinema there can be no doubt) and to engage with the 
historical currents of film theory therein calls for familiarity with the 
development of cinema studies as a critical discipline worthy of a dedicated 
film theorist. Perhaps most challenging of all, it asks that these threads be 
grasped in relation to his own uniquely demanding engagement with the 
history of philosophy itself and, more specifically, his own appropriation and 
transformation of that history and the problems that subtend it as developed 
across a philosophical career – or indeed, a philosophical life – spanning the 
1940s to the 1990s.2 The astonishing scope and ambition of the project are 
announced in its very title: a work of philosophy (for that is what it surely is) 
titled simply Cinema, as if within its pages Deleuze seeks in some sense to 
address or draw on the cinema in its entirety and as a whole. The 
extraordinary nature of this project invites a very simple question: why does 
Deleuze write about the cinema as a philosopher? This is the question this 
thesis seeks to explore.  
                                                
1 Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1986); Cinema 2: The Time-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert 
Galeta (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989). I refer to these collectively hereafter as ‘the Cinema 
books.’  
2 Although the Cinema books themselves were published in the 1980s, the problems in question, and 
their treatment in those books, nevertheless bear on, inform and can be productively informed by the 
works that came after them − What is Philosophy? in particular. 
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One path to accounting for this extraordinary fusion might be to locate its 
origins in Deleuze’s own biographical history. His famous antipathy to travel 
was such that his ‘philosophical life’ can be clearly circumscribed in place as 
well as in time in the Paris of the 1940s to the 1990s. As such, his 
philosophical investigations share a temporal and spatial origin with one of the 
great historical and cultural focal points of cinephilia and cinematic 
exploration, in which the love of cinema takes on the form of a critical 
exploration of the powers of the cinema itself. It would be difficult for anyone 
engaged with the intellectual and aesthetic life of Paris in the 1950s and 60s 
(and beyond) not to have been aware of, if not actively drawn to, this 
upswelling of critical, creative and intellectual activity around the cinema.  
As such, one can easily point towards a range of developments located 
within that specific film culture that have had an impact on Deleuze’s 
engagement with and knowledge of film history, theory and criticism, and 
ultimately on the Cinema books themselves. The role of Henri Langlois’ 
Cinémathèque Française in the development of Parisian film culture after the 
war,3 the critical and pedagogical activities of André Bazin4 and the foundation 
and development of the journal Cahiers du cinéma under the latter’s guidance 
seem, on the evidence of the Cinema books, to have had a particular impact 
on Deleuze’s experience of and interest in the cinema. Certainly it seems 
plausible to suggest that the Cinémathèque’s film programs would have 
                                                
3 For an account of the history of Langlois and the Cinémathèque Française, see Richard Roud, A 
Passion for Films: Henri Langlois and the Cinémathèque Française (Baltimore & London: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1983). For the events of May 68,  see 148−160 in particular. 
4 Dudley Andrew’s 1978 biographical study André Bazin remains a key reference point for those wanting 
to grasp Bazin’s impact and significance to the Cahiers tradition and cinema studies more generally, 
while the 2011 collection Opening Bazin is testament to his continuing relevance and importance to 
cinema studies today. André Bazin (New York & Oxford: Columbia UP, 1978); Opening Bazin: Postwar 
Film Theory and Its Afterlife (New York: Oxford UP, 2011).  
1. Introduction / 3 
 
served as one of Deleuze’s key (although by no means only) experiences of 
the cinema and its history from the 40s onwards, as it did for so many 
Parisians of the time.5  
The influence of Bazin’s critical and theoretical explorations of the 
cinema is also clearly evident, not least of all in the Cinema books’ structuring 
proposition that post-war Italian neo-realist cinema marks a new and distinct 
phase in the cinema’s history. Although Cahiers du cinéma was, and remains, 
only one of a range of film journals and focal points of film criticism and 
thinking within Parisian film culture, one can make a strong argument for its 
particular influence over Deleuze and on the Cinema books. Raymond 
Bellour, for example, notes that Deleuze is “particularly close” to the authors 
of the Cahiers tradition.6 Certainly the influence of the critical and creative 
works of the great Nouvelle Vague critic/filmmakers who were so central to 
the journal and its impact in the 50s and beyond is clearly apparent in the 
cinematic and theoretical reference points of the Cinema books, as is the 
impact of Serge Daney’s contribution within the journal and without.7  
More than this, however, I would locate Deleuze as one of the key 
inheritors of what Dudley Andrew, following Daney, calls “the Cahiers line” − a 
conceptual lineage of critical and theoretical thinking in and through which a 
                                                
5 Film scholar William D Routt once proposed to me in conversation that it should in principle be 
possible to work out which programs of the Cinémathèque Française Deleuze had attended, on the 
basis of the films referred to in the Cinema books.  
6 Raymond Bellour, "Thinking, Recounting: The Cinema of Gilles Deleuze," Discourse 20, no. 3 (1998): 
69. 
7 Daney was a contributor to Cahiers du cinéma from 1964 and its co-editor and editor from 1973 to 
1981. He was also instrumental in inviting philosophers such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière and 
Deleuze himself to contribute to the journal, and so marks an important point of contact between the 
trajectories of French philosophy and cinema studies. For more on what Garin Dowd describes as the 
“traffic of ideas and concepts between Deleuze and Daney”, and the specificities of Parisian cinephilism 
within which this traffic took place, see "Pedagogies of the Image between Daney and Deleuze," New 
Review of Film and Television Studies 8, no. 1 (2010): 41, and 41−56 more generally. 
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particular conception of film as a critical activity concerning not just cinema 
but the world takes shape. This lineage is articulated around the backbone of 
the journal’s long history, whose shared proposition Daney presents as 
follows: “The Cahiers axiom is this: that the cinema has a fundamental rapport 
with reality and that the real is not what is represented – and that’s final.”8 Just 
as Bazin serves as the tutelary figure for and progenitor of the Cahiers line,9 
his critique of montage in favour of mise en scène and the long take marks a 
point of origin for this ‘axiom’: for him, where montage presents us with a 
ready-made analysis of the world comprehended within its formal patterns, 
the latter seek merely to expose the world to the eye and to thought as a 
problem to which they must respond, rather than seek to capture or master.10 
Given the vicissitudes of French political, theoretical and philosophical thought 
from the 50s to now, the terms in which the Cahiers axiom is dealt with and 
expressed within that line necessarily vary. However, those treatments all 
share a concern for the relationship between image and world understood not 
in terms of representation or reflection, but as a problem offered to the eye 
and to thought.  
If Deleuze’s work on cinema can be regarded as a continuation of this 
‘line’,11 it is not only because of the evident impact of that line on his ideas, 
                                                
8 Dudley Andrew, What Cinema Is! (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 4–5. Andrew cites as the 
original source of this quote Serge Daney, L'exercise a Été Profitable, Monsieur (Paris: Pol, 1993), 301.  
9 As Andrew puts it, this ‘line’ “is neither perfectly straight, nor is it singular (having many threads), nor is 
it necessarily tied to this one periodical [Cahiers du cinéma]; however it does identify an orientation that 
owes most to Bazin”. Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin, "A Binocular Preface," in Opening 
Bazin: Postwar Theory and It's Afterlife, ed. Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2011), x. 
10 André Bazin, What Is Cinema?, trans. Hugh Grey, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: U of 
California P, 2005), 23–40. 
11 In a quite separate context Thomas Elsaesser and Malte Hagener identify within the traditions of film 
theory “a French line of thought linking Jean Epstein, André Bazin and Gilles Deleuze”. Film Theory: An 
Introduction through the Senses (New York & London: Routledge, 2010), 2. 
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but because Daney’s axiom also serves as an apt description of the concerns 
of Deleuzian philosophy as a whole, irrespective of any discussion of the 
cinema. Indeed, the significance of this axiom may be clearer, at least in an 
immediate sense, in the context of Deleuze’s work than in relation to the 
theoretical traditions of cinema studies. Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism, 
understood as the attempt to come to grips with the conditions of real, and not 
merely possible, experience, can be glossed as a concern for the real as that 
which cannot be adequately grasped or responded to by means of any 
representation of that reality. But it is for precisely this reason that I argue that 
the Cinema books must be understood not as a response to the cinema, or as 
a product of his love for cinema, but as a response to a properly philosophical 
problem within and for Deleuzian philosophy itself approached by means of 
the cinema: if the Cahiers axiom bears on Deleuzian thought, it is not as an 
axiom of the cinema, but rather of philosophy.  
However, although such an answer may tell us why cinema is of 
relevance to his philosophical project, given that difference and a concern for 
thinking in terms of difference lies at the heart of everything he writes it does 
not tell us much about why the cinema in particular draws his attention. 
Deleuze tells us that philosophical problems ‘compelled’ him to “look for 
answers in the cinema”.12 Unfortunately he does not say what those problems 
are, or what it is about cinema that enables him to respond to them in a way 
that philosophy on its own does not (even this hint is offered ‘outside’ the 
Cinema books, in an interview for Cahiers du cinéma.)  
                                                
12 Gilles Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen: An Interview with Gilles Deleuze," in The Brain is the 
Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis & London: U of 
Minnesota P, 2000), 367. 
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Likewise, although the secondary literature surrounding the Cinema 
books makes it abundantly clear that the latter are both continuous and 
deeply intertwined with the philosophical concerns and approaches explored 
across his entire body of work, that literature provides no more clarity on this 
point than Deleuze himself. David Rodowick identifies the task of his Gilles 
Deleuze’s Time Machine (which provides one of the most sustained, 
substantial and successful examples of such work13) as the attempt to “treat 
the two [Cinema] books as philosophical works and to try to understand them 
as a logical development through cinema of Deleuze’s more general 
concerns” insofar as the latter’s philosophy is “in the deepest and most 
complex ways, a philosophy of time.”14 Rodowick achieves precisely that, but 
given that ‘time’ understood as Bergsonian duration (as it is in the Cinema 
books) is simply another way of saying ‘difference’ this brings us no closer to 
understanding the specificity of those books within the Deleuzian œuvre or to 
answering the question ‘why cinema?’  
Similarly, the substantial body of individual essays that engage with the 
Cinema books in many cases provide valuable insights into particular aspects, 
problems or issues arising from them in their relation to Deleuzian philosophy 
(and, to a lesser extent, their relation to problems within the research tradition 
of cinema studies).15 However, their very specificity limits their capacity to 
                                                
13 DN  Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine (Durham & London: Duke UP, 1997). For further 
significant examples of book length treatments of the Cinema books in this vein, see Paola Marrati, 
Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy, trans. Alisa Hartz (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2008); and 
Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema (London & New York: Routledge, 2003). 
14 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, xiii. 
15 Gregory Flaxman’s anthology The Brain is the Screen is a key source of such material, but numerous 
significant examples can be found in a diverse range of compilations and journals – many of which are 
cited in this thesis. The Brain is the Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Cinema (Minneapolis & 
London: U of Minnesota P, 2000). If there is an exception to this rule it is Bellour’s remarkable essay 
“Thinking, Recounting: the Cinema of Gilles Deleuze”. For my money, this essay is the best short 
analysis of the Cinema books available and perhaps the finest at any scale − the subtlest, the most 
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respond to the question of the project of those books as a whole. The task of 
this thesis is specifically to redress this absence: not only to answer the 
question ‘why does Deleuze write about cinema as a philosopher?’, but to do 
so in terms of the specific philosophical problems that compel him to do so.  
It seems worth asking why this absence in the critical literature remains, 
more than twenty-five years after the second volume of the Cinema books 
became available in English.16 Nearly two decades ago, Rodowick noted that 
the Cinema books were regarded as “anomalies” by the research 
communities of both philosophy and cinema studies,17 seen by both as 
‘outside’ their legitimate field of interest or perhaps even as an unwarranted 
expansion of one field into the other (although possibly more so for cinema 
studies than philosophy.)18 The manner in which Deleuze approaches issues 
and arguments ‘belonging’ to or arising out of the cinema studies research 
tradition as and in terms of philosophical problems, or presents his own 
philosophical arguments as though they were internal to the cinema means 
that readers from both traditions can find themselves alienated from and 
critical of those arguments, even (or especially) when they appear to concern 
issues ‘proper’ to the reader’s own field.  
                                                                                                                                      
graceful, the most able to grasp their fusion of cinema and philosophy and respond in kind. "Thinking, 
Recounting." 
16 Given that I neither speak nor read French, this thesis has an unavoidable bias to the anglophone 
reception and discussion of the Cinema books. Although this constitutes a real and present limitation on 
its scope, the enthusiasm with which French philosophical/cinematic thought and writing have been 
engaged with in the English speaking world means that a significant (although necessarily selective) 
body of relevant French language material is available in translation.  
17 Within the anglophone world at least, although Tom Conley suggests this confusion was shared to 
some degree by French readers as well. “Film Theory 'after' Deleuze.” Film-Philosophy 5, no. 31 (2001): 
n.p., www.film-philosophy.com/vol5-2001/n31conley.  
18 The rise of interest in the relation between film and philosophy in the years since Rodowick’s book 
was published – attributable at least in part to the influence of the Cinema books themselves and thus 
contributed to by Rodowick’s own work – suggests that this ‘distrust’ is at the very least less prevalent 
now than it was then. 
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‘Philosophical’ responses to the Cinema books have tended to 
acknowledge in passing, and with a greater or lesser degree of sympathy, the 
claim Deleuze makes of the philosophical significance of the cinema, without 
going far beyond seeing this as one more example among others of Deleuze’s 
tendency to engage with philosophy through and with a vast diversity of non-
philosophical materials drawn from science, mathematics, literature and art. In 
doing so, the specificity of his engagement with the cinema has tended to be 
pushed to the background in favour of a focus on the more familiar 
philosophical concepts, problems and personae that arise therein. The 
cinema studies community has been more directly critical of the lapses, gaps, 
incongruities or limits they perceive in Deleuze’s treatment of ‘their’ tradition 
(especially, although not exclusively,19 in the Anglophone world.) Even 
Rodowick himself, who is clearly deeply engaged with and sympathetic to the 
philosophical project of the Cinema books, argues (with some justice) that 
Deleuze’s “knowledge of film history departs little from the general histories 
that have been so profoundly challenged and revised by the new film history 
of the past fifteen years” and that his attitude towards film authorship 
“represents one of the worst aspects of Parisian cinephilisim … [while] his 
analyses are often derivative of other works”.20  
David Bordwell’s argument that Deleuze uncritically repeats the 
dominant research tradition of cinema studies from the perspective of an 
                                                
19 See for example, Luc Moulett’s attack on what he describes as Deleuze’s “schoolboy” errors in the 
latter’s treatment of the cinema. Moullet, Luc. “The Green Garbage Bins of Gilles Deleuze.” Translated 
by William D Routt. Rouge 6 (2005): www.rouge.com.au/6/Deleuze.htm. 
20 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, x and xiii-xiv. What Rodowick doesn’t acknowledge here is 
how thorough Deleuze’s grasp of this tradition is or, indeed, that most of the ‘revision’ of this tradition he 
refers to in this passage took place after the Cinema books were written. 
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arbitrarily imposed theoretical and philosophical framework21 offers itself as a 
kind of synecdoche for such criticisms, insofar as behind them all is the 
question of why the cinema (its histories, theories and the films on which they 
bear) can or should be approached in terms of philosophy at all.22 The 
specific terms of Bordwell’s critique foreground the difficulty of responding to 
the Cinema books in terms adequate to the demands of the intellectual and 
critical traditions of both philosophy and cinema studies. Bordwell 
characterises the philosophical framework he sees Deleuze as imposing as 
implicitly Hegelian (by which he largely means ‘teleological in orientation’,) 
which will immediately strike anyone familiar with the Deleuzian philosophy as 
somewhat surprising (at least without some very careful and nuanced 
supporting argument – which Bordwell does not provide.)  
Bordwell is one of the most significant figures in anglophone cinema 
studies, and although hostile to what he calls “grand theory” as a framework 
for approaching cinema,23 is a wide-ranging and exacting thinker and writer 
on the formal, industrial and theoretical dynamics of the cinema and its 
histories. As such, his failure to support his assertion of Deleuze’s 
Hegelianism in terms that might satisfy (if not necessarily convince) a reader 
grounded in Deleuzian philosophy seems to me less a reflection of a lack of 
rigour on his part than it is of the difficulty of dealing with a work (the Cinema 
                                                
21 David Bordwell, On the History of Film Style (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard UP, 
1997), 116–17. 
22 Indeed, a similar criticism can be made in reverse with regard to the relevance of the cinema as a 
means of exploring philosophical problems. In particular, Deleuze’s assertion that the history of the 
cinema in some sense repeats or recapitulates the history of philosophy risks seeming no less arbitrary 
an imposition in the absence of an account of how and why this parallel is either justified or required, or 
indeed what is meant by ‘history’ in this context – an issue that, as we shall see, has a particular 
resonance with the project of the Cinema books. 
23 See, for example, David Bordwell, "Lowering the Stakes: Prospects for a Historical Poetics of 
Cinema," Iris 1, no. 1 (1983): 5–18. 
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books) that refuses to distinguish between cinema and philosophy. Any 
response from a position rooted within only one of those two research 
traditions runs the risk of missing, misreading or misplacing the goal or the 
context of the arguments therein or, more dangerously, the problems to which 
those arguments respond to or are grounded in. To read the Cinema books as 
if they were about either cinema or philosophy is to miss the point entirely.  
It seems worth noting that even if Bordwell’s use of the adjective 
‘Hegelian’ can be seen as problematic, this does not mean that his 
overarching criticism – that Deleuze ‘imports’ a conceptual framework external 
to the cinema to the analysis of it – can therefore be dismissed out of hand. A 
more adequate response to Bordwell’s critique (and to the wider question of 
why the cinema can or should be approached in terms of philosophy) and to 
its philosophical counterpart (why and how the problems of philosophy should 
be approached by means of the cinema), would be to demonstrate how and 
why the philosophical problems Deleuze responds to by means of the cinema 
are internal to the cinema itself. This, of course, goes to the very heart of the 
problem the Cinema books pose to their reader, no matter their intellectual 
and aesthetic commitments. It is not only that the simultaneous depth of 
cinematic and philosophical erudition that Deleuze demands of his reader has 
been such that few have been either equipped or willing to engage fully with 
both aspects, as Rodowick points out.24 Rather, it is that the Cinema books 
are premised on the principle not only that the cinema ‘thinks’ in its own right, 
but that that thought bears directly on philosophy – and that the basis on 
                                                
24 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, ix–x. 
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which that ‘principle’ is asserted remains obscure within the books 
themselves.  
The barriers to engagement that Rodowick describes with such clarity 
have, it must be said, lowered somewhat in recent years, and the reach of the 
Cinema books’ impact and influence has in consequence expanded 
considerably. The continuity and consistency of the Cinema books with 
Deleuze’s other work have been skilfully unpacked in the intervening period 
(not least by Rodowick himself) and as Robert Sinnerbrink has argued, 
Deleuze’s work on cinema has been a significant contributor to the 
emergence of ‘film-philosophy’ as an area of research in the anglophone 
world.25 Within the field of cinema studies, the question of how, or indeed 
why, Deleuze’s work could or should be brought to bear on research problems 
generated from within that field at all has been a contested issue. Even here, 
however, we can note that the reconsideration of Bazin’s critical fortunes after 
their nadir in the 1970s and 80s (driven in part by the work of Daney and 
reinforced within the Anglophone world by the efforts of Andrew) has at least 
to some extent been propelled by Deleuze’s treatment of Bazin’s work and 
ideas in the Cinema books.26 Nevertheless, even if the conjunction of cinema 
                                                
25 Robert Sinnerbrink, New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images (London & New York: Continuum, 
2011), 4. Sinnerbrink identifies Deleuze and Stanley Cavell (their very different philosophical contexts 
notwithstanding) as the “founding figures” of this area. Along with the work of Sinnerbrink himself, we 
might point to Daniel Frampton’s book Filmosophy and the journal Film-Philosophy (along with its 
eponymous conference) as markers for this ‘emergence’ in the English speaking world. Filmosophy 
(London & New York: Wallflower Press, 2006).  
It should be noted that this interest is, at least in part, a belated response to a long-standing French 
tradition of treating the cinema as a legitimate sphere of philosophical interest and engagement, of 
which Deleuze’s work is only one instance. To point to some recent significant expressions of this 
tradition now available in English, both Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière have published collections 
of essays on the cinema in the context of their respective philosophical interests. Alain Badiou, Cinema, 
trans. Susan Spitzer (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Jacques Rancière, Film Fables, trans. Emiliano Battista 
(Oxford & New York: Berg, 2006).  
26 As evidence for Deleuze’s role in this revival we can note, for example, that the index of names in 
2011’s Opening Bazin lists no fewer than eighteen references to Deleuze therein – the second highest, 
on equal footing with Orson Welles and beaten only by references to Jean Renoir with twenty-five. 
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and philosophy found in the Cinema books appears less anomalous now than 
it once did, the specific basis on which Deleuze himself constructs this 
conjunction constitutes no less of a problem now than before.  
The difficulty of identifying and specifying this basis is, I think (and 
perhaps inevitably), rooted in difference itself as the very ground of Deleuzian 
philosophy, and the corresponding critique of representation and identity that 
accompanies it. This difficulty manifests itself on multiple levels. To begin 
with, there is a general methodological problem that faces anyone wishing to 
write about, on or with Deleuze and Deleuzian concepts. The primacy of 
difference for Deleuze means that his own philosophical practice cannot 
simply describe, analyse or discuss difference, since to do so would in various 
ways be to seek to represent it, to treat it as something identical to itself and 
so not difference at all. Rather, his philosophical practice must differ from itself 
if it is to engage with difference as difference: it offers, as Bellour says, a 
“heterogenesis” whose consistency lies in its difference from itself.27  
Insofar as difference grounds all that he writes, Deleuze is the most 
systematic and consistent of philosophers, but that system is fundamentally 
disjunctive insofar as each ‘moment’ or ‘event’ within it is one of creation, 
given as the variation of the system itself. In short, as Daniel W Smith says, 
“there is a becoming of concepts not only within Deleuze’s corpus, but in each 
book and in each concept, which is extended to and draws from the history of 
                                                                                                                                      
Moreover, both Welles and Renoir are of key cinematic reference points for Bazin’s own writing, in a 
way Deleuze is not and could not be. Andrew and Joubert-Laurencin, Opening Bazin, 339–44. Such 
metrics are a blunt tool at best, but they at the very least support Elsaesser’s contention that Deleuze’s 
work on cinema warrants the description of him as one of Bazin’s key ‘successors.’ Thomas Elsaesser, 
"A Bazinian Half-Century," in Opening Bazin, ed. Dudley Andrew and Hervé Joubert-Laurencin (Oxford 
& New York: Oxford UP, 2011), 5.  
27 Bellour, "Thinking, Recounting," 70. 
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philosophy, and is repeated in each act of reading”.28 Attempting to identify or 
specify what Deleuze is doing at any given point (say, in the Cinema books) is 
thus always problematic, not only because it always slips from our grasp, but 
also because doing so risks falling into the trap of representation (“Deleuze 
says … “, “Deleuze means … ”) and so missing the point.  
One response to this in the secondary literature has been to claim that 
one’s commentary marks an ‘appropriation’ of or ‘deviation’ from Deleuze’s 
work and ideas, rather than a representation or critique of them – to be 
consistent with and to Deleuze by differing from him.29 Deleuze himself 
encourages us to treat a theory “exactly like a box of tools”,30 to take what is 
useful from it in relation to one’s own frame of reference and do something 
with it, rather than seek to fix or pin down what it ‘means’. Both of these paths 
have produced valuable insights into, and uses of, Deleuzian philosophy. 
However, they are limited in their capacity to investigate and respond to the 
coherence and consistency of that philosophy.  
As Alain Badiou has noted, Deleuze’s commitment to difference as the 
univocity of being is such that it appears throughout his work repeatedly in 
different guises and via different terminology.31 Badiou emphasises this 
repetition as part of his interpretation of Deleuze as a philosopher of the One, 
but in doing so he suppresses difference itself as the single voice in which 
                                                
28 Daniel W Smith, Essays on Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2012), 124–25. 
29 Massumi is often cited in justifying this kind of approach to the use or interpretation of Deleuze’s work. 
See, for example, "Translator's Foreword: The Pleasures of Philosophy," in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis & London: U of Minnesota P, 1987); Brian Massumi, A 
User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari (Massachusetts: 
MIT P, 1992).  
30 Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, "Intellectuals and Power," in Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, ed. D F Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), 208. 
31 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis & London: U of 
Minnesota P, 2000), 15. 
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being speaks, and so distorts the consistency of Deleuzian philosophy 
(egregiously, to my mind), rather than seeking to understand it in its own 
terms: the univocity of being is given not as unity, as Badiou would have it, but 
as multiplicity.32 What is needed instead is an approach that recognises the 
repetition Badiou identifies, but this time as an expression of difference as the 
ground of the coherence and consistency of Deleuzian philosophy.  
Deleuze offers us a path to fulfilling this demand insofar as he 
characterises the specificity of any given ‘thing’ in terms of the difference of 
the thing itself. The specificity of the colour red, for example, lies not in its 
difference from green or blue or even of all the ‘other’ shades of red, but in its 
‘participation’ in the differing from itself of ‘pure white light’ (which ‘contains’ all 
the colours as nuances of that difference).33 The consistency of Deleuzian 
philosophy – the repetition of the ‘same’ concept under different names 
(movement, duration and difference for example) – is thus given in the 
specificity of each ‘name’ as a nuance or differing from itself of that concept, 
such that they are vitally connected without being interchangeable.  
One path to grasping that nuance, that specificity, is to examine the 
relation between the variations of the concept as it appears throughout the 
Deleuzian corpus in order to grasp the specificity of the task or problem to 
which that nuance responds. In more straightforward terms, if you want to 
                                                
32 As Jon Roffe points out in his excellent critique of Badiou’s treatment of Deleuze, “In Badiou’s account 
of Deleuze’s ontology, the word multiplicity only ever appears in places where it is clearly 
interchangeable with the word multiple … which erases, at the level of terminology, a decisive 
Deleuzean theme”. Badiou's Deleuze (Durham: Acumen, 2012), 9. Emphasis in original. 
33 Gilles Deleuze, "Bergson's Conception of Difference," in The New Bergson, ed. John Mullarkey 
(Manchester & New York: Manchester UP, 1999), 54. He ‘repeats’ this argument in a different context 
and in slightly different terms some years later, in Difference and Repetition: “The Idea of colour, for 
example, is like white light which perplicates in itself the genetic elements and relations of all the 
colours, but is actualised in the diverse colours with their respective spaces”. Difference and Repetition, 
trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 206. 
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work out what Deleuze is doing at any given point and why, you need to 
locate the ‘moment’ you are examining in the context of its difference from 
related concepts, problems or arguments that appear throughout his work. In 
relation to the task at hand, this suggests that to identify the problems that 
drive the argument of the Cinema books is to identify the specificity or nuance 
of difference that they unfold, and to do so in relation to the difference that 
grounds the consistency of Deleuzian philosophy.  
The necessity of such an approach is only amplified if one accepts 
Michael Hardt’s argument that “Often, Deleuze’s arguments appear 
incomplete because he takes for granted and fails to repeat the results of his 
previous research”,34 thus obscuring the problem or concept each work in turn 
responds to and differs from. Reading Deleuze in the manner I have outlined 
requires that we look for our cues and clues in the relationship between texts 
– what might, in traditional terms, be called a hermeneutic methodology. If 
such an approach can usefully be brought to bear on Deleuze, it is because 
the repetition of a concept or problem across texts marks the differing of that 
concept or problem, and in that differing lies the specificity of the instance 
under examination. Such an approach is not merely a case of attempting to 
define and restate what Deleuze already says – in this case, the arguments 
presented in the Cinema books. To prefigure arguments made in the body of 
this thesis regarding Deleuze’s own philosophical practice, this approach can 
rather be conceived of as kind of montage – a cutting up and reordering of 
and relations between texts in order to enter into the movement of the Cinema 
books by counter-actualising the event of thought actualised within them.  
                                                
34 Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 
1993), xix. 
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1.2 The Monotony of Difference 
Given the demands that I have argued the Cinema books place on their 
reader, I cannot help but be aware of the hubris implicit in the undertaking of 
this project. Although I love the cinema and know its history, I do not count 
myself a cinephile and most certainly not one on the scale of someone like 
Deleuze. My academic specialisation is the history of film theory, not 
philosophy, and in the best light I might be regarded as an informed outsider 
with regard to the field of Deleuze studies − although certainly better informed 
at the end of this thesis than at its beginning. But there are, I hope, some 
advantages to such a position, at least in the sense that it allows me to offer a 
pair of fresh eyes to the question of the relation of the Cinema books to 
Deleuze’s philosophical œuvre.  
It must be said that there is a great deal that might have been addressed 
in this thesis that is not. The usual caveats as to the shortness of time, space 
and life apply, of course, but it should also be noted that a great deal has 
already been said about the Cinema books. I have tried to avoid repeating 
analyses already done better elsewhere, except where they might be brought 
to a new conclusion. For reasons we will see in a moment, the focus of my 
argument is on the terms of the break or gap between the two Cinema books, 
and on the relation this break constructs between the different images of 
thought proper to each of them. It is that relation, and not the details of 
Deleuze’s taxonomy of the classical and modern cinemas and their films, that 
interests me here. As such, the specifics of Deleuze’s arguments regarding 
the classical and modern cinemas individually play little part in my discussion, 
except where they bear on this break and relation. And although my analysis 
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of this break offers a foundation for understanding the Nietzschean powers of 
the false that Deleuze attributes to the modern cinema, those powers 
themselves are mentioned largely in passing. The taxonomy of the time-
image is barely touched on and Deleuze’s analyses of the modern cinema in 
Cinema 2 are not discussed at all, except where they bear directly on the 
break between Cinema 1 and 2.  
Perhaps most striking of all for a thesis on a work titled Cinema, the 
discussion of films and their interpretation plays virtually no part in it. Although 
my own intellectual background and the origins of my interest in the Cinema 
books are rooted in the traditions of cinema studies rather than philosophy, it 
is one of the underlying contentions of this thesis that Deleuze’s engagement 
with and relevance to cinema studies can only be adequately grasped in 
terms and by means of an understanding of the philosophical problems that 
drive Deleuze to the cinema. That is, although Deleuze himself thinks with 
and through the cinema and a vast proliferation of examples thereof, I aim to 
understand the philosophical terms on which this cinema-thought takes place 
and can be understood. It is therefore these problems, and in particular their 
roots in the very ground of Deleuze’s philosophical project, that are the focus 
of this thesis. Any exploration of what one might say about specific films on 
that basis is a task for another time. It is, however, my hope that unpacking 
these problems may help lay out the terms in which the relation between 
cinema and philosophy Deleuze constructs might be brought to bear 
productively on the research problems and traditions of both. 
How then can we begin to approach the specificity of the philosophical 
problems that drive Deleuze to the cinema? Bellour makes the observation 
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that the Cinema books stand out as something distinct within the Deleuzian 
œuvre, singular or perhaps even unique, insofar as they concern themselves 
with a single art form in its entirety – the cinema as such, and as a whole.35 
Where other of Deleuze’s works turn on encounters with specific authors or 
artists,36 or entrain congeries of the most diverse artistic and scientific 
materials as grasped by and for philosophy,37 the Cinema books summon all 
of a single art form. They do so not in order to produce a philosophy of it (an 
idea Deleuze regards as plainly “stupid”38), but to discover what cinema can 
enable philosophy to think for itself that it otherwise could not. “I was able to 
write about cinema”, he says, “not because of some right of consideration, but 
because philosophical problems compelled me to look for answers in the 
cinema”.39  
Now this statement tells us very clearly that if we wish to understand the 
Cinema books and what is at stake in them for Deleuze, we must read them 
as philosophy and specifically in the context of Deleuze’s own philosophical 
history. The necessity of such an approach is implicit in Hardt’s observation 
that each new work by Deleuze tends to assume its predecessors as a given. 
As such, Deleuze’s reasoning at any given moment can remain obscure if the 
reader is not familiar enough with its antecedents to place both the terms of 
an argument, and the problems it responds to, in the context of his work as a 
                                                
35 Bellour, "Thinking, Recounting," 57. 
36 Hume, Spinoza, Kafka, or Bacon, and so on. 
37 Difference and Repetition, The Logic of Sense, the work with Félix Guattari. 
38 Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen," 366. 
39 Ibid., 367. 
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whole.40 Immediately, however, we find a curious tension at play: the Cinema 
books as a ‘unique’ and ‘singular’ event within Deleuze’s career, which are 
nevertheless inextricably a part of that career, continuous with it and 
inexplicable outside of it.  
The two poles of this tension (the unique and the continuous) might be 
read as an echo of Badiou’s characterisation of Deleuze’s career as one 
devoted to the monotony of the singular, in which Deleuze’s account of 
universal creation as univocal difference gives rise to:  
conceptual productions that I would unhesitatingly 
characterise as monotonous, composing a very particular 
regime of emphasis or almost infinite repetition of a limited 
repertoire of concepts, as well as a virtuosic variation of 
names, under which that which is thought remains 
essentially identical.41 
In this vein we could say that Deleuze’s thought is devoted to accounting for 
the unique and the singular, in each and every case, in terms of a single and 
singular thought: that of being which is everywhere and always given in the 
same way and in the same sense, as difference that differs from itself. 
Hallward points us in a similar direction when he notes that “the real challenge 
in writing about Deleuze’s philosophy lies not in the remarkable diversity of 
materials that he considers but in the monotony of the underlying logic he 
invokes to understand them.”42 In other words, all of Deleuze’s writing, all of 
                                                
40 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, xix. As Rodowick points out, this “obscurity” 
is perhaps exacerbated in the case of the Cinema books – readers drawn to them by an interest in 
cinema may lack the requisite expertise not only in Deleuze, but in philosophy as such, while those 
drawn by Deleuze and an interest in philosophy may find their knowledge of film and film history lacking. 
Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, x-xi. 
41 Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, 15. 
42 Out of This World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation (London & New York: Verso, 2006), 2. 
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its dizzying proliferation of subjects and terminology and topics and fields of 
inquiry, unfolds from the single assertion that the difference of the unique 
subsists not in its difference from anything or everything else, but in the 
difference of being from itself first of all. In this sense, then, the uniqueness of 
the Cinema books does indeed demand to be grasped as a production, or 
indeed a repetition, of the very same univocal difference that animates all of 
Deleuze’s writing.  
The danger of such a formulation, however, is that left undeveloped it 
remains purely abstract and thus, in a properly Deleuzian sense, incapable of 
grasping the difference that the Cinema books repeat concretely and for itself. 
In other words, the concept of difference would remain transcendent to the 
differences collected under its name (i.e., to the cinema) and thought would 
consist of going “from the concept to the variety that it subsumes”,43 
recognising this or that difference as just another case of the concept. This is, 
of course, a model of thought Deleuze rejects: for him, thought is creation, not 
recognition.44 To put it more concretely and pragmatically, to say that the 
Cinema books are just another example of Deleuzian difference doesn’t tell us 
very much about them – it tells us nothing of the “nuance” Deleuze demands 
of a thought adequate to the concrete, the “how, how many, when and 
where”.45 The task at hand, then, is to account for the singularity of the 
Cinema books – their difference – in terms of the singular, monotonous 
                                                
43 Deleuze: The Clamour of Being, 14. This is precisely what a theory of cinema would do, and is why 
Deleuze has no interest in producing such a theory. 
44 The genuinely new – creation − is of necessity unrecognisable, since it has no model that could 
precede it in our understanding. Thus “things and people are always forced to conceal themselves, have 
to conceal themselves when they begin. What else could they do? They come into being within a set 
that no longer includes them”. Deleuze, Cinema 1, 2–3. 
45 Bergsonism, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 44–5. 
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thought that animates them: breathes life into them, causes them to move of 
their own accord.  
The two poles of this task unfold from a single question: what use is 
cinema to Deleuze? At one end, this question seeks to account for the 
singularity Bellour finds in the Cinema books (what is it about cinema that 
makes Deleuze want to write about it, in a way that is different from all his 
other works?) At the other, it looks towards the monotony of thought Badiou 
finds in Deleuze (how do the Cinema books fit with, develop, draw on, 
assume, repeat the thought of his other work?) Asked “When did you begin to 
love cinema and when did you begin to consider it a domain worthy of 
philosophy?” Deleuze responds that he was “compelled” to look to cinema for 
answers to philosophical problems.46 He is interested in cinema because it is 
able to give philosophy something strictly philosophical that philosophy 
nevertheless lacks. In particular, it is movement that crosses or is given back 
and forth in the movement between philosophy and cinema, and which draws 
him to the latter:  
I liked those authors who demanded that we introduce 
movement to thought, ‘real’ movement (they denounced the 
Hegelian dialectic as abstract movement). How could I not 
discover the cinema, which introduces ‘real’ movement into 
the image?47 
In the first sentence of this quote, we find, ab ovo, all of Deleuze’s philosophy 
and all that it flees. We will have cause to expand on the themes embedded in 
                                                
46 This question and his answer to it take place in the context of a series of ‘conversations’ with Cahiers 
du cinéma, which were published after being edited and synthesised by Deleuze himself. My citations 
are from the version published in Flaxman’s anthology The Brain is the Screen, which takes its own title 
from that of the essay in question. "The Brain is the Screen," 365–6. 
47 Ibid., 366. 
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it in this thesis, but in their compacted form, they are as follows. On the one 
hand, there is the positive assertion of the primacy of the being of becoming 
as the founding principle of Deleuzian philosophy: the difference from itself of 
being is real movement. On the other, there is its critical moment, figured by 
Hegel as the most extreme version of philosophies of identity and 
representation – those that begin with being and only then seek to account for 
its becoming (which gives only an abstract movement). Finally, and most 
important of all, there is the positing of a thought for which real movement will 
always be a demand and not a right, such that its proper task is always and 
only to become adequate to such movement, that is to say, to difference as 
such or, as Peter Hallward puts it, to creation: “The main task facing a 
creature capable of thought is to learn how to think”48. To become adequate 
to movement, then, is to escape the lures of representation and identity, to 
wrest oneself free of abstraction in the struggle to think movement as differing 
difference. Hence the dramatic nature of so much of Deleuze’s philosophy: in 
each of its endless proliferation of cases, it is a story of the struggle of thought 
to think. 
 Thus, in his second sentence, Deleuze tells us it is cinema’s capacity 
for real movement that draws him to it. It is not, however, that cinema makes 
thought adequate to such movement in and of itself. He goes on to say 
Something bizarre about the cinema struck me: its 
unexpected ability to show not only behaviour, but spiritual 
life as well … Cinema not only puts movement in the image, 
it also puts movement in the mind. Spiritual life is the 
                                                
48 Hallward, Out of This World, 2. It is worth noting that, as we shall see, although I agree with many of 
the premises of Hallward’s reading of Deleuze, I do not agree with his conclusion – specifically, I do not 
agree that Deleuzian philosophy offers nothing to the human or to properly human concerns. 
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movement of the mind. One naturally goes from philosophy 
to cinema, but also from cinema to philosophy.49 
Immediately, the story is more complex: to put movement into the image is 
merely to show behaviour, but cinema also puts movement into the mind, into 
thought – it shows us the movement of the mind or “spiritual life”. Cinema is 
not simply thought, but shows us thought thinking, presents it to us directly. 
This, it seems to me, would be the special virtue of the cinema for Deleuze. 
Philosophy, surely, can think for itself and may put these thoughts into words, 
but it cannot show us thought in its struggle to think. Cinema, then, does not 
merely think, but presents us with the dramatisation of thought’s struggle to 
become adequate to becoming, to real movement: the drama of the struggle 
to construct concepts or ideas adequate to the being of becoming. As 
Deleuze says elsewhere, it is through “dramatisation [that] the Idea is 
incarnated or actualised”.50 This, then, is the proposition of the Cinema books: 
cinema as the dramatisation of philosophy itself. 
Indeed, this is precisely Bellour’s answer to the problem posed by the 
uniqueness of the Cinema books: “why the cinema, why the cinema at that 
point? Quite simply so that philosophy can thus itself write its novel.”51 And as 
he points out, this ‘dramatisation’ or ‘novelisation’ of philosophy is prefigured 
long before the Cinema books, in Difference and Repetition52, where Deleuze 
argues that:  
                                                
49 Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen," 366. 
50 "The Method of Dramatization," in Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953−1974, ed. David Lapoujade 
(Los Angeles & New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 94. 
51 Bellour, "Thinking, Recounting," 64. 
52 Ibid., 72. 
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A book of philosophy should be in part a very particular 
species of detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction … 
The search for new means of philosophical expression was 
begun by Nietzsche and must be pursued today in relation to 
the renewal of certain other arts, such as the theatre or the 
cinema.53 
What Bellour does not add is that Deleuze then goes on to say: “It seems to 
us that the history of philosophy should play a role roughly analogous to that 
of collage in painting”.54 Christian Kerslake draws our attention to the preface 
of the English edition of Cinema 2, where Deleuze “claims that cinema is a 
repetition, in speeded-up form, of an experience that has already occurred in 
the history of philosophy”.55 The Cinema books, then, offer us the history of 
philosophy not as “collage”, but as montage: the gap or interval between the 
two volumes, the classical and the modern cinemas, the pre and post-war 
periods as a cutting together or splicing apart to create the film of the history 
of philosophy. 
 We can be more precise. The ‘experience’ that has already occurred in 
the history of philosophy that is repeated in the history of the cinema is what 
Deleuze calls the “great Kantian reversal” of the subordination of time to 
movement. Here  
time ceases to be the measurement of normal movement … 
[and] increasingly appears for itself and creates paradoxical 
movements. Time is out of joint: Hamlet’s words signify that 
                                                
53 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, xx-xxi. 
54 Ibid., xxi. 
55 Christian Kerslake, "Transcendental Cinema: Deleuze, Time and Modernity," Radical Philosophy 130 
(2005): 7. 
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time is no longer subordinated to movement, but rather 
movement to time.56 
In the Cinema books, this reversal takes place as or in the break between 
classical and modern cinema, between movement and time-image: in other 
words in the break or interval between two regimes of montage, the second of 
which reverses the subordination of time to movement characteristic of the 
first. But what this reversal reveals is thought’s confrontation with the 
impossibility of thought, of its ‘impower’, “this powerlessness at the heart of 
thought”57 as Deleuze says. Thus the dramatisation of thought’s struggle to 
become adequate to movement, the dramatisation of the history of philosophy 
itself, is not one thought’s ascension to power or mastery, but thought’s 
confrontation with its own impossibility.  
 The pivot of this drama is the demand for the introduction of real 
movement into thought. Inasmuch as it is a demand, and not something 
thought possesses by right, it is driven by the failure, the inadequacy, of 
thought itself. Thought that retains a merely abstract conception of movement 
– thought that subordinates time to movement – is, to invert Hallward’s 
formulation, the thought of a creature that has not yet learnt to think. Yet to 
accede to this demand, to introduce into thought a movement now 
subordinated to time – what we see in the time-image of Cinema 2 – is to 
cause it to suffer the disordering, destabilising, decentring powers of time “out 
of joint.” A thought that truly thinks, it seems, is a thought for which thought is 
no longer a power that it holds, but powerlessness that it suffers. Thus the 
                                                
56 Deleuze, Cinema 2, xi. 
57 Ibid., 166. 
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appearance of “the Mummy” in Cinema 2, “this dismantled, paralysed, 
petrified, frozen instance which testifies to “the impossibility of thinking that is 
thought”.58 Thought, then, either fails to think, or else can think only and 
always its own failure.  
But what is it that thinks, and thus fails to think, in one of these two 
ways? The human being, whose task it is to ‘learn how to think’. And what is it 
that human being fails to think, in one of these two ways? Being as such, 
being as difference that differs from itself. Thought that insists on the 
subordination of time to movement is a thought tied ultimately to a static 
conception of being, which moves only on the impulsion of an abstract 
movement imposed from without (the becoming of being, whose most 
extreme avatar is Hegel’s dialectic). But a thought that introduces real 
movement, the movement that is the being of becoming, is a thought that 
suffers its own impossibility. If, as Badiou says, the Cinema books sing 
Deleuze’s monotonous refrain of univocal being, it is because they do indeed 
return us to his single and singular thought of being as self-differing 
difference. The singular nature that Bellour finds in them, their nuance and 
concreteness, lies in their dramatisation not merely of thought, but of thought 
understood in terms of human being’s confrontation with being.  
This, in a sense, is the essential theme of all ontological speculation, 
insofar as ontology is, and can only be, a problem posed to and of being by 
beings, and from within being, by human beings themselves (there is no one 
else to ask the question and nowhere else to ask it from).59 In contrast, the 
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59 It is a fairly common convention to capitalise ‘Being’ when using it in its ontological sense, in contrast 
to the lower case ‘being’, used to refer to a particular being or beings. This usage tends to imply a 
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specificity of Deleuze’s formulation of the ontological question lies in his 
positing of a being that is univocal, such that beings, and thus human beings, 
are given in the same terms as being itself and not transcended by it. 
Transcendence only appears to or in thought to the extent that movement 
remains abstract and thus separated arbitrarily from being. When real 
movement is introduced into thought, being appears in and as that movement 
(that is to say, as real difference): thought becomes adequate to movement at 
the moment it places itself within that movement, when it thinks with or in 
movement rather than of it. What the cinema gives us, what it thinks and 
shows us, then, is, as Deleuze says, the relationship between man and the 
world. This is ‘the thought of the world’, understood as the problem of 
thought’s thinking of being, and its struggle to become adequate to being. 
What I hope to demonstrate in this thesis is that it is this struggle that lies at 
the heart of the philosophical problems Deleuze turns to the cinema to solve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
transcendent conception of being, inasmuch as the necessity of distinguishing between the two 
suggests that being is of a different order to beings. In keeping with Deleuze’s univocal conception of 
being (in which being and beings are necessarily of the same order), I do not follow this convention in 
this thesis, relying rather on context to provide the reader with the relevant sense in which ‘being’ is 
being used. I apply the same principle to cognate terms such as ‘the open’ or ‘the whole.’ 
 2. The Interval as Disaster 
2.1 Terminus, or, Waiting for a Train 
“my waiting, whatever it be, expresses duration as mental, spiritual reality.”60 
 
If the path to unfolding the problem that drives this thesis lies in the 
examination of the relation between texts, then the proposition of this opening 
chapter is that the starting point for this hermeneutic investigation lies in the 
relation between the two volumes of the Cinema books themselves. In 
particular, it lies in the relation between the movement and time-images that 
dominate the first and second volume respectively. This relation is far murkier 
than it might at first seem, and constitutes in itself a significant interpretative 
problem for their reader. It is this interpretative problem and the terms in 
which it is to be resolved that marks the path this thesis will follow in order to 
show how, and why, the cinema offers Deleuze the means to resolve a strictly 
philosophical problem. 
We can start this investigation with a fable of origin: that of the cinema 
itself. Here, then, at the beginning, we are waiting. We stand patiently on the 
railway platform at Ciotat, at the railway terminus, waiting for the train to 
arrive. We sit patiently in the audience at the Grand Café in Paris, 1895, 
waiting for the cinema to arrive, tired, bored, restless, fidgeting, waiting for 
something to happen.61 Now, a waiting whose object can be determined and 
                                                
60 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 9. 
61 The reference here is to stories surrounding the first public appearance of Auguste Lumière and Louis 
Lumière’s cinematograph, and the audience reaction to the films screened at that event – in particular, 
the film known as “Arrival of a Train.” It is a fable partly because stories of origin are always an 
oversimplification: in this case, not only are there a range of proto-cinematic technologies that predate 
and map a path towards the Lumière brothers’ ‘invention’, but as John L Fell points out, there are a 
range of competing claims for different kinds of ‘firstness’ with regard to motion picture technology from 
Germany, England, the United States and within France itself. Film before Griffith (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: U of California P, 1983), 9. But it is also a fable because the events recounted with 
respect to that event have less to do with actual historical details than they do with the mythologies 
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met, that is, a waiting for something that will arrive (a train, perhaps) is no 
more than a pause or delay in a system of action and reaction. To this extent, 
this waiting might be understood in terms of the sensory-motor schemata that 
Deleuze describes as characteristic of the movement-image. Its figure would 
be that of a railway timetable, measuring only the time it takes until the next 
train will arrive, constituting or reconstituting time and this time of waiting 
simply as a function of movement (the regular and regulated movement of 
trains between stations).62 Inherent in this waiting, however, is the possibility 
that its object can always not arrive − not only that the train may not arrive on 
time, but that it will never make it to the station. Thus waiting as pause or 
delay finds itself inhabited, haunted by another potentially unlimited or 
interminable waiting which has lost its object, which corresponds to no 
timetable and whose only figure would be that of time itself. Here, in this 
interminable waiting we find ourselves closer to something like the time-image 
Deleuze describes in Cinema 2. Implicit in such a formulation (of a sensory-
motor waiting inhabited by the possibility of an interminable or unlimited 
waiting) is the conclusion that, despite Deleuze’s presentation of a movement-
image which is succeeded more or less historically by the time-image after the 
Second World War, this time-image is present in some sense at the very 
                                                                                                                                      
accreted around it. For example, as Martin Loiperdinger has demonstrated, although a film of a train 
arriving at a station may have been part of the evening’s program, there is good reason to doubt that 
L'Arrivée d’un Train à la Ciotat was actually part of the Grand Café screening at all, and that film most 
probably had its first screening in 1896. "Lumière's Arrival of the Train: Cinema's Founding Myth," The 
Moving Image 4, no. 1 (2004): 103. It seems likely that successive retellings of this myth of origin have 
collapsed a range of early experiences of the cinema into one conveniently packaged story. This does 
not, however, detract from its utility for my purposes.  
62 This correlation of time given as a function of movement, and the operational organisation of a railway 
timetable, should be taken concretely and literally. As Stephen Kern points out, the adoption of World 
Standard Time towards the end of the nineteenth century has as its direct antecedent the imposition of a 
uniform time by railroad companies in the United States and elsewhere seeking to rationalise and 
simplify their operations. The train, and its regular and regulated movement between stations, thus 
serve as a figure for technological modernity’s subordination of time to movement. The Culture of Time 
and Space: 1880-1918 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1983), 11–12.  
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earliest point of the cinema, waiting there at the very beginning, inhabiting the 
movement-image, tracing within it the echo of what Deleuze describes as 
“that Proustian dimension where people and things occupy a place in time 
which is incommensurable with the one they have in space”.63  
It seems useful, then, to take this moment of arrival (of the train at en 
gare de La Ciotat) and the mythology of origin that surrounds it as a place 
from which to begin to explore the ambiguous and ambivalent relations 
between the movement and time-images that Deleuze uses to divide the 
cinema into a ‘classic’ pre-war and a ‘modern’ post-war phase. To the extent 
that Deleuze uses this historical periodisation to mark the path of a 
development of the cinema (from the movement-image to the time-image) one 
might comfortably expect to assume that the early Lumière films, L'Arrivée 
d’un Train à la Ciotat (1896)64 among them, would present the characteristics 
Deleuze attributes to the cinema of the movement-image. This would seem at 
least to a certain extent to be true, both in terms of the internal relations of the 
elements of the image, and in terms of the relations of those images to the 
audience. The hustle and bustle of the train arriving, passengers getting on 
and off and milling around on the platform, would seem to meet the minimal 
criteria for a movement-image, inasmuch as it at least points towards a setting 
or situation which could form an element in a schema of action and reaction.  
Moreover, the film is clearly capable of engaging its audience in a 
sensory-motor situation. As Dai Vaughan recounts, in a “story so frequently 
repeated as to have assumed the status of folklore ... members of the first 
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64 Lumière, Auguste, and Louis Lumière. "L’arrivée D'un Train À La Ciotat." 50 Seconds. France, 1896. 
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audiences [of this film] dodged aside as [the] train steamed towards them into 
[the] station”.65 This response has little to do with any excess of naïveté or 
credulity on the part of this first audience. As Vaughan notes:  
We cannot seriously imagine that these educated people ... 
expected the train to emerge from the screen and run them 
down ... What this legend means is that the particular 
combination of visual signals present in that film had had no 
previous existence other than as signifying a real train pulling 
into a station.66  
In terms of Deleuze’s model, in the absence of any other context through 
which they might filter and suppress it, the habitual sensory-motor 
engagement that this image articulated for its first audiences outweighed any 
intellectual recognition that this was only an image of movement before them, 
and not the real movement of an actual train. And lest we fall into the 
temptation to separate the sophisticated viewing responses of contemporary 
audiences from the primitive responses of those first spectators, it’s worth 
noting that despite the knowledge that it is ‘only a movie’, the movement-
images that, as Deleuze points out, make up the bulk of contemporary 
cinema,67 are nonetheless still entirely capable of inducing today’s audiences 
to jump in their seats, shriek in horror or weep with sadness. To this extent at 
least, Arrival of a Train offers itself to be seen as a figure, even if a mythical 
one, for the origins of a cinema of sensory-motor engagement that is active 
even now.  
                                                
65 Dai Vaughan, "Let There Be Lumière," in Early Cinema: Space, Frame, Narration, ed. Thomas 
Elsaesser with Adam Barker (London: BFI, 1990), 63.  
66 Ibid. 
67 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 168. 
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Nonetheless, despite these potential reasons for assimilating this and 
perhaps the other early Lumière films to a cinema of the movement-image, 
there are certain issues which problematise the possibility of such an 
assimilation. Not the least of these is that Deleuze quite specifically rules out 
the early cinema from the constitution of a movement image, thereby 
excluding it from his theorisation of the cinema and effectively relegating it to 
the status of cinematic ‘pre-history’. Tom Gunning has pointed out that “The 
history of early cinema, like the history of cinema generally, has been written 
and theorised under the hegemony of narrative films”,68 to the extent that one 
of the major questions which is asked of these films is whether and to what 
extent they might be considered to constitute a minimal or originary form of 
cinematic narrative.  
Despite clearly discounting Christian Metz’s linguistically based account 
of cinematic narrative, Deleuze holds enough common ground with Metz to be 
able to follow him in noting that “The historical fact is that cinema was 
constituted as such by becoming narrative, by presenting a story, and by 
rejecting its other possible directions”.69 The cinema is constituted as cinema 
in becoming narrative; if films like Arrival of a Train belong to the pre-history of 
the cinema for Deleuze, this exclusion is tied to their inability to constitute a 
cinematic narrative. In order to grasp the significance of this for the position of 
the early or primitive cinema within Deleuze’s schema, however, we must first 
examine what narrative itself constitutes for Deleuze. 
                                                
68 Tom Gunning, "The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-Garde," in Early 
Cinema: Space, Frame, Narrative, ed. Thomas Elsaesser with Adam Barker (London: BFI, 1990), 56. 
69 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 25. 
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One of the noteworthy features of Deleuze’s history of the cinema (to the 
extent that it is such) is that it begins well after the ‘beginning’, with a 
discussion of the films of DW Griffith, circa 1915, and progresses, in Cinema 1 
at least, in a roughly chronological fashion from there, thereby largely eliding 
the early or primitive cinema from in his account. This is less a gap or 
omission than it is a logical consequence of the importance of montage and 
the use of the mobile camera in Deleuze’s theory of the movement-image, 
and of Griffith’s role in articulating these elements into a coherent model of 
cinematic narration. Deleuze quite specifically excludes the early cinema from 
the constitution of the movement-image, defining what he calls the “primitive 
state of the cinema” as one “where the image is in movement rather than 
being movement-image”, suggesting that the static unedited shot (like those 
of the Lumière films presented at the Grand Café) can at best contain the 
tendency or potential for “the mobilisation of the camera in space, or ... 
montage in time” which the movement-image requires.70 It thus can never 
articulate a movement-image as such. 
Now, although both montage and the mobile camera make their 
appearance some time after the Lumière films, their appearance in the 
cinema substantially predates their use by Griffith, as do more or less 
fragmentary attempts to use these techniques within the context of a filmic 
narration (Edwin S Porter is the name most likely to spring to mind in this 
context). Nonetheless, Griffith is generally credited with their integration into a 
systematic and unified mode of specifically cinematic narration, the so-called 
‘classic narrative’ form. Moreover, this form is, according to Deleuze, derived 
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directly from the organic composition of the different kinds of movement-
image through montage and “according to the laws of a sensory-motor 
schema”, a system of possible responses to perception which maintains a 
correspondence between the action received and the reaction generated in 
response to it.71  
If the French, German and particularly Soviet counterparts of Griffith that 
Deleuze discusses produce narrative forms that differ in various ways from 
the model that Griffith sets up, this is a consequence of the differing 
conceptions of the composition of movement-images articulated in their 
various models of montage.72 These offer us varying degrees of difference in 
styles of narrative while still remaining narrative as such. For example, 
Deleuze suggests that parallel alternating montage in Griffith articulates a set 
of differentiated parts unified only by their common membership of the same 
organic whole; “men and women, rich and poor, town and country, North and 
South, interiors and exteriors etc”.73 Eisenstein on the other hand offers a 
“montage of opposition”, through which rich and poor, for example, cannot be 
paralleled simply as separate elements of the same whole, but which are, 
rather, opposed to each other dialectically to produce a unity at a higher level 
of explanation, in a third shot. This higher level of explanation is, as Deleuze 
points out, that of social exploitation.74  
The differing conceptions and uses of montage that Griffith and 
Eisenstein present us with each produce a whole determined by a different 
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73 Ibid., 30. 
74 Ibid., 32–3. 
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sensory-motor schema, a different system of action and reaction, and hence a 
different model of narration. Thus Deleuze is able to note that, if Eisenstein 
condemns Griffith’s conception of the whole as “bourgeois”, this is not merely 
on the basis of Griffith’s “way of telling a story or of understanding History”75, 
but relates directly to Eisenstein’s own conception of montage (and note the 
implications of this statement: by the concept of montage Deleuze presents us 
with, it is not only story but also history that is secondary to montage, a 
product of it and not a given).  
For Deleuze, narrative thus “results from the sensory-motor schema, 
and not the other way round”,76 as the organisation of movement-images 
according to a sensory-motor schema (articulated in montage) which itself 
constitutes a whole which changes. This whole “isn’t any set of things but the 
ceaseless passage from one set to another, the transformation of one set of 
things into another”,77 as for example in the changing set of relations between 
objects in a single mobile shot, and more generally in the transformation in 
relations articulated between two fixed or mobile shots. To this extent the 
whole is not closed, but open, as the never-completed transition from one set 
to the next (and the next and the next ...) With each movement the whole 
changes qualitatively, and what this change expresses is time as duration. As 
such, Deleuze suggests that “it is montage itself which constitutes the whole, 
and thus gives us the image of time [and] is therefore the principal act of 
cinema”.78 
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We are now in a position to perhaps understand Deleuze’s comment 
that the cinema as such, the cinema as cinema, is constituted in becoming 
narrative. Narrative, understood as the organisation of movement-images 
(which are themselves formed at the level of the shot), according to a 
sensory-motor schema articulated at the level of montage, is thus constitutive 
of the changing whole which gives us the indirect image of time and which, as 
Deleuze says, is the “principal act of cinema”. The question is now, where 
does this leave the Lumières? Given that Arrival of a Train is made up of a 
single fixed shot, there is little possibility of it presenting a narrative in 
Deleuze’s sense, that is, as a sensory-motor schema articulated at the level of 
montage. Furthermore, for Deleuze, it cannot articulate a whole which 
changes, since in a single fixed shot, “the whole is identical to the set in 
depth”79, with the consequence that there can be no transformation in 
relations between the elements of the set or shot, so that the set remains 
closed and immutable. There can thus be movement within the image, but not 
a movement-image as such. 
On these grounds, one might reasonably follow Deleuze in taking the 
position that Arrival of a Train belongs more to the pre-history of the cinema 
than its history proper, a mere step in the development of the techniques 
which would allow it to display its true character in the presentation of a 
movement-image. There remains, however, the problem of that first audience, 
the one so engaged by the sensory-motor scheme presented in the image 
that its members jumped out of the way as the image of the train pulled into 
the image of the station. For a cinema of the movement-image, the sensory-
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motor schema is articulated at the level of montage, as the coordination of 
perception and action across the different sets or shots which ensures their 
coherence and rationality, and thereby maintains a unity across the totality of 
the transformations of the open whole. In the absence of montage, however, it 
becomes difficult to speak of a system of action and reaction, or a sensory-
motor scheme as such, since there is no whole to coordinate, no multiplicity of 
shots to articulate into a coherent totality.  
Thus in the case of Arrival of a Train, we might say that, rather than a 
system of action and reaction, we are offered an incident. The audience 
leaping out of the way of the moving image of the train clearly indicates a 
sensory-motor engagement, but it seems closer to the isolated movement of a 
reflex response than a participation in a coherent world presented in the 
relations between images, inasmuch as it does not extend itself beyond that 
initial shock. Equally, the represented action of the arrival of the train, 
passengers getting on and off etc, could certainly present itself as an element 
within a sensory-motor schema (one determined by a railway timetable, for 
instance). However, for this potential or tendency to become manifest in even 
a minimal sense requires either a second shot, of the train leaving the station 
for instance and thereby creating a montage of arrival and departure, or else 
the use of a mobile camera effecting a montage within the single shot by a 
continuous framing and reframing of the train as the camera follows it leaving 
the station.  
Of course, this means that the single fixed shots of the Lumière films 
always contain the potential for the production of a movement-image. All that 
is required to draw this potential out is the montage produced in the addition 
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of this second shot. As such, Deleuze argues that the movement-image was 
always present, even in the primitive cinema, as a potential as yet unable to 
express itself, a tendency or demand waiting to be filled. Thus he notes that:  
This movement [expressed by the mobile camera and/or 
montage] was already characteristic of the cinema, and 
demanded a kind of emancipation, incapable of being 
satisfied within the limits set by the primitive conditions – so 
that the so called primitive image, the image in movement, 
was defined less by its state than by its tendency.80  
Despite this tendency, however, it would seem overly hasty to then simply 
assimilate the early cinema to that of the movement-image that follows it. The 
tendency towards montage and the mobile camera nonetheless does not yet 
actually constitute either of them as such. As it stands, what we are offered in 
a film like Arrival of a Train would seem to present at best a fragment of a 
sensory-motor schema articulated in montage.  
Here some interesting possibilities begin to present themselves. 
Deleuze’s account of the transition from the cinema of the movement-image 
to that of the time-image begins precisely with the fragmentation and collapse 
of the unity of action and reaction presented in the sensory-motor schema. In 
this fragmentation, “perceptions and actions cease to be linked together, and 
spaces are now neither coordinated nor filled”.81 Montage no longer produces 
a continuity of world across and between shots, but produces aberrant 
movements articulating non-localisable relations, such that perceptions can 
no longer be extended into action. There is no longer a world to which 
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characters can respond, but only “pure optical and sound situations” to which 
there can be no response or reaction. As Deleuze says, “These [characters 
become] pure seers ... given over to something intolerable which is simply 
their everydayness itself”.82 If Arrival of a Train, as a single static shot, does 
not yet present us with a movement-image, does it, as a fragment of a 
sensory-motor schema, move towards the presentation of a time-image? It 
must be said straight off that a ‘fragment’ as such probably cannot be taken 
as being of the same order as a ‘fragmentation’. Fragmentation still presumes 
a system, albeit one whose connections are weakening or have fallen apart 
altogether. Even in a situation of total fragmentation, that fragmentation only 
has a sense to the extent that there are gaps between a number of fragments 
which are not crossed; that is to say, fragmentation presumes or is predicated 
on the interstice between fragments. Where the sensory-motor links 
presented in a film are weak or non-existent, and thus in the absence of a 
unifying system, the fragment each shot presents becomes incommensurable 
with the next and montage, rather than offering the open totality of the whole, 
produces the false continuities and aberrant movements which give rise to the 
time-image. It is in this sense that Deleuze notes that the time-image 
presupposes montage just as much as the movement-image.83  
It follows from this that an isolated fragment, a single-shot film like 
Arrival of a Train, cannot produce aberrant movement or false continuities as 
such. Nonetheless, the fragment of a sensory-motor schema that it presents 
is equally incapable of extending itself into the open totality of a whole. It 
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cannot yet extend itself into action, leaving it apparently in the realm of neither 
the time nor the movement-image. It is interesting to note in this context the 
responses of some of the early audiences to these films. Vaughan refers to 
Georges Sadoul’s Histoire Générale du Cinéma for the observation that: 
what most impressed the early audiences was what would 
now be considered the incidentals of scenes: smoke from a 
forge, steam from a locomotive, brick-dust from a 
demolished wall. Georges Méliès, a guest at the first Paris 
performance ... made particular mention of the rustling of 
leaves in the background [of a shot of the infant Lucie 
Lumière being fed her breakfast].84  
Siegfried Kracauer also makes a point of the enthusiasm with which “the 
ripple of leaves stirred by the wind” were received in discussion of the 
Lumières’ work.85 It seems to me that what is being identified in these 
instances are the elements of the image beginning to exist for themselves, 
rather than in relation to their place in a world of action and reaction; the 
steam from the train rather than the transport of passengers from one stop to 
the next, the brick dust from a fallen wall rather than the labour of the workers 
responsible for its demolition, the rustling of the leaves rather than the 
necessities of parenthood. Isolated from either a unified whole or a 
fragmented system articulated in montage, the partial elements of action 
within the single shot film begin to float aimlessly, are emptied out of purpose 
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or function and tend towards an existence for themselves outside of any 
system, irrespective of their tendency or potential to move towards such a 
system, fragmented or otherwise.  
It seems to me that in this situation we are presented with the limit case 
of what Deleuze refers to as a “pure optical situation”, an opsign, in which:  
the viewer’s problem becomes ‘What is there to see in the 
image?’ (and not now ‘What are we going to see in the next 
image?’) The situation no longer extends into action through 
the intermediary of affections. It is cut off from all its 
extensions, it is now important only for itself, having 
absorbed all its affective intensities, all its active 
extensions.86  
The opsign (and its aural correlate, the sonsign) are the genetic elements of 
the time-image; it is with their appearance in the films of the post-war period, 
particularly in Italian neo-realism, that Deleuze marks the beginning of the 
modern cinema and the appearance of the time-image. They mark the 
dispersion of the movement-image, the weakening of the links of action and 
reaction such that “objects and settings take on an autonomous, material 
reality which gives them an importance in themselves … [so that] the action 
floats in the situation, rather than bringing it to a conclusion or strengthening 
it”.87 As already noted, however, this weakening of links, and even their 
complete collapse, is nonetheless articulated in and through montage. It is 
through the false continuities and aberrant movements generated between 
opsigns and sonsigns that the cinema gives rise to the different varieties of 
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time-image. How then are we to understand the isolated opsign, the singular 
fragment that a film like Arrival of a Train seems to present us with? 
In his discussion of the appearance of the time-image in the cinema of 
the post-war period, Deleuze notes briefly and with little discussion that the 
time-image has always inhabited the cinema as a possibility or implicit 
presence, saying that: 
It took the modern cinema to re-read the whole of cinema as 
already made up of aberrant movements and false continuity 
shots. The direct time-image is the phantom which has 
always haunted the cinema, but it took modern cinema to 
give a body to this phantom.88  
If then, as we have noted, the fixed single shot films of which Arrival of a Train 
is representative contain at best the tendency or potential for the presentation 
of a movement-image, we must also say that, to the extent that they represent 
an isolated opsign, a fragment without a system to fragment, they also offer 
themselves as the genetic element of a direct time-image which was implicit in 
the cinema from and at the very beginning.89  
As a first approximation, then, we might say that the classic cinema, that of 
the movement-image, suppresses this implicit tendency by subsuming it to a 
system of action and reaction, a sensory-motor schema, without 
fundamentally altering this potential. When this system comes into question, 
when it begins to lose its capacity to maintain coherent relations between 
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images, to produce an organic unity, the time-image as fundamental 
possibility of the cinema begins to rise up from beneath the movement-images 
under which it has been buried and suppressed. This is the sense in which 
the time-image haunts the cinema like a phantom, as Deleuze says, in that it 
always remains implicit in any world or whole unified by a system of action 
and reaction, waiting to assert itself when that system begins to fragment. 
Thus the time-image is not opposed to the movement-image, but rather 
inhabits it, subsists within it.  
The multiplicity of waiting I described at the beginning of this section 
thus offers itself as a kind of model for the cinema itself. As we find ourselves 
back at the railway platform, still waiting for the Arrival of a Train, still waiting 
for the arrival of the cinema, we wait in a fashion that is of necessity 
indeterminate. Waiting for a train which will arrive, scheduled and coordinated 
to the system determined by its timetable, we engage in a sensory-motor 
waiting which participates in the schema of action and reaction aligned with 
the movement-image. We wait until our train arrives, on time or not, get on 
and travel to our destination, arriving either on schedule or at a time which is 
late or early only relative to that schedule.  
But as we wait and still the train does not appear, we begin to wonder, 
‘when will the train arrive?’ and sensory-motor connections begin to slacken 
and unravel, until finally we realise that our waiting will never be met by the 
arrival of any train, and that our waiting has become interminable. Thus the 
interminable, the non-figurative figure of the time-image, inhabits the limited 
and delimited waiting of the movement-image, subsists within it. Indeed, there 
is no way of knowing, no way of telling where one ends and the other begins, 
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since, just as the interminable has no end, no termination, no terminus which 
can be reached, it also has no point of departure.  
Even though the distinction between a train that will arrive and one that 
will not can be articulated as a binary opposition, the waiting proper to each 
forms part of a continuum which allows of analogue difference, but not digital 
distinction; there is no point at which one ends and the other begins. By the 
time one realises that one’s train is not simply late but is never going to arrive 
at all, one is already in the middle of the interminable waiting which is the 
virtual counterpart of the actual waiting measured on a railway timetable, 
without that waiting ever having begun.  
2.2 (Film) History as Montage 
Such an understanding certainly offers us a model for the mutual 
imbrication of the movement- and time-images apparent in the conditions of 
the early or primitive cinema that Deleuze largely excludes from his analysis. 
The danger with this approach, however, is that we may once again lose the 
specificity of each image; if we cannot mark the movement-image and the 
time-image as distinct from each other, how can we account for the distinctly 
different characteristics Deleuze attributes to each of them? Indeed, what is 
missing here is precisely the gap itself. Baldly put, the differences between 
the cinemas of the movement and time-image turn to a large degree on the 
role of montage in each or, more precisely, on the interval or gap which 
montage inserts between images as one which is either crossed (movement-
image) or not (time-image), rational or irrational, coherent or dispersive.  
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Indeed, the movement that Deleuze posits from movement-image to 
time-image is itself a form of montage; there is a cut, gap or interval between 
these two images conceptually, between the classical and modern cinemas 
historically, and between the two books physically and materially (in the 
separate volumes devoted to the movement-image and time-image 
respectively.) Thus Angelo Restivo points out that 
Gilles Deleuze’s work on the cinema is marked by a grand 
caesura, not only conceptually (movement-image giving way 
to time-image) and ‘historiographically’ (World War II as the 
name for the historical moment of this giving way), but also, 
even, materially.90  
This homology suggests that an adequate account of the relationship 
between the movement and the time-image requires a theory of the interval or 
gap not only as it applies to cinematic montage proper, but also in relation to 
the conceptual, historical and material ‘montage’ that the Cinema books 
themselves put into play (and ‘material’ must be understood with absolute 
literality as their physical separation into two volumes, Cinemas 1 and 2.) The 
terms in which Deleuze accounts for the transition from movement to time-
image in the cinema make it clear that the theory (or theories) of cinematic 
montage he presents are fundamentally intertwined with concrete material 
and historical formations, and cannot be understood in isolation from them. 
The cinema of the movement-image, for example, is characterised by a 
montage organised according to a sensory-motor schema, which ensures that 
relations between perception, action and reaction remain coherent; it posits a 
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world that we know how to respond to, in which we know true from false, and 
in which time moves in one direction only.  
It is in the collapse of this sensory-motor schema that the time-image 
begins to appear, following the Second World War. As Deleuze makes clear, 
however, this transition is not merely a matter of a change in the way films are 
edited before and after the war. Rather, the collapse of the sensory-motor 
schema as it expresses itself in cinematic montage is an expression of a 
world historical (as opposed to merely film historical) change in our relation to 
the material conditions of our existence. Thus:  
the post-war period has greatly increased the situations 
which we no longer know how to react to, in spaces we no 
longer know how to describe … what tends to collapse, or at 
least to lose its position, is the sensory-motor schema which 
constituted the action image of the old cinema.91  
Clearly the sensory-motor schema Deleuze refers to here is not simply a 
system for organising relations between the shots in a film: it describes a way 
of relating to and understanding the world we live in, one which begins to 
break down after the war and which finds one of its expressions in the 
cinema. More precisely, what is at stake in this transition from the pre to the 
post-war era is the status of the relations between the elements of the whole, 
and of the consequent nature of that whole itself. When Deleuze tells us that 
the cinema of the movement image expresses “the sensory-motor relationship 
between world and man, nature and thought”,92 he describes a world in which 
we know how to act, a world to which it is possible to respond, which we may 
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2. The Interval as Disaster / 47 
grasp in thought and master in action – “a sensory-motor unity of nature and 
man”.93 In the post-war cinema, however, we find no such unity; we are 
confronted precisely with a world, a whole, to which we do not and cannot 
know how to respond, which thought is powerless to master, and which 
reveals only the powerlessness of thought to think either itself or the whole: 
the whole as the outside.94 My point here is not the fairly self-evident one that 
the Cinema books aren't just about the cinema. It is rather that the theories of 
montage, of the interval or gap, that Deleuze presents in relation to the 
cinema must themselves be understood and accounted for not only in terms 
of the cinema, but also in terms of the “relation between man and the world, 
nature and thought” or, more precisely, in terms of the transformation of the 
whole and of this relation with the whole expressed within the conceptual, 
historical and material ‘montage’ that the Cinema books put into play. 
Furthermore, our account must be capable of sustaining both the specificity of 
the movement- and time-images (and therefore of the gap between them) and 
the necessity of their mutual imbrication, the spectral relationship in which the 
time-image haunts the movement-image “like a phantom”. 
Any analysis of the ‘historical’ face of the Cinema books, however, hits 
its first snag the moment it begins: the very first thing Deleuze tells us when 
we begin to read his two volumes on the cinema, in the preface to the French 
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edition, is that “This study is not a history of the cinema”.95 The force of the 
statement is clear; the stakes of this argument are not historical or at least not 
‘film-historical’. To attempt to read into the Cinema books any form of 
historical thesis is, it seems, to wilfully ignore the express intentions of their 
author. Despite this injunction, however, for many readers the temptation to 
understand the two books in precisely this manner, as a history, has been 
difficult to resist (at least partly for the very good reason that they look and 
read very much like a history). For example, András Bálint Kovács has argued 
that “owing to his theoretical starting point, as well as his analytic methods, 
Deleuze inevitably discusses his subject matter in historical, as well as 
taxonomic terms”,96 while for Jon Beasley-Murray, the Cinema books outline 
“a formal history of tendencies inherent in the very idea of cinema … a history 
of the cinematic image along the lines of a conception of ‘total cinema’ as 
overdetermining myth”.97 At the very least, it seems reasonable to argue that 
Deleuze's ‘discussion’ is historical in the sense that it posits a progression 
from a ‘classical’ period distinguished by the movement-images which 
characterise its films, to a ‘modern’ period in which a new kind of image 
presents itself (the time-image), and identifies the break between them with a 
precise historical moment (the Second World War).  
Certainly this progress gives Cinema 1 its structure. Deleuze begins with 
a presentation of the philosophical ground of the movement-image as a 
concept that is in a fundamental sense cinematic, and then proceeds to 
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articulate a taxonomy of images and signs produced by the cinema in a 
gradual ramification of the possibilities implicit within its fundamental character 
as movement-image.98 His exposition of this process begins more or less with 
Griffith in 1915, opening with a definition of montage as the composition of 
movement-images into an indirect image of time. Since, in Deleuze’s schema, 
different modes of composition form different kinds of indirect images, 
Deleuze contrasts Griffith’s use of montage (which Deleuze calls “organic”) 
with differing styles or practices of montage represented in various historically 
and geographically distinct ‘schools’ of montage: the Soviet school (dialectical 
composition); the pre-war French school (quantitative composition); and the 
German Expressionist school (intensive composition).99 Deleuze then begins 
the process of differentiating the movement-image into three component 
images: the perception-image, the affection-image and the action-image. He 
then divides these three images further according to a taxonomy derived from 
Charles Sanders Pierce’s model of semiotics. Here again, his exposition takes 
the form of an examination of specific “schools”, genres and filmmakers. As 
he progresses through his discussion of each image and its varieties in turn, 
he also progresses through the history of the cinema (albeit with a variety of 
loops and circles backwards), towards the final chapter in which the ‘classical’ 
period of film reaches its culmination and completion in the work of Alfred 
Hitchcock, who “accomplishes and brings to completion the whole of the 
cinema by pushing the movement-image to its limit”.100  
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However, this ‘completion’ is also a precursor of the crisis that marks the 
classical cinema’s break or transition to the modern period. Deleuze specifies 
the crisis or break in which these new images begin to arise not only 
historically, but also geographically: “The timing is something like: around 
1948, Italy; about 1958 France; about 1968, Germany”.101 In this sense, 
Deleuze’s typology of images in Cinema 1 presents itself indirectly as a kind 
of historical progression from 1915 to 1968, as if the history of the cinema 
were one of a progressive discovery or uncovering of the implicit capacities 
held in reserve by each variety of the movement-image, leading finally to the 
appearance or discovery of the time-image.  
This sense of historical progression in the books is so marked that 
Jaimey Fisher feels justified in describing it as “a teleological march through 
cinema”,102 a process of progressive mastery akin to those histories of 
science which present it as a timeline marked off at the appropriate points by 
the cumulative mastery of the laws of nature in an inevitable historical 
movement towards final and complete knowledge or, to put it in more 
Hegelian terms, ‘absolute knowledge’. All this is simply to say that, implicit in 
the composition of Cinema 1 itself, in its ‘montage’ of chapters and sections, 
there is an indirect image of time, of time as subordinate to movement, time 
as progress, time as action. 
 This, of course, is a central or defining characteristic of the movement-
image itself, as it is discussed in the second chapter of Cinema 2, on the 
condition that the movement in question is ‘normal’:  
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What we mean by normality is the existence of centres: 
centres of the revolution of movement itself, of equilibrium of 
forces, of gravity of moving bodies, and of observation for a 
viewer able to recognize or perceive the moving body, and to 
assign movement.103  
Time is thereby subordinated to movement to the extent that that movement is 
assigned to a centre, a scheme, a system which organises it and keeps each 
movement ‘in proportion’ with the others; thus the system of movements 
corresponds to an organisational principle which determines the relation of 
one movement to another and makes them coherent.  
The system of movements deployed in Cinema 1 appears simply to be 
that of ‘progress’, the inevitable mastery of the inherent possibilities of the 
cinema as movement-image, from a ‘primitive state’ to the ‘discovery’ of 
montage, the mobile shot and then the varieties of the movement-image and 
their various combinations, up to its most complex form in a cinema of ‘mental 
images’ (represented by the work of Alfred Hitchcock). The evaluation of one 
form of cinema as ‘primitive’ and another as ‘complex’, and of the relationship 
between them as one of a progressive development from the former to the 
latter, implies a goal-oriented development, a telos which serves as the 
principle or scheme of organisation which thereby produces the ‘movements’ 
described in Cinema 1 as ‘normal’.  
Indeed, Fisher is not alone in reading the Cinema books in this fashion – 
not merely as a history,104 but specifically a teleological history, whose end or 
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goal is the time-image as the ‘essence’ of the cinema, that which orients and 
guides its development towards its final uncovering or revelation. Thus Greg 
Lambert refers to “Deleuze’s teleology of modern cinema”105, while Kovács 
argues that not only is Deleuze’s model of film history linear, but that “the 
incarnation of the time-image … is also the incarnation of a goal (telos) in the 
broad cinematographic evolution”.106 Indeed he goes even further, quoting 
with approval Alain Ménil’s comment that “Deleuze considers the time-image 
‘the object of a singular conquest, the point at which the cinema would come 
into possession of its essence’107 and later asserting that “Whether we like it 
or not, Deleuze’s model [of cinema, and cinema history] is linear”.108 If we say 
then that time is subordinated to movement here, it is in the sense that, from 
the perspective of this goal or end, film-historical time is articulated as 
chronological progression towards this goal, as a movement along a line 
travelling from past to present, from primitive to complex, and is thus given as 
no more than a measure of this movement, this progress.  
However, if we attempt to follow this film-historical timeline from the 
period covered in Cinema 1 into Cinema 2, the situation becomes rather more 
complex. To the extent that Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 function together as a 
whole, a single work which presents a theory of the cinema or a set of 
philosophical concepts which are in some sense ‘cinematic’, and to the extent 
that the groundwork laid out in the first volume provides the basis for ideas 
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developed in the second, one might reasonably expect that there would be a 
coherence or continuity across or between them. This coherence would derive 
from a shared centre or system of organisation that would determine Cinema 
2 as a continuation and expansion of the concepts laid out in Cinema 1. The 
shift from the ‘organic’ regime of the movement-image described in the first 
volume (where the constituent images form a whole or totality according to 
principles of differentiation and integration) to the ‘crystalline’ regime laid out 
in the second (where integration and differentiation are replaced by 
serialisation and relinking on irrational divisions) would then simply represent 
a continuation of the ‘teleological march’ Fisher describes. In this sense, then, 
the time-image would then simply be the newer, more advanced, more perfect 
expression of the possibilities inherent in the cinema, a continuation of the 
development mapped out in Cinema 1. Indeed, Bordwell makes precisely this 
argument, claiming that “Deleuze’s … belief that a cinematic essence unfolds 
across history” constitutes not merely a teleological but an explicitly Hegelian 
conception of film history.109  
For all that the books seem to allow and even welcome such a reading, 
however, the teleological and Hegelian approach that it identifies would be 
strikingly at odds with the anti-Hegelian110 and anti-teleological tenor of 
Deleuze’s philosophy in general. Rodowick emphasises this point when he 
argues that “For Deleuze, the history of cinema is in no way a progression 
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toward an ever more perfect representation of time”,111 while Gregory 
Flaxman notes that:  
Deleuze condemns history as an enterprise that stakes out 
origins and anticipates conclusions, the result of which is a 
chronological series. This model organizes history as an 
organic process – history as story (histoire) – whose 
naturalization rings with a note of Hegelian inevitability: in 
other words, history reveals the prototypical movement of 
Spirit (Geist).112  
Flaxman thus implies that any reading of the Cinema books as a model of 
film-historical progress towards some end or essence illegitimately conceives 
of them, to a greater or lesser extent, as Hegelian and teleological in 
orientation and fails to adequately acknowledge the anti-Hegelian tendencies 
of Deleuzian thought.  
However, I would argue that the ‘historical’ reading of the Cinema books 
that Fisher et al. present is not simply wrong, or at least is not wrong in a way 
that is itself simple. Where Cinema 1 does indeed appear to offer itself to be 
read as a chronological history of the cinema as the development of the 
possibilities latent within the movement-image, Cinema 2 not only fails to 
continue that history post-1968 (or 58, or 48), but describes a regime of the 
image which is neither opposed to the movement-image, nor subsumable to it 
as a simple continuation of its development.  
Moreover, this ‘crystalline’ regime of the time-image not only fails to 
provide a centre which normalises movement, but rather is essentially 
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decentring; not only does it not continue the chronology of Cinema 1, but it 
revisits or displaces that history, fragments it, de-chronologises it such that 
movement that was ‘normal’ now becomes ‘aberrant’. Thus the ‘new’ image 
which arises in the crisis or break announced at the end of the first volume in 
precise geographical and historical terms then appears in more or less 
dispersed and fragmentary forms throughout the whole of cinematic history in 
the second volume. Elements accounted for in terms of the taxonomy of the 
movement-image are then understood or worked through as somehow 
characteristic of the time-image. Thus Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier notes 
that:  
the very foundations of the first volume tumble down in the 
second: The first volume proceeds by means of categories 
leading to traditional divisions in the history of cinema, while 
the second proceeds by operations that void the traditionally 
established typologies … [for example] Eisenstein’s 
conflictual hypotheses are treated in terms of organic 
synthesis in volume one, and are necessarily re-examined in 
volume two ... [in terms of] a problematic of discontinuity and 
disconnection.”113  
However, for all that the historicist tendencies of the first volume find 
themselves fundamentally disrupted in the transition to the second, we are 
nevertheless left with the very specific historical timing Deleuze gives for the 
break between the regime of the movement-image and that of the time-image. 
This begs the question: why then? What is it in the war or its aftermath that 
prompts the time-image to separate itself out from the movement-image? 
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Deleuze poses this question for himself in the preface to the English edition of 
Cinema 2:  
Why is the Second World War taken as a break? The fact is 
that in Europe, the post-war period has greatly increased the 
situations which we no longer know how to react to, in 
spaces we no longer know how to describe ... what tends to 
collapse, or at least to lose its position, is the sensory-motor 
schema which constituted the action-image of the old 
cinema.114  
As we can see, there is something of a slippage between the question 
Deleuze asks and the answer that he actually gives. What his answer 
describes are the conditions out of which the time-image arises after the war. 
What his question seems to be asking, however, is ‘why is the war itself the 
break? What happens in the war to create this break, to set up these new 
conditions?’ He gives us an effect (“situations we no longer know how to react 
to ... spaces we no longer know how to describe”), but not a cause. We are 
left to infer the fact of the break from its symptoms, while the break itself 
slides out of view.  
It’s possible to read this slippage as a necessary manifestation of the 
ambivalence of the relation between the pre- and the post-war cinema, 
between the movement and the time-image. On the one hand, if the break is 
posited as a historical event that takes place, thereby producing the 
conditions under which the time-image then begins to appear, then a causal 
chain is mapped out linking the movement-image to the time-image (a 
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‘rational cut', to use Deleuze’s terminology115). However, relations of cause 
and effect, of action and reaction, belong properly to the movement-image, to 
the pre-war cinema. Were it possible to posit a chain of cause and effect 
across the break between pre and post-war cinema (this event takes place 
during the war, leading to these changes) the time-image in effect would once 
again be reduced to a simple continuation of the movement-image. As such, 
there would be no new image at all: just an extension of the old sensory-motor 
schema of the movement-image.  
On the other hand, if the time-image is indeed anterior to the movement-
image, always already subsisting within it, this causal chain is unavoidably 
disrupted. At a specific level, relations of cause and effect are themselves 
disturbed if the effect (time-image) is posited as anterior to its causal 
predecessor (movement-image). That is to say, if the appearance of the time-
image is a function of the disruption of the sensory-motor schema of the 
movement-image, then for the time-image to precede the movement-image 
would be to disrupt causality itself.  
More generally, if the time-image is anterior to the movement-image, 
then one must assume that the decentring, disordering power of the time-
image would disrupt any sensory-motor schema before it ever formed and so 
the movement-image itself would never appear. This would resolve the 
problem of a causal chain linking the appearance of movement and time-
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images (by disordering all causal chains), but at the price of effacing the 
movement-image altogether and positing the entire cinema, both pre- and 
post-war, as one of the time-image. Depending on how one looks at the 
problem, then, either the time-image is subsumed by the movement-image as 
a causal extension of it, or else the movement-image has always in fact been 
a time-image. Clearly neither option is satisfactory. 
For all that these complexities seem to suggest that, at some level, the 
relationship between the time and movement-image is non-totalisable, 
unamenable to being fully determined or delimited as such, the problematic 
that this relationship arises out of can at least be stated with some precision. 
The difference (that is to say, the gap) between the movement and the time-
image (whether conceptual, historical or material) is nothing other than their 
differing accounts of the gap, of the interval, of montage. On the one side of 
this gap we find 'rational' cuts, ordering coherent relations between images in 
terms of sensory-motor schemata; on the other, 'irrational' cuts give rise to a 
disordering, decentring montage in which relations between action and 
reaction collapse.  
The impossibility of determining the relationship between movement and 
time-image is precisely that if we attempt to grasp the difference between 
them in the terms of the account given in either Cinema 1 or Cinema 2, we 
necessarily efface, and thereby lose, the other. As I've argued, if the gap 
between movement- and time-image, the transition from one to the other, is 
rational and coherent, then the irrationality of the time-image is constrained to 
and by the order of the movement-image and is thus reduced to a simple 
continuation of it. If, however, the gap between them is irrational, then the 
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movement-image itself is disordered and disrupted to the extent that there is 
and only ever has been a time-image.  
As such, to attempt to reconcile this conflict, or alternatively to attempt to 
show that it truly is irreconcilable and that Deleuze's conceptual framework is 
therefore incoherent, would be to neglect both the content and the form of the 
work itself, inasmuch as this tension between coherence and incoherence 
runs to the heart of the definitions of and relations between the movement and 
the time-image themselves. In short, we can read the Cinema books as a 
whole neither coherently nor incoherently, since to do either is to collapse the 
theoretical framework of one of the two volumes into that of the other. They 
are, in a strict sense, impossible to read.  
Deleuze indirectly suggests a way of approaching this problem in his 
comment that “It took the modern cinema to re-read the whole of cinema as 
already made up of aberrant movements and false continuity shots”.116 If the 
whole of cinema is re-read as a cinema of the time-image (‘already made up 
of aberrant movements and false continuity shots’), then the movement-image 
is indeed effaced, inasmuch as in that act of re-reading it is produced as a 
time-image. From this perspective, the time-image is indeed anterior to the 
movement-image, in that it effaces it altogether, so that the time-image was 
always already there from the very beginning.  
However, it is only so retrospectively. It is a process of re-reading which 
reinscribes the movement-image as a time-image only after the break in 
which the time-image begins to appear. To get to the time-image you must 
pass through the break between movement- and time-image; once you fall 
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under the regime of the time-image, however, the movement-image is effaced 
and there can no longer be any break. The break between pre- and post-war 
cinema must therefore take place as an event that does not take place, can 
only ‘take place’ in the interminable event of its own absence. Interminable 
waiting: nothing happens and does not stop happening. In The Writing of the 
Disaster Maurice Blanchot gives us a name for just such a non-eventual 
eventuality: the disaster, “advent of what does not happen, of what would 
come without arriving”117, or again, “that which does not come, that which has 
put a stop to every arrival”.118 The break, the interval, the cut (and thus 
montage), the disaster. 
2.3 Cinema as an Anterior History of Violence 
 The interval as disaster: what does such a sentence tell us about the 
cinema, or indeed about the Cinema books? Under what circumstances can it 
be considered legitimate? Gerald L Bruns points out that The Writing of the 
Disaster is “usually perceived as a book about the Holocaust”119 in the sense 
that the Holocaust and the death camps in some sense lie at its centre. It is 
not that the Holocaust functions as a paradigmatic or exemplary instance of 
the disaster: “the Holocaust is not a species of the disaster.”120 Rather, the 
impossibility of thinking or doing anything which could respond to, account for, 
or even grasp such an event in a way which could ever be adequate to it 
exposes us to the disastrousness of thought when thought itself is lost. The 
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disaster is so disastrous it destroys all possibility of response or 
comprehension, evades any thematisation, and in doing so destroys even 
itself, erases any possibility of taking it as an object of or for thought: 
The holocaust, the absolute event of history – which is a 
date in history – the utter-burn where all history took fire, 
where the movement of Meaning was swallowed up … How 
can it be preserved, even by thought? How can thought be 
made keeper of the holocaust where all was lost, including 
guardian thought?121  
Such a disordering of thought and action has clear correspondences with the 
decentring power Deleuze attributes to the time-image, and he does note 
briefly that: 
The great post-war philosophers and writers demonstrated 
that thought has something to do with Aushchwitz, with 
Hiroshima, but this was also demonstrated by the great 
cinema authors from Welles to Resnais – this time in the 
most serious way.122  
Deleuze does not expand on this idea in the Cinema books. However, as 
Flaxman argues, it is implicit that the collapse of the sensory-motor schema in 
which the time-image is ‘released’ is, in some sense, a function of the 
discovery of the Nazi death camps and the images of them that filtered out of 
Europe after the war: 
Especially in the aftermath of the Holocaust, which 
effectively obliterated any attempt to ‘make sense’, the old-
style narrative seems impossible. The system of Truth or 
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sensory-motor schema, which was entrusted with 
intelligibility even at the cost of illusion, is no longer up to the 
task: no explanation, no statement, can adequately respond 
to these images.123  
The closest Deleuze comes to saying this, and even then indirectly, is in his 
“Letter to Serge Daney”, where he attributes the idea to Daney himself: 
You’ve pointed out that this form of cinema didn’t die a 
natural death but was killed in the war … in circumstances 
where horror penetrated everything, where “behind” the 
image there was nothing to be seen but concentration 
camps.124  
To say ‘the interval as disaster’, then, would be to attribute the break 
between the classical and modern cinemas to the loss of faith in the capacity 
of action or thought to respond or correspond adequately to the world as a 
result of such an event within this very same world. However, for all that such 
an attribution may perhaps be justifiable on many levels, and potentially 
capable of accommodating the conceptual, historigraphical and material 
caesuras in the Cinema books that Restivo points us towards, it remains 
inadequate or incomplete. It accounts for only one aspect of ‘the interval’ as 
such and moreover does so on the basis of an event which is, strictly 
speaking, external to the cinema itself.  
What is lacking here is a means to understand the sense in which the 
interval internal to the cinema – that is to say, montage – may also be said to 
be ‘disastrous’. If, as I’ve argued, the transition from the classical to the 
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modern cinema is not merely a matter of a change in the ways films are 
edited before and after the war, neither can that change be explained without 
reference to Deleuze’s conception of what cinema, and in particular montage, 
itself is. Deleuze’s treatment of the cinema turns on quite precise technical or 
empirical determinations, or rather, takes elements traditionally given in such 
a fashion − specifically, framing, shot, montage − and grasps them in terms of 
a specifically Bergsonian treatment of the relationship between movement 
and time. That is to say, framing, shot and montage are taken by Deleuze as 
the material elements of a metaphysical problematic: the cinema as a 
question of, and to, ontology.  
Moreover, the break between the classical and the modern cinemas 
(whether we grasp it conceptually, historiographically or even materially) is 
itself intimately tied to the transformation in the operation of such elements. 
To say ‘the interval as disaster’, then, is not merely to be confronted with a 
disaster external to the cinema (the Holocaust) that finds its reflection or 
representation in a disaster internal to the cinema (given in terms of framing, 
shot and montage). Rather, it is to posit a disaster that must be found, in 
some sense, in the cinema itself, as if the Holocaust and the death camps 
could be deduced on the basis of cinema alone: the death camps as the 
realisation of “cinema’s dream, in circumstances where horror penetrated 
everything, where “behind” the image there was nothing to be seen but 
concentration camps”.125  
Such a claim seems at best problematic, and at worst a grotesque 
overvaluation of the importance of ‘the movies’ unless one recognises in the 
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cinema what Nicole Brenez (paraphrasing Vachel Lindsay) describes as “not 
as a simple reflection, the redoubling of something that already existed, but as 
the emergence of a visionary critical activity.”126 This is the cinema as an 
anterior history of violence, insofar as, according to Goddard, it “does not 
show, it previsions”.127 If this conception of the cinema as “visionary critical 
activity” appeals to Deleuze in relation to his two volumes which are 
philosophical in the same terms and at the same time that they are cinematic, 
it is because he has already found in philosophy just such a “critical and 
anticipatory power”,128 a “science fiction” of philosophy in which it is “neither a 
philosophy of history, nor a philosophy of the eternal, but untimely, always 
and only untimely”.129  
Such a project (which is, of course, the project of this thesis) begins 
necessarily from Bergson, inasmuch as it is his treatment of movement and 
time which “prefigure[s] the future or essence of the cinema”.130 Indeed, one 
of the most paradoxical features of the theoretical framework that Deleuze 
constructs in the Cinema books revolves around the very centrality of the 
position Bergson occupies throughout both volumes. The difficulty lies in the 
transformation in the nature of the whole that occurs in the transition from the 
classical to the modern cinema. Bergson’s treatment of the relationship 
between movement and time turns ultimately on his definition of the whole 
within which movement occurs, not as a closed set, but as an open whole. 
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Where a set contains a number of fixed and determined elements that are 
static and unchanging, and thus can be given in advance, an open whole 
neither contains determined elements, nor has any consistency other than its 
continuous and continual difference from itself. The open whole is that which 
constantly transforms, and this transformation is duration itself, is time:  
Bergson’s always saying that Time is the Open, is what 
changes – is constantly changing in nature – each moment. 
It’s the whole, which isn’t any set of things, but the ceaseless 
passage from one set to another, the transformation of one 
set of things into another.131  
If the classical cinema is defined by its relation to the open whole, it is 
because the movement-image is given in relation to its openness to that 
whole, such that movement is nothing more than an expression of duration, or 
change in the whole itself. Now Deleuze presents these ideas in the very first 
chapter of Cinema 1, which offers a commentary on Bergson’s theses on 
movement, and at the end of that chapter he makes it clear that the time-
image, no less than the movement-image, is ultimately derived from these 
very same theses: 
Now we are equipped to understand the profound first thesis 
of Matter and Memory: (1) there are not only instantaneous 
images, that is, immobile sections of movement; (2) there 
are movement images which are mobile sections of duration; 
(3) there are, finally, time-images, that is, duration-images, 
change-images, relation-images, volume-images which are 
beyond movement itself.132  
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This seems hardly surprising, given that Bergson’s work provides the 
foundation for the ideas presented in Cinema 2 no less than in Cinema 1 − 
except, however, in one respect. Halfway through Cinema 2, in his chapter on 
“Thought and Cinema”, Deleuze makes the point that, in the shift from the 
classical to the modern cinema, the status of the whole changes; where, for 
the movement-image, the whole was the open, for the time-image the whole 
is the outside.133 The open whole is defined in the third and final of Bergson’s 
theses on movement presented at the start of Cinema 1 and is in many 
senses the foundation on which all the others rest, the foundation of 
Deleuze’s conception of the cinema.  
Moreover, as we have just seen, both the movement and the time-image 
are derived on the basis of those theses. And yet for the modern cinema, for 
the time-image, the whole is no longer open. Inasmuch as the classical 
cinema works explicitly to articulate the “relation between man and the world, 
nature and thought” – the relation of man and the whole, thought and the 
whole – this transformation in the nature of the whole itself reflects a 
fundamental shift in these relations. How then are we to understand the 
Bergsonism of the time-image, of Cinema 2, when Deleuze removes its 
Bergsonian foundation?  
Now, ‘the outside’ is of course not a Bergsonian concept. Deleuze 
adopts it, rather, from the work of Blanchot:  
The whole thus merges with that Blanchot calls the force of 
‘dispersal of the Outside’, or ‘the vertigo of spacing’: that void 
which is no longer a motor-part of the image, and which the 
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image would cross in order to continue, but is the radical 
calling into question of the image.134 
Blanchot, in his turn, also tells us that ‘the outside’ and ‘the disaster’ are in 
some sense terms for the same ‘thing’ (were it not for the fact that what both 
name is simply the differing of difference from itself):  
These names, areas of dislocation, the four winds of spirit’s 
absence, breath from nowhere – the names of thought, when 
it lets itself come undone and, by writing, fragment. Outside. 
Neutral. Disaster. Return.”135  
One might wish to differentiate them, hastily perhaps, by saying that in 
relation to the Cinema books at least, ‘the outside’ is concerned with the 
nature of the whole (‘the whole as the outside’), whereas ‘the disaster’ 
concerns the interval, the gap (‘the interval as disaster’).  
Yet it is clear that, to the extent that the whole is the outside, it is 
precisely the interstice, the gap that is not crossed, that itself comes to 
constitute the whole. To the extent that it ‘is’ anything, the disaster is, 
precisely, the interval as the whole or, more properly, the absence of any 
whole that thought could think, to the point to which “The modern fact is that 
we no longer believe in this world … The link between man and the world is 
broken”.136 The interval as disaster; the whole as the outside; “The names of 
thought when it lets itself come undone”; interminable waiting for waiting to 
begin.  
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All of this happens ‘against’ Bergson, inasmuch as his notion of the open 
whole provides the theoretical foundation of the Cinema books and it is this 
whole which is suspended, fissured, cracked in the shift from the open to the 
outside. And yet Bergson remains untouched by all of this, inasmuch as the 
time-image no less than the movement-image belongs to, is articulated by 
Deleuze in terms of, a specifically and overtly Bergsonian thought of cinema.  
In some sense, then, Cinema 2 asks us to think ‘against’ or indeed 
outside Bergson on the basis of Bergson, as if Bergson’s thought were 
somehow subject to the aporetic logic of the disaster, of the outside, of 
Blanchot ‘from within’ as it were, in a way that leaves it nonetheless 
untouched.137 Indeed, if the relation between the two volumes of the Cinema 
books is, as I’ve argued, ‘disastrous’, then to the extent that the disaster 
happens (in the non-event of its own happening), it happens as a result of the 
first volume, happens ‘after’ having read it, as if it somehow led us or drew us 
towards the disaster in its “teleological march through cinema” and having 
happened, has not happened, has never happened, has never stopped (not) 
happening. It is in this sense that, for all that it is the outside and the disaster 
that Blanchot poses ‘together’, in order to read the Cinema books (impossible 
task) we must ‘find’ the disaster on the basis, not of Blanchot and the outside, 
but of Bergson and the open whole itself.  
In fact this task can (must) be formulated more precisely, as that of 
‘finding’ the disaster on the basis of Deleuze’s own Bergsonism. It is 
something of a commonplace to note that the roots of Deleuzian philosophy 
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are to be found in his engagement with Bergson,138 most particularly in 
relation to the founding principles of his philosophical approach: the primacy 
of difference over identity and the corresponding ontological principle of being 
as that which differs with itself first of all.139 This gives our task a quite specific 
frame: the problems posed by the Cinema books are not ‘merely’ problems 
concerning their entanglement of cinema, thought and history, but are posed 
in the context of a return by Deleuze, via cinema, to problems that constitute 
his own origins or foundations. As such, these foundations and their 
transliteration into cinematic terms are the subject of the next chapter. 
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 3. Movement, Duration and Difference 
3.1 The Three Theses on Movement 
The drama of thought presented in the Cinema books begins in a 
fashion Horace would surely approve of: as Flaxman points out, “to read the 
cinema books is to lapse, almost in media res, into Deleuze’s assurance that 
‘Bergson does not just put forward one thesis on movement, but three’.”140 
This is, as Flaxman says, a somewhat disorienting beginning: immediately we 
“begin to lose our bearings, thrown from one strange milieu – what was billed 
as a philosophy of the cinema – into another: the theses of Henri Bergson”.141 
The disorientation, of course, comes from the fact that we don’t know how we 
got there: looking for an answer to the question ‘why Deleuze and cinema?’ 
we are thrown instantly instead into the question ‘why Bergson and cinema?’ 
The importance of Bergson to Deleuzian philosophy is well attested, but 
equally so is Bergson’s critique of cinematographic movement as an illusion 
constructed out of abstractions.142  
An apparent act of perversity by Deleuze then, or perhaps even a 
paradox: two volumes on cinema built on the theses of a philosopher who 
rejects it. Deleuze fully accepts both this critique of abstraction and the terms 
in which it is offered. However, he suggests that, although thought and 
philosophy do indeed suffer this illusion, Bergson’s choice of the 
cinematograph as a metaphor for it is misguided. In fact, Deleuze argues, the 
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movement we see on screen at the cinema is real, not abstract: in some 
sense, the cinema serves to ‘correct’ the cinematographic illusion.  
Although the secondary literature is sometimes critical of the arguments 
Deleuze offers to justify this claim,143 such commentaries largely content 
themselves with noting the paradoxical nature of the conjunction of Bergson 
and cinema Deleuze presents, and then move on to other aspects of the 
Cinema books. The effect of this is that the cinematographic illusion tends to 
be regarded as, at most, a minor preliminary barrier to Deleuze’s Bergsonian 
treatment of the cinema, one that he quickly sweeps aside, leaving it no 
further part to play. By my reading, this interpretation is almost entirely wrong. 
In fact, the cinematographic illusion and its relation to both thought and 
cinema are central to the project of the Cinema books and to the philosophical 
problem they respond to, in ways that I will discuss in detail in further on in 
this thesis. Moreover, as this chapter will demonstrate, the Cinema books 
don’t mark just a return to Deleuze’s early interest in Bergson, but more 
precisely a return to the cinematographic illusion itself and the role it plays in 
establishing the foundations of Deleuzian philosophy. The three theses on 
movement that serve as the opening salvo of those books provide us with the 
key to demonstrating this link. 
Bergson’s first thesis can be summarised in this fashion: actual 
movement cannot be determined spatially, that is, as a passage over or 
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across a given territory.144 Rather, it must be determined temporally as a 
passage of time and as such is the expression of a concrete duration. If we 
attempt to determine movement in terms of space covered, we lose the actual 
movement itself, a conclusion implicit in Zeno of Elea’s ‘Arrow’ paradox and in 
Bergson’s resolution of it. If you define movement in terms of space covered, 
no matter what units you use to measure that space – no matter how finely 
you divide it up – there is no point at which an object supposedly in motion 
(such as an arrow in flight) actually moves, since at any given instant, or point, 
that object can only occupy the same space as itself.145 If we spatialise 
movement we fall into what Bergson refers to as “the absurd proposition, that 
movement is made of immobilities”.146 Deleuze puts it like this: “you can bring 
two instants or two positions together to infinity [that is to say, subdivide space 
more and more finely, even to infinity]; but movement will always occur in the 
interval between the two, in other words behind your back.”147 Indeed, Zeno’s 
aim with this paradox is to prove that movement is logically impossible, and 
that its appearance is therefore an illusion.  
Bergson was clearly aware that the tools to resolve Zeno’s paradoxes 
mathematically had been developed throughout the nineteenth century.148 
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However, while such approaches can offer mathematically consistent 
resolutions of Zeno’s paradoxes, they do not of themselves show that such 
mathematical abstractions are in fact an adequate description of concrete 
physical reality.149 The key issue here is the way that mathematics defines 
motion in its resolution of Zeno’s paradoxes. Salmon tells us “Motion may be 
described in mathematical terms as a functional relation between space and 
time”.150 This is the basis of the ‘at-at’ theory of motion: at any given time t, 
the object in motion will be at a position x, so that Zeno’s “arrow moves when 
for every time – that is, every value of t − x(t) has a value such that there are 
no ‘jumps’ in x as t varies. At every t, the arrow is at some x”.151 Thus from a 
mathematical perspective, movement is indeed composed of an appropriately 
ordered series of immobilities or instantaneous states – the value of x for 
every possible t, which form an infinitely divisible, but nonetheless continuous 
and finite series. However, from a Bergsonian perspective, the mathematical 
resolution of Zeno’s paradoxes simply reproduces the same flawed 
conception of motion as the paradoxes themselves – taking actual movement 
to be the same thing as space covered. Although one may say that a “moving 
body occupies, one after the other, points on a line, motion itself has nothing 
to do with a line”.152 
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Bergson’s resolution of this problem is to argue that although it is 
possible to represent a movement from point A to point B abstractly via a line 
drawn from one to the other, the movement itself is qualitatively different to 
that representation:  
The truth is that mathematics … deals and can deal only with 
lengths. It has therefore had to seek devices, first, to transfer 
to the movement, which is not a length, the divisibility of the 
line passed over, and then to reconcile with experience the 
idea … of a movement that is a length, that is, of a 
movement placed upon its trajectory and arbitrarily 
decomposable like it.153  
We can see, then that both Zeno’s paradoxes and the modern 
mathematical resolutions of them, share the same error, that of thinking of 
movement abstractly, conceiving of movement in terms of the line drawn by 
movement, rather thinking the movement itself. However, the means of 
abstraction is not the same in each case. Bergson’s second thesis on 
movement is in fact an account of the different ways that the ancient and 
modern thought produce this same error. The ancient, which he identifies with 
Platonism and with finalism more generally, consists of defining movement in 
terms of the transition from one ideal form to another, as a series of privileged 
instants or poses whose transformations are ultimately summed up in or as 
the movement towards a pre-given transcendental ideal, and whose essential 
moment is thus this “final term or culminating point (telos, acme)”.154 Thus the 
ancient conception of movement has both its physics, which tells us how 
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movement works (the transition from one privileged moment to the next), and 
its metaphysics, which tells us why it works that way (it derives from the 
transcendent eternal forms which these moments instantiate). The movement 
itself is designated as of little interest to ancient science, since it thinks that “it 
knows its object sufficiently when it has noted of it some privileged 
moments”.155 What counts for this model are the poses themselves (and not 
the transitions between them) and the end or goal towards which moment is 
oriented: it is a teleological, or finalist, conception.  
The modern version of this error relates movement not to significant or 
privileged instants, but to what Deleuze, following Bergson, calls “any-
instants-whatever”. This is the approach of “modern science”, derived in large 
part from precisely the kind of mathematical techniques referred to above, in 
which time is treated as simply another dimension equivalent to the three 
properly spatial ones and thus as analysable in the same terms. Modern 
science presents its spatialisation of time in formulae that explicitly correlate 
time with the movement of an object in space – whether it be the formula for 
the orbit of a planet around the sun, the rate of fall of an object or the 
trajectory of a cannon ball.  
Such formulae give a precise position relative to any-instant-whatever, 
such that time is reduced to “a sequence of instantaneous states linked by a 
deterministic law”.156 As opposed to the finalism of the ancient conception, the 
modern presents us with a deterministic model of mechanical causality. 
Despite their differences, however, both the ancient and the modern approach 
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rely on the ‘absurd’ assumption that movement can be reconstituted from 
immobilities, whether they be privileged points or any-instant-whatevers. 
What is significant about this for us here is that the finalism and 
mechanism Bergson critiques in the ancient and the modern conceptions of 
movement respectively are both constituted in relation to a whole which is in 
some sense given in advance as a totality. Thus “in both cases, one misses 
the movement because one constructs a Whole, one assumes that ‘all is 
given’, whilst [real] movement only occurs if the whole is neither given nor 
giveable”.157 Finalism determines movement in relation to its telos, the “formal 
transcendental elements”158 or poses which its privileged moments 
instantiate, such that each moment in that movement is determined in relation 
to that ideal form or goal, and thus given by it in advance.  
In contrast, from the modern perspective (that of mechanism), the whole 
is given in terms of the formulae that determine the movements of its 
elements. This kind of mechanistic determinism makes the “future and past 
calculable functions of the present, and thus claim that all is given”.159 
Inasmuch as the whole is given, there can be no change, no production of the 
new or unforeseeable, since every moment is in some sense ‘given in 
advance’. To take the whole as given is, in effect, to spatialise time, to treat it 
as if it has no duration. Bergson says of the mechanistic formulae of modern 
science that:  
nothing would have to be changed in our scientific ideas of 
things if the totality of the real was deployed all at once and 
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instantaneously … [Thus] positive science essentially 
consists in the elimination of duration.160  
That this is equally so for finalism is even more explicit, since for it the 
“totality of the real” is deployed all at once and instantaneously in its 
transcendental and ideal form. Movement understood as the transition 
between poses instantiating ideal forms is thus given in advance and for all 
time in the eternal, transcendent realm where those ideal forms dwell. In 
these terms, the unforseen, the production of the new, is impossible. Thus, as 
Deleuze puts it in Bergsonism: 
The confusion of space and time, the assimilation of time 
into space, make us think that the whole is given, even if 
only in principle, even if only in the eyes of God. And this is 
the mistake that is common to mechanism [the modern 
conception of movement] and to finalism [the classical 
conception]. The former assumes that everything is 
calculable in terms of a state; the latter, that everything is 
determinable in terms of a program: In any event, time is 
only there now as a screen that hides the eternal from us, or 
show us successively what a God or superhuman 
intelligence would see in a single glance … this illusion is 
inevitable as soon as we spatialize time.161  
In Cinema 1, Deleuze sums it up this way: “As soon as a whole is given to 
one … there is no longer room for real movement”.162 
These first two theses together define the terms of the cinematographic 
illusion. In terms of this metaphor, the individual frames of the film strip 
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abstract the real movement of the objects that pass before the motion picture 
camera to a series of still images, just as finalism and mechanism reduce 
movement to a series of static points (first thesis). The movement we see 
when that film is projected on screen is not the movement of the things 
themselves, but is something added to the still frames of the film strip by a 
strictly external motor – that of the projector (second thesis). Finalism’s 
external motor is the ideal form or goal that constitutes the quintessence or 
synthesis of the static poses in which it culminates. For modern science, the 
motor is causality: an object only moves because something else – something 
external to it – causes it to do so.163  
There is an important difference, however, between the ancient and the 
modern conceptions of movement. The ancient gives movement as the 
transition between instantiations of pre-given, eternal and unchanging ideal 
forms; these forms are the whole, the transcendent ideal form of reality. There 
is by definition no space for the creation of the new in this model, since 
everything is given once and for all time, and movement is only the movement 
towards these final and perfect idealities. The modern conception, on the 
other hand, although its whole is equally given in advance, does not do so in 
terms of pre-given forms towards which movement tends, but rather in the 
mechanical working through of causality, which does not move towards a pre-
given telos, but is, rather, determined by its past, which leads necessarily to 
its future. The importance of this difference for Bergson is that, if one can 
show that the arbitrarily closed frames of reference of modern science in fact 
subsist within the framework of a necessarily open system, then the genuinely 
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unforseen becomes possible, since movement is thereby determined neither 
by the finalism of ideal forms nor by the determinism of mechanical necessity. 
The creation of the new becomes possible, at any-instant-whatever. 
This demonstration is precisely what we find the third thesis on 
movement, which seeks to show that the whole is not a totality given in 
advance, but is instead an unceasing variation or differing from itself that can 
neither be closed off nor totalised. This is what Bergson calls the Open whole. 
In fact, this final thesis is largely implicit in the first theses’ definition of 
movement as the expression of a concrete duration. If movement expresses a 
passage of time rather than a passage through space, then that movement 
cannot be divided without changing qualitatively, since every movement 
expresses a concrete duration in which change takes place. The important 
factor here is that this change is not related to the spatial translation of 
elements, but rather concerns the transformation of the relations between 
objects or elements. 
If I move from Melbourne to Paris, this does not happen ‘abstractly’ but 
concretely, for a purpose – perhaps there is a job in Paris and none in 
Melbourne. This movement cannot be captured in a spatial translation, a line 
on a map, since what defines that movement is not the distance covered, but 
the transformation that movement expresses: I change from unemployed to 
employed, the job from available to taken, I change from a local to a foreigner, 
my family misses me rather than being sick of the sight of me and so on. 
Moreover, it is not ‘me’ that changes in this movement, nor my employers, nor 
any of the other ‘elements’ involved. Rather, it is the relations between these 
elements that are transformed. As Deleuze points out, “Relation is not a 
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property of objects, it is always external to its terms”164 and exists between 
elements, not as a part of them. I am only employed in relation to my new 
employer; I am only missed in relation to my family; I am only a foreigner in 
relation to the locals. The movement that has taken place here is not that of a 
change in relative position of a set of elements space so much as it is a 
transformation of the relations between them. Movement as an expression of 
duration is nothing other than the expression of this change in relations. Thus, 
"We can say of duration itself or of time, that it is the whole of relations".165  
Now implicit in this definition is that any given movement expresses itself 
in the change of relations between a given set of elements, which is in itself 
finite. Of course, that set may be expanded, new elements added, new 
relations entered into, but just as movement cannot be divided without 
changing in kind, so too it cannot be ‘added to’ without changing in quality. 
Consider Bergson’s example of the glass of sugared water: if we look at the 
set of elements which includes only the glass, the water, and the sugar, then 
the movement (that is to say, the duration) which pertains to it expresses 
nothing more than the relation of ‘solubility’ between the sugar and the water, 
and the relation of ‘container’ to ‘contained’ between the glass and them both. 
If, however, I expand that set to include myself, I find that, having put the 
sugar in the water, that “I must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts”.166 The 
relations expressed in this expanded set are something other than merely 
solubility or containment. They express the relation of my own temporality to 
that of the sugar, the water, “my impatience … a certain portion of my own 
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duration”;167 in other words, my waiting: “My waiting, whatever it be, 
expresses duration as mental, spiritual reality”.168  
If at any point the set of elements could be closed, this kind of qualitative 
change would itself be foreclosed, inasmuch as the whole (of the set) would 
indeed be given. In such an instance there would be no real movement, only 
translation without transformation (the difference here is, as Bergson puts it, 
“between an evolution and an unfurling, between the radically new [temporal 
transformation] and a rearrangement of the pre-existing [spatial 
translation]”169). The problem here, of course, is that sets as such are 
necessarily closed, since the rules of membership that define a given set 
determine the elements of that set completely.170 The third thesis on 
movement presents Bergson’s solution to this problem: movement is a mobile 
section of duration (and as a ‘section’ is necessarily limited), which expresses 
a qualitative change in the whole (a change in relations), but that whole in 
itself is neither given nor giveable, “because it is the Open, and because its 
nature is to change constantly, or to give rise to something new, in short, to 
endure”.171 
What then is this whole, and what is it that constitutes its ‘openness’? 
Deleuze has already given us at least a partial answer: “If one had to define 
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the whole, it would be defined by relation”.172 Although any given set of 
elements is necessarily closed by virtue of its rules of membership, relations 
are external to their terms and thus not a property of sets or their elements. 
They belong to the whole, which has no parts and is itself not a set.173 Where 
sets are constituted of discrete and separate elements extended spatially, 
relations, and therefore the whole, are continuous and temporal. Every 
change in relations – every expression of real duration – is continuous with 
the whole as such, and propagates no less to the most distant and the 
nearest aspect of the whole. As Bergson puts it: 
 Our sun radiates heat and light beyond the farthest planet. 
And, on the other hand, it moves in a certain fixed direction, 
drawing with it the planets and their satellites. The thread 
attaching it to the rest of the universe is doubtless very 
tenuous. Nevertheless it is along this thread that is 
transmitted down to the smallest particle of the world in 
which we live the duration immanent to the whole of the 
universe.174  
As the transformation of relations between elements of a set which is itself 
closed, movement is an expression of duration and thus of the whole, which 
“changes and does not stop changing”. It thereby links or opens that set to the 
openness of the Whole, and so prevents the set from closing in on itself. We 
may grasp the flight of an arrow abstractly as a simple translation from here to 
there, but this passage and the transformation of relations it expresses 
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concretely are nothing other than a ‘mobile section’ or ‘partial view’ of the 
whole with which it is continuous. As Bergson puts it, “The systems we cut out 
within … [the whole] would, properly speaking, not then be parts at all; they 
would be partial views of the whole”.175 This is the basis of the ‘metaphysics’ 
Bergson seeks to add to the account of modern science, the ‘correction’ which 
enables it to account for genuine creation, the production of the new:  
The whole is not a closed set, but on the contrary that by 
virtue of which the set is never absolutely closed, never 
completely sheltered, that which keeps it open somewhere 
as if by the finest thread, which attaches it to the rest of the 
universe.176 
The openness of the whole is simply time as the endurance or duration of 
matter that plunges it into memory, into time, into the past as that which differs 
from itself first of all. To put it in Deleuzian terms, it is the being of difference 
itself. 
3.2 The Temporalisation of Difference  
One of the aspects that make these theses such a startling, and 
potentially disorienting opening to the Cinema books is that their significance 
is not immediately apparent. The arguments that follow are derived from them 
clearly enough, but the problem that they themselves respond to is not: the 
stakes of the game are hidden. Apropos of Hardt, if we wish to find them we 
must look elsewhere, in the previous arguments Deleuze ‘assumes’ in this 
opening volley. In particular, we must look to arguments presented some thirty 
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or so years earlier in his essay “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”.177 The 
link between this essay and the three theses is the cinematographic illusion 
itself. The cinematographic illusion is never mentioned by name in “Bergson’s 
Conception of Difference”, indeed anywhere in Deleuze’s work prior to the 
Cinema books. However, as we shall see, Bergson’s critique of that illusion 
underpins the entire argument of this early work. To the best of my 
knowledge, this link has not been noted in the secondary literature and this is, 
I think, an important oversight.  
Giovanna Borradori has argued that “Bergson’s Conception of 
Difference” has been unjustly neglected as “one of Deleuze’s least known 
essays”,178 with Hardt one of the few authors to draw attention to it. More 
recently, however, Hallward has noted that “From start to finish, Deleuze’s 
philosophy is everywhere consistent with the point of departure he adapts 
from Bergson in opposition to Hegel”.179 “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” 
is that point of departure and in it are outlined the foundations on which 
Deleuze’s philosophical project rests: the critique of philosophies of identity 
and representation, and thus of negation; his own purely positive alternative, 
given in terms of the being of difference; and finally the demonstration that his 
critique of the errors of negation and the negative is given in terms that allow 
Deleuze to derive or deduce those errors on the basis of real difference − 
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which, as we shall see, is essential if Deleuze’s own philosophy is to retain its 
purely positive character.  
Let us start, then, from this positivity. Deleuze’s philosophy is, as 
Hallward suggests, a philosophy of creation,180 such that the Deleuzian 
question par excellence is ‘how is something new possible?’181 The task he 
essays in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” is to provide a firm foundation 
for such a philosophy by demonstrating the necessity of a purely positive 
conception of being, one in which negation and the negative have no place.182 
‘Necessity’ is used here in a properly philosophical sense, as opposed to the 
accidental or the contingent. More precisely, Deleuze seeks to demonstrate 
that a purely positive conception of ontology is the only one capable of 
retaining the necessity of being itself.  
As the title of Deleuze’s essay suggests, the key term here is difference, 
insofar as any philosophy that seeks to grasp being must account in some 
way for difference. This is, in an everyday sense, self-evident, in that one 
need only open one’s eyes to see a world that changes, that differs: things 
move and are thus other than they were. Immediately there is an intimate 
relationship between movement and difference: that which moves, differs, and 
that which differs, moves. The question, then, is how to account for that 
movement: how is it that being moves, how is it that it differs? Thus, for 
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Deleuze, it is the reality of movement, of difference as that which is that is at 
stake in ontological speculation.  
The argument presented in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” is 
dense, and contains the seeds of many of the themes that Deleuze returns to 
throughout his career in order to unpack and develop them. Hardt’s 
commentary on that essay provides an excellent entry point and my reading 
of it is indebted to his analysis (although my presentation of it below places an 
emphasis on the identity of movement and difference that owes more to 
Borradori than it does to Hardt).183 Hardt identifies two key phases to 
Deleuze’s argument, the first of which essays a critique of mechanism and 
Platonism (or finalism). These targets are criticised for accounting for 
difference (change, that is to say, movement) in terms of something strictly 
external to the thing that moves. In the case of mechanism, this ‘something’ is 
causality: it posits a world of things that move (which differ) only under the 
impetus of other things.  
Where mechanism accounts for movement in terms of a material cause 
(this billiard ball hits that one), Platonism, on the other hand, accounts for it in 
terms of a movement towards a telos, a finality, an end or goal: “the difference 
of the thing comes from its use, its end, its destination, The Good”.184 As 
such, the differences between things are given only in relation to their end: 
“only the Good accounts for the difference of the thing and lets us understand 
it in itself”.185  
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In either case, difference is reduced to a determination imposed from 
without: things change, move, being becomes only by means of something 
outside of them. Difference remains external to being, a ‘motor’ that is added 
to it ‘after the fact’. And since being is all there is, an external conception of 
difference also implies both that difference has no being and that being has 
no difference. Being is thereby reduced to a static, sterile immobility: all that 
there is is the One, a closed totality with neither change nor movement. 
External conceptions of differences such as those offered in Platonism and 
mechanism are thus incapable of accounting for the being of difference, and 
thus the reality of movement and of change. 
The discussion in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, then, turns 
primarily on the contrast of internal and external difference. The term 
‘movement’ is clearly identified in the text with duration and real difference, 
but in general remains something of a background figure in the argument. 
Deleuze does, however, make the observation that  
Movement is qualitative change and qualitative change is 
movement. In short, duration is what differs and what differs 
is no longer what differs from something else, but what 
differs from itself … movement is no longer the character of 
something, but has itself taken on a substantial character, it 
presupposes nothing else, no moving object.186 
Thus duration is that which differs from itself, and is given in and as qualitative 
change, as movement. This is what Borradori calls Deleuze’s “temporalisation 
of difference.” The importance of this for Deleuzian philosophy cannot be 
overstated: for Deleuze, the being of difference is simply time itself as the 
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form of change.187 Thus both movement and duration must be understood 
here as substantives, as something in and of themselves, and not in relation 
to any other thing: movement is real only insofar as it is something for itself, 
rather than being the movement of some other thing. Remember that it is the 
internal character of difference, of movement, that allows it to retain its 
necessity: the reality of movement is its necessity. Real movement – 
movement as qualitative change, as duration – is internal difference.  
Thus we can see in the “three theses on movement” an instance of the 
‘assumption’ of earlier arguments Hardt argues is characteristic of Deleuze’s 
writing. They are in fact a transliteration of the arguments of “Bergson’s 
Conception of Difference”, in which the terminology of difference has been 
translated into that of movement, and unless we recognise this, we risk 
missing the ontological force of their arguments. Specifically, we find ‘internal 
difference’ posited in the first thesis in terms of movement as the expression 
of duration and contrasted with ‘external difference’ given as movement 
understood as a series of static points, points abstracted from real movement. 
The demonstration in the second thesis that both the classical/finalist and 
modern/mechanist conceptions of movement lead only to a static and 
unchanging model of the universe – a closed whole, given in advance – which 
is equally a demonstration that such conceptions of movement are incoherent: 
they conceive of movement as something static. Real movement is neither 
movement imparted by something else (mechanism), nor movement towards 
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something else (finalism). For movement to be movement, it must be 
necessary that it move in and of itself, rather than being the movement of 
some thing. This leads us directly to the conclusion offered in the third thesis: 
being must be open, must be movement, duration, difference that differs from 
itself first of all.  
 We can see then that the ‘return to Bergson’ we find in the Cinema 
books is more precisely a return to the founding premises of Deleuzian 
philosophy itself, and to the role of the cinematographic illusion in establishing 
these premises. However, recognising this does not, as yet, allow us to 
understand the reason for this return; we do not yet know the stakes of the 
game. These stakes, it seems to me, belong to a more subterranean link 
between the three theses and concerns of “Bergson’s Conception of 
Difference”. The aspect of the latter that the three theses don’t seem to invoke 
is, for Hardt, the very core of that essay: the ontological critique of Hegel and 
the dialectic that Deleuze constructs out of the arguments Bergson turns 
against mechanism and Platonism. It seems to me that this critique points us 
towards the stakes of the game that are left unspoken in the opening chapter 
of Cinema 1. However it is not so much the critique of Hegel itself that lurks 
behind this opening, as it is the dangers inherent in such a critique and, more 
specifically, the manner in which Deleuze escapes those dangers. 
Before we can get to this point, however, we need to understand the 
critique itself and the specific challenges it poses to Deleuze in posing his own 
alternative. Hardt locates Deleuze’s critique of Hegel within the context of the  
“generalized Hegelianism” that dominated Continental philosophy from the 
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40s through to the 60s,188 and which Vincent Descombes traces in large part 
to the influence of Alexandre Kojève’s series of lectures on Hegel,189 which 
were presented throughout the 30s and published in 1947. 
For the generation of Continental thinkers that came to 
maturity in the 1960s, Hegel was the figure of order and 
authority that served as the focus of antagonism. Deleuze 
speaks for his entire cohort: ‘What I detested above all was 
Hegelianism and the dialectic’.190  
Such a rejection is, however, perilous. As Hardt takes care to make clear, to 
oppose Hegel (that is, to stand in a relation of negation to him) is to risk being 
subsumed to him once more in the totalising synthesis of the dialectic.191 He 
directs us to Judith P Butler’s analysis of the relations between Hegel and 
contemporary French philosophy, in which she points out that “References to 
a break with Hegel are almost always impossible, if only because Hegel has 
made the very notion of ‘breaking with’ into a central tenet of his dialectic”.192 
The rejection of Hegel that Deleuze speaks of on behalf of his ‘cohort’ can 
thus only ever be a fraught one, since “the act of repudiation more often than 
not requires the continued life of that which is repudiated, thus paradoxically 
sustaining the ‘rejected Hegel’”.193 As Blanchot puts it, “One cannot ‘read’ 
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Hegel, except by not reading him. To read, not to read him – to understand, to 
misunderstand him, to reject him – all this falls under the authority of Hegel or 
doesn’t take place at all”.194 As such the question of difference, and how to 
articulate a difference from Hegel which nevertheless does not constitute a 
negation of him, takes on a signal importance for Deleuze.  
Deleuze begins to essay this task in “Bergson’s Conception of 
Difference”, despite Bergson having little or nothing to say about Hegel 
himself. Indeed, Hardt presents this apparently curious choice as part of a 
tactical distancing of Deleuze and his arguments from Hegel and the territory 
of the dialectic, the better to avoid opposing Hegel directly.195 Rather than 
attack Hegel head on, he adopts what Hardt calls a “method of triangulation”:  
 [Deleuze] does not attack the dialectic directly, but rather he 
introduces a third philosophical position that he locates 
between Bergson and the dialectic. Deleuze then engages 
this proximate enemy on the specific fault that marks its 
insufficiency, and then he proceeds to show that Hegel, the 
fundamental enemy, carries this fault to its extreme.196  
In “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, the ‘proximate enemies’ that he 
critiques via Bergson are those of mechanism and finalism (in the form of 
Plato). It is the Hegelian dialectic, however, that is the fundamental target of 
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bears on the role Bergson’s three theses on movement play in the Cinema books. 
196 Ibid. 
3.#Movement,#Duration#and#Difference#/#92#
these critiques, and that according to Deleuze takes these flaws to their 
extreme.197 The essence of the dialectic “is constituted by a dynamic in which 
the cause is absolutely external to its effect”,198 since the negation of one term 
by another requires that they be absolutely external to each other. As a result, 
“The process of the mediation in the opposite necessarily depends upon an 
external causality”.199  
Indeed, the defining characteristic of the dialectic is to take external 
difference, difference between things, to its most extreme point: “According to 
Hegel, the thing differs from itself because it differs in the first place from all 
that it is not, such that difference goes to the point of contradiction”;200 that is 
to say, all the way to negation. Thus Hardt argues that, “In effect, if we ignore 
questions of historiography, Hegel appears to gather the faults of Mechanism 
and Platonism and repeat them in their pure form by taking external difference 
to its extreme”.201 As we should now recognise, this also positions the 
Hegelian dialectic as the most extreme form of the cinematographic illusion 
Bergson critiques within philosophy. 
Hegel's negative ontological determination is thus identified merely as 
the most extreme end of a spectrum of philosophies in which difference is 
merely difference in degree, spatialised difference. Deleuze for his part 
replaces the negative ontological determination of Hegel with a conception of 
duration as positive ontological differentiation: being which differs first of all 
                                                
197 Both Plato and Hegel offer teleological conceptions of the movement of being and are in this sense 
both forms of finalism. It is the ‘extremity’ to which Hegel takes his model – all the way to negation – that 
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and immediately with itself, such that difference is thereby both internal and 
necessary to being. The necessity of being itself is thus conserved by posing 
its essence as its very inessentiality, by replacing the determination of being 
offered by the targets of his critique with being as indetermination itself.  
Bergson always insists on the unpredictable character of 
living forms: ‘indeterminate, i.e. unforeseeable’. And with 
Bergson, the unpredictable and the indeterminate is not 
accidental, but on the contrary the essential.202 
The word ‘unforseeable’ here bears a significant load, insofar as the creation 
of the genuinely new is only possible to the extent that its creation is 
unforeseeable, that is, to the extent that being is open (to the future). More 
important in this context, however, is that Bergson's conception of being as 
that which differs from itself offers Deleuze “a conception of difference without 
negation, which does not contain the negative – such is Bergson’s greatest 
effort”.203  
3.3 How to Escape the Dialectic 
Deleuze’s argument contains a further step, which allows him to develop 
his critique of Hegel towards a fully positive alternative. The importance of this 
step for his philosophical framework is flagged by the fact that he returns to it 
several times in his career, although in new terms and in relation to different 
problems (for example, in Bergsonism and in Difference and Repetition, 
whose resources I will draw on where they add to or clarify what is at stake in 
this issue). The initial ‘critical’ phase of this manoeuvre draws on the critique 
of external difference already mapped out in order to define the characteristics 
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of a thought that is adequate to the concrete and to the real.204 Both Bergson 
and Deleuze posit such a thought as essential to any philosophy that seeks to 
account for or think the real as such, rather than mere abstraction.  
Platonism and mechanism, despite their inability to grasp internal 
difference, are at least capable of distinguishing differences of degree; their 
concept of difference allows for contrast between different things without 
implying a relation of opposition between them. Hegel’s dialectic, however, 
pushes this contrast to its extreme, all the way to negation. As Hardt says, 
“From the very first moments of Science of Logic – from pure being to 
nothingness to determinate being – the dialectic is constituted by a dynamic in 
which the cause is absolutely external to its effect: This is the essence of a 
dialectic of contradiction”.205 Thus Deleuze points out that:  
If the objection that Bergson made against Platonism was 
that it stopped at a still external conception of difference, the 
objection that he makes to a dialectic of contradiction is that 
it remains with a merely abstract conception of difference. 
‘This combination [of two contradictory concepts] can 
present neither a diversity of degrees nor a variety of forms: 
it is, or it is not.’ What comprises neither degrees nor 
nuances is an abstraction.206 
                                                
204 Deleuze returns to this question of ‘concreteness’ a number of times throughout his career, often in 
very similar terms to the ones deployed in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” (another example of his 
‘monotony’) and always with reference to Bergson. I therefore don’t hesitate to cite these as well as the 
article at hand where the former offer a clearer formulation of a given problem or argument. 
205 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, 7. 
206 Deleuze, "Bergson's Conception of Difference," 53. Emphasis in original. He is citing Bergson, The 
Creative Mind, 184. Intriguingly, Karl Marx’s essay “On Hegel’s Concrete Universal” presents a critique 
of Hegelian idealism posed in strikingly similar terms. "On Hegel's "Concrete Universal"," in From Hegel 
to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual Development of Karl Marx, ed. Sidney Hook (U of Michigan P, 1962; 
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3.#Movement,#Duration#and#Difference#/#95#
Indeed Deleuze points out that, for Bergson, ‘the one’ and ‘the many’ are 
abstract concepts that are simply too general to ever lead us to an 
understanding of the concrete:  
in this type of dialectical method, one begins with concepts 
that, like baggy clothes, are much too big. The One in 
general, the multiple in general, non-being in general … In 
such cases the real is recomposed with abstracts”.207  
Such generalities lack precision, and so can only account for reality in general 
terms, while letting the concrete, the singular, the particular ‘slip through their 
net’. Deleuze returns to this theme in Difference and Repetition when he 
argues that:  
The one and the many are concepts of the understanding 
which make up the overly loose mesh of a distorted dialectic 
which proceeds by opposition. The biggest fish pass 
through. Can we believe that the concrete is attained when 
the inadequacy of an abstraction is compensated for by the 
inadequacy of its opposite?208 
Even if we think of difference purely in terms of the difference between 
determined beings,209 we can see the ‘generalising’ tendency of the Hegelian 
dialectic in the way it takes the difference between beings to the most extreme 
point, ‘all the way to negation’, and thereby loses any possible conception of 
degrees of difference between things. Such generalising tendencies lose any 
possible grasp of the concrete quality of reality and thus tell us little, if 
anything, about it. As Bergson puts it, pure opposition, “yes and no are sterile 
                                                
207 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 44. 
208 Difference and Repetition, 182. 
209 That is, in terms offered by mechanism and Platonism. 
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in philosophy. What is interesting … is in what measure?”210 The fish that slip 
through the dialectical net are thus precisely specificity, detail, ‘nuance’, as 
Bergson says. Thus the combination of the one and the many in general 
misses the essential: “how, how many, when and where. ‘What’ unity of the 
multiple and ‘what’ multiple of the one?”211 
Deleuze contrasts Hegel’s purely abstract notion of being that becomes 
via pure negation (dialectical movement as that which first posits being, and 
only then seeks to account for its movement) with Bergson’s conception of 
being as that which differs with itself first of all (movement as an expression of 
duration). In contrast to Hegel, Bergsonian ontology seeks to think the real in 
its concreteness and specificity. This is the very goal of Bergson’s philosophy: 
to escape the illusions of abstraction and to constitute a philosophy, a 
thought, adequate to the real. The manner in which it is able to do so is 
implicit in his references to ‘nuance’ as that which the ready-made generality 
of the dialectic necessarily misses. Consider the qualities evoked by ‘nuance’ 
and its cognates – shade, tone, timbre, grain; they all describe aspects that 
are difficult to pin down exactly, to assign a precise identity or location to. To 
put it another way, they allude to something that is ‘precisely’ indeterminate, 
which cannot be determined, given a precise content or identity without 
betraying it, but is nonetheless unquestionably real in some sense.  
Imagine a whitewashed wall, illuminated by the sun. Although we might 
simply call it ‘white,’ that nomination is an abstraction that compresses a 
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variation of shade and tonality that cannot be contained by or reduced to that 
label.212 Moreover, as the light of the sun passes overhead, that wall perforce 
presents a constant variation of shades of ‘whiteness’ to the eye at different 
times. Not only does the light change in angle and intensity throughout the 
day, it bounces off and reflects or absorbs the colours of the plants and 
flowers nearby, such that the whiteness of the wall presents a subtle and 
continuous spectrum of difference. Nevertheless, it is impossible to distinguish 
‘one’ shade from the ‘next’, even if different times of day reveal tones that 
would be ‘clearly’ different from each other if placed side by side. Because the 
angle and intensity of the light on the wall changes in an unbroken and 
continuous transition, there is no point at which the wall becomes a distinctly 
‘different’ shade: there is only an unbroken and continuous variation 
throughout the day.  
Indeed, to speak of the wall’s ‘whiteness’ is in itself a false 
determination. To the extent that the wall presents a continuous variation, 
there is no pure white here at all. There are, rather, various tendencies 
towards colour and colours, in the sense that cinematographers refer to the 
‘colour’ of a light source: the warm yellow white of the tungsten lamp, the cold 
blue white of the Sun, the green white of fluorescent light, and so on. 
Whiteness, in this sense, is like the concept of colour itself, so that the 
different shades or colours are simply “the nuances or degrees of the concept 
itself [of whiteness], degrees of difference itself and not differences of 
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degree”.213 There is in such variation a differentiation of whiteness, a 
continuity of nuances of difference without any determination of distinct 
shades or colours of white.  
In the ‘indetermination’ or continuous variation I’ve described, ‘white’ 
cannot be understood as a singular, abstract idea that is represented in 
different degrees in its various shades, since these shades cannot be 
determined as different from each other. If one were to take a series of 
photographs of the wall at different times of day, each photograph would show 
a specific and determined shade of white. But as we have seen with Zeno’s 
paradoxes, to attempt to reconstruct a continuous movement of change 
through the addition of static points is to lose the essential quality of that 
change, which is change itself. No matter how many photographs you took 
(even up to and beyond the twenty-four 'photogrammes' a second of the film 
strip), you would only ever have a series of static determinations of the wall’s 
whiteness, without ever capturing the essential difference of that colour from 
itself − that is to say, its duration. Inasmuch as such a series of photographs 
does give us a sense of the movement, or change over time, it is because we 
add to them an abstract concept of movement in general, a concept whose 
‘bagginess’ ensures that the essential aspect of the real movements, its 
“nuance”, is lost.214 This abstraction, and the bagginess of the general 
                                                
213 What I have presented here is a variation or adaptation (intended to bring out the temporal character 
of Bergsonian difference more directly) of an argument Deleuze presents in “Bergson’s Conception of 
Difference” and again in Difference and Repetition in slightly different terms ten years later. In both 
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concepts it gives rise to, are precisely the philosophical illusions Bergson calls 
cinematographic. 
Deleuze characterises this difference between Bergson's difference and 
that of mechanism and finalism (and, at its most extreme point, Hegelianism) 
as one between differences in kind and differences in degree. It is important 
to recognise that what is at stake here is the difference between internal and 
external difference, and thus between movement understood as an 
expression of duration or as a mere translation in space. But which type of 
difference is the difference between these two differences? Is it one of kind or 
one of degree?215 A difference of degree – a quantitative or external 
difference – will never change in kind, no matter how large or small it 
becomes, and thus will always remain a difference of degree, can never 
extend to a difference in kind, and thus cannot account for the difference 
between difference in kind and in degree. Difference in kind, on the other 
hand − qualitative, or internal difference − differs with itself first of all. That is, 
it differs even from its own difference to the point that it contains all the 
degrees of difference between quality and quantity, all the way up to and 
including differences of degree. Deleuze presents this argument over several 
pages in “Bergson's Conception of Difference”216 but gives it more concisely 
in the later Bergsonism; thus: 
                                                                                                                                      
However, they are only 'there' virtually, and to find them there actually requires that they be artificially 
‘cut’ out of the continuity they are contained within – as if in a 'snapshot' of them. 
215 There’s an obvious similarity in the logic of this argument to the terms in which I have posed the 
problem of the relation between the two volumes of the Cinema books. Deleuze’s analysis of the 
relation between differences in kind and in degree will indeed bear directly on my own characterisation 
of the break that lies between Cinema 1 and 2, once the tools needed to do so have been prepared in 
the chapters to come. 
216 Deleuze, "Bergson's Conception of Difference," 47−54. 
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between the two there are all the degrees of difference or, in 
other words, the whole nature of difference … Differences in 
degree are the lowest degree of Difference; differences in 
kind (nature) are the highest nature of Difference. There is 
no longer any dualism between nature and degrees. All the 
degrees coexist in a single Nature that is expressed, on the 
one hand, in differences in kind, and on the other, in 
differences in degree.217 
Put simply, degrees of difference (internal difference) are capable of 
accounting for or ‘containing’ differences in degree (external difference). The 
latter are merely the static points ‘extracted’ from the continuous variation of 
the former. And this treatment of difference and thus movement reflects in 
direct terms the critique presented in Bergson’s first thesis on movement.  
Both internal and external difference are thus given univocally, in one 
and the same ‘voice’, insofar as the genesis of the latter is deduced on the 
basis of the differing from itself of internal difference: difference in degree is 
merely the furthest degree of difference. Duration, movement, and thus being, 
can only be grasped in its reality if it is understood in terms of qualitative 
difference: real movement is introduced into thought in these terms, and these 
terms only. To think in terms of quantitative difference or differences of 
degree, on the other hand, is to lose the reality of the real, to think a merely 
abstract, static and ‘sterile’ thought: such is a thought that ‘fails to think’. 
Here we are close to the secret and the power of Deleuzian philosophy, 
understood in terms of a precise characterisation of its ‘purely positive’ nature. 
Hegel is often described as Deleuze’s great ‘enemy’, on the basis of several 
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highly critical references by the latter to the former, such as that in the “Letter 
to a Harsh Critic”, where Deleuze makes the comment that “What I most 
detested was Hegelianism and dialectics”.218 The violence of such language 
certainly suggests the relationship of antagonism often posited between the 
two. However, to take one’s lead from such comments risks missing the 
subtlety, and indeed delicacy, with which Deleuze’s actual arguments respond 
to the challenge posed by Hegel and the dialectic. As I noted earlier, Hegel 
poses a specific challenge to those who wish to attack or refute him. To 
oppose Hegel is to stand in relation of negation to him, and thus to risk being 
subsumed by him or, rather, synthesised by him via the dialectical movement 
of negation, to let negation in ‘by the back door’ as it were. To put it bluntly, to 
be Hegel’s enemy is to be his friend. Hence the vital importance Deleuze 
places on being able to constitute a purely positive basis for philosophy: a 
philosophy that seeks to elude Hegel can have neither part nor parcel of the 
negative or negation.  
As Hardt argues, the “tactical” distance Deleuze places between himself 
and Hegel in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” (by critiquing Hegelianism 
as the most extreme instance of flaws already manifest in mechanism and 
Platonism) should be understood as a response to this problem. It is, 
however, a merely tactical distance, an argumentative methodology that holds 
Hegel at arms-length, while still keeping him in reach. The distance it imposes 
is susceptible of being collapsed if one breaks the argument down and 
reduces it to its essence − which is exactly what Hardt’s reading of “Bergson’s 
Conception of Difference” does. To truly escape from the dialectical trap that 
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Hegel sets, Deleuze needs something more: he requires a means to account 
for Hegel without opposing him. The treatment of difference in terms of 
degrees of difference that differ all the way to differences of degree provides 
him with the tools to do just that. 
We can see this more clearly in later, more developed formulations of 
this idea. To do this, however, we require a slight change in terminology. The 
heterogenesis of Deleuzian philosophy is such that with each new book he 
seems to invent a whole new range of terms and concepts,219 without ever 
entirely leaving the terminology of earlier works behind. More confusingly, the 
concepts these terms describe often seem to overlap with or repeat those of 
other works. For example: being, difference, duration, real movement, the 
pure past, the virtual. All these terms refer more or less directly to Deleuze’s 
founding ontological conception of the internal difference of being. At the 
same time, they each draw out a nuance or tendency within that model that 
finds its expression in relation to the specific territory a given argument is 
exploring.220  
For example, if we move from “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” to 
the fifth chapter of Bergsonism,221 we find a shift in emphasis marked by the 
introduction of three terms (virtual, actualisation, actual) to account for the 
differences in difference that are dealt with in the earlier work via two 
                                                
219 Bellour notes that he seems to invent a conceptual language for each new book – which is perhaps 
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(‘degrees of difference’ and ‘difference of degree’). This shift is at least in part 
a response to the need to give this difference in terms of process, of 
movement: the two part model is too conceptually static for the action it 
describes. The three-part model offers the same argument, but places that 
argument more clearly in the movement it describes, and in doing so 
emphasises the creative character of this movement. This movement is 
needed here insofar as Deleuze is responding directly to Bergson’s notion of 
élan vital as a force of differentiation or evolution: the argument seeks to place 
its concepts in the same movement it finds within Bergson’s creative 
evolution.222  
What then does the use of three, rather than two, terms add to our grasp 
of the notion of difference they all correspond to? It brings out more clearly the 
status of the actual (the differences in degree contained within the degrees of 
difference) and the traps this sets for thought. In this tripartite distinction, the 
virtual (which is difference that differs from itself) actualises itself according to 
divergent lines, which become actual only insofar as they ‘appear’ as a 
specific degree of difference:  
When the virtuality is actualised, is differentiated, is 
‘developed’, when it actualises and develops its parts, it does 
so according to lines that are divergent, but each of which 
corresponds to a particular degree in the virtual totality. 
There is here no longer any coexisting whole; there are 
                                                
222 Thus we find the critique of external difference and abstraction repeated once again, but given this 
time in terms of the movement of evolution. Evolutionary models that conceive of “the action of the 
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understanding of the elements that evolve, understood only in terms of “relations of association and 
addition. Evolution understood as a vital differentiation (Bergson’s ‘creative evolution’), on the other 
hand, accounts for the diversity of the products of evolution in terms of a vital internal differentiation, so 
that the evolved creature is not acted on by a purely external environment, but ‘co-evolves’ with it as 
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merely lines of actualisation … Nevertheless, each of these 
lines corresponds to one of these degrees that all coexist in 
the virtual; it actualises its level, while separating it from the 
others; it embodies its prominent points, while being 
unaware of everything that happens on other levels.223 
There are two points to clarify here. First of all, that which is actualised 
of the virtual is life as it presents itself in and as matter. Actualisation is the 
mode of being’s creation of beings such that “Evolution takes place from the 
virtual to actuals. Evolution is actualisation, actualisation is creation”.224 The 
second point concerns actualisation or, more precisely, the significance of its 
‘addition’ as a third term to the pair of degrees of difference and differences of 
degree. Deleuze emphasises the fact that the actual does not resemble the 
virtuality that it embodies. To use Ronald Bogue’s analogy, “Just as the 
structure of genes bears no resemblance to the structure of an actual animal, 
so the structure of a virtual idea bears no resemblance to the structure of its 
actual embodiment”.225 Thus: 
It is difference that is primary in the process of actualisation 
– the difference between the virtual from which we begin and 
the actuals at which we arrive, and also the difference 
between the complementary lines according to which 
actualisation takes place.226 
The difference that is enacted at each stage of this process (the 
difference that differs from itself first of all, into different ‘lines’ of actualisation, 
which manifest themselves in actual beings or creations that bear no 
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resemblance to the action or process in which they are actualised) is essential 
to Deleuze’s requirement that being be creative, be creation. He emphasises 
this through a comparison of the ‘virtual and the actual’ with the ‘possible and 
the real’.227 One cannot map these pairs onto each other: whereas the 
possible has no reality at all, both the virtual and the actual are equally real.228 
As we have seen, actualisation is a movement of creation, such that the 
virtual that is actualised in no sense resembles that which is actualised of it, 
since “It is difference that is primary in the process of actualisation”.229  
The realisation of the possible, on the other hand, is governed by the 
principles of resemblance and limitation; ‘resemblance’ since "the real is 
supposed to be in the image of the possible that it realises (It simply has 
existence or reality added to it … from the point of view of the concept, there 
is no difference between the possible and the real)”.230 ‘Limitation’ since not 
everything that is possible comes to be realised, so that the real is simply a 
subset of the possible and pre-exists itself ready-made, so that "Everything is 
already completely given".231 (Note the echo of the second thesis on 
movement, where mechanism and finalism are critiqued for conceiving of the 
whole as ‘given in advance.’) 
However, as Deleuze points out, this conception of the real as a limited 
representation of the possible is a fiction, a ‘sleight of hand’: it is not the real 
that resembles the possible, but rather the possible that resembles the real. 
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The possible is no more than a fictitious image we produce on the basis of the 
real − that is, on the basis of real actuals divorced from the virtual they are the 
actualisation of. We then project this image backwards in order to account for 
the real itself, to be able "to claim that it was possible at any time, before it 
happened".232 We postulate the possible on the basis of the real, ‘after’ the 
real and in order to explain the real, and then pretend that the real derives 
from the possible and not the other way around. The fallacy of the possible 
and the real is thus the model for any thought that begins from the actual 
divorced from its movement of actualisation and then attempts to account for 
it on the basis of what is thus given actually. Such a thought ‘projects 
backwards’ the characteristics of the actual and thus ‘extracts’ the possible 
from the real “like a sterile double” 233 and claims that this then explains or 
accounts for the qualities of the actuals themselves. 
Thus we can see that, firstly, the actual does not resemble the virtual 
that it actualises because actualisation is an act of creation in and of itself. 
Secondly (and this is the key point), although there is no negation or 
negativity in this movement of actualisation and creation, if one abstracts the 
products of actualisation from that movement (that is, if one considers only the 
actuals themselves and not the virtual that they are the actualisation of), the 
difference of those isolated actuals from each other can be articulated in 
purely external terms, as a difference between two actual and determined 
elements, which are thus susceptible of appearing in a relation of negation 
with each other. Thus: 
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Forms of the negative do indeed appear in actual terms and 
real relations, but only in so far as these are cut off from the 
virtuality which they actualise, and from the movement of 
their actualisation. Then, and only then, do the finite 
affirmations appear limited in themselves, opposed to one 
another, and suffering from lack or privation.234  
The actual, inasmuch as it is ‘cut off’ from the virtual it is the 
actualisation of – if it is taken independently of the movement of becoming it is 
the expression of – can be taken to constitute a self-identical element. 
However, it is an identity whose condition is difference. Rather than deriving 
difference from identity (as the difference between self-identical elements), 
difference is given here as the basis of identity itself. As a consequence, 
however, if thought begins from actuals taken on their own, in isolation from 
the movement of creation and invention in which they are actualised – if 
thought takes the actualised elements as static points, as self-identical 
elements – it is able to arrive, however falsely, at a negative conception of 
being, despite being's purely positive foundation as and in difference. Thus “In 
short, the negative is always derived and represented, never original or 
present: the process of difference and differenciation is primary in relation to 
that of the negative and opposition”.235  
The error of Hegel’s dialectical movement of negation and synthesis is 
that it is premised on the apparent qualities of actual things divorced from the 
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virtual of which they are the actualisation. Thus isolated, these "finite 
affirmations appear limited in themselves, opposed to one another, and 
suffering from lack or privation".236 Hegel derives the principle of negation 
from this apparent opposition and projects it backwards, and then claims that 
this accounts for the actual world he sees before him. But the world so 
constructed is merely a cinematographic illusion that loses the reality of both 
movement and of difference itself. 
These are the terms of Deleuze’s escape from the ‘dialectical trap’ of 
negation: one accounts for the position of one’s ‘enemy’ not in terms of 
contestation or negation, but rather subsumes them as a limited, abstract and 
arbitrary237 construction that can be deduced from one’s own strictly positive 
position, while the failings of one’s foe are those of negation and the negative, 
and the models of identity and representation these give rise to. As he puts in 
Difference and Repetition, it is a case of accounting for “the genesis of the 
appearance of negation” on the basis of a purely positive genesis of 
affirmation.238 Thus Deleuze is able to critique Hegel and demonstrate the 
insufficiency of the dialectic as means of responding to the specificity of real 
being, all the while retaining the virtues of a purely positive movement of 
affirmation and creation for himself. In doing so, Deleuze is able to 
demonstrate that Hegelian philosophy (and indeed, any mechanist or finalist 
model at all) may be deduced in principle from his own philosophy of 
difference, and should be understood as something constructed within an 
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arbitrarily limited or closed set of actual elements ‘cut out’ or abstracted from 
the open whole of being. As we shall see, this genetic method, whereby 
Deleuze deduces and accounts for the target of his ‘critique’ on the basis of 
his own philosophical principles, plays an important part in the logic and 
argument of the Cinema books. 
For the moment, however, this perspective suggests that the 
characterisation of Hegel as Deleuze’s great ‘enemy’ both mistakes the nature 
of their relationship and overlooks the elegance of the means with which 
Deleuze negotiates it. An enemy is something one seeks to destroy, one 
whose aims and goals are not only different from yours, or at odds with them, 
but which go so far as to put yours in danger. One must destroy, kill, negate 
one’s enemy before they negate you (the showdown at the dialectical corral). 
This is more or less how Hardt characterises the relationship between 
Deleuze and Hegel. Hardt deals with the danger of dialectical synthesis with 
and by the enemy by proposing a strictly non-dialectical concept of negation, 
a pars destruens or moment of absolute destruction that “clears the terrain for 
creation; it is a bipartite sequence that precludes any third, synthetic 
moment”.239  
I find this proposal unconvincing for two reasons. Firstly, as I understand 
him, Deleuze seeks to account not only for being in strictly positive and 
creative terms, but also thought and the powers of thought as creative 
creations of being in themselves. The introduction of negation, even an 
absolute or pure negation without hope of synthesis, thus seems to me to rely 
on an element that is strictly external to Deleuze’s own thought (in the sense 
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that it is not derived or derivable from the ontological difference that founds it) 
in order to explain or account for that thought. By accounting for the thought of 
his ‘enemy’ as immanent to his own, he is able to demonstrate the genesis of 
their thought on the basis of a purely positive ontological conception.  
Secondly, to think of the relationship between Deleuze and Hegel in 
terms of pure enmity is to miss the commonality that they share, a 
commonality that turns precisely on the issue Deleuze emphasises in his 
account of what drew him to the cinema: the introduction of movement to 
thought. As Flaxman points out, “In modern philosophy, the question of 
putting movement into thought was effectively broached by Hegel, as Deleuze 
admits”.240 This is why the nature of the movement one wishes to introduce 
into thought, the means by which one understands and conceives of that 
movement, are so vital for Deleuze: far from being Hegel’s enemy, he is, as 
Hallward says, his rival.241  
Both seek the same goal of putting movement into thought, so that the 
stakes of their rivalry are given in the competition between their respective 
conceptions of movement: is the movement of being dialectical or differential? 
By demonstrating the incoherence and inadequacy of dialectical movement at 
an ontological level, while simultaneously showing how the dialectical 
movement can be derived from his own differential conception of movement 
as a kind of ‘epistemological illusion’242 Deleuze in effect contains or 
subsumes his rival without destroying or negating him as an enemy. In short, 
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he accounts for an apparent dualism (Deleuze vs Hegel) as a strict monism 
(the dialectic determined and accounted for in and by Deleuze). Like the 
winner of a footrace, who in a sense ‘contains’ all the races run by his rivals 
within his own, Deleuze thus both ‘contains’ and dismisses Hegel, without 
destroying or negating him and thus tripping on the dialectical traps set by the 
latter. Moreover, the terms in which he does so allow him to account for any 
philosophy in which negation or the negative play a part – any philosophy 
premised on notions of identity and representation, any philosophy that falls 
under the sway of the cinematographic illusion – in precisely the same 
fashion. 
According to Hallward, this mode of engagement is, in fact, “one of the 
most characteristic features of Deleuze’s work” throughout his career:  
his tendency to present what initially appears as a binary 
relation [in my example, the relation of ‘enmity’ between 
Deleuze and Hegel] in such a way as to show that this 
relation is in fact determined by only one if its two ‘terms’. 
The difference between active and reactive force, for 
instance, turns out to be internal to the self-differentiation of 
active force, which alone is … In this and every comparable 
case, ‘dualism is therefore only a moment, which must lead 
to the re-formation of a monism’.243 
Although Hallward does not identify it as such, what he describes here is the 
application of a method of genetic deduction that ultimately finds its roots or 
its ur-form in Deleuze’s treatment of the relation of internal and external 
difference. Deleuze’s ‘monism’ is simply the demonstration of the univocity of 
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being as difference, insofar as the genesis of the ‘second’ term of a given 
binary is ultimately deduced in terms of the first. As we shall see by the end of 
this thesis, this ‘genetic’ method bears directly on Deleuze’s treatment of the 
cinema and on its relation to his treatment of Kant. 
By repurposing Bergson’s critique of cinematographic conceptions of 
movement into a critique of external conceptions of difference, Deleuze is 
able to establish the necessity of a strictly internal conception of difference, 
one that underpins his entire philosophical project. Moreover, although 
negation and the negative play no role in that project or its foundations, on the 
basis of that concept of difference he is able to account for his philosophical 
rivals in purely positive terms, without falling into the illusions and errors that 
negation and the negative draw those rivals into.  
The cinematographic illusion is, then, central to both the positive and the 
critical dimensions of Deleuzian philosophy. By invoking not just that illusion, 
but its foundational role for Deleuze’s work, the ‘three theses’ at the very least 
indicate that the project of the Cinema books bears in some sense on 
problems derived from those foundations, and from the place of the 
cinematographic illusion in them. The task of the next chapter is to identify the 
key problems that derive from that foundation, how Deleuze responds to them 
in his work at large, and only then to specify what role the cinema is to play in 
relation to them. 
 4. What Use is Cinema to Deleuze? 
4.1 The Necessary Illusions of Practical Life 
We can start this chapter with a preliminary problem. As should be clear 
by now, Bergson’s primary concern in positing his cinematographic metaphor 
has little to do with criticising the cinema. Indeed, he has very little interest in 
the cinema as cinema and is certainly not in any sense presenting a theory of 
the cinema.244 Bergson’s critique of the cinematographic illusion is aimed at a 
far larger target than the cinema: it critiques mechanistic science, Platonism 
and indeed the Western metaphysical tradition itself. Far from being derived 
from or targeted at the cinema, the cinematographic illusion is, as Ménil puts 
it, “in fact so ancient that it is co-extensive with the entire history of Western 
thought”.245 Deleuze adopts this evaluation wholeheartedly and articulates it in 
his own terms in his critique of external conceptions of difference within 
philosophy. However, even if we accept these arguments, the question 
remains: why does philosophy suffer this illusion so pervasively?  
In Creative Evolution Bergson tells us that thought, perception and 
language are all cinematographic in their orientation: “Whether we would think 
becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than 
set going a kind of cinematograph inside us … the mechanism of our ordinary 
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knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.”246 On this basis it would certainly 
follow that philosophical thought, too, suffers this illusion. However, this simply 
kicks the can down the road. What is it that necessitates that thought, 
language and perception are cinematographic in nature? Bergson hints at an 
answer when he notes in passing the fundamentally practical character of this 
orientation.247 But to find a full account of what this means, we have to look 
not in Creative Evolution, but in Matter and Memory. 
The role of Matter and Memory in the Cinema books is a complex one. 
The resources Deleuze draws on to propose his Bergsonian characterisation 
of the cinema come primarily from that work, rather than Creative Evolution. 
He argues that the movement we are given by cinema presents us with 
mobile sections of duration, or movement-images, “the discovery of which 
was the extraordinary invention of the first chapter of Matter and Memory”.248 
It is on the basis of this ‘discovery’ that Deleuze derives the taxonomy of 
cinematic signs he then unfolds. This, on the surface of it, appears to be the 
basis on which he argues that the cinema is itself free of the cinematographic 
illusion, to the point that he appears to berate Bergson for having ‘forgotten’ 
the findings of Matter and Memory when he comes to discuss the 
cinematographic illusion in Creative Evolution some ten years later.249 
Certainly this is how the secondary literature tends to interpret this passage in 
Deleuze’s discussion of the first of Bergson’s three theses on movement. I 
think this interpretation is flawed, for reasons I explore in detail in the next 
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chapter. For now, however, it suffices to note that the arguments that 
culminate in Bergson’s cinematographic metaphor and his attribution of its 
role in shaping thought, perception and language to its practical utility find 
their roots not in Creative Evolution, but in Matter and Memory itself.  
In Matter and Memory, the issue arises as follows: having developed his 
argument for a conception of the world as a ‘mobile continuity’ on the basis of 
his critique of realism and idealism, Bergson must nevertheless account for 
the fact that this is not what our everyday perception of the world presents to 
us. When we open our eyes, what we see it a world consisting of distinct 
things, objects and beings, located distinctly in space, and not an unbroken 
continuity of becoming. He accounts for this apparent discrepancy in the most 
pragmatic of fashions. Being may be an unbroken becoming, but living beings 
need to eat, and in order to do so they must first distinguish themselves from 
this becoming as a thing (constitute themselves as a centre of action) and 
then find something else to nourish themselves on: perceive it, act on it (hunt 
it down) and eat it.250 The necessities of life thus require us to constitute a 
world of determined bodies, discrete beings or actual elements constituted 
relative to the demands of action. The pragmatism of this ‘cutting up’ of the 
continuity of reality is no more complex than an organism’s will to survive; at 
its most basic level it is the determination of some other body as food, in order 
to consume it. As Bergson puts it:  
Whatever the nature of matter, it may be said that life will at 
once establish in it a primary discontinuity, expressing the 
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duality of the need and of that which must serve to satisfy it 
… Our needs are, then, so many searchlights which, 
directed upon the continuity of sensible qualities, single out 
in it distinct bodies. They cannot satisfy themselves except 
upon the condition that they carve out, within this continuity, 
a body which is to be their own and then delimit other bodies 
with which the first can enter into relation, as if with persons. 
To establish these special relations among portions thus 
carved out from sensible reality is just what we call living.251 
What Matter and Memory tells us, then, is that in order to live, life must 
abstract the unbroken continuity of being into distinct objects cut out artificially 
according to its practical needs. And inasmuch as social life is also practical 
life, the world of human actions and interactions and constructions are 
products of this same illusion. Thus Bergson can say “That which is 
commonly called a fact is not reality … but an adaptation of the real to the 
interests of practice and to the exigencies of social life”.252 In order to live we 
must eat; in order to eat we must act; in order to act we must cut out distinct 
elements from the continuity of being to act on. In other words, life is obliged 
to grasp the world cinematographically in order to live (even if this term will 
not be used to describe this phenomenon until much later, in Creative 
Evolution). Now it should be said immediately that this element of Bergson’s 
argument is a secondary theme in Matter and Memory. The emphasis is, 
rather, on establishing the illusory and artificial nature of this ‘cutting out’ in 
relation to the unbroken world of images, whose establishment is his major 
concern. But despite Deleuze’s apparent suggestion that the cinematographic 
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illusion articulated in Creative Evolution is a ‘step backwards’ from the 
‘cinematic’ ontology of images presented in Matter and Memory, the logic that 
will lead Bergson to the formulation of that illusion in the former is already 
clearly present in the latter.  
 Bergson does, however, develop this logic much further in Creative 
Evolution. In Matter and Memory, the argument that will be developed later 
into the critique of the cinematographic illusion turns on the necessity for 
perception to abstract static moments from the undivided becoming of being, 
in order to be able to act. In Creative Evolution, this perceptual abstraction is 
developed as the model for the operations of thought and language. This is 
what Bergson indicates when he refers to two theoretical illusions, and not 
one, in his introduction to the chapter in which he develops the idea of the 
cinematographic illusion.253 The first illusion is the perceptual abstraction to 
which life is subject to as a function of the needs of action, which is already 
present in the arguments of Matter and Memory.  
The second is the development of language and thought on the basis of 
the first. Thus this second illusion “is near akin to the first. It has the same 
origin, being also due to the fact that we import into speculation a procedure 
made for practice”.254 That is, thought develops in relation to life’s needs as 
an extension of life’s power over the world, and action in turn is guided by that 
thought, since “The function of the intellect is to preside over actions”.255 
Thought perforce starts from a static and abstract grasp on being, derived 
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from the needs of action, and thus builds itself on a cinematographic base. 
Thus  
The cinematographical method is therefore the only practical 
method [of thought – but note the emphasis on practical], 
since it consists in making the general character of 
knowledge form itself on that of action, while expecting that 
the detail of each act should depend in its turn on that of 
knowledge.256 
This cinematographic tendency in thought manifests itself in its focus on 
capturing the state of things, rather than their change, so that “the mind 
derives … three kinds of representations: (1) qualities, (2) forms of essences, 
(3) acts”.257 And to the extent that language is a tool for thought, and for 
communicating thought, it too takes on a cinematographic form, such that the 
“three ways of seeing correspond to three categories of words: adjectives, 
substantives, and verbs, which are the primordial elements of language”.258  
If we now have the outline of a plausible account of why and how the 
cinematographic illusion shapes perception, thought and language, and thus 
philosophy, this in turn poses another problem, which bears on Deleuze no 
less than Bergson. The problem is simple: if perception, thought and language 
are all cinematographic in character, what possible tools are left to us to think 
or see, or speak otherwise? How can we come to grips with being, with 
becoming or duration, if we are condemned to the cinematographic illusion 
merely by virtue of being alive, being life, and thus forced to act? For thought 
to think real being, real movement, it seems, the living being must overcome 
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the natural tendencies that constitute both it and its relationship to the world, 
must overcome itself, since, as Deleuze puts it, “The illusion … does not 
result only from our nature, but from the world in which we live, from the side 
of being that manifests itself to us in the first place”.259 For human being to 
truly think, it seems, it must overcome the human condition.260 
John Mullarkey poses the quandary concisely:  
The problem is this: according to everything Bergson seems 
to write about language, thought, and philosophy itself, it is 
far from evident how he, or anyone for that matter, could 
ever have been able to write genuinely about time at all … 
An immediate grasp of the temporal which is inexpressible 
would hardly seem to be a good place to begin one’s 
philosophy.261  
The moment we attempt to think or talk about real being, about duration, we 
perforce fall under the sway of the cinematographic illusion, and thus lose the 
being we seek to speak or think of. And yet insofar as beings, and thus 
human beings, are part of being they participate in the real movement and 
duration of that being. This at least seems to allow for the possibility of the 
intuition by which Bergson seeks to grasp the real, since we are an aspect or 
expression of that which we seek to intuit and never in reality isolated or 
separated from it. Even if we allow this possibility, it does not, however, 
resolve the problem of how we are to communicate such an intuition, or 
indeed even think of or with it, without reducing it once more to an abstract 
and static representation that loses its essential quality – its duration.  
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The solution Bergson offers, at least as far as language goes, is that we 
must force it ‘beyond’ itself through a creative use of language and especially 
of metaphor. Mullarkey notes that Bergson does not seek a metaphysics 
without concepts or language, but rather one that uses language, in a sense, 
against itself and its own conceptual tendencies.262 He directs us to a 
passage in The Creative Mind, in which Bergson argues that metaphysics:  
is strictly itself only when it goes beyond the concept, or at 
least when it frees itself of the inflexible and ready-made 
concepts and creates others very different from those we 
usually handle, I mean flexible, mobile, almost fluid 
representations, always ready to mold [sic] themselves on 
the fleeting forms of intuition.263 
The difficulty with this claim asserts itself in the ‘at least’ Bergson is forced to 
use; metaphysics is itself when it goes beyond the concept, but an absolute 
going beyond is not possible in language, insofar as language’s ‘primordial 
elements’ are themselves conceptual. At best, or ‘at least’ it can try to ‘free 
itself’ from such concepts, by creating ‘others very different from those we 
usually handle.’ This implies at least a thread or a tendency within language 
that links it to the non-conceptual real of real duration.264 This is consistent 
with the immanence of the cinematographic to the real that Bergson implies – 
it is part of real being, albeit abstracted or drawn from it, and thus cannot be 
conceived as utterly outside of or disconnected from being. Representation, 
cinematographic thought, is therefore immanent to being that differs, and thus 
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is not divided from it absolutely, but contingently, in relation to the needs of 
life. The problem we face in trying to capture this thread is that the more 
precisely we try to define or determine the difference between conceptual 
language and flexible or mobile language, the further we move away from the 
latter: the language we seek is of necessity vague and imprecise, the more so 
the closer it approaches the reality of being. Even Bergson himself struggles 
with this difficulty, as the following passage suggests: 
it is easy to see that Butler only uses images, comparisons, 
etc. to supplement or even simply to decorate the expression 
of his thought: he could, strictly speaking, do without it. By 
contrast, in a book like Creative Evolution or The Two 
Sources, images are most often introduced because they are 
indispensable, as none of the existing concepts are able to 
express the thought of the author, and the author is thus 
obliged to suggest it.265  
Even if one accepts Bergson’s account argument that language can be 
forced ‘beyond’ its ‘primordial’ conceptual tendency (and it does seem at odds 
with claims such as “The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to 
comprehend life”266), the vagueness we are left with remains a barrier, at the 
very least, to any satisfactory expression of such intuition as we may have of 
real being or duration. We are left in the paradoxical situation that the more 
adequately we express it, the less clearly we are able to communicate it to 
others. For all his remarkable gifts as a writer (he won the 1928 Nobel prize 
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for literature), even Bergson cannot escape this paradox. Paul Douglass 
notes that the latter’s  
‘Introduction to Metaphysics’ tells us that life is like ‘the 
unrolling of a coil’, and also like a ‘continual rolling up’, but 
actually ‘it is neither’. Such cryptic formulations caused 
understandable annoyance in Bergson’s critics. Even 
friends, like William James, confessed that there is a 
‘peculiarity of vision’ in Bergson’s work: ‘I have to confess 
that Bergson’s originality is so profuse that many of his ideas 
baffle me entirely’.267 
It seems to me that the problem or paradox that gives rise to these ‘cryptic’, 
‘baffling’ and ‘annoying’ qualities in Bergson’s writing are internal to, and thus 
unavoidable for Bergsonism, inasmuch as they derive from his very 
conception of both being and beings, and of the cinematographic terms in 
which the beings must grasp being if they are to live. And given the central 
place that Deleuze gives to the cinematographic illusion in the critique of 
external conceptions of difference that sets the scene for his own ontology of 
difference, it constitutes a problem internal to his own Bergsonism. 
4.2 A Materialist Practice of Metaphysics 
The possibility of a non-cinematographic thought of thought is clearly of 
some relevance to philosophy. It’s obvious, but important to keep in mind, that 
although philosophy clearly thinks, not all thinking is philosophical. The 
practice of thought that gives philosophy its specificity, is, for Deleuze, its 
creation of concepts. This conception of philosophy, and its difference from 
science and art as distinct modes of thought, finds its clearest expression in 
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What is Philosophy? In that work, he and Félix Guattari present these three 
modes as distinct practices of thought, with specific productive and creative 
outcomes: concepts in philosophy, functions in science and affects in art. 
They accord no priority to philosophy over these others, only a specificity 
given in terms of the materials they work with and the relations they construct 
among those materials. Furthermore, despite their distinctive practices, there 
is always a ‘zone of interference’ between or among them, such that they 
“intersect or intertwine but without synthesis or identification”.268  
We may add as a preliminary comment on the relation between this 
work and the Cinema books that, although cinema is certainly an art, 
Deleuze’s treatment of it in the Cinema books is strictly philosophical. That is, 
although cinema, as an art, may be said to think via the creation of affects, the 
task Deleuze essays in relation to it is to draw on the ‘zone of interference’ 
between philosophy and cinema in order to create concepts which 
nevertheless belong to the cinema. Thus the: 
theory of cinema is not ‘about’ cinema, but about the 
concepts that cinema gives rise to and which are themselves 
related to other concepts corresponding to other practices, 
the practice of concepts in general having no privilege over 
others … Cinema’s concepts are not given in the cinema. 
And yet they are cinema’s concepts, not theories about 
cinema … Cinema itself is a new practice of images and 
signs, whose theory philosophy must produce as a 
conceptual practice.269 
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The question of philosophy’s adequacy to the task of thinking being 
confronts philosophy with the cinematographic illusion very clearly on two 
closely related fronts. Firstly, if thought itself is cinematographic, how is it 
possible for philosophy to think otherwise, to think real movement, real being? 
Second, even if we were to simply grant philosophy this power by fiat, there 
remains the problem that if one wishes to share such thoughts, they of 
necessity must be expressed in language, which once again traps them in the 
realm of the cinematographic. Thus Deleuze must first of all find the means by 
which to constitute philosophical thought as non-cinematographic thought, 
and then offer an account of how such thought might evade the 
cinematographic tendencies of language. And insofar as both are problems 
arising in and from the Bergsonian foundation of Deleuzian ontology, the 
responses Deleuze offers are developments of and responses to Bergson’s 
own treatments of them. 
Bergson’s response to our first problem (that of the means by which 
philosophy may think being) is simply the notion of intuition itself: “To think 
intuitively”, he says, “is to think in duration itself”.270 Now as I have suggested, 
to the extent that beings, and thus human beings and their thoughts are an 
aspect of being, it is at least plausible to argue that their continuity with it 
affords them the possibility of a participation or relation to it based on that 
continuity, rather than the cinematographic and practical basis of ‘thought, 
perception and language’. In other words, since we are already ‘in’ duration, 
‘all’ we need do is overcome our cinematographic grasping of the world and 
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we will recognise the real duration, the real being, which we were always an 
expression of.  
The difficulty, of course, is that to do so we must turn against the 
constitutively cinematographic character of living beings and thus of human 
beings. Bergson always emphasises the ‘arduous’ and ephemeral character 
of intuition271 and of ‘prodigious’ effort required to make this turn.272 The 
intuition Bergson speaks of shares little in common with the everyday 
understanding of intuition as a kind of spontaneous or immediate capacity of 
thought to grasp things or beings. Indeed, he goes so far as to suggest that to 
think intuitively “we must do violence to the mind, go counter to the natural 
[cinematographic] bent of the intellect. But that is just the function of 
philosophy”.273 
Moreover the participation in being, in duration, to which such thought 
aspires comes at the cost of our capacity to act, inasmuch as it is the 
cinematographic illusion that affords us that power. Indeed, this passivity 
appears as characteristic of being. Bergson notes that “if almost the whole of 
our past is hidden from us because it is inhibited by the necessities of present 
action, it will find strength to cross the threshold of consciousness in all cases 
where we renounce the interests of effective action”.274 Deleuze, in his turn, 
points out that this past which we may reach only by abandoning the 
‘necessities of present action’ is, in its purest form, nothing other than being: 
“Useless and inactive, impassive, it IS, in the full sense of the word: It is 
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identical with being in itself”.275 Thus being, and our grasp of being, are given 
in relation to a fundamental passivity or waiting: as Bergson says, “the 
material universe in its entirety keeps our consciousness waiting; it waits 
itself.”276  
Intuition, then, requires the human to turn against itself in something akin 
to an ‘act’ of violence and yet that act is intimately tied to the loss or 
abandonment or forgoing of the power to act. Insofar as it offers to the human 
access to something of being, intuition seems less an act or a power of 
human thought than a waiting, perhaps interminable, for the arrival of the 
inhuman, such that we might justly characterise its human experience as a 
suffering of time. As we shall see in the final chapter, this thought of the 
thought of real being as a ‘suffering of time’ has an intimate relationship with 
Deleuze’s characterisation of cinema of the time-image.  
However, even if this ‘suffering of time’ is indeed the modality of the 
human experience of being, it nevertheless offers us no insight into how such 
intuition might ever be conveyed to another in an act of communication (how 
can such passivity and waiting be transliterated into action, into words?) 
Indeed, if we wish to convey precisely what it is that intuition consists of, what 
it is, we are faced with “the fact that intuition … is exactly what excludes, in 
the words of one commentator, ‘the idea itself of definition’”.277 Bergson 
clearly recognises this problem to some degree. He notes, for instance, that:  
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Intuition will be communicated only by the intellect. It is more 
than idea; nevertheless in order to be transmitted, it will have 
to use ideas as a conveyance ... Comparisons and 
metaphors will here suggest what cannot be expressed.278 
Nevertheless, this recourse to “comparisons and metaphors” seems no less 
vague than the idea of intuition itself, able to be suggested but not expressed. 
It is hardly surprising then that Bergson’s philosophy, and in particular his 
notion of intuition, have been criticised as ‘casual’, ‘incoherent’, 
‘unsystematic’, as an ‘analysis against analysis’ and as fundamentally 
irrationalist in its orientation and its outcomes.279  
Deleuze can be seen to respond indirectly to these charges in 
Bergsonism, insofar as he argues there for an interpretation of intuition as a 
properly rigorous philosophical method. That is, far from depending on “a 
feeling, an inspiration … [or] a disorderly sympathy”,280 he presents it quite 
literally as a series of rules which can be applied repeatedly and consistently, 
irrespective of individual ‘vision’, to the resolution of philosophical problems.281 
What is important here, for our purposes, is that insofar as intuition is given 
here as a philosophical method, philosophical thought is itself identified as a 
practice real thought demands, rather than a capacity thought possesses by 
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right.282 That is, thought must act (and act in a certain way) in order to be 
philosophical. A paradox then: intuition is a specific act or practice of thought, 
but an act that thought suffers or undergoes, rather than a power it 
possesses. As I suggested in the introduction to this chapter, a thought that 
truly thinks is one for which thought is no longer a power that it holds, but 
powerlessness that it suffers. And if this powerlessness has a relation to real 
being, real duration, it is as the time of an interminable waiting for a thought 
lacking the power to begin. 
 Both sides of this problem – that of the means by which thought might 
grasp being and that of the means by which it might communicate this grasp – 
can be summed up in terms of the search for precision in philosophy. As we 
have seen, the fundamental criticism both Bergson and Deleuze direct against 
cinematographic thought is its abstraction, the ‘bagginess’ of the concepts it 
extracts from the becoming of duration and of movement, through which it 
gains mastery over the living (insofar as it gives us the power to act) at the 
cost of losing the nuance or specificity of life itself, so that in gaining the 
power to act, we separate ourselves from the world. What both Bergson and 
Deleuze seek instead is a true empiricism in philosophy, which is to say, an 
empiricism capable of grasping things as they are in themselves, rather than 
as they are constituted relative to the needs of action. As Bergson points out, 
this empiricism is fundamentally metaphysical: 
A true empiricism is the one which purposes to keep as 
close to the original itself as possible, to probe more deeply 
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into life, and by a kind of spiritual auscultation, to feel its soul 
palpitate; and this true empiricism is the real metaphysics.283 
Clearly such an empiricism differs from one in which one simply looks at the 
world and tries to explain it on that basis. The latter leads inevitably to 
analyses that reinscribe the cinematographic illusion that makes such ‘looking’ 
possible. Nevertheless, metaphysical empiricism and its conventional 
counterpart do share a commonality, insofar as both assume an objectively 
real world whose truth is available to us in and through experience, such that 
Mullarkey argues that Bergsonian philosophy presents us with a ‘thoroughly 
classical’ “realist view of truth as correspondence”.284  
However, where a conventional empiricism locates this correspondence 
as one between human perception and the world, Bergson derives it from the 
character of the world as image in itself, rather than for us. Insofar as images 
are all there is, we ourselves are nothing but images among other images 
(this is the immanence of beings and being) such that to perceive the world 
(empirically) is not to perceive some thing, but plunge into perception itself, 
into images that move (or movement-images): “to perceive what can only be 
perceived rather than what is a mixture of abstraction and everyday 
experience: as such, “metaphysics will then become experience itself”.285 
Precision in philosophy, then, would consist in a thought that enters into, or 
rather opens itself up to, the movement of being itself, the movement-images 
that express being in its duration rather than its abstraction, grasping things in 
their becoming, so that:  
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radical empiricism is metaphysical to the extent that it 
focuses on the individual specificity of its object – the 
singularity of the individual that can only be sensed 
[perceived] rather than imagined. Metaphysics is not the 
contemplation of an alternative reality [a transcendent reality 
‘above’ reality] but the perception of a heightened reality, a 
perception Bergson eventually calls ‘intuition’.286 
We can see from this why Deleuze insists that philosophy must be a practice, 
something that itself takes place: if it is to be adequate to the real, it must be 
real in itself, and not abstract, and thus must be something that itself takes 
place, takes time, and thus takes place in time, because to be precise, to be 
empirical, it must enter into the movement of being and to do so it too must 
move.  
However, no matter how real the movement of philosophical thought and 
method, it remains merely solipsistic unless we can convey something of it to 
someone else. If the practice of philosophical intuition succeeds in opening 
human thought to the thought of being, it nevertheless must then contend with 
the cinematographic character of language itself. Mullarkey argues that, in 
claiming for language the power (however forced) to express or articulate the 
real movement of being, Bergson nevertheless does not claim for language 
the power to represent this movement (such a representation could only offer 
a cinematographic illusion of that movement.) Just as intuition seeks to place 
thought within the movement of being, Bergson asks for language and 
concepts that place themselves within the very movement they seek to 
express. That is, Bergson’s “aim is not to have thought and language 
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correspond to an immobile thing, but to recreate the movement of things and, 
by that, render them a part of a process-reality”.287  
If there is a representation or mimesis in this kind of language and 
thought, what is mimicked in it is not a thing or static object (an abstraction), 
but the movement of being itself, or rather, the mobile section of that 
movement in which a facet or aspect of being is expressed (the flow of a river, 
the flight of an arrow, the sugar dissolving in a glass of water). Rather than 
representing an object, philosophical language would seek to trace or retrace 
the movement of an ‘object’ (or more properly a ‘mobile section of duration’) in 
its becoming, a becoming that is always connected to the being of becoming 
itself, even if only by the finest thread.  
Moreover, both the movement and the language that mimics it are 
equally real and equally acts of creation. Inasmuch as thought is an aspect of 
being, it is so in the following sense: everything is an image, so that both the 
‘object’ of a concept and the concept itself are both images, and thus 
movements or constant variations: both the thought and the language 
Bergson requires are mobile, and must not be confused with the static and 
abstract concepts and language he criticises. A ‘mobile’ language does not 
represent the thing it seeks to account for – it is not an image of the thing. 
Rather, it ‘mimics’ the movement, the variation that the ‘thing’ is by recreating 
that movement, but in its own terms and with its own materials, which are its 
terms. Thus Mullarkey argues that:  
If this is mimesis, then it is mimesis with a new meaning: 
language imitating reality by being real itself, this being 
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achieved by giving language a certain élan, a movement of 
reality … [it] does not aim, says Bergson, to reproduce either 
the ‘abstract type’ or conception of is model, or the 
‘materiality’ of the model: it recreates the ‘characteristic 
movement’ that animates its lines.288 
 Nevertheless, it is not immediately clear how this mimesis might work 
in practice – that is, how it manages to reconcile the cinematographic 
characterisation Bergson gives of language with the demand for a language 
that attains the power of a real movement, and thus can ‘recreate’ the 
movement of the real in its own terms. It is hardly accidental that what 
Bergson demands of thought and language seems to describe what we would 
more commonly attribute to art: a power of creation that causes the 
(cinematographically) imperceptible to appear to and for the eye or ear or 
hand. Art is, for Bergson, closely akin to both intuition and image,289 so much 
so that he suggests were we able to experience reality directly (without any 
cinematographic intermediary), if we were able to “enter into immediate 
communication with things and with ourselves [in a pure intuition], I really 
believe art would be useless, or rather that all of us would be artists, for our 
soul would vibrate then continually in unison with nature”.290  
It is hardly surprising, then that Bergson often invokes the work of art 
(both in the sense of art as work, as a practice of creation, and of the 
productions of that practice, that is, artworks themselves) as a model for 
philosophical intuition and its expression. Indeed he goes so far as to claim 
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that it is the function of artists “precisely to see and make us see what we do 
not naturally perceive”.291 As Mullarkey says, “Art [for Bergson] is not an act of 
imagination fancifully creating ex nihilo: it is rather a restoration of a world that 
our normally practical, narrowed and impoverishing perception has 
destroyed”.292 That is to say, both philosophical intuition and art constitute 
acts of creation, not from nothing but de novo, and in doing so open our 
perception to the world in its becoming.293 
Deleuze’s continued interest in and philosophical engagement with the 
arts, and with literature and cinema in particular, should thus be understood at 
least partially in terms of the ways in which, as art, they realise or actualise 
Bergson’s demand for a ‘forcing’ of language beyond its cinematographic 
tendencies, in order that it create a ‘vision’ or make visible what is otherwise 
hidden in and by language’s primordial tendencies.294 Deleuze, however, 
takes this demand further, by making explicit what is only implied in Bergson: 
that art not only offers a model for how philosophical intuition might be 
expressed (non-cinematographically) but that it constitutes a model of a non-
cinematographic practice of thought whose ‘intuitions’ are expressed in and 
as that practice. That is, art shows us not only how to force language or 
expression beyond its cinematographic tendencies, but also that that forcing 
                                                
291 The Creative Mind, 135. 
292 Mullarkey, Bergson and Philosophy, 160. 
293 As such, the following comment by Bergson in “The Life and Work of Ravaisson” might equally well 
be taken to apply to himself: “The whole philosophy of [Jean Gaspard Felix] Ravaisson springs from the 
idea that art is a figured metaphysics, that metaphysics is a reflection of art, and that it is the same 
intuition, variously applied, which makes the profound philosopher and the great artist”. Bergson, The 
Creative Mind, 231. It is clear from the account Bergson offers of Ravaisson that Bergson finds in him at 
least a kindred philosophical spirit.  
294 Deleuze suggests something similar in an interview with Bellour and François Ewald for Magazine 
Littéraire (republished in English in Negotiations) where he argues “Style in philosophy is the movement 
of concepts. This movement’s only present, of course, in the sentences, but the sole point of the 
sentences is to give it life, a life of its own. Style is a set of variations in language, a modulation, and a 
straining of one’s whole language toward something outside it”. Negotiations, 140−41. 
4.#What#Use#is#Cinema#to#Deleuze?#/#134#
is itself thought thinking or, more precisely, thought understood as a practice. 
Whether it is a case of affects and percepts (in art) or in concepts (in 
philosophy) the problem of both the intuition of being and the expression of 
that intuition are resolved as a single problem whose solution is to be found in 
the notion of (artistic or philosophical) practice. 
In the preface to the French edition of Essays Critical and Clinical, 
Deleuze notes that:  
writers, as Proust says, invent a new language within 
language, a foreign language, as it were. They bring to light 
new grammatical or syntactic powers. They force language 
outside its customary furrows, they make it delirious. But the 
problem of writing is also inseparable from a problem of 
seeing and hearing ... One must say of every writer: he is a 
seer, a hearer.295 
In their ‘forcing’ of language beyond its limits, such writers place art in intimate 
contact with the task of philosophy, even though the materials they work with, 
and the affects and perceptions they create, differ from the concepts 
philosophy creates in and with its own materials. We find this intimacy figured 
in Nietzsche’s account of both artists and philosophers as “‘physicians of 
culture’, for whom phenomena are signs or symptoms that reflect a certain 
state of forces”,296 a description that in turn evokes Bergson’s characterisation 
of philosophy as a kind of spiritual or metaphysical ‘auscultation’. In both 
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cases, art and philosophy are presented as a kind of diagnostic process, a 
symptomatology or interpretation of the signs of the world which reveal 
aspects of being that the cinematographic tendencies of life hide from us.297  
It is hardly surprising, then, that the practice of philosophy that Deleuze 
and Guattari sum up in What is Philosophy? in terms of the creation of 
concepts bears a striking similarity to the diagnostic power Deleuze attributes 
to and analyses with regard to literature in his Essays Critical and Clinical. But 
what does it mean to describe artists and philosophers as ‘physicians’ or 
‘diagnosticians’ of culture? In his introduction to Essays Critical and Clinical, 
Smith notes that a doctor who labels a disease for the first time  
certainly does not ‘invent’ the disease, but rather is said to 
‘isolate’ it; he or she distinguishes cases that had hitherto 
been confused by dissociating symptoms that were 
previously grouped together and by juxtaposing them with 
others that were previously dissociated. In this way, the 
doctor constructs an original clinical concept for the 
disease.298 
In this sense Parkinson’s disease, for example, is certainly real but 
nevertheless virtual. Its consistency is not given in the individual symptoms 
actualised across the patient’s body, but in the dissociation and juxtaposition 
of symptoms ‘constructed’ by the doctor from those symptoms, from those 
actual states of affairs. The disease is clearly not just in the physician’s mind: 
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the patient’s suffering certainly exists, whether or not it is recognised or 
isolated as a distinct condition.  
However, the concept of the condition is an invention, and is thus a 
genuine creation, inasmuch as it constitutes a kind of counter-actualisation of 
the virtual disease into a new form: the symptoms of the disease expressed 
across the patient’s body are both the actualised mode of the virtual disease, 
as well as signs that the physician must dissociate and juxtapose from out of 
the mass of divergent symptoms that swarm across the body in question, in 
order that her or she might counter-actualise the virtual disease into a new 
form or consistency − that of the clinician’s concept rather than the physical 
symptoms of the patient. The clinician, in a sense, recreates or enters into the 
movement from virtual (the disease as it exists outside of and separate from 
any actual symptoms, or the individuals that suffer from it299) to actual (the 
disease as the patient’s suffering) but ‘in reverse’, moving from the actual 
symptoms to the virtual syndrome, and in doing so gives the disease a new, 
actual, consistency quite distinct from the diverse and apparently disjoined 
symptoms of the patient’s body.  
 Of course, for Nietzsche or Bergson or Deleuze, the diagnosis in 
question is not a medical but an artistic or philosophical one: art, literature, 
cinema, metaphysics as a diagnosis of the signs of the world, such that for 
Deleuze, “The whole of philosophy is a symptomatology, and a semiology”.300 
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If art and philosophy differ in this regard, it is in terms of the ‘materials’ in 
which their diagnoses are expressed: affects and percepts in art, and 
concepts in philosophy. Nevertheless, the process or method just described is 
equally applicable to the creation of concepts Deleuze and Guattari use to 
characterise the specificity of philosophy. Just as Bergson asks for a 
language that enters into the movement of real being, Deleuze and Guattari 
insist that a concept that seeks to be adequate to being as creation, as real 
movement, must also itself be a genuine act of creation itself.301 A concept 
that seeks to represent being can only do so cinematographically, as a static 
abstraction. The problem, then, is how a concept that is a creation in itself can 
relate to or express anything of the movement it seeks to be adequate to if it 
is not a representation of it.  
The answer lies in its relationship to the movement of actualisation and 
counter-actualisation we have just seen in relation to the physician’s 
construction of the concept of a disease or syndrome, and is a function of the 
metaphysical or transcendental empiricism Deleuze practices. As we have 
seen, the actual (the present, the world in which we act) bears no 
resemblance to the virtual of which it is the actualisation. Moreover, virtual 
problems are susceptible of a multiplicity of such actualisation or solutions, 
which will not necessarily resemble each other either: “While actual forms or 
products can resemble each other, the movements of production [of 
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actualisation] do not resemble each other, nor do the products resemble the 
virtuality that they embody [actualise]”.302  
Thus if we merely look to the signs given in actual world around us, after 
the fashion of a conventional empiricism, we will fail to see the real 
differences they actualise and our grasp of being will develop only on the 
basis of ‘false’ or ‘badly stated’ problems, that, as Deleuze says in 
Bergsonism, “arbitrarily group things that differ in kind”.303 If Deleuze’s own 
‘transcendental empiricism’ seems ‘unhinged’ or unrecognisable as 
empiricism, it is because rather than basing its grasp of the world simply in 
what it experiences in it, it instead begins from particular ‘cases’ and signs in 
that world, and seeks from them to find the virtual event that is actualised in 
them, in unrecognisable and superficially unrelated actual states of affairs, or 
‘symptoms’. This results in classifications based not on resemblances among 
experiences, but rather according to a virtual problem or differentiation 
‘dispersed’ unrecognisably across these diverse actual elements. And these 
classifications are concepts, concepts created out of the dissociation and 
juxtaposition of the actual in order to mimic not the actual, but the virtual 
becoming that manifests or actualises itself unrecognisably in the world in 
which we live and act. 
Thus when Deleuze and Guattari speak of the concept as a ‘counter-
effectuation of the event’, they describe a properly philosophical concept that 
enters into the movement of creation, as Bergson sought to do, but in a 
sense, in reverse. This reversal does not return us to a point of origin: it is 
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neither a mirror image of the actualisation of the virtual nor representation of 
the virtual, since the concept is a creation in itself, no less than the virtual 
problem or its actualisations in states of affairs: 
From virtuals we descend to actual states of affairs, and from 
states of affairs we ascend to virtuals, without being able to 
isolate one from the other. But we do not ascend and 
descend in this way on the same line: actualisation and 
counter-effectuation are not two segments of the same line 
but rather different lines”.304  
Being and the virtual events or problems it creates are not sensible, cannot be 
‘seen’ just by looking at the actual world. In order to think being or the 
movement of being, we must create concepts which are movements in 
themselves, which enter into the movement of being by enacting or mimicking 
that movement in the other direction, from the actual to the virtual, but by its 
own means and in its own terms:  
Such a mime neither reproduces the state of affairs [the 
actual] nor imitates the lived; it does not give an image but 
constructs the concept. It does not look for the function of 
what happens but extracts the event from it, or that part that 
does not let itself be actualised, the reality of the concept.305  
One cannot represent the virtual, then, which differs from itself at all stages, 
but one can ‘mimic’ its movement or its differing from itself, ‘extracting’ it from 
and with the (actual) materials at hand. And in doing so, “We go beyond 
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305 Ibid. 
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experience [the actual, the symptoms] toward the conditions of experience 
[the virtual, the syndrome or concept of the disease]”.306  
If it is the case, then, that artists and philosophers can be understood as 
‘physicians of culture’, it is in the sense that in dividing the apparently similar 
and joining the apparently diverse they construct concepts that ‘counter-
actualise’ or ‘counter-effectuate’ the virtual event. In doing so, they create of it 
a new actual consistency which is nevertheless distinct from its actualisation 
in actions or functions in the world, from the chains of cause and effect among 
actual states of affairs (the concept of the disease shares nothing of the 
patient’s suffering). It is in this sense that we can understand Deleuze’s 
comment that Sacher-Masoch may be a better guide to masochism than 
Freud, since “a writer can go further in symptomatology, that the work of art 
gives him a new means – perhaps because the writer is less concerned with 
causes”.307 The clinician (or in this case, psychoanalyst) conducts their 
symptomatology in order to best know what to do (what treatment is best for 
this patient?) and thus subordinates it to the needs of action that entrap life 
within the cinematographic illusion. The artist, author or philosopher, on the 
other hand, who introduces or mimics the movement of real being in the 
concepts they create, through and in their work instead extract the event from 
the lived and from the necessities of action and of cause and effect as a 
                                                
306 Deleuze, Bergsonism, 23. 
307 In the interview in which this claim is made, Deleuze is asked “Do you think we may one day speak 
of kafkaism or beckettism the same way we speak of sadism or masochism?” "Mysticism and 
Masochism," in Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade (Los Angeles & New 
York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 132−33. Although the term ‘kafkaism’ is never used in Roberto Calasso’s 
book K, it seems to me that in that work Calasso subjects Kafka and his work to a profound 
symptomatology of precisely the kind Deleuze is describing, quite independently of Deleuze, or 
Deleuzian terminology or concepts. K., trans. Geoffrey Brock (New York: Vintage, 2005).  
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concept (for Sacher-Masoch, that of masochism) and in doing so are better 
able to find a path for thought beyond or outside merely human experience.308  
 We can see in this concept of the concept Deleuze’s account of the 
means by which properly human thought might introduce real movement into 
its thoughts or, rather, to place its thought within the real movement of 
becoming, ‘ascending’ from actual to virtual in the counter-actualisation or 
counter-effectuation of the event of being’s differentiation. In this sense it can 
be understood as a development or extension of Bergson’s claims for a use of 
language that is capable of ‘forcing’ language beyond its primordial 
cinematographic tendencies.  
At the same time, it can also be traced back to Deleuze’s early analysis 
of Bergsonian intuition as a properly philosophical method, on two levels. 
Firstly, I would argue that the ‘unhinged’ empiricism of the method of the 
‘dissociation of the similar and joining of the diverse’ can be read as a 
development and extension of the ‘second rule’ of Deleuze’s account of the 
intuitive method. This rule concerns the division of the impure composite of 
‘fact’ (the actual) into its ‘qualitative and qualified tendencies’, its differences in 
kind and in degree, so as to “go beyond experience, towards the conditions of 
experience”.309 That is, it provides Deleuzian empiricism with the principle by 
which the actual should be divided and joined. Secondly, in the movement 
from the virtual event to its actual manifestations, and then in the movement 
of counter-effectuation from the actual ‘back’ towards the virtual, we can find 
                                                
308 Bergson makes a very similar set of claims in the first of the two lectures collected under the title 
“The Perception of Change” (originally presented at Oxford University). He attributes to artists the 
capacity to show us a reality we ourselves do not perceive, because the artist “is less preoccupied than 
ourselves with the positive and material side of life” whereas our vision is ‘narrowed’ and ‘drained’ by 
“our attachment to reality, our need for living and acting.” The Creative Mind, 135−36. 
309 Bergsonism, 21−29, and 22−23 in particular. 
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traces of Bergsonism’s conception of philosophical intuition as starting from 
experience and ‘diverging’ in lines developed according to the recognition of 
differences in kind, which then converge on “the virtual image or the distinct 
reason of the common point” – that image or point corresponding, more or 
less, to what Deleuze comes to describe as the virtual event or problem.  
Thus I would argue that the concept of the concept Deleuze and Guattari 
present in What is Philosophy? has its roots in Deleuze’s early response to 
the problem Bergson faces in attributing to thought the capacity to intuit being, 
given the cinematographic basis of thought, perception and language. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the concept is, at one and the same time, a 
method of both philosophical intuition (in the Bergsonian sense) and the non-
cinematographic expression of that intuition, inasmuch as it enters into or 
mimics the movement of being in precisely the fashion Bergson sought from 
language. By conceiving of philosophy as a practice, they transform 
Bergsonian intuition from a mystical sympathy with being into something that 
might plausibly be called a materialist practice of metaphysics.  
Bergson’s great problem is that he posits intuition first of all, in terms that 
make it inexpressible, and then must try to express this in actual language. 
Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, start from the actual, material and 
cinematographic experience in which the world is given to us first of all, and 
only then, on the basis of the dissociation and juxtaposition of that actual, 
material world, move towards the virtual conditions of that experience, or 
being. From this perspective, we can understand this concept of the concept 
as a key tool in Deleuze’s continuation of the Bergsonian project of 
developing a philosophy capable of thinking with and in the concrete reality of 
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being, rather than in terms of mere ‘baggy’ abstractions. That is, it constitutes 
the grounds of a properly non-cinematographic mode of philosophy and of 
thought. 
 However, this is not to say that Deleuze thus banishes the 
cinematographic illusion from thought (or language or perception). His 
concept of the concept constitutes a philosophical method, a practice of the 
construction of concepts so as to place them within the movement of being. It 
is the method as such that introduces real movement into thought, and not the 
concepts it produces and certainly not the language they are expressed in. 
That is, concepts, insofar as they partake of the real movement of being, have 
little or nothing to do with communication, or at least retain within them an 
incommunicable core, which is their movement.  
We can see in this a significant shift from Bergson’s treatment of this 
problem. Bergson seeks to communicate this incommunicable aspect of being 
(which is duration, or real movement) in language, by ‘forcing’ language 
beyond its limits, but in doing so places himself in conflict with the 
cinematographic character of language he himself posits. Deleuze, on the 
other hand, accepts the strictest consequences of the cinematographic 
illusion, by distinguishing concepts and ideas on the one hand, and 
communication and information on the other. The ‘forcing’ of the 
cinematographic performed by and in artistic and philosophical practice does 
not result in something that can be transmitted and exchanged as ‘data’ or 
information. The latter is the domain of cinematographic language and 
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communication, part of the realm of action and mastery.310 For Deleuze, the 
ideas and concepts created by art and philosophy remain incommunicable 
and are only ‘shared’ with others, with readers and viewers and listeners, to 
the extent that those others subject them to a practice of creation in turn.  
This has significant consequences for what it means to read Deleuze (or 
perhaps any author) and in particular for what one does with the concepts one 
finds in his work. Unless one’s reading and thinking and doing with Deleuze 
constitutes a practice of creation in its own right, his concepts will remain as 
static, abstract and cinematographic as those of Platonism, mechanism or 
indeed of Hegel, since insofar as we grasp them as actual words on the page 
or in our ears, all they can do is communicate something other than the 
incommunicable and virtual movement that constitutes them as concepts. 
This, it seems to me, is the basis for at least part of Deleuze’s hostility to 
discussion and interpretation in philosophy. Philosophers, he claims, 
have very little time for discussion. Every philosopher runs 
away when he or she hears someone say, ‘Lets discuss 
this.’ … Of what concern is it to philosophy that someone 
has such a view, and thinks this or that, if the problems at 
stake are not stated? And when they are stated, it is no 
longer a matter of discussing but rather one of creating 
concepts for the undiscussible problem posed. 
Communication always comes too early or too late, and 
                                                
310 Indeed, Deleuze explicitly ties information to questions of power and social control, such that we 
might say that ‘information management’ is social management: “information is exactly the system of 
control.” "What Is the Creative Act?," in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975−1995, ed. 
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when it comes to creating, conversation is always 
superfluous.311 
That is, to engage with concepts, with thought, with philosophy, is not to 
discuss or interpret it, or to ‘apply’ it as one does a coat of paint. All that one 
can do with a concept is to create concepts with it in turn, to subject it to the 
method of dissociation and recombination, of counter-effectuation, and create 
something of one’s own in relation to the virtual and ‘undiscussible’ problem it 
poses, not in order to communicate it, but in the hope that someone else will, 
in their own turn, do the same to one’s own concepts. This is the distinction 
Deleuze poses between a theory of the cinema, and the creation of its 
concepts: a theory one applies, but a concept can only be the materials, 
starting point or provocation for new concepts.  
4.3 Transcendental Empiricism as Cinematic Philosophy 
If, like Bordwell, we look at the Cinema books and see what we already 
know repeating itself under the sign of an arbitrarily imposed theoretical 
armature (‘a new teleology’), we wilfully ignore Deleuze’s insistence that these 
books are precisely not a theory of the cinema, a series of baggy concepts 
draped over an indifferent mass of examples. Alternatively, we might see that 
‘what we already know’ is itself an ill-fitting suit for the cases it clothes, and 
that Deleuze’s ‘auteurism’ does not consist in a series of static ‘illustrations’ or 
‘examples of’, but seeks to seeks to think with the case, in each case, and not 
of it. Thus Ropars-Wuilleumier says of the Cinema books that  
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thought in that of Bergson, insofar as, according to Leonard Lawlor, “Philosophy, for Bergson, cannot be 
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By manipulating fragments that already have an established 
meaning – hypotheses, ideas, or viewpoints inspired by 
screening films – Deleuze makes it possible for himself to 
put them into movement, to make meanings circulate, and to 
break their initial meanings by inscribing them into his own 
system of thought.312  
‘To put them into movement’ (to put movement into thought, and thus 
thought into movement), then, is to cause these fragments to differ from 
themselves, such that what we already know (‘fragments that already have an 
established meaning’ − familiar films and directors and authors, familiar 
historical divisions and progressions) become so many cases of the case 
which lead us towards the creation of concepts that belong to the cinema, but 
are not given in it.313 The creation of concepts, then, as the introduction of 
difference into what we already know as the introduction of difference into 
‘ourselves’, inasmuch as such ideas are indeed ‘our own’. And, therefore, the 
production of concepts as the production of monsters in ourselves, and for 
ourselves. Or, to summon up one more difference in difference, and to 
indicate the directions in which Cinema 2 will take us, perhaps we could say: 
the monstrosity of thought outside itself and the unthought in (our) thought.  
An understanding of this concept of the concept, then, is integral to any 
understanding of the Cinema books, since they constitute just such a 
symptomatology in their taxonomy of cinematic signs, which are nothing other 
than the concepts of the cinema philosophy produces in its encounter with the 
cinema. Éric Alliez notes that two reproaches have always been made against 
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313 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 280. 
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Deleuze: that “he is not an author because he comments, but neither is he a 
commentator because what he writes is always ‘Deleuzian’”.314 A 
“commentator” because he always begins with the case, sign or symptom, 
and not a schema into which the case must be placed, so that we are always 
tempted to think we know what he is talking about (‘ah, he’s telling me about 
Spinoza’, ‘this bit’s about Mizoguchi’, ‘oh look, something on Bazin’). Not a 
commentator because the necessity of creating the concept of which the case 
is the actualisation (and not the representation) gives rise to conceptual 
productions which are not merely ‘Deleuzian’ in every case, but in which the 
case becomes to a greater or lesser extent unrecognisable, even (or 
especially) to those who are familiar with the case in question: the creation of 
the concept as a ‘giving birth to monsters’.315 Deleuze uses this phrase to 
describe his work in the history of philosophy, but it is an equally apt 
description of the Cinema books themselves, such that Claire Perkins is able 
to sum up them up transitively as “monstrosity as cinephilia as philosophy”.316 
As a result, to a reader versed in the history of film and film theory, the 
Cinema books can appear, at one level at least, highly familiar; familiar 
directors and authors, familiar films (albeit hundreds of them), familiar 
historical divisions and progressions. Thus Rodowick points out that 
Deleuze’s “knowledge of film history departs little from the general histories 
that have been so profoundly challenged and revised by the new film history 
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of the past fifteen years”.317, while Bordwell sees him as merely mapping 
philosophical distinctions onto that same historiographic tradition, such that 
“Orthodox historical schemes become ratified by a new teleology. Stylistic 
development follows not from a law of progress but from the medium’s 
mysterious urge to fill in every square of a vast grid of conceptual 
possibilities”.318 However, if one pays attention to Deleuze’s treatment of this 
‘familiar territory’, the apparent familiarity can often all but vanish. Even films 
and filmmakers one feels one knows intimately can appear in nigh-on 
unrecognisable guises, to the point that Bellour can say that “it becomes 
improbable that each auteur would recognize himself in them”.319 
We need only think of Deleuze’s reference (in relation to his taxonomy of 
cinematic signs) to Borges’ ‘Chinese’ classification of animals that so 
delighted Foucault (“belonging to the emperor, embalmed, domesticated, 
edible … mermaids, and so on”320) to start to recognise how this might 
manifest itself in relation to cinema:  
A classification always involves bringing together things with 
very different appearances and separating those that are 
very similar … a classification is always a symptomatology. 
What we classify are signs in order to formulate a concept 
that presents itself as an event rather than an abstract 
essence.321 
                                                
317 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, x. 
318 Bordwell, On the History of Film Style, 117. 
319 Bellour, "Thinking, Recounting," 69. 
320 Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen," 368. For Foucault’s account of Borges’ classification, see The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Science (New York: Random House, 1971), xvi−xxvi. 
Deleuze leaves out my favourite item of the list: ‘animals that from a long way off look like flies’. 
321 "The Brain is the Screen," 368. 
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Insofar as a classification or taxonomy (as in the Cinema books) is also a 
symptomatology, it draws together diverse actual elements or symptoms 
which are visible (the signs of cinema), and constitutes of them a concept 
“which marks the meeting place of these symptoms, their point of coincidence 
or convergence”322, a point which is itself not actual but virtual.  
Deleuze’s application of the ‘empirical’ method of the ‘dissociation of the 
apparently similar and the bringing together of the apparently diverse’ 
accounts for the odd sense of both familiarity and strangeness the reader 
versed in film and film history often finds within them. This approach can 
create some consternation for the reader. Luc Moullet, for example, takes 
offence with Deleuze for aligning the category of the impulse-image with 
naturalism, and then grouping together under that sign filmmakers who would 
seem at first glance to share little in common with each other, or with what 
Moullet understands ‘naturalism’ to refer to: “Vidor, Losey, Ray and Fuller”, 
even Stroheim and Buñuel. “But who is further from naturalism than King 
Vidor?” he complains.323 As William D. Routt points out, however, Deleuze’s 
concept of ‘naturalism’ has little to do with the ‘meticulous surface 
observations’ Moullet seems to see as the point of resemblance qualifying a 
film or filmmaker for the category ‘naturalist’. Rather: 
Deleuze claims that cinematic naturalism links surface 
observation with an invisible system of underlying natural 
forces which impel characters to act in certain ways. 
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Moreover, some films which are not realistic on the surface 
are still motivated by ‘naturalist’ impulses. The visible surface 
and invisible impulse of a movie are interconnected just like 
a natural organism appears, to our sight, determined by a 
specific ‘natural’ physiology and psychology that we cannot 
see or hear.324 
It is the relationship between the visible surface of behaviour and these 
invisible and unseen impulses that constitutes the virtual problem or event 
actualised in the works of these apparently diverse and unrelated filmmakers, 
and whose relation to each other cannot simply be seen, but must be created 
as a concept (in this case, the concept of the impulse-image325).  
Thus the unhinged or transcendental empiricism Deleuze practices gives 
rise to concepts that can make the empirical or actual (film) world around us 
unrecognisable (“who is further from naturalism than King Vidor?”), despite 
being constructed with what seem to be the most familiar of materials. And, of 
course, it provides the organising principle of Deleuze’s entire taxonomy of 
cinematic signs, such that in his treatment of cinema, of films and of film 
history we find the same practice of ‘buggery’ Deleuze speaks of in relation to 
his work in the history of philosophy (“taking an author from behind and giving 
him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous”326). He creates, as 
something non-pre-existent, concepts of the cinema that are not given in the 
cinema, but which are nevertheless “cinema’s concepts, not theories about 
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the cinema”,327 concepts that are cinema’s own offspring, but that are 
nevertheless unrecognisable in it.  
We can certainly say, then, that the Cinema books constitute an 
instance of Deleuzian ‘conceptology’ in practice; but then, one could say that 
of all of his work, so perhaps this is not saying very much. However, it seems 
to me that there is a much more intimate or integral connection between the 
cinema and Deleuze’s philosophical practice of the concept, in the following 
sense. Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism extends or develops Bergson’s 
metaphysical empiricism by pushing ‘spiritual auscultation’ to a veritable 
symptomatology of being. In doing so he seeks to think by thinking beyond 
the actual, beyond human experience, on the basis of that actual and human 
experience, but only insofar as that experience is dissociated and juxtaposed 
such that it can become ‘unhinged’ or unrecognisable.  
We can unpack this a little further. Human experience is constitutively 
cinematographic, such that what is cut up and reordered, dissociated and 
juxtaposed, is nothing other than the productive and practical illusions of 
perception, thought and language that give us the power to act in, and on, the 
world. Transcendental empiricism, precision in philosophy, the symptomatic 
method, the creation of concepts all consist in cutting the world up and 
reordering its pieces: they are nothing other than forms of montage. 
Philosophy, then, as a properly cinematic practice that offers thought a non-
cinematographic access to being, to real movement and real duration. In other 
words, to put real movement into thought is to enter the cinema of the world. 
This would be the weight of Jean-Luc Nancy’s claim that  
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Deleuze’s interest in the cinema is not just appended to his 
work: it is at the centre, in the projective principle of this 
thought. It is a cinema-thought, in the sense of having its 
own order and screen, a singular plane of presentation and 
construction, of displacements and dramatization of 
concepts (the word ‘concept’ means this for Deleuze – 
making cinematic).328  
But if all of Deleuzian philosophy is already cinematic – already a 
‘montage thought’, we might justly ask why he needs the cinema at all. To ask 
the question ‘what use is cinema to Deleuze?’ is to ask after the problem that 
lies at the core of the Cinema books – to ask, in other words, what the stakes 
of the game are that he puts into play with his discussion of the three theses 
on movement. As we have seen, this game cannot be separated from the one 
played throughout most, if not all of Deleuze’s work and writing, insofar as the 
‘monotony’ Badiou finds in that work is a function of the Bergsonian 
ontological foundation that provides Deleuze with the means to escape the 
dialectical trap set by Hegel. That is, the univocity of this ontological 
foundation (being which ‘speaks’ or is ‘spoken’ always and everywhere in the 
same and single voice) and the immanence of beings with being that it implies 
are such that in each and every of the diverse cases taken up throughout 
Deleuze’s work, it is always the problem of the relation of the actual case to 
the virtual being it is actualised of that is at stake. The significance of the 
Cinema books within the Deleuzian œuvre lies not in the case of cinema, but 
in the means it offers Deleuze to think through, or think past, the impasse that 
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the cinematographic illusion constitutes for philosophy and philosophical 
thought.  
As we have seen, the cinematographic constitution of living beings, and 
human beings in particular, enables Deleuze to account for the ‘errors’ or 
illusions of thought that manifest themselves in Platonism, mechanism, and at 
their extreme, Hegelianism, in a strictly positive sense, without any recourse 
to negation or the negative, and thus in principle as contained and explained 
Deleuzian ontology. That is, it allows Deleuze to account for the genesis of 
negation and the negative as arbitrarily limited or abstract ‘moments’ within 
being as becoming. But this cinematographic genesis of the living, of the 
human being (in the cutting up or abstraction of being in order to gain the 
power to act), is almost too successful. How can thought, and thus 
philosophy, think real being, real movement, if that which thinks is necessarily 
constituted in an illusory relation to being – that of the cinematographic 
illusion? The foundation of any solution to this impasse is the necessity of 
some kind of relation between beings and being: the cinematographic illusion 
is nothing but an illusion, no matter how useful or necessary it is for beings 
that act in the world, such that the barrier it creates to the thought of real 
being is contingent, and not ontologically necessary or absolute.  
Bergson’s response to the impasse in question largely stops at this 
point, insofar as his conception of intuition in thought, and the capacity for 
‘forcing’ or ‘stretching’ the cinematographic illusion beyond itself in language, 
in art and in philosophy, are ultimately founded and justified on the necessity 
of some kind of shared link between beings and being. That this stopping 
point is premature is demonstrated by the repeated turn or return throughout 
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Deleuze’s work to developments or redevelopments within his own thought of 
the relationship of philosophy, language and art to being, and in particular to 
the terms in which both the thought of being, and the expression (if not 
communication) of that thought are possible.  
In other words, it is not enough to merely say that beings are part of 
being, and therefore capable of thinking it and saying it, despite the 
cinematographic character of human thought and language. The 
cinematographic illusion may be ontologically contingent, but it is 
epistemologically constitutive, insofar as it is the basis on which living beings 
act in and on the world. A thought that seeks to think real being must go 
beyond (or perhaps behind) its own constitution as thought, and it must do so 
in particular rather than general or abstract terms, since it is abstraction itself 
that it must elude in thought, such that we must in each case think the 
specificity or nuance of the case in question (the ‘how, how many, when and 
where’329) by thinking from the actual to the virtual, and not seeking to place 
ourselves and our thought within that virtual immediately, as if the thought of 
real being were a power we possess, rather than an ‘impower’ we suffer. The 
specificity of the Cinema books, the stakes of their game, lie in the case they 
seek to think, which gathers together or crystallises or is the point of 
convergence of all the other cases. The case in question is not that of cinema, 
or of films or film theory, but that of man and his relationship to the world.  
To understand the weight this phrase carries in relation to the Cinema 
books, we need to understand the quite specific sense in which each of its 
terms is used. ‘Man’ is very simply human being as it is constituted 
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cinematographically: the ‘man’ of action, the one who acts and reacts, and in 
these actions seeks mastery and control, the ‘man’ who communicates, 
gathers and dispenses information, who construes the world as resource or, 
at the extremes of action, as battlefield. Deleuze’s use of the gendered 
pronoun is potentially troubling here, unless one reads it not as an obtusely 
sexist use of language, but rather as an indication that ‘man’ here is used in 
the ‘molar’ or ‘majoritarian’ sense laid out in A Thousand Plateaus: man not as 
a gender or even a quantitative majority, but as  
a state or standard in relation to which larger quantities, as 
well as the smallest, can be said to be minoritarian: white-
man, adult-male, etc … It is not a question of knowing 
whether there are more mosquitoes or flies than men, but of 
knowing how ‘man’ constituted a standard in the universe in 
relation to which men necessarily (analytically) form a 
majority.330 
‘Man’, then, as “the molar entity par excellence”,331 the abstract norm such 
that becoming-woman is task for both genders (“Even women must become-
woman”332) insofar as they would escape the cinematographic conditions of 
life, and thus social life. As Brian Massumi points out in the discussion of 
‘becoming-woman’ in his Users Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia, within 
the Deleuzian framework, “‘Man’ and ‘Woman as such have no reality other 
than that of logical abstractions”333 – or in the terms of our current discussion, 
                                                
330 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis & London: U of Minnesota P, 1987), 291. 
331 Ibid., 292. 
332 Ibid., 291. 
333 Massumi goes on to add that “What they are abstractions of are not the human bodies to which they 
are applied, but habit-forming whole attractors to which society expects its bodies to be addicted (love, 
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no reality other than that of cinematographic abstractions. Such an 
interpretation implies that man, as molar, is indeed part of that which must be 
overcome if thought is to think real difference, to think the world in its 
reality.334 
The sense of ‘the world’ to which this ‘man’ is related is perhaps more 
complex. It is undoubtedly ‘the world’ in its fullest sense, as being in its 
movement and real difference from itself first of all. But cinematographic man 
constitutes and is constituted in another world in this world; the world of 
action, limited, arbitrary and abstract to be sure, but no less real or effective 
for all that (and indeed, for beings and for human beings all the more effective 
in that, unlike the world of being, it is a world they can live and act in). To 
speak of the ‘relationship between man and the world’, then, is to speak of the 
cinematographic constitution of beings, and of human beings, and of the 
abstract, limited and arbitrary world grasped in and by this constitution, in 
terms of genesis on the basis of being, or the world as open whole.  
In this sense the philosophical problems that Deleuze says ‘compelled’ 
him to look for answers in the cinema might be summed up in terms of the 
                                                                                                                                      
more so, at the level of the constitution of the social and political as it does at the level of the individual. 
Massumi, Users Guide, 86−87. 
334 For the sake of clarity I follow Deleuze (and Deleuze and Guattari) in using ‘man’ in this molar sense 
throughout this thesis. However, it is important to note that the assertion that ‘becoming woman is a task 
for both genders’ is a problematic one. At the very least it risks effacing actually existing women 
altogether, whether in terms of the molar struggles women’s identities and rights, or in its implication of 
a symmetry between the molar positions of both male and female identity. As Rosi Braidotti points out, 
the proposition of such a symmetry “acts as if sexual differentiation or gender dichotomies did not have 
as the most immediate and pernicious consequence the positioning of the two sexes in an asymmetrical 
power relationship to each other.” "Becoming Woman: or Sexual Difference Revisited," Theory, Culture 
& Society 20, no. 3 (2003): 51. As such, and notwithstanding Deleuze and Guattari’s acknowledgement 
that it remains “indispensible for women to conduct a molar politics, with a view to winning back their 
own organism, their own history, their own subjectivity”, the question of “becoming woman” and its 
relation to the politics and theorisation of feminine identity remain contested. Thousand Plateaus, 276. 
See, for example, Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook, eds., Deleuze and Feminist Theory (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 2000); Louise Burchill, "Becoming-Woman: A Metamorphosis in the Present Relegating 
Repetition of Gendered Time to the Past," Time & Society 19, no. 1 (2010): 87; Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile 
Bodies: Towards a Corporeal Feminism (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 160−83. 
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problem of the thought of the world. This phrase too has a dual sense; on the 
one hand it concerns a strictly human thought or, rather, the means by which 
human thought thinks the world in which it lives and acts. On the other, 
inasmuch as this thought is an aspect of being, it also concerns a strictly 
inhuman thought to which human thought, human being must expose itself if it 
is to think real being, real movement, real difference. This inhuman thought is 
‘the thought of the world’ understood as the world as thought, as thinking in 
itself beyond human thought and the human condition: thought as a 
powerlessness at the heart of thought, inasmuch as man thinks it only to the 
extent that he loses or frees himself from his cinematographic power to act.  
More prosaically, what Deleuze essays in the Cinema books is an 
genetic account of thought itself and thus of philosophy (and by ‘account’ I 
mean both an explanation and a history or, rather, dramatisation). And this 
task can only be addressed in terms of the genesis of beings able to ask such 
questions of being. To pose it as a question, how does ontological difference 
give rise to epistemological questioning? What is the genesis of thought or, as 
Claire Colebrook puts it, “Why does thought emerge from life?”335 To answer 
such questions, Deleuze must first provide an account of the genesis of the 
cinematographic orientation of human thought on the basis of ontological 
difference. Then (and this is the hard part) he must be able to show how such 
cinematographic thought is nevertheless capable of giving rise to a thought 
and philosophy adequate to being as it is for itself, rather than being as it is 
given over to human power and action.  
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This is the task of the Cinema books themselves. In other words, what 
Deleuze attempts in them is a vastly more ambitious version of his ‘escape’ 
from the dialectic, which adds to that ‘escape’ the ground and source of the 
errors it exemplifies, in the form of the cinematographic genesis of beings 
themselves. He thus seeks to provide not just an account, but a genetic 
account of the entire history of thought and of philosophy (even the most 
foreign to his own), on the basis of his own philosophy of difference. This is 
the full meaning of my claim that the proposition the Cinema books present us 
with is a dramatisation of philosophy itself: the history of cinema as the film of 
philosophy and of the history of philosophy, as shot from the perspective of 
being. 
The reasons that Deleuze turns to the cinema in order to achieve this 
task are mapped out in the analyses of the relations of language, philosophy 
and thought we have seen in the precursors to the Cinema books. Firstly, he 
finds in cinema a non-linguistic semiotic system that is mobile in itself, and 
thus is capable of a thought that immediately and already contains real 
movement: cinema as non-cinematographic thought. Secondly, insofar as 
Deleuze’s method of conceptual production is already cinematic in its method 
of dissociation and juxtaposition, the cinema en tout is already Deleuzian in its 
mode of thought. Indeed, it is in a sense more Deleuzian in its mode of 
thought than Deleuze himself (who is only human, after all), insofar as it thinks 
with mobile sections of duration, or movement-images, immediately and first 
of all.  
This, I would suggest, is why Deleuze must turn to cinema in order to 
find answers to philosophical problems: in its inhuman mode of thought, it is 
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better equipped to think the thought of the world (in both the senses outlined 
above) than philosophy itself, even Deleuzian philosophy. In this sense, the 
apparent perversity of writing two volumes on the cinema in the terms of a 
philosopher who condemns the cinema as the exemplar of a mechanism of 
thought that divides the human from being reveals itself as the purest 
pragmatism: Deleuze deploys the cinema to account for and resolve the 
problems internal to his own Bergsonism, which are simply the problems of 
the constitution of a thought and a philosophy adequate to being on the basis 
of the cinematographic genesis of human being and human thought.  
These, I would argue, are the stakes of the game, the use that cinema 
has for Deleuze. The second half of this thesis will demonstrate how the game 
is played: how and in what sense the cinema is the correction of the 
cinematographic illusion (that is to say, how and why it is able to think, and 
think real being better than human thought); how and why cinematographic 
thought arises within the cinema on the basis of the cinema’s non-
cinematographic constitution (the genesis of human thought and of ‘abstract’ 
philosophy); and, finally, how this cinematographic thought dramatises the 
confrontation of human thought with the inhuman thought of being, or thought 
outside itself, and the unthought in thought. 
 
 
 5. Genesis and Deduction 
5.1 Cinematic Being 
One way of reading the Cinema books is to regard them as a kind of 
counterfactual thought experiment in the history of philosophy in which 
Deleuze reads Matter and Memory, first published in French in 1896, as if it 
were both a book about, and a prefiguration of, cinema (which was in fact only 
beginning its birth pangs as Bergson’s book was being written). Underwriting 
this experiment is Deleuze’s claim that Bergson, in a move ‘startlingly ahead 
of his time’, and ahead of the cinema as such, conceives of the universe as 
ontologically cinematic in and of itself, irrespective of any actual cinema. That 
is, Bergson offers us a vision of “the universe as cinema in itself, a 
metacinema”.336 Read this way, Deleuze’s argument goes well beyond the 
partial conciliation of cinema and cinematographic illusion implied in his claim 
that “Even in his critique of the cinema, [the first chapter of Matter and 
Memory suggests that] Bergson was in agreement with it, to a far greater 
degree than he thought”.337  
Cinema has a privileged access to being, in particular as a mode of 
thought of being, because being itself is already metacinematic. As we shall 
see, however, the terms of the genesis of beings (and thus human beings) on 
the basis of this metacinematic universe are such that human nature is itself 
constitutively cinematographic. To put the argument in its most condensed 
form, Deleuze draws on Bergson to argue that being itself is nothing but light, 
and beings arise on that basis as a ‘screen’ that selectively reflects or reveals 
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that light. Deleuze seeks to demonstrate in the first few chapters of Cinema1 
that the cinema as such has the capacity to both deduce and correct this 
cinematographic genesis of human being by means of its own strictly formal 
capacities – its deployment of frame, shot and montage.338 This double 
proposition is the basis of the philosophical privilege Deleuze accords the 
cinema, over and above all other arts and in some sense even over 
philosophy itself.339 The cinema has the capacity not only to deduce the 
genesis of both beings and their abstract grasp of being, but also to articulate 
or dramatise the relations between them in its own strictly non-human terms. 
The task of this chapter is to demonstrate how it does so.  
Deleuze derives his claims regarding the metacinematic character of 
being from his reading of the arguments of the first chapter of Matter and 
Memory, in which Bergson sets out to dissolve the philosophical problems 
arising from both realist and idealist conceptions of the relations between 
mind and body, or spirit and matter.340 There Bergson argues that “both 
realism and idealism go too far, that it is a mistake to reduce matter to the 
perception we have of it, a mistake also to make of it a thing able to produce 
                                                
338 Although the deduction and the correction in question derives from quite distinct operations of these 
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339 It is privileged over the other arts insofar as it is the only form he deals with as a form (and not in 
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privileged over philosophy in the sense that Deleuze is ‘compelled’ to turn to cinema rather than 
philosophy to look for answers to philosophical problems. Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen," 367. 
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in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they”.341 In this chapter, 
beginning from a stance of self consciously quotidian empiricism,342 Bergson 
seeks to resolve the excesses of both the realist and idealist positions via the 
deduction of a strict identity of matter and image, in which: 
Matter … is an aggregate of ‘images.’ And by ‘image’ we 
mean a certain existence which is more than that which the 
idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the 
realist calls a thing – an existence placed halfway between 
the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’.343  
Thus for Bergson, an image is neither a representation, more or less flawed, 
of some externally existent thing (which is, roughly speaking, a realist 
position) nor the production or projection of a purely mental state (which 
would correspond broadly to idealism). In their different ways both realism and 
idealism dissociate the existence of a thing from its appearance, or its 
appearance from its existence. Realism thus faces the problem of accounting 
not only for two (real or apparent) modalities of the one ‘thing’, but also for the 
mechanism of the relationship (if any) between them, while idealism endows 
the brain with the ‘miraculous power’ of in some sense producing the order of 
the universe entirely within itself.344  
This complicates a state of affairs that may be dealt with far more easily 
if we begin from a position based in everyday experience. Thus, argues 
Bergson, “a mind unaware of the disputes between philosophers … would 
                                                
341 Bergson, Matter and Memory, 9. 
342 The first sentence of the book reads: “We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of 
theories of matter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the reality or ideality of the 
external world. Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images 
perceived when my senses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed”. Ibid., 17. 
343Ibid., 9.  
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naturally believe that matter exists just as it is perceived; and, since it is 
perceived as an image, the mind would make of it, in itself, an image”.345 An 
image so understood is neither the production nor reproduction of some other 
thing, but is rather the thing itself, existing where and as it is perceived: that 
which is, is image, such that the materiality of being must be understood as 
consisting of images, and nothing but images. What things are and what we 
perceive − matter and image − are one and the same thing. Insofar as being 
moves, and thus differs from itself, these images are movement-images. 
Thus, as Deleuze puts it:  
We find ourselves in fact faced with the exposition of a world 
where IMAGE = MOVEMENT … There is no moving body 
which is distinct from executed movement. There is nothing 
moved which is distinct from the received movement. Every 
thing, that is to say every image, is indistinguishable from its 
actions and reactions: this is universal variation.346 
This world of image=movement is in a sense ‘prior’ to or, rather the 
condition for perception, since images so conceived are not functions of 
perception (as they are in different ways for both realism and idealism). For 
Bergson perception is, in a very specific manner, both an aspect of this 
‘image-world’ and an image in itself. Considered in its priority and thus for 
itself, the world of universal variation is nothing but light itself, such that to be 
is to be image=movement=matter=light. Being is thus constituted as an 
‘infinite set of all images’, a ‘plane of immanence’ without orientation or 
ordering347 in which these images exist in themselves, but not for anyone or 
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347 On that plane “there are neither axes, nor centre, nor left, nor right, nor high, nor low”. Ibid., 58−59. 
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anything else, and “every image is ‘merely a road by which pass, in every 
direction, the modifications propagated throughout the immensity of the 
universe’”.348 
This in-itself of the image is matter: not something hidden 
behind the image, but on the contrary the absolute identity of 
the image and movement. The identity of image and 
movement leads us to conclude immediately that the 
movement-image and matter are identical … The material 
universe, the plane of immanence, is the machine 
assemblage of movement-images.349 
If this ‘in-itself’ of the image is cinema, or cinematic in its being, however, 
it is so in a very particular and peculiar fashion: it is a cinema without a 
screen, an appearing without an eye; “the virtual perception of all things”350 in 
which “an image may be without being perceived … [and] may be present 
without being represented”.351 These virtual images in themselves are simply 
‘lines or figures of light’ diffusing or propagating unopposed throughout the 
plane of immanence, figures that do not appear as such in the absence of 
something that would capture or reflect or stop them. This is the distinction 
Deleuze makes when he describes Bergson’s imagistic ontology in terms of 
the universe understood as cinema in itself (and not for anyone). It is a 
Metacinema, rather than cinema as such: it is the condition for cinema, 
without yet being cinema.  
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In this I must disagree with Paola Marrati’s claim that Deleuze “”sees 
Bergson’s universe as a perfect metacinema but only when it has given rise to 
‘living images.’ And to everything that our ordinary perception sees and 
names: actions, affects, bodies”.352 The universe, or being, is precisely a 
metacinema insofar as it is grasped without reference to ‘living images’, 
whereas it is those living images or beings themselves which are to be 
compared with the cinema properly speaking. This is not merely a ‘point of 
order’ – the distinction between the metacinematic conditions for cinema and 
the cinema as such goes to the heart of the tension between ontology and 
epistemology that I argue motivates Deleuze’s engagement with cinema. The 
first step towards recognising this lies in noting that the universe as 
metacinema constitutes the conditions for cinema in precisely the same 
sense, and for the same reasons, that the perception-for-itself of Bergson’s 
image-universe constitutes the condition for perception-for-someone: to speak 
of a metacinema is to speak of the ‘virtual perception of all things’ without the 
appearance of any image that would itself be perceived, that is, without the 
images that make up cinema as such. 
Perception in its everyday sense – the perception of an actual, rather 
than virtual, image for someone or something − does not arise within this 
image-world without a screen to stop or reflect the luminous figures of being 
which would otherwise continue to flow unseen and uninterrupted. Thus 
although the image-universe may be constituted as a metacinema, it is 
perception for someone that is constituted in properly cinematic terms, that is, 
in terms of a screen on which images finally ‘appear’. What Bergson proposes 
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as his candidate for this screen is consciousness or ‘living beings’: as Deleuze 
puts it, “The Brain is the screen”.353 Perception for someone, the image that 
appears, arises with consciousness and as consciousness.354  
With this proposition, Deleuze poses an account of the genesis of 
thought not only in terms of its virtual metacinematic conditions, but also in 
terms of a properly cinematic actualisation of images-for-someone as a 
function of the brain/screen that reflects them. In other words, both thought 
and the image-for-someone share the same genesis. Bergson offers us an 
image of things as luminous in themselves: things are light, are image. Rather 
than illuminating being from a position somehow external to being, 
consciousness is merely an image among others, whose only privilege is to 
obscure or subtract from the universal light of things that which does not 
concern it – the brain is the screen on which the luminosity of the world 
reveals itself in and as actual things for someone. These are the terms of 
Bergson’s model of perception: the thing as image-in-itself, enfolded in and 
continuous with the ‘virtual perception of all things’ and the appearing of that 
image for someone or something as a screening or filtering of that ‘virtual 
perception’. Thus the consciousness of living beings will: 
allow to pass through them, so to speak, those external 
influences which are indifferent to them; the others isolated, 
become ‘perceptions’ by their very isolation. Everything thus 
happens for us though we reflected back to surfaces the light 
which emanates from them, the light which, had it passed on 
                                                
353 Deleuze, "The Brain is the Screen," 366. 
354 It should be noted that both Bergson and Deleuze afford the term ‘consciousness’ a broader 
reference than its common usage, since any form of life at all, even the simplest, is conscious in their 
terms, such that we must take care not to conflate their references to consciousness with self-
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unopposed, would never have been revealed. The images 
which surround us will appear to turn towards our body the 
side, emphasized by the light upon it, which interests our 
body.355 
It is important to note that it is in relation to the body as a centre of action 
within the world that this limitation takes place; only those images that are of 
concern to the body and its needs are actualised, selected for ‘reflection’. For 
the time being, however, we can say that rather than continuing to divide spirit 
and matter, image and thing, as far as Bergson is concerned, “there is for 
images merely a difference of degree, and not of kind, between being and 
being consciously perceived”.356 
What is most radical here is that, insofar as the brain/screen and the 
interval it imposes between action and reaction are one and the same thing, 
we find ourselves with a definition of the brain in strictly univocal and 
materialist terms: there is nothing in the brain that is not in the world, no 
‘interior life’ or mental representation or thought that is different in nature from 
the world. Thus, as Frédéric Worms points out, “Bergson defends, in an 
apparently extreme form, the thesis of an ‘exteriority of the mind’”.357 What 
then are the terms in which consciousness-in-fact (the opaque screen or 
cinema of thought) ‘appears’ within the consciousness-by-right of being (the 
unbroken luminosity of movement-images or ‘flowing-matter)? As we have 
seen, it is neither something other than an image itself, nor adds anything to 
the image-world, image-universe: “There is nothing positive here, nothing 
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added to the image, nothing new”.358 Consciousness in fact differs from 
consciousness by right only in its power of limitation or subtraction: the screen 
or living being retains from the unbroken continuity of the image in itself only 
that which concerns its own interests, and what is thus retained is the image 
as it exists for someone. What does not concern us simply passes through 
unopposed, such that our perception of the world is given as a function of our 
action within it: “Our representation of matter is the measure of our possible 
action upon bodies: it results from the discarding of what has no interest for 
our needs, or more generally, for our functions”.359 It is, Deleuze says, “an 
operation which is exactly described as a framing: certain actions undergone 
are isolated by the frame”.360  
The brain/screen does not just reflect, it selects, and this selection 
constitutes our power of action on and in the world; our thought is in the world 
and is a thought of the world, insofar as it acts on the world. In other words, 
our knowledge of the world derives from the action of our bodies as part of 
that world: representation or the image as it exists for us, and thus 
consciousness, is strictly speaking a function of action: “the brain is nothing 
but this – an interval, a gap between action and reaction”.361 Bergson’s 
cinematic ontology thus dissolves the philosophical problem of the relation 
between matter and spirit, mind and body by posing them as one and the 
same thing; it is a monist, or as Deleuze might say, univocal conception of 
both being and beings as image, and nothing more than image (indeed, 
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where beings are concerned, we might say that they are, if not ‘less’ than 
image, then certainly a limited or ‘framed’ subset of the open set of images).  
In his discussion of Bergson’s materialist model of consciousness – the 
‘special image’ of the brain/screen – in the interval it imposes between action 
and reaction, Deleuze follows his observation that “All Bergson asks for are 
movements and intervals between movements which serve as units” with the 
aside that this “is also exactly what Dziga Vertov asked for, in his materialist 
conception of the cinema”.362 It seems to me that this comparison makes 
sense only if we take it to suggest that the minimal components required to 
constitute the materiality of cinema can be characterised in exactly the same 
terms as those required to constitute the materiality of consciousness. 
Cinema thus understood can rightly be considered as a mode of thought, or at 
least of consciousness, in precisely the same material terms as that of living 
beings (indeed, Deleuze proposes that we turn to the ‘biology’ of the brain for 
the principles by which we might seek to understand films, rather than to 
psychoanalysis or linguistics363).  
As we have seen, the basis on which Deleuze accords a philosophical 
privilege to the cinema goes well beyond the metacinematic nature of being 
itself (Bergson’s positing of being as a universe of light=movement=matter 
=image). Not only is consciousness-by-right identical to being understood as 
image-in-itself (such that consciousness-by-right must also be said to be 
metacinematic) but both the image-in-fact (the image for someone) and 
consciousness-in-fact (the consciousness of someone, however elementary 
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that ‘someone’ may be) are actualised cinematically. Thus an actual 
consciousness is defined in terms of a screen which reflects and thus 
actualises the image-for-itself in and as an image for someone, and thus as 
the consciousness of someone. Furthermore, the mechanism by which this 
actualisation takes place is no more than a subtraction or exclusion of those 
aspects of image/matter that are of no interest to that living being; the screen 
that reflects is also a frame that selects and excludes.  
Deleuze assigns the task of the Cinema books neither in relation to 
Bergson nor even to philosophical problems more generally. It is, rather, the 
production of “a taxonomy, and attempt at the classification of images and 
signs”.364 What is vital here, and what is rarely noted, is that he introduces the 
taxonomic distinction between action, affection and perception-images not in 
relation to cinema, but to the dual system of reference which accounts for 
both the objective existence of images and our subjective apprehension of 
them. The acentred universal variation of the universe=image constitutes the 
first system of reference of images; images as they appear for and in relation 
to the brain/screen as a centre of action constitutes the second.  
As such this ‘cinematic’ taxonomy must be understood as arising from a 
distinction belonging not to the cinema, but to the limitation imposed on the 
‘pure’ movement-image of being by the necessity of our action within it. That 
is, the avatars of the movement-image that Deleuze deduces arise as a 
necessary consequence of the same terms in which living beings and 
consciousness (the terms are interchangeable for Bergson) arise within the 
world. In other words, these images constitute the “material moments of 
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subjectivity”365 such that “each one of us, the special image or the contingent 
centre, is nothing but an assemblage [agencement] of three images, a 
consolidate [consolidé] of perception-image, action-images and affection 
images”.366 In other words, the task Deleuze essays in the Cinema books is a 
taxonomy of the signs of consciousness and subjectivity first of all, before it is 
a taxonomy of the signs of cinema. This taxonomy, is on the one hand a 
categorisation of signs that are the material moments of human thought itself 
and on the other the elementary terms of the cinema insofar as it constitutes a 
spiritual automaton, a machine for the production of thought.367  
The pure movement-image from which these image/signs are extracted 
or subtracted exists only for itself (as do the image-for-itself and 
consciousness-for-itself of the image-universe) but perception, action and 
affection images exist only for someone and in a sense as someone (they are 
not signs that represent to a consciousness, they are that consciousness). 
That is to say, they constitute and express the relation between the two ‘poles’ 
of the double system of reference of images. Things or images exist in and for 
themselves at one pole, but at the other appear for us as bodies determined 
in relation to their possible action on us, and our potential action or reaction to 
them. The effect of this is a distinction between the way in which movement 
exists for itself, and how it exists for us.368 The movement-image in itself (that 
is, the image grasped from within the first system of reference) is not the 
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5.#Genesis#and#Deduction#/#172#
movement of some thing; it is a movement in and for itself, a difference that 
differs from itself first of all. Grasped in relation to the needs of action (the 
second system of reference), however, movement-images in themselves now 
appear for someone in terms of bodies that move and are moved within 
space, such that  
actions, in precisely this sense, have already replaced 
movement with the idea of a provisional place towards which 
it is directed or that of a result it secures. Quality has 
replaced movement with the idea of a state which persists 
while waiting or another to replace it. Body has replaced 
movement with the idea of a subject which would carry it out 
or of an object which would submit to it, of a vehicle which 
would carry it. We will see that such images are formed in 
the universe (action-images, affection-images, perception-
images).369  
Perception-images thus arise inasmuch as the special image that is a 
brain/screen constitutes a centre within the acentred variability of the image-
universe, thus orienting the latter as a horizon of possible actions for and by 
that centre: “If the world is incurved around the perceptive centre, this is 
already from the point of view of action, from which perception is 
inseparable”.370 The perception-image constitutes the image-universe in terms 
of bodies in relation to their possible action on us, thus preparing for our 
possible response to and on them: 
Distance is in fact a radius which goes from the periphery to 
the centre: perceiving things where they are, I grasp the 
‘virtual action’ they have on me, and simultaneously the 
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‘possible action’ that I have on them, in order to associate 
me with them or avoid them, by diminishing or increasing the 
distance. It is thus the same phenomenon of the gap which 
is expressed in terms of time in my action and in terms of 
space in my perception.371 
Perception is already part way to action, and an indispensable aspect of it, as 
one side of the interval or delay the brain/screen imposes on the causal 
chains of being. On the other side of the interval, the action-image relates 
movement not to things, but to actions: “Just as perception relates movement 
to ‘bodies’ (nouns), that is to rigid objects which will serve as moving bodies or 
as things moved, action relates movement to ‘acts’ (verbs) which will be the 
design for an assumed end or result”.372  
In between perception-images on one side of the gap, and action-
images on the other, the interval itself is occupied by affection, the 
“coincidence of subject and object, or the way in which the subject perceives 
itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself ‘from the inside’”.373 The aspect 
of the image-universe that the brain/screen selects and reflects may manifest 
itself as things at a distance (perception-images) or actions in response to 
them (action-images,) but there is also some part which “we ‘absorb’, that we 
refract, and which does not transform itself into either objects of perception or 
acts of the subject; rather they mark the coincidence of the subject and the 
object in a pure quality”.374  
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Affection is the ‘internalisation’ of the object as quality by and for the 
subject, and it is this quality that the subject acts in response to, rather than 
acting ‘directly’ on perception. Things are not just ‘near’ or ‘far’, but may be 
‘sharp’, ‘fast’, ‘threatening’ and so on, such that action acts on perception 
mediately, through affection, through the qualities of perceived things as they 
are internalised within the subject. Insofar as affection marks the coincidence 
of subject and object, the affection-image is to be found in the subject as 
much as in the thing perceived, in an image ‘expressed’ in or across the 
perceiving being as “a kind of motor tendency in a sensory nerve”.375 Affect 
thus constitutes a kind of action by the powerless, a movement of the 
immobile. It remains an action in response to perception, like the action-
image, but one expressed through an immobile organ incapable of acting 
directly on anything else – which is why Deleuze relates the affection-image in 
cinema to the face, and more generally to “what Blanchot calls ‘the aspect of 
the event that its accomplishment cannot realise’.”376  
The quality expressed by the affection-image belongs not to the thing 
perceived nor the consciousness that perceives it but somewhere ‘between’ 
them, in the relation between the two that marks their coincidence. It is not 
merely a quality of ‘sharpness’, ‘speed’ or ‘threat’, but also the ‘concern’, 
‘anxiety’ or ‘fear’ expressing the internalisation of the object in the subject. It is 
thus affection that maintains the connection between perception and action – 
if the gap imposed by the brain/screen were truly an ‘empty’ interval, if there 
were no means of ‘crossing’ or relating ‘received movement’ and ‘executed 
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movement’, they would remain ‘incommensurable’.377 Thus Deleuze notes 
that where the perception-image relates movement to ‘nouns’ and the action-
image to ‘verbs’, the affection-image relates it to “‘quality’ as a lived state”378 – 
to ‘adjectives’. It is perhaps worth emphasising the lived aspect of the affect 
image; affect is no less physical, concrete, no less bodily and active than 
perception or action, for all that it is expressed through a body that cannot 
move, and an action that cannot act on another directly.  
What are most important for my argument here are the terms by 
Deleuze derives perception, action and affection-images from the ‘pure’ 
movement-image or pure perception for-itself, and in particular the centred, 
stabilising and action oriented character of those images. As both the 
‘material moments of subjectivity’ and the primary categories of the spiritual 
automata of the cinema, perception-, action- and affection-images articulate 
the relation of thought to being in terms of a centred, stable and active 
perspective on the acentred variation of being-for-itself. In other words, from 
within the world of action, there is no direct access to ‘pure’ movement as 
differing difference, which is the province of the movement-image as it exists 
for itself (the movement-image). Perception-, action- and affection-images are 
movement-images, and thus open in some sense onto the infinite variation or 
movement of the movement-image (the open whole, or being itself), but they 
are nevertheless limited and selective perspectives on that whole, on that 
absolute movement.  
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Deleuze explicitly identifies these avatars with the equivalent of the basic 
constituent elements of language: action replaces pure movement with a 
place or goal towards which it is aimed − verb; quality or affection has 
replaced movement with a state which persists − adjective; perception has 
replaced movement with things which move or are moved − noun. This 
attribution of grammatical correlates to the three basic kinds of movement-
images379 mirrors precisely the passage in Creative Evolution where Bergson 
uses the same grammatical correlates to characterise human beings’ 
tendency to grasp movement in abstract and ultimately static terms.  
In other words, Deleuze characterises perception-, action- and affection 
images in precisely the same terms in which Bergson chooses to characterise 
the cinematographic illusion: before they constitute the elementary forms of a 
taxonomy of cinema, they mark the ways in which “the mind manages to take 
stable views of … instability”380 as a necessary result of the terms in which 
living beings come into being. Thus the taxonomy of the signs of the 
movement-image is in no sense at odds with the cinematographic illusion: 
these signs are an alternative way of describing or analysing the terms in 
which the limits of thought that Bergson calls ‘cinematographic’ continue to 
afflict consciousness, even when that consciousness finds its genesis within 
the pure variation of the image-universe, of perception-for-itself, of being as 
differing difference. 
What we can see, then, is that the passage in which Deleuze presents 
his characterisation of perception, action and affection-images is itself a 
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paraphrase of the arguments in Creative Evolution whereby Bergson lays the 
groundwork for his introduction of the cinematographic metaphor for the 
centred, stable and active character of the grasp that consciousness has of 
being and of movement.381 The aim of Bergson’s argument in this passage is 
not merely the conclusion that “the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of 
a cinematographical kind” but that “The cinematographical method … consists 
in making the general character of knowledge form itself on that of action”.382  
That this is so is a direct function of the genesis of conscious beings in 
fact within the consciousness by right of the image-universe. The criterion for 
selection and reflection of images to actualise from the pure virtuality of the 
image-universe by the brain/screen is action; consciousness, as the 
imposition of a delay or gap in the unbroken propagation of images, has as its 
only function the possibility of an active, rather than passive, relation to 
images and their impact on us. The more reflective possibilities of thought, up 
to and including philosophy, are built on or derived from this active basis, and 
oriented by it: “We are made in order to act as much as, and more than, in 
order to think – or rather, when we follow the bent of our nature, it is in order 
to act that we think”.383 Bergson’s analysis of the cinematographic basis of 
classical philosophy384 (which is valid for any philosophical system premised 
on an abstract conception of movement) and of modern science is presented 
as an explicit demonstration of how the genetic orientation of consciousness 
towards action has shaped the tendencies of philosophical thought. Moreover, 
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the results of this demonstration bear directly on Deleuze’s philosophical 
reasons for engaging with cinema. 
What this indicates is that the relationship Deleuze in fact proposes 
between the movement-image and cinematographic illusion is more complex 
than it may at first seem. At the very least, the avatars of the movement-
image that arise in relation to the brain/screen (the second ‘system of 
reference of images’) cannot be treated as simply ‘opposed’ to the 
cinematographic illusion, or strictly separated from it, as neither can the 
‘cinematic’ philosophy of Matter and Memory be simply divorced from the 
cinematographic critique of Creative Evolution. Deleuze’s analysis of the 
relation between the movement-image and the cinematographic illusion is 
less a critique of the latter by means of the former than it is a reformulation of 
that illusion in terms of the movement-image.  
To the best of my knowledge, the universal tendency of the secondary 
literature is to either explicitly or implicitly interpret Deleuze’s claim that 
cinema operates in terms of movement-images, rather than static frames, as 
the claim that cinema corrects the cinematographic illusion because it 
operates in terms of movement-images. By my reading, this is precisely not 
the case. Deleuze’s aim in defining cinema in terms of movement-images is 
not to show how it ‘corrects’ the cinematographic illusion – as we shall see 
later in this chapter, his demonstration of this correction takes place in quite 
different terms.  
This of course leaves open the question of why he reformulates the 
cinematographic illusion in this way and what this achieves. The clue lies in 
Deleuze’s observation that:  
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On the basis of this state of things [being as acentred 
universal variation of the image-for-itself] it would be 
necessary to show how, at any point, centres can be formed 
which would impose fixed instantaneous views. It would 
therefore be a question of ‘deducing’ conscious, natural or 
cinematographic perception … Even in his critique of the 
cinema, Bergson was in agreement with it, to a far greater 
degree than he thought. We see this in the brilliant first 
chapter of Matter and Memory.385    
As I read it, in this passage Deleuze is implicitly criticising Bergson’s 
formulation of the cinematographic metaphor because it describes the effects 
of that illusion without showing how it can be derived or deduced on the basis 
of duration as real difference. As a result, it remains something external to 
and arbitrarily imposed on Bergson’s own model of being as pure variation − it 
cuts thought off from being absolutely, as if thought were somehow separate 
from being or external to it. Hence Deleuze’s preference for the more complex 
model offered in Matter and Memory; there, centres of perception are derived 
or deduced directly from this universal variation, without the need to 
“introduce a different factor, a factor of another nature”.386 From this ‘internal’ 
perspective, the genesis of ‘conscious, natural or cinematographic perception’ 
can all be deduced in precisely the same terms, and it is on that common 
basis that Deleuze is able to justify his extraordinary intertwining of thought, 
philosophy and cinema.387  
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The attention given by commentators to the apparent conflict between 
cinema and cinematographic illusion in their analyses of the Cinema books is 
perhaps understandable, since it does at least initially seem to be mapped out 
by Deleuze himself. In the opening pages of Cinema 1, he argues that:  
cinema does not give us an image to which movement is 
added, it immediately gives us a movement-image … Now 
what is again very odd is that Bergson was perfectly aware 
of the existence of mobile sections or movement-images. 
This happened before Creative Evolution, before the official 
birth of cinema: it was set out in Matter and Memory in 1896. 
The discovery of the movement-image, beyond the 
conditions of natural perception, was the extraordinary 
invention of the first chapter of Matter and Memory. Had 
Bergson forgotten it ten years later?388 
However, the question ‘Had he forgotten it ten years later?’ is not a proposal, 
however tentative, for how one might explain the apparent tension between 
the arguments Bergson presents in 1896 and those of 1907. It is the first half 
of a rhetorical figure, rather than a attempted rationalisation, allowing him to 
immediately propose as its counterpart the explanation for these differences 
that he genuinely holds: “Or did he fall victim to another illusion which affects 
everything in its initial stages?”389 Deleuze suggests that anything that is 
genuinely new (in this case, the concept of movement-images created in 
Matter and Memory), as opposed to a merely incremental change, is in a very 
real sense, unprecedented – it comes into being ‘out of place’, at odds with 
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the world within which it appears. Thus, he argues, such creations are forced 
to conceal their novelty to begin with:  
in order not to be rejected [they] have to project the 
characteristics which they retain in common with the set [of 
the determined elements of the world into which they enter]. 
The essence of a thing never appears at the outset, but in 
the middle, in the course of its development. Having 
transformed philosophy by posing the question of the ‘new’ 
instead of that of eternity (how are the production and 
appearance of the new possible?), Bergson knew this better 
than anyone.390 
His point, I think, is that Matter and Memory was too radical for its time 
and that Bergson’s reformulation of the genesis of consciousness in 
cinematographic terms, rather than those of movement-images, should be 
understood as an attempt to simplify his arguments, to reduce their ‘novelty’ in 
order to be better grasped by the unready world it had thrust itself into. Thus 
the metaphor of the cinematographic illusion presents a simplified abstraction 
of the relation between movement-for-itself (the pure movement-image) and 
movement-for-someone (the avatars of the movement-image when it is 
related to a centre or subject). In order to communicate this relation clearly 
and directly, Bergson is forced to simplify and abstract it from the more 
complex but more concrete terms in which it is implicit within Matter and 
Memory: he brings the effect of the centred nature of movement-for-someone 
into clear focus (the cinematographic illusion) but in doing so obscures the 
terms of its genesis within the acentred universe of movement-for-itself.  
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In both the movement-images of Matter and Memory and the static 
photogrammes of Creative evolution it is images that are at stake − but what 
has been abstracted from Bergson’s treatment of images in the latter is 
precisely movement itself. The irony here, of course, is that Bergson is forced 
to abstract his own account of the relation between real or concrete 
movement and human thought in order to communicate it. But as we have 
already seen, this is an irony that afflicts Bergsonian philosophy en tout; the 
very premises that he reasons from require that the closer his thought comes 
to real movement, the less it is able to communicate it, and the greater the 
clarity with which he is able to express it the further he moves away from it, 
and the more abstract his account becomes.  
5.2 Weak Reasoning, Perversity and Grasping at Threads 
As we have seen, Deleuze’s preference for grasping the cinema in terms 
of the movement-images of Matter and Memory rather than those of the 
cinematographic illusion of Creative Evolution does not on its own constitute 
either a rejection or a correction of Bergson’s characterisation of living beings, 
and of human thought in terms of their genesis as centred, active and stable 
perspectives on the pure variation of being itself. The metaphor of the 
cinematograph is merely a simplified and abstracted presentation of 
arguments already present in Matter and Memory in terms of movement-
images; movement images as they appear for someone rather than in 
themselves – perception-, action- and affection-images both as avatars of the 
movement-image for itself and as the material moments of subjectivity – are 
nothing other than limited, centred and stable perspectives on the unceasing 
variation of being, derived directly from the needs of action. If the cinema 
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offers Deleuze a means of ‘correcting’ the cinematographic illusion, this 
correction is nevertheless not provided directly by the characterisation of the 
cinema in terms of movement-images and neither does that correction 
(whatever form it takes) constitute a rejection of the philosophical critique that 
is that metaphor’s primary aim.  
However, by interpreting Bergson’s ontological arguments as the 
proposition of a being which is metacinematic in character, and his deduction 
of the genesis of living beings on the basis of that metacinema in terms of 
cinema as such, Deleuze is able to reformulate Bergson’s characterisation of 
the cinematographic illusion in terms of movement-images, rather than the 
static frames of a film strip – that is, in the terms provided by Matter and 
Memory, rather than those proposed in Creative Evolution. Doing so offers 
Deleuze two advantages. Firstly, it provides him with the means to bridge the 
chasm between ontology and epistemology that Bergson’s model of the 
cinematographic illusion opens up (and in a sense bridges the gap between 
Matter and Memory and Creative Evolution he identifies in the opening pages 
of Cinema 1). Secondly, in doing so, it provides Deleuze with the tools to 
account for the history of philosophy itself, including the philosophies of 
identity and representation that he rejects – philosophies of transcendence – 
in strictly differential terms, in the following sense.  
The dominant tradition of Western philosophy that both Bergson and 
Deleuze critique is characterised by the abstract concept of movement it 
directly or indirectly relies on. Such philosophies are thus deduced (at least in 
principle) on the basis of the genesis of the cinematographic illusion, while 
that illusion is in turn deduced in terms of its genesis as the centred and 
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stable perspective on the acentred variation of being constituted by living 
beings. That is to say, by accounting for the effects of the cinematographic 
illusion in terms of movement images, Deleuze shows how abstract 
movement can be deduced in terms of real movement – in precisely the same 
sense and in the same terms that he is able to deduce negation and Hegelian 
dialectics in terms of Bergson’s ontological conception of difference (the 
former demonstration is in fact implicit within the latter).  
In other words, across the two volumes of the Cinema books, he will 
ultimately be able show how and why thought, and philosophy, can go so far 
astray by conceiving of movement abstractly, even though they arise within 
and as part of the real movement and real difference of the being itself. More 
than this, it allows him demonstrate the terms in which they come to confront 
this barrier to thought within thought, in relation to a ‘thought outside itself, 
and the unthought within thought’ as an ahistorical moment that both belongs 
to and unfounds the historical as the mode of human thought and being.  
The recapitulation of the history of philosophy, and particularly of the 
Kantian reversal of the relation of movement and time, that Deleuze finds in 
the history of cinema is this account: the history of cinema as the 
dramatisation of the history of philosophy told in and by movement images, 
rather than via the (Bergsonian) cinematographic illusions of properly human 
thought and language. To understand how this dramatisation operates (which 
is the task of the final chapters of this thesis), however, we need first of all to 
understand the precise terms in which Deleuze demonstrates how the cinema 
can surpass the centred and stable perspective of natural perception as a 
function of its own formal properties, and thus escape the illusions of thought 
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that derive from that perspective. In other words, we need to know how 
cinema escapes the cinematographic illusion, even when that illusion is 
grasped in the more complex terms implicit in Matter and Memory. 
Deleuze’s account of the relationship between the cinema and the 
cinematographic illusion – the reasoning by which he absolves the cinema 
from Bergson’s philosophical critique of the cinematographic illusion − has 
been a point of contention for some of his commentators. Rodowick, for 
example, finds Deleuze’s reasoning on this point ‘weak’,391 while Douglass 
describes his account as ‘wonderfully perverse’ in its reconfiguration of the 
premises of Bergson’s argument.392 One of the complicating factors here is 
that Deleuze appears to offer not one, but two sets of arguments for why the 
cinema is not subject to the cinematographic illusion. Rodowick’s concerns 
are with the first of these arguments, in which Deleuze responds to the most 
literal application of Bergson’s metaphor to actual cinema in terms of the 
distinction between the conditions of natural and cinematic perception. 
Douglass’ concerns are with the second argument, in which, as he puts it:  
Deleuze cleverly exploits the terminological ambiguities in 
Bergson’s attack on cinematic illusion, transferring the 
definition of Bergson’s term ‘cuttings’ from the frame to the 
shot … Grasping, then, at threads trailing from this supposed 
terminological misunderstanding, Deleuze proceeds to claim 
that Bergson was ‘startlingly ahead of his time’ in defining 
the universe as ‘cinema in itself, a metacinema’.393  
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As his references to ‘exploiting terminological ambiguities’ and ‘grasping at 
threads’ suggest, Douglass, like Rodowick, is unconvinced by Deleuze’s 
justifications for engaging with the cinema in Bergsonian terms – not because 
Deleuze’s reasoning is ‘weak’ but because he regards Deleuze’s treatment of 
Bergson as something of a philosophical shell game in which he “makes us 
believe that perhaps he understood Bergson better than the philosopher 
understood himself”.394  
As we shall see, however, the apparently distinct arguments that 
Rodowick and Douglass concern themselves with are in fact two faces of the 
same argument, which, far from ‘perverting’ Bergson’s account of 
cinematographic illusion, returns it to its origins. Deleuze does so by 
demonstrating how this illusion is not only already implicit within the 
arguments of Matter and Memory, but that in using the cinematograph as a 
metaphor, Bergson has oversimplified or abstracted his own ontological 
insight in a manner that ‘traps’ him epistemologically. In doing so, Deleuze 
sets up the terms in which it is cinema itself that allows both Bergson and 
himself to escape this philosophical trap and provide the philosophical terms 
in which thought can be ‘reunited’ with the real movement, or real being, that it 
arises out of. In order to recognise this, however, we must first deal with 
Rodowick’s criticisms. 
 Given the terms in which Bergson poses the cinematographic illusion, it 
seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the cinema must itself ‘illustrate’ 
this illusion. Since the film strip does indeed consist of immobile sections 
artificially put into motion by the strictly external movement of the projector – 
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static ‘photogrammes’ running through the projector at twenty-four frames a 
second – how can cinema not reproduce this error of thought? Taken in 
isolation, Deleuze’s response to this question does indeed seem 
underdeveloped, even perfunctory, given that his entire Cinema project rests 
on this point (it occupies a mere paragraph slightly more than half a page 
long.) Indeed, it seems to rest largely on the assertion that what we 
experience when watching a movie is not twenty-four static frames a second, 
but an image that moves of itself: 
Cinema proceeds with photogrammes – that is with immobile 
sections … But it has often been noted that what it gives us 
is not the photogramme: it is an intermediate image, to which 
movement is not appended or added; the movement on the 
contrary belongs to the intermediate image as immediate 
given.395 
The obvious rejoinder to this claim is that the appearance of movement 
created out of static images is precisely the illusion that Bergson condemns – 
and is the very reason he chooses our experience of movement in the movies 
as the metaphorical exemplar of this generalised error of thought, perception 
and language. As Rodowick puts it, “It is hard to say that movement is truly 
immanent to the film image when, on the one hand, it is artificially produced 
below the image by the automated passage of still images, and, on the other it 
is corrected cognitively ‘above’ the image by mental processes that are still 
not thoroughly understood”.396  
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What Rodowick fails to take into account here is the distinction Deleuze 
makes between ‘natural’ and ‘cinematic’ perception. Where natural perception 
is concerned, “the illusion is corrected ‘above’ perception by the conditions 
that make perception possible in the subject. In the cinema, however, it is 
corrected at the same time as the image appears for a spectator without 
conditions”.397 What appears perfunctory, or ‘weak’ in Deleuze’s reasoning 
here, it seems to me, is the lack of detail this paragraph offers regarding both 
the nature of the ‘correction’ Deleuze has in mind and the ‘conditions’ or lack 
thereof that differentiate natural and cinematic perception. This lack of detail 
seems all the more culpable given that, without it, his assertion of the 
difference between natural and cinematic perception amounts to nothing less 
than the assertion that cinema does not suffer from the cinematographic 
illusion – which does rather appear to beg the question in question. 
However, what Rodowick appears to overlook here is that Deleuze 
immediately goes on to set up the terms in which he will in fact elaborate on 
the ‘conditions’ or lack thereof in question here in the very next paragraph. He 
does so via the distinction he makes between cinema’s beginnings in its 
‘primitive’ state (the single shot actualité shot from a static camera, as 
exemplified in the films of the Lumière brothers) and “the conquest of its [the 
cinema’s] own essence or novelty … through montage, the mobile camera 
and the emancipation of the view point, which became separate from 
projection”.398 For Deleuze, in its ‘primitive’ state the cinema is precisely 
cinematographic in the terms of Bergson’s metaphor, but the introduction of 
                                                
397 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 2. 
398 Ibid., 3. 
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montage and the mobility of the camera free it from this illusion. In other 
words, the condition of natural perception that condemns it to the 
cinematographic illusion is simply that our point of view is always our own: our 
perception is always centred and stabilised in relation to the distinct image 
that our body/brain constitutes for itself within the universal variation of 
images that constitutes being. Sitting in the cinema, our point of view and that 
of the projector behind our heads coincide, such that it replaces our point of 
view with its own. While the point of view of the camera that has shot the 
images is presented through (and thus tied to) that of the projector that 
presents them for us (and which substitutes its point of view for our own) we 
remain under the conditions of natural perception, irrespective of the fact that 
the images we see on screen are the products of technology rather than 
nature.  
But while the projector of necessity always remains in the one place,399 
so that its point of view always coincides with our own, the camera does not 
have to stay static. It is always possible for the point of view of the camera to 
move with respect to that of the projector, either within a shot via a literal 
camera move, or across shots via montage – and the history of post-primitive 
cinema is shaped by the realisation of this possibility in its various forms. As 
soon as the camera takes up this option, its point of view no longer coincides 
with that of the projector (and thus of the spectator) and the centring and 
stabilising conditions of natural perception that are at the heart of the 
cinematographic illusion are broken. In other words, the special privilege of 
                                                
399 Experimental installations notwithstanding. 
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the cinema is its potential or ‘tendency’400 (which is not necessarily realised) 
to free both itself and the spectator from the conditions of natural perception. 
The movement the spectator is given to experience once freed from these 
conditions is then no longer the mere reanimation of static sections produced 
by the external motor of the projector, but rather presents a real movement 
expressing the properly internal difference of being.  
Until the cinema emancipates its viewpoint from that of the projector 
(until it surpasses its primitive state) it merely reproduces this same condition 
– it is cinematographic. But once the viewpoint of camera and projector no 
longer coincide – once cinematic perception becomes decentred – rather than 
reproducing the conditions of natural perception, the cinema corrects the 
constitutive illusions of such perception, insofar as the images of, and in, the 
cinema appear ‘for a spectator without conditions’ (that is to say, for a 
spectator separated or freed from the conditions of natural perception). Far 
from being perfunctory, the full elaboration of the arguments Deleuze derives 
from the terms of this distinction is developed in detail across the first four 
chapters of Cinema 1, and indeed, is the basis on which his entire project 
rests.  
From the perspective of cinema studies, Deleuze’s distinction between 
‘primitive’ cinema and the “conquest of its [cinema’s] own essence”401 has 
often seemed problematic, since it in effect suggests that cinema properly 
speaking does not ‘begin’ until well after its apparent origins in the Grand Café 
in 1895 (an implication reinforced by the fact that the history of cinema 
                                                
400 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 25. 
401 Ibid., 3. 
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Deleuze appears to present in the Cinema books chooses 1914 as its starting 
point, in the form of the work of DW Griffith). Rodowick, in particular, argues 
“Deleuze’s historical understanding of primitive cinema is terribly remiss”.402 
He sees Deleuze’s approach as beholden to an (implicitly outdated) paradigm 
adopted from classical film theory, particularly with regard to the importance 
placed on montage as the differentiating feature of the primitive and post-
primitive cinemas.  
It seems worth noting, however, that the distinction Deleuze offers 
between these two ‘origins’ is contingent, rather than necessary. The 
‘primitive state’ he refers to always remains as a possibility even in the most 
modern of films (the camera, after all, can always not move, and within the 
confines of each individual shot there is no montage). That is to say, the 
boundary between primitive and post-primitive cinema is more permeable 
than it may at first seem, and the ‘essence’ of cinema Deleuze finds in 
montage and the mobility of the camera is already present in the primitive 
cinema as a power or potential waiting for its chance to appear (as the tale of 
Georges Méliès ‘accidental’ discovery of the power of montage aptly 
demonstrates403). Thus: 
This movement [the concrete movement of the movement-
image] was already characteristic of the cinema, and 
demanded a kind of emancipation, incapable of being 
satisfied within the limits set by the primitive conditions – so 
                                                
402 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, 214, n.6.  
403 Méliès describes shooting at the Place de l’Opéra with a very early film camera, which jammed, and 
took a minute to unstick. During that time, he tells us, “the passerby, a horse trolley, and the vehicles 
had of course changed positions. In projecting the strip, rejoined at the point of the break, I suddenly 
saw a Madeline-Bastille trolley change into a hearse, and men changed into women.” "Cinematographic 
Views," October 29 (1984): 30. 
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that the so-called primitive image, the image in movement, 
was defined less by its state than by its tendency.404 
 In other words, the cinematographic is given univocally with the cinematic, 
such that both the cinematographic illusion and its correction coexist as 
tendencies within the cinema at all times. More precisely, this illusion is 
merely a function of the arbitrary (non-necessary in the philosophical sense) 
limitation of the movement-images that Deleuze posits as the essence of the 
cinema – an essence which nevertheless only reveals itself as such once the 
point of view of the camera begins to diverge from that of the projector.405  
Once we recognise Deleuze’s discussion of the state of the primitive 
cinema as an elaboration of his distinction between the conditions of natural 
and cinematic perception, it becomes apparent that it plays a genuinely 
pivotal role in negotiating the relation between philosophy and cinema that 
both Bergson and Deleuze propose in their different ways. The implications of 
this distinction extend towards philosophy on one side and towards the 
cinema on the other. Where philosophy per se is concerned, Deleuze 
reformulates the account of the cinematographic illusion Bergson offers in 
Creative Evolution in terms of the movement-image proposed in Matter and 
Memory. In doing so, he merely foregrounds what is already implicit within the 
latter – that the essential limitation placed on living beings’ grasp of being by 
the illusion Bergson later comes to call cinematographic is a function of the 
need for the living to act. In order to live, such beings must first of all 
distinguish themselves as a ‘centre of action’ within the acentred variation of 
                                                
404 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 25. 
405 One might usefully compare this ‘arbitrary limitation’ to the divorcing of the actual from its movement 
of actualisation, which, as we have seen, is the basis of the ‘genesis’ of errors of negation and the 
negative. 
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being, and distinguish other beings as distinct elements in relation to that 
centre (especially those that might count as ‘food’).  
One of the consequences of this is that the movement of the elements 
(or beings) thus extracted from being can then only be grasped abstractly and 
spatially, as a movement of those elements through space, and thus in terms 
divided from the concrete movement-for-itself of being. More succinctly, the 
cinematographic illusion is a function of the centring and stabilising character 
of natural perception, and the conditions of such perception are a function of 
the necessities of action. It is this necessity, then, that orients not only 
perception, but also language and thought, and thus philosophy. As Bergson 
puts it, ““Before we speculate we must live”.406  
Having shown how natural perception can be both a product and 
function of movement-images and nevertheless subject to the 
cinematographic illusion at the same time (and thus having reconciled the 
apparent disjunction between the arguments of Matter and Memory, and 
those of Creative Evolution), Deleuze is free to demonstrate how the cinema 
can also ‘correct’ this illusion without rejecting or denying its role in natural 
perception. This demonstration is simply the other face of the same argument, 
turned this time towards cinema rather than philosophy: if the conditions of 
natural perception orient it in terms of the centring and stabilising tendencies 
at the heart of the cinematographic illusion, it is precisely the lack of these 
conditions for cinematic perception that free it from this illusion. Deleuze 
points us towards the French filmmaker and film theorist Jean Epstein, who, 
writing in the 1920s:  
                                                
406 Bergson, The Creative Mind, 38. 
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was perhaps the first to focus theoretically on this point, 
which viewers in the cinema experienced practically: not only 
speeded up, slowed down and reversed sequences, but the 
non-distancing of the moving body (‘a deserter was going flat 
out, and yet remained face to face with us’), constant 
changes in scale and proportion (‘with no possible common 
denominator’) and false continuities of movement.407 
The experiences Epstein describes are those of the viewer confronted in the 
cinema with the impossible (from the human perspective) perceptions of the 
camera, and with a movement that is aberrant because its image is no longer 
oriented in relation to a fixed centre (the camera is free to move as it wishes), 
all the while appearing for the viewer as if those images were given with 
reference to the viewer as a centre, since those images are projected from a 
point of view apparently identical with the viewer’s own (that of the projector 
behind them in the cinema). In other words, the break between the point of 
view of camera and projector decentres perception for the viewer, despite 
retaining the appearance or form of natural perception (insofar as the aberrant 
images given to the viewer’s perception nevertheless appear to come from 
the viewer’s own centre of perception).  
This is the basis of the cinema’s capacity to decentre natural perception; 
in doing so it frees the viewer’s perception from its cinematographic blinkers, 
and exposes it to a ‘profoundly aberrant and abnormal movement’ that opens 
onto the movement-image for itself, rather than the movement-image as 
                                                
407 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 36. Deleuze does not comment directly on what seem to me to be significant 
differences between the examples of ‘speeded up, slowed down and reversed’ movement, and the 
‘changes in scale and proportion’ that Epstein offers us in this account. Where the latter present a clear 
case of movement that is aberrant in space, it seems to me that the former present us with a movement 
that is aberrant not only in space but in time as well. 
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grasped for themselves.408 In short, if the cinematographic character of 
human nature is a function of the living being or brain/screen as a centred 
perspective on the acentred variation of being, the cinema offers a correction 
to that cinematographic perspective not because it is made of movement-
images (such images make up the ‘material moments of subjectivity’ – they’re 
what human cinematographic consciousness are made of too) but because it 
has the capacity to decentre perception, and to that extent open our ‘human 
nature’ to a genuine intuition of real being, real duration in its acentred 
variability.409 
As I’ve noted, Douglass regards Deleuze’s treatment of the relationship 
between the cinema and Bergson’s own account of the cinematographic 
illusion as ‘perverse’, on quite specific grounds. Deleuze, he argues, 
completely transforms the nature and intent of Bergson’s treatment of it by 
‘transferring the definition of Bergson’s term ‘cuttings’ from the frame to the 
shot”.410 Although Douglass presents this observation as a criticism, it seems 
to me a graceful, succinct and accurate summation of Deleuze’s 
argumentative manoeuvres around relation of cinema to the cinematographic 
illusion, and one that is entirely consistent with my arguments so far. Rather 
than conceiving of cinematic movement as a function of the gap between 
frames, or static ‘cuttings’ of movement, Deleuze reformulates it in terms of 
the gap between shots, such that cinematic movement is properly understood 
                                                
408 Ibid. 
409 It seems worth noting that this ‘decentring’ applies equally with or without reference to the viewer. 
Insofar as the projector replaces the audience’s point of view with its own, it is the projector’s 
perspective that is decentred no less than that of the audience. In other words, this decentring ‘belongs’ 
to the cinema before it ‘belongs’ to the viewer. In other words, for all that cinematic thought has the 
capacity to decentre the human, its operation is nevertheless autonomous of the human.  
410 Douglass, "Bergson and Cinema: Friends or Foes?," 220. 
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as the movement of the camera in relation to the stasis of the projector, and 
not the movement of objects on screen (whose movement does remain 
cinematographic in precisely Bergson’s sense).  
However, by characterising the difference between natural and 
cinematic perception in terms of the difference between ‘primitive’ cinema and 
the essence revealed by the introduction of montage and the mobile camera, 
Deleuze does not, as Douglass suggests, ‘perversely’ redefine the 
cinematographic illusion in order to present Bergsonian philosophy as 
cinematic in essence. Far from erasing or ‘overwriting’ Bergson’s own 
account, Deleuze’s version retains the cinematographic illusion precisely as 
the former characterises it, and extends the logic of his argument to include to 
elements that Bergson himself, writing in the ‘primitive’ phase of the cinema, 
would have had difficulty foreseeing – to be specific, the elements of montage 
and the mobility of the camera.411 Moreover, he not only deals with these new 
elements in strictly Bergsonian terms (albeit those of Matter and Memory 
rather than Creative Evolution), he does so without replacing or distorting the 
terms in which Bergson himself does explicitly treat the cinema.  
5.3 From ‘Primitive’ Cinema to Real Movement  
Deleuze makes it clear that the cinematographic illusion as Bergson 
describes it does indeed describe the conditions of the ‘primitive’ cinema and 
remains at the very least implicit within all cinema – the film strip and its static 
frames are not conjured away by an argumentative sleight of hand on 
Deleuze’s part. Rather, the attention Deleuze gives to the role of montage in 
                                                
411 As noted, Bergson tells us that he was using the metaphor of the cinematographic illusion in his 
lectures at least five years before the publication of Creative Evolution. Creative Evolution, 272, n.1. 
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breaking cinema from the conditions of natural perception reproduced in the 
primitive cinema enables him to define the terms of a cinematic thought which 
is non-human in principle – a thought which is no longer constitutively 
separated from being – on the very same basis by which Bergson accounts 
for the epistemological limits of all too human thought.  
In other words, he shows that the cinematographic illusion, far from 
proffering a critique of the cinema, is deduced on the basis of the cinema in 
strictly Bergsonian terms, without that illusion defining the possibilities the 
cinema offers to philosophy. And Deleuze does so in terms that apply equally 
to both Bergson’s characterisation of the cinematographic illusion in Creative 
Evolution and to Deleuze’s own ‘reformulation’ of that illusion in the more 
complex terms implied in Matter and Memory. The capacity of the cinema to 
separate the point of view of the camera from that of the projector (and thus of 
the viewer) offers cinematic thought the means to overcome or escape those 
limits and illusions in both cases. I argue Bergson’s use of the 
cinematographic to illustrate the illusion in question has been something of a 
red herring and has led commentators astray when exploring the relation 
between cinema and that illusion, since within the cinema itself it arises only 
where camera and projector coincide, and not as a direct result of the still 
frames that make up the film strip.412  
One of the consequences of Deleuze’s argument is that the cinema is in 
a sense both cinematographic and cinematic at the same time – both abstract 
and real movement may ‘appear’ on screen simultaneously, because they are 
                                                
412 And it’s worth noting that Bergson coins his cinematographic metaphor at a time when the cinema 
was largely characterised by the coincidence and identity of camera and projector as one and the same 
piece of equipment. Had the mobile camera been commonplace earlier, he may have framed his 
metaphor differently. 
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produced by distinct means that nevertheless both belong to the cinema. The 
‘correction’ the cinema offers of the cinematographic illusion does not take the 
form of a replacement, effacement or even negation of that illusion. Rather, 
the cinema presents us with both illusory and real movement at the same 
time. As we have seen, Bergson accounts for both the objective character of 
being and our subjective experience of it in terms of a double system of 
articulation of one and the same reality: the objective reality of movement-for-
itself of being on the one hand, and on the other the subjective reality of that 
same movement when it is grasped in relation to a centred perspective that 
arises in the same terms as being itself (that is, as an image).  
Insofar as it begins in its primitive state with a reproduction of the 
conditions of natural perception (it starts with and from a ‘human’ or centred 
perspective) the cinema traces this passage ‘in reverse’. It starts from the 
centre (the subjective and relative movement-for-someone given in terms of 
the camera/projector that replaces the viewer’s own point of view). And from 
this starting point, the cinema then ‘returns’ such perception to the absolute or 
objective reality of movement-for-itself (and thus opens on to the acentred 
universal variation of being) – that is to say, to the pure perception-for-itself of 
Bergson’s first system of articulation. As we have seen, it does this by virtue 
of the aberrant movement of the camera (via montage or the camera’s own 
mobility) in relation to the static point of view of the viewer/projector. Bergson 
accounts for or deduces movement-for-someone in abstract terms as an 
arbitrary limitation of the movement-for-itself of being.  
But through the introduction of montage and the mobile camera, the 
cinematographic movement presented in the cinema’s primitive state is 
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revealed as an arbitrary limitation of the real movement that is always implicit 
in the cinema, as its potential or essence. Thus the cinema ‘overcomes’ the 
cinematographic conditions of the viewer’s natural perception (overcomes the 
human) to reveal beyond it the movement-image as a mobile section of 
movement-for-itself, which opens onto the indefinite elsewhere of the open 
whole of being. It traces in reverser the ‘descent’ of beings from being – and 
as such it has at least the potential to open up or reveal to thought and to 
philosophy their limits with regard to the thought of being. 
Consider, for example, the most obvious and familiar type of movement 
the cinema offers us, which is the movement of bodies across the screen − a 
train pulling into a station, workers leaving a factory and so on – a movement 
that is “still attached to people or things”413 rather than movement in and for 
itself. All that we see in such movement is the reordering of the elements of 
the set defined by the boundaries of the shot. This is what Deleuze calls 
‘relative’ movement:414 cinematographic movement, abstract movement, 
movement understood as equivalent to the line drawn by the passage of a 
body from A to B. Such movement is an aspect of any film in which people or 
things act within the world and on each other – which is to say, it is to be 
found in the vast majority of the cinema.415  
                                                
413 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 25. 
414 Ibid., 19. 
415 Certain modes of experimental cinema might offer examples of exceptions to this dominant ‘rule’. 
Take, for example, Stan Brakhage’s hand-painted films or his “Mothlight”, in which the image is the 
result of actual moth wings pressed between two long strips of tape, which were in turn run through an 
optical printer to produce the film strip itself. Stan Brakhage, "Mothlight," (USA1963). As we shall see in 
Chapter Six, experimental cinema (and specifically the American experimental cinema as exemplified by 
Brakhage) holds a quite distinctive place within Deleuze’s taxonomy of cinematic signs by virtue of its 
particular treatment of cinematic movement.  
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Bergson sees only this sort of movement in the cinema, but Deleuze, 
looking beyond the cinema’s ‘primitive’ state, sees coexisting with it another 
type of movement given not in terms of the translation of elements in space, 
but rather by the transformation of relations between those elements effected 
in terms of montage and the mobile camera. The essence of the movement-
image, he says,  
lies in extracting from vehicles or moving bodies the 
movement which is their common substance, or extracting 
from movements [the movement still attached to things] the 
mobility that is their essence … pure movement extracted 
from bodies or moving things”.416  
Such movement is absolute, rather than relative, and expresses the 
universal variation of being itself417 − but it is worth emphasising that this 
movement is something that cinema must extract from moving bodies by 
means of its own formal capacities. In other words, it is the formal operation of 
the cinema that reveals the absolute movement (the essence of movement) of 
which the merely relative movement the translation of bodies in space 
presents to us is a mere abstraction.  
What Deleuze proposes is not a choice between these two options, 
between relative and absolute movement, but rather a recognition that the 
former is merely a limited case of the latter, derived or deduced from rather 
than opposed to it. We might understand this in practical terms as follows: 
irrespective of any montage or camera mobility, whenever we focus on the 
movement of bodies on screen in terms of their translation in space (on the 
                                                
416 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 23. 
417 Ibid., 19. 
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‘content’ of the shot) – whenever we emphasise the similarity between our 
own natural perception and what we see at the movies – we emphasise a 
properly cinematographic and abstract movement which is always there in the 
cinema as a possibility (and most often as an actuality), whether that cinema 
is ‘primitive’ or not. At the very least we can say that this kind of 
cinematographic movement is given to us whenever the camera is static and 
we consider the individual shot in ‘isolation’ from the other shots that make up 
the film in question. This may seem an overly qualified set of conditions on 
which to base the claim that it appears throughout all cinema, but argue that 
under most circumstances this relative movement tends to be what we 
habitually notice and keep first of all, irrespective of any other type of 
movement that may also be present. Such movement – the movement 
‘attached to people or things’ − is ‘familiar’ because it resembles the 
movement given to us under the conditions of natural perception.  
If our attention is drawn to this, rather than to the absolute movement 
Deleuze argues is also given in post-‘primitive’ cinema, this is because our 
natural habits of perception make it easier to see and recognise – more 
‘obvious’. However, if this is all we see, we neglect the real or concrete 
movement that always coexists with it (although produced by distinct means) 
at the level of film form itself. Nevertheless, to recognise this real movement, 
beyond the habits of natural perception, requires a genuine break with the 
conditions that shape our properly human experience of the world (and not 
just cinema) and to that extent at least, a break with the human or human 
nature. This is of course exactly what attracts Deleuze to the cinema, but it 
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seems worth acknowledging that for all that cinema may invite or even 
demand this break, it cannot require that we recognise and acknowledge it.  
Were it to be otherwise – were cinema in fact able to require that we see 
and recognise real movement against our own ‘human nature’ – we would, 
after all, be left with the tricky task of explaining why it took nearly a hundred 
years of cinema for someone (Deleuze) to notice this, and write an account of 
how and why it might be so. Of course, part of Deleuze’s argument throughout 
the Cinema books is that certain filmmakers and thinkers have indeed to 
some degree or other recognised this power of cinema, offered various 
partial, overlapping and conflicting accounts of its sources and exploited 
aspects of it in their work.418 But if they have recognised and expressed it to 
some degree or other, it has been left to Deleuze to ‘extract’ it from their work 
and express it conceptually.  
The distinction between relative (or abstract) and absolute (or real) 
movement is the integral to Cinema 1’s second chapter, ‘Frame and Shot, 
Framing and Cutting’,419 in which Deleuze seems to shift his focus from 
Bergson’s theses on movement to the analysis of the formal elements of 
cinema itself. However, this is in fact a continuation of Deleuze’s response to 
the philosophical problems posed or implied in his discussion of Bergson’s 
three theses on movement. And as we shall see, this analysis ultimately offers 
us an answer to the conundrum of how an image that moves can 
                                                
418 For an example Deleuze doesn’t point to, see Routt’s argument that not only is the distinction 
between perception, affection and action-images in the cinema foreshadowed in 1915 in Vachel 
Lindsay’s tripartite distinction between images of ‘splendour’, ‘intimacy’ and ‘action,’ (in The Art of the 
Moving Image) but Lindsay’s treatment of the cinema furthermore “is underpinned by an understanding 
of existence as a forest of images not unlike that advanced in Henri Bergson's Matter and Memory.” 
“The Madness of Images and Thinking Cinema.”  Postmodern Culture 8, no. 2 (1998). n.p., 
muse.jhu.edu/jourhals/pmc/v008/8.2routt.html; Vachel Lindsay, The Art of the Moving Picture (New 
York: Liveright, 1970). 
419 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 12−28. 
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nevertheless ‘impose fixed instantaneous views’ while also expressing 
movement as real duration. The most obvious feature of this chapter is the 
definition and analysis of the basic elements of film form: frame, shot and 
montage. However, embedded in this account of features proper to the 
cinema are the details of his philosophical argument demonstrating the 
univocity of qualitative and quantitative difference, and of the cinematographic 
illusion and cinema. If we consider the simplest example, that of the static 
shot where frame and shot are identical, such a shot defines the contents of a 
set – the set of the elements within it, the people, bodies, that appear on 
screen within the frame. Considered in itself, such a set is closed, insofar as it 
contains a definite number of distinct elements. These elements – the people 
and things that occupy the shot − may certainly change their position within 
the space of the frame, but such change is merely relative, a reordering of 
elements expressing a difference of degree rather than a difference in kind.420  
If one considers such a shot/set in relation to that which exists ‘beyond’ 
its borders (either in terms the shots which come before or after, or of the ‘out 
of field’ of the frame − that which does not appear on screen, but is ‘implied’ 
above or below or to either side of the frame), its relation to the next shot (and 
the next and the next) may be considered strictly additive – the contents of 
each shot/set merely combine to form a larger set, including more and more 
elements, equivalent to a simple expansion of the frame to contain what was 
previously ‘out of field’.  
                                                
420 As Bogue puts it, “if we consider movement within a closed set we tend to see unchanging bodies 
shifting positions within a space-container.” Bogue, Deleuze on Cinema, 26. 
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From this perspective, the ‘out of field’ and the shots that come before 
and after are in principle of the same order: they merely add to the set defined 
by the shot without changing it qualitatively. Whether this addition takes place 
through a direct expansion of that shot (by the widening of the frame to 
incorporate more and more of what was formerly out of field) or by adding a 
new set or sets to it (each of the shots before and after), “when a set is 
framed, therefore seen, there is always a larger set, or another set with which 
the first forms a larger one, and which in turn can be seen, on condition that it 
forms a new out-of-field, etc”.421 This expansion is potentially infinite, but as 
Deleuze points out, however far it goes it can never constitute a whole, or 
rather the whole. To do so would define the whole itself as a set and thereby 
set in motion Russell’s paradox of set of all sets. Such a set must either 
include itself (thus constituting a new set which must be included in the set of 
all sets, which also must be included and so on ad infinitum) or not (in which 
case it does not contain all sets). In either case the set of all sets fails to 
define its own contents, and thus fails to be identical to itself, fails to be the 
set of all sets.  
This in turn allows Deleuze to provide a properly ontological 
characterisation of the whole as the open, which is not a spatial 
determination, but “relates back to time or even to spirit rather than to content 
and to space”.422 Given the paradoxical character of the concept of the set of 
all sets, Deleuze concludes that the whole is therefore “not a set and does not 
have parts. It is rather that which prevents each set, however big it is, from 
                                                
421 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 16.  
422 Ibid., 17. 
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closing in on itself”.423 In other words, sets contain only actual elements, 
distinct things, bodies, people – quantities of things which can be subdivided 
or extended to infinity without changing in kind, but the whole is qualitatively 
different from those contents. It neither constitutes nor can be considered as a 
totality, either in principle or in fact, since it has no determinable contents (it is 
not a set). It is neither numerically nor spatially finite or infinite (the infinitely 
large can always be reached spatially or numerically, at least in principle, by 
the continuous addition of one thing to another).  
The whole is never ‘present’ or visible in any given shot or combination 
of shots. It does not exist as such, but rather subsists or insists as “a more 
radical Elsewhere, outside homogenous space and time … [whose function] is 
that of introducing the transspatial and the spiritual into a system which is 
never perfectly closed”.424 The whole, then, is properly virtual, rather than 
actual. Having no actual elements or terms to differ from each other, it is 
rather the continuous variation of being itself, the unlimited universe of light 
‘before’ the arbitrary and cinematographic limitation that the interval of the 
brain/screen imposes on it. In other words, the whole Deleuze refers to here is 
simply being in its difference from itself: “The whole is that which changes – it 
is the open or duration”.425 The relation of the shot to that which is ‘beyond’ it 
thus has:  
                                                
423 Ibid., 16. It seem to me that there is a complementary argument implicit here that Deleuze does not 
spell out. If the paradox of the set of all sets is that it necessarily fails to be identical to itself, then we 
could just as aptly say that such a set differs from itself. In other words the paradox inherent in set 
theory is one of the paradoxes of becoming, and takes us by its own means and in its own terms from 
distinct and determined elements (of sets) to pure and indeterminate difference as the condition of and 
for those elements. As counterintuitive as it might at first seem, then, Russel’s ‘set of all sets’, from this 
perspective, can be read in this light as the equivalent of Bergson’s ‘open whole.’ 
424 Ibid., 17. 
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two qualitatively different aspects: a relative aspect by 
means of which a closed system refers in space to a set 
which is not seen, and which can in turn be seen, even if this 
gives rise to a new unseen set, on to infinity; and an absolute 
aspect by which the closed system opens onto a duration 
which is immanent to the whole universe, which is no longer 
a set and does not belong to the order of the visible.426 
Thus although these two aspects of movement are qualitatively different, 
neither are they separate or distinct. Once again, this is a function of the 
difference between the two kinds of difference in question here. Relative 
movement is a function of quantitative and spatial difference, or difference in 
degree. But as we have seen, no matter how far such a difference is extended 
(no matter how large the set becomes), it can never give rise to a difference 
capable of accounting for the differences in difference itself. That is, 
quantitative difference can never extend itself all the way to a qualitative 
difference – no matter how far the frame is expanded, it can never become or 
attain the whole.  
The reverse, however, is not true. Because qualitative difference is not 
given in terms of difference in degree, but rather manifests all the degrees of 
difference itself, it differs from itself all the way to difference in degree. In other 
words, the absolute movement expressed in the transformation of the open 
whole differs from itself all the way to the relative movement manifest in the 
translation of elements within a set. Taken on its own, relative movement is 
merely spatial and cinematographic; understood in relation to the whole that 
subtends it, it expresses an aspect of the change in that whole, and thus is a 
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‘mobile section of duration’. Absolute movement as qualitative difference thus 
‘bridges the gap’ between the relative and the absolute by means of its own 
difference from itself. As Deleuze puts it: 
The whole is therefore that which prevents each set, 
however big it is, from closing in on itself, and that which 
forces it to extend itself into a larger set. The whole is 
therefore like a thread which traverses sets [without ever 
being a member of them] and gives each one the possibility, 
which is necessarily realised, of communicating with another, 
to infinity.427 
This ‘thread’ is the concrete expression of the univocity of being itself (of 
the univocity of relative with absolute movement; of the cinematographic with 
the cinematic; of identity with difference) and thus of the procedure by which 
identity and negation (which are characteristics or derived in terms of sets and 
their elements, but not of the whole) can be accounted for in the purely 
positive terms of difference. The openness of the whole – its difference from 
itself – allows it to ‘descend’ all the way into the merely relative difference 
found in closed systems or sets. It thereby forces those sets to remain open, 
both relatively and spatially in terms of their capacity to extend themselves 
into larger and larger sets, onto infinity, and absolutely and temporally as an 
expression of an aspect of the duration or change of the whole:  
A closed system [a set] is never absolutely closed; but on the 
one hand it is connected in space to other systems [sets] by 
a more or less ‘fine’ thread, and on the other hand it is 
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integrated or reintegrated into a whole which transmits a 
duration to it along this thread.428 
Given the ‘everyday’ character of the relative movement described within 
the frame, there is no difficulty in translating Deleuze’s abstract description of 
the ‘modification’ of the respective positions of the elements of a set’ into 
terms immediately recognisable to someone sitting in the local multiplex: on 
screen in front of us a car pulls up and someone gets out, a plane flies 
overhead, a can rolls down the hill … This sort of movement is all too familiar, 
since it simply mirrors the cinematographic tendencies of our own natural 
perception. But what of the absolute movement that subtends these relative 
movements? How is it made manifest in the cinema itself – how can we ‘see’ 
it − given that it ‘does not belong to the order of the visible’ and belongs 
properly to a whole that is never present as such?  
The answer turns on the dual character of the shot, insofar as the 
relation between relative and absolute movement is expressed formally within 
the cinema via the ‘intermediate’ status of the shot between the two poles of 
framing and montage.429 Facing ‘inwards’ towards the frame, the shot delimits 
the contents of a determinate set and manifests a movement which is only 
relative; facing outwards towards the cut between itself and the shots that 
come before or after, it follows the ‘thread’ of duration that links it to the whole, 
such that “The shot is movement considered from this dual point of view: the 
translation of the parts of a set which spreads out in space, the change of a 
whole which is transformed in duration”.430 In other words, absolute 
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movement, the non-cinematographic movement that attracts Deleuze to the 
cinema, is a function of montage.431  
Thus the dual face of the shot, turned on one side towards both the set, 
and on the other towards montage, also mirrors in reverse the ‘double régime 
of reference of images’ through which Bergson accounts for the objective 
reality of movement and our subjective abstraction of it. Turned towards the 
set, the shot defines the elements that constitute that set as elements, as 
images-for-someone, but turned towards montage, the shot opens onto the 
whole, the universal variation of being itself, and thus links the abstract 
movement of those elements to the movement-in-itself, or duration, of being.  
But how does montage express a transformation in the whole as 
duration itself, rather than a mere translation of elements in space? If absolute 
movement is not the movement attached to elements, things, people, bodies 
on screen, if it is neither visible nor present, then how is it given to us to 
experience in the cinema? Although the movement of the elements present 
on screen may be spatial and visible, the relations between those elements 
are not. As Deleuze reminds us,” Relation is not a property of objects, it is 
always external to its terms.”432 In other words, relations between actual 
things can never be reduced to an attribute of one thing or another, but exist 
‘between’ them. Since it can never be distinguished as an element in itself, or 
as an attribute of an elements on its own, this relation must be understood as 
                                                
431 Ronald Bogue offers an excellent treatment of the relation between relative and absolute movement, 
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exclusion of real or absolute movement. Indeed, that is precisely the purpose and function of the 
cinematographic illusion and why we need the cinema to ‘see’ beyond it. Deleuze on Cinema, 25-28. 
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strictly virtual rather than actual, and as dynamic rather than static (it has no 
‘identity’). It is in terms of relations that things, as elements of a closed set, 
nevertheless remain connected to the open whole or being.  
Imagine a herd of hungry cattle standing in a field denuded of grass;433 it 
moves to the next field, where the grass is lush and green, to feed. The path 
beaten by the cattle’s hooves traces their movement in space as a line on the 
ground, but if this is all we grasp of it, we comprehend movement only in its 
relative, spatial and abstract aspects. In the movement of the herd from one 
field to the next, the relations expressed between these elements are also 
transformed, from (say) hunger and desire where there is no grass, to satiety 
where there is. These qualities are not attributes of the herd, or of the 
presence or absence of grass, but rather are an expression of the relations of 
these elements to each other and to their environment, to the whole that they 
exists within. If the world of the herd consisted simply of the farm on which 
they live, with its several fields (if they lived within a closed set), their 
movement from one patch of grass to the next would be mere translation in 
space; but on the other side of the fence, that farm opens onto the world, onto 
the whole, which is not a set, which cannot be given in advance, because its 
being is transformation itself, a constant creation of the new: “if the whole is 
not giveable, it is because it is the open, and because its nature is to change 
constantly, or to give rise to something new, in short, to endure”434. The 
transformation in relations in question is a function of the herd’s movement 
only insofar as that movement expresses an aspect of change in the whole – 
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movement grasped as a mobile section of duration, rather than in terms of a 
line beaten on the earth.  
Nancy (glossing Deleuze) draws out this tension between translation 
and as transformation within cinematic movement in his discussion of the 
films of Abbas Kiarostami: 
But what is the motion that, in this way, is cinema (and 
neither its object nor what it represents or restores, as goes 
the belief of those who see cinema wholly as an ‘animated 
feature’)? Motion is that which ‘only occurs if the whole is 
neither given nor giveable’. Motion is not a displacing or a 
transferring, which may occur between given places in a 
totality that is itself given. On the contrary, it is what takes 
place when a body is in a situation and a state that compel it 
to find its place, a place it consequently has not had or no 
longer has. I move (in matter or mind) when I am not – 
ontologically – where I am – locally. Motion carries me 
elsewhere but the ‘elsewhere’ is not given beforehand: my 
coming will make of it the ‘there’ where I will have come from 
‘here.’435 
Movement as transformation is an act of creation, of ‘myself’ and of the world, 
in the transformation of relations between ‘elements’ that open those 
elements onto the unceasing variation and creation of being itself. Relation 
thus manifests the ‘thread’ of duration that links the cinematographic to the 
cinematic, abstract movement to real movement, the actual to the virtual, the 
set to the whole. In other words, it is in terms of relations that Deleuze is able 
to demonstrate, rather than merely assert, the immanence of the first term of 
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each of these dyads to the second, and it is in terms of relation that we must 
understand the whole:  
If one had to define the whole, it would be defined by 
Relation … It [relation] is also inseparable from the open, 
and displays a spiritual or mental existence … Relations do 
not belong to objects, but to the whole, on condition that this 
is not confused with a closed set of objects. By movement in 
space, the objects of a set change their respective positions. 
But, through relations, the whole is transformed or changes 
qualitatively. We can say of duration itself or of time, that it is 
the whole of relations.436 
Montage (as the aspect of the shot turned ‘outwards’ towards the whole) 
thus expresses a transformation in the state of the whole rather than the 
translation of elements in space. It is “the operation which bears on the 
movement-images to release the whole from them, that is, the image of time. 
It is a necessarily indirect image, since it is deduced from movement-images 
and their relationships”.437 Take, for example, a scene of conversation 
between two people presented in a shot-reverse-shot structure, in which the 
alternation of shots (that is to say, the movement of the camera position) 
expresses something like the change from ‘looking’ to ‘being looked at’, or 
‘seeing’ to ‘being seen.’ Although it is rare for such a scene to be filmed so 
that the alternating perspectives of the camera are tied directly to the 
subjective point of view of the characters themselves, it is very common for 
the camera to ‘side’ more or less with the perspective of one character, and 
then the other, by shooting over their shoulder (often with them partially in 
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frame).438 Although such a sequence is properly speaking indirect and 
objective in style, it nevertheless offers an alternating alignment of emphasis 
from each character’s point of view, and variations in the angle of alignment, 
framing and length of shot can all be used to articulate the internal dynamics 
of this relationship, all the while placing them within a world whose movement 
their relationship is inextricably tied to, expresses and is an aspect of. The 
change in relations expressed here is literally the change in the protagonists 
relationship that takes place throughout the conversation (they fall in love, 
betray each other, plan a murder…).  
Alternatively, consider a scene which opens with a wide shot of the 
locale in which the action will take place (the ‘establishing shot’) then moves 
to a closer but still objective and indirect shot which draws our attention to a 
specific character within that environment, and then cuts to a subjective and 
direct shot from that character’s point of view, and thus as it relates to or 
impacts on the character and their goals or actions. The variability of 
perspective imposed on the viewer by montage means that, rather than their 
status as a centre of perception providing the common denominator according 
to which the elements of world are composed or divided into sets, the viewer 
is subject to a:  
pure movement [that] varies the elements of the set by 
dividing them up into fractions with different denominators 
[different perspectives or points of view] – because it 
decomposes and recomposes the set – that it also relates to 
a fundamentally open whole, whose essence is to ‘become’ 
                                                
438 To be more precisely, this is done by placing the camera at an angle with respect to the favoured 
character of less than ninety degrees to the perpendicular of the eye-line running between the 
protagonists.  
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or to change … [Jean] Epstein comes closest to the concept 
of the shot: it is a mobile section, that is, a temporal 
perspective or a modulation.439 
It is the composition of these variable temporal perspectives in montage that 
brings pure movement to light, by varying the relations between the elements 
of the world, dividing and joining, decomposing and recomposing them 
according to ‘different denominators’, rather than according to the common 
denominator imposed by the centred point of view of natural perception. 
The mobile camera perhaps presents a more complex case, since both 
persons and camera can move, and thus change their perspective – why, in 
this case, would the cinema offer anything that natural perception cannot? It is 
not enough to merely note that cameras may move in ways persons generally 
do not – for example, the technical apparatus that allows such camera moves 
could, at least in principle, be adapted to move a person in similar ways (on a 
dolly, a crane, a helicopter and so on). What we must keep in mind is that it is 
not the camera’s movement in space (no matter how unusual it might be from 
a human perspective) that underlies its capacity to show real, rather than 
abstract movement. Rather, it is the disjunction between the point of view of 
the camera and that of the viewer/projector in the cinema that constitutes the 
decisive breach in the conditions of natural perception for the viewer, and thus 
surpasses the cinematographic limits of human perception and thought: it is 
not the mobility of the camera with respect to the objects it captures that gives 
us real movement, but its mobility with respect to the point of view of the 
projector.  
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If we consider montage from the perspective of the transformation of 
relations that it effects, we can see why Deleuze aligns it with the mobility of 
the camera, even though the latter produces a movement that strictly 
speaking takes place within the confines of the shot itself, rather than between 
shots. A mobile shot, rather than simply determining the elements of a set, 
effects a transformation in the relations between those elements rather than a 
mere translation in space, and thus expresses an aspect of duration itself – or 
at least has the capacity to do so. Deleuze offers the example of such a shot 
from Alfred Hitchcock’s Frenzy (1972):440  
the camera follows a man and a woman who climb a 
staircase and arrive at a door that the man opens; then the 
camera leaves them, and draws back in a single shot. It runs 
along the external wall of the apartment, comes back to the 
staircase that it descends backward, coming out on to the 
pavement, and rises up the exterior up to the opaque 
window of the apartment seen from outside. This movement, 
which modifies the relative position of immobile sets, is only 
necessary if it expresses something in the course of 
happening, a change in the whole which it itself transmitted 
through these modifications: the woman is being murdered. 
She went in free, but cannot expect any help – the murder is 
inexorable.441 
The implicit distinction Deleuze makes here between a camera 
movement which is ‘necessary’ and one which is merely arbitrary, tells us that 
the transformation of relations that surpasses the limits of human perception 
is not an automatic function of the moving camera, but is simply a potential or 
                                                
440 Alfred Hitchcock, "Frenzy," (USA1972).  
441 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 19. 
5.#Genesis#and#Deduction#/#216#
power the mobile camera has at its disposal (one need only think of the 
hyperkinetic, but narratively and conceptually insignificant, camera movement 
characteristic of much contemporary action cinema to recognise what an 
‘arbitrary’ camera movement of the kind Deleuze hints at might look like in 
practice). This potential coexistence of arbitrary and necessary camera 
mobility is merely an aspect of the co-existence of the cinematographic and 
the cinematic Deleuze proposes.  
Nevertheless, if, with Deleuze, we define montage in terms of the 
transformation of relations effected between shots, then the mobile camera in 
effect constitutes a kind of montage internal to the shot itself, as if there were 
montage between each single frame of the film strip itself: when the camera 
itself moves, each individual ‘photogramme’ presents an imperceptibly 
different ‘angle’ on the world, continuously decomposing and recomposing it, 
‘dividing it into fractions with different denominators’ whose cumulative effect 
across the length of the shot is to make visible a transformation in and of that 
world, in and of the whole. 
If, as Deleuze says, the Cinema books are the product of a ‘natural’ 
movement from philosophy to cinema, it is not simply because the images of 
the cinema move. Rather, the ontological speculations of philosophy find 
themselves reflected in the cinema because being itself is already cinematic 
in nature, such that the movement we find in the cinema does not reproduce 
or represent the movement of the world so much as it simply is that 
movement. As Rancière puts it, for Deleuze “Images, properly speaking, are 
the things of the world. It follows logically from this that cinema is not the 
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name of an art: it is the name of the world”.442 The priority that Deleuze gives 
to the cinema over all other arts, and in some sense over philosophy stems 
from this identity not only of cinema and world, but also of world and thought.  
Just as importantly, the conditions under which the images of the cinema 
appear for the viewer break with the conditions of natural perception in a 
fashion that decentres thought’s grasp of those images, and produces an 
abnormal and aberrant movement. Thus the identity of perception and 
consciousness both for itself and for someone that Deleuze proposes is such 
that, in breaking with the conditions of natural perception, the cinema breaks 
with the conditions of human thought in its cinematographic genesis. In doing 
so, it offers a properly cinematic consciousness in its place – a ‘spiritual 
automaton’ that opens onto the real movement, real duration and real thought 
of being. The ‘place’ here is literal: the projector re-places the viewer’s point of 
view (their perception, and thus their consciousness) with a perception and 
consciousness of its own, offering a technical reproduction of the conditions of 
natural perception. But once the point of view of the camera breaks with that 
of the projector, these conditions are decentred, and both perception and 
consciousness become abnormal, aberrant – that is to say, non-
cinematographic.  
As we can now see, Deleuze’s characterisation of the cinematographic 
illusion in the Cinema books is more complex and more subtle than is 
generally recognised. Likewise, its relevance to and roots within Deleuzian 
philosophy as a whole are deeper and have greater resonance throughout 
than it might at first seem. However, what we have seen so far is only the first 
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layer of the full complexity of his treatment of that illusion and of the cinema’s 
relation to it. As we will see in the next chapter, the terms in which Deleuze 
characterises the cinema’s correction of that illusion not only enable the 
cinema to dramatise the consequences of that illusion for philosophy, and the 
history of philosophy, in the cinema’s own non-human terms, but it also 
provides the basis on which the cinema is able to think the relation of the 
human to being itself as a problem for and of thought.  
  
 
 6. The Thought of the World 
6.1 Cinematic Aberration and the “Great Kantian Reversal” 
Whether we consider it from the perspective of Bergson’s 
characterisation of the cinematographic illusion in Creative Evolution, or from 
that of Deleuze’s reformulation of that illusion in terms of movement-images, 
the primitive cinema is strictly cinematographic in its orientation. It is the 
introduction of the formal resources of montage and camera mobility that 
propels the cinema into its ‘post-primitive’ phase and takes it ‘beyond’ that 
illusion. In doing so, it leads the cinema to “the conquest of its own essence or 
novelty”,443 and inaugurates narrative cinema, insofar as narration is, for 
Deleuze, a product of the combination of movement-images effected by 
montage.444  
However, for all that these premises lay the foundations of Deleuze’s 
Bergsonian treatment of the cinema, Deleuze is not yet done with the 
cinematographic illusion, or its consequences for both cinema and thought. As 
we shall see, narrative – specifically the narrative mode of the classical, pre-
war cinema – reintroduces the effects of the cinematographic illusion at a new 
level: that of the relations between shots, rather than relations between the 
still photograms of the film strip. The terms in which narrative does so sets the 
scene for the ‘collapse’ of the classical cinema itself, and thus for the 
‘impossible’ break between it and the modern cinema (between the 
movement- and time-image, and between the two volumes of the Cinema 
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books). Unfolding the terms of the classical cinema’s trajectory towards this 
collapse, and this impossibility, is the task of this chapter. 
 Cinematic narration, as the mode of combination of movement images, 
articulates the relationship of the arbitrarily closed set determined by the shot 
to the whole. In doing so, it also sets the terms of the relationship between the 
cinematographic, abstract and relative movement of the elements of that set, 
that shot, and the real, concrete and absolute movement of the whole. And 
given, as we have seen, that the shot as movement-image is the direct 
cinematic correlate of the material moments of human subjectivity, narrative in 
these terms dramatises relations between merely human thought and being, 
in and by the non-human terms of the cinema itself. In other words, if, as 
Deleuze suggests, the cinema articulates the “relationship between man and 
world, nature and thought”445 then narrative is the means by which it does so. 
And insofar as ontological speculation necessarily takes the form of an 
exploration of being by beings from within being – philosophy thinking the 
relation between man and the world starting from its merely human 
perspective – then narrative, as the composition of just such a relation, 
constitutes its cinematic equivalent.  
However, what merely human philosophy lacks, and what the cinema 
possesses by virtue of the decentring of natural perception effected in 
montage and the mobile camera, is the capacity to manifest the thread that 
links the centred perspective offered by movement-images to the acentred 
variation of THE movement-image concretely. Moreover, unlike human 
perception, thought and language, the cinema does this as a function of its 
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own nature or ‘essence’. And insofar as it does so, it reveals the univocity of 
the cinematographic illusion with the real movement and duration of being – 
the non-human thought of the cinema thinking (articulating, reproducing) the 
limits of human thought from beyond those limits. Thus if the cinema 
recapitulates the history of philosophy ‘in speeded up form’,446 it is able to do 
so insofar as there are as many modes of narration as there are modes of 
composition of movement-images. Different modes of composition of images 
– of montage – constitute speculative constructions of differing conceptions of 
whole and of our relation to it, different ways of thinking the relation between 
man and the world. As Deleuze puts it:  
since the most ancient philosophy, there have been many 
ways in which time can be conceived as a function of 
movement, in relation to movement, in various 
arrangements. We are likely to come across this variety 
again in the different ‘schools’ of montage.447 
In other words, the cinema is an ‘experimental brain’ or spiritual 
automaton, and specific instances of the cinema constitute or enter into 
different forms of ontological speculation which parallel those found in the 
history of philosophy. Deleuze does not suggest that there is a one-to-one 
correlation between the history of philosophy and that of the cinema; the 
overall trajectory may be same, but the cinema enters into that movement by 
its own means, and in its own terms. He does on occasion link the films 
collected under the respective signs of his cinematic taxonomy to particular 
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philosophical approaches and perspectives, and sometime even identifies 
specific filmmakers with specific philosophical approaches (most directly in his 
description of Eisenstein as the ‘cinematic Hegel’448). However, the passage 
where Deleuze compares the histories of philosophy and cinema does specify 
one direct correlation, albeit a pivotal one. While the classical cinema 
corresponds to philosophical perspectives that subordinate time to movement,  
It is possible that, since the war, a direct time-image has 
been formed and imposed on the cinema. We do not wish to 
say that there will no longer be any movement, but that – just 
as happened a very long time ago in philosophy – a reversal 
has happened in the movement−time relationship in which it 
is no longer time which is related to movement, it is the 
anomalies of movement which are dependent on time.449  
Where philosophy is concerned, this is what Deleuze refers to in his 
book on Kant as the “great Kantian reversal”, in which 
it is no longer a question of defining time by succession, nor 
space by simultaneity, nor permanence by eternity … [time] 
is not an eternal form, but in fact the form of that which is not 
eternal, the immutable form of change and movement.450 
This reversal plays a central role in Deleuze’s resolution of the philosophical 
problem he turns to the cinema to resolve. We will examine this connection in 
detail in the final chapter. For now, what is of interest is that this reversal, 
insofar as it belongs to the cinema, reveals a deep-seated tension in the 
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argument of the Cinema books themselves. Specifically, it points towards a 
conflict in the terms in which the relationship between cinema and the 
cinematographic illusion is presented Cinema 1 and in Cinema 2 respectively.  
In the former, while establishing the Bergsonian basis for his treatment 
of the cinema, he argues that it is the disjunction of camera and projector that 
provides the cinema with the means or capacity to overcome, to contain and 
to explain the cinematographic illusion. Specifically, the introduction of 
montage and the mobile camera produces an aberration of movement that 
opens the closed set of the shot to the open whole, or duration as unceasing 
variation. It is on this basis that Deleuze is able to claim that the cinema 
‘thinks’ in terms of real, rather than abstract, movement. This implies that the 
classical cinema should operate in terms of real movement no less than the 
modern, since it is montage and the mobile camera that inaugurate the era of 
the classical cinema. In Cinema 2, however, the terms in which the mode of 
narration of the classical cinema comes to be defined (montage as the 
composition of movement-image according to sensory-motor schemata), and 
the relation that is then posited between it and modern cinematic narration, 
suggest that it is here that the cinematographic illusion finds its ‘correction’ 
and is revealed as a limited and abstract perspective on being as it exists for 
itself, as we shall see.  
The classical cinema is characterised by what Deleuze calls ‘rational’ 
linkages between shots, whose coherence is ensured by the composition of 
movement-images according to a sensory-motor schema – in other words, 
perception and action are coordinated according to relations of cause and 
effect. Rational movement and coherent causality require and imply an 
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ordered and linear passage of time from one moment to the next; this is a 
spatialised conception of movement in which the passage of time is grasped 
in terms analogous to the static divisions of a clock face.  
Take, for example, a hypothetical sequence of two shots edited together: 
a static close up of the timer on a bomb counting down towards zero in the 
basement of an anonymous building, followed by a wide shot of a man 
running at speed down the middle of a crowded city street. There is no direct 
or overt link between these shots – the spaces they occupy share no physical 
connection, there is no cut on movement or graphic match to link them 
formally, the point of view and scale of each shot are different. In other words, 
the passage from one to the other ought in principle to produce aberrant 
movement.  
What prevents this from happening is precisely the imposition of a linear 
progression of time, and a spatialised conception of movement derived from 
it, marked by the counting down of the timer. The images of the bomb and the 
running man are linked as cause and effect via the imposition of a linear 
progression, and thus spatialisation, of time: the man’s desperate movement 
is measured by his progress towards the bomb in space, and the end of its 
countdown in time: he is running to get to the bomb in time to defuse it. 
Ordered in this fashion, the two shots constitute a minimal narrative in the 
mode of the classical cinema. What was aberration in relation to montage 
alone thus becomes rational insofar as montage is ordered according to this 
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sensory-motor schema, and this schema constructs movement in 
cinematographic terms.451  
Thus rather than aberrant movement being a function of montage from 
the earliest moments of the post-primitive cinema (and therefore an aspect of 
the classical cinema in its entirety), the classical cinema recentres the 
aberrant movement the cinema itself produces through the imposition of 
sensory-motor schemata as a principle for the organisation of images. The 
appearance of aberrant movement then emerges in the cinema as a result of 
the collapse of such schemata, which release or give rise to the “anomalies of 
movement which are dependent on time”452 that are characteristic of the 
modern cinema of the time-image. This is the ‘great Kantian reversal’ of the 
relation between time and movement Deleuze finds in the post-war cinema.  
We are thus left with two apparently contradictory and incompatible 
accounts of the cinema’s ‘correction’ of the cinematographic illusion. On the 
one hand this illusion is overcome in terms valid for the whole of ‘post-
primitive’ cinema, in the production of aberrant movement via montage. On 
the other, it is corrected in terms valid for the modern cinema alone, via the 
anomalies of movement produced by the collapse of the rational and causal 
linking of images that characterised the classical cinema. How can we 
account for this conflict while maintaining the validity of both (since to do 
otherwise would be to put the argument of the Cinema books as a whole in 
disarray)? 
                                                
451 It should be noted that this example is partial at best, since the relation of two shots taken on their 
own does not serve to determine a scheme. The ‘rules’ governing the organisation of relations between 
shots within the classical cinema only become apparent across a series of shots, and only fully so 
across a film in its entirety.  
452 Deleuze, Cinema 1, ix. 
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 Deleuze draws our attention to this problem early in Cinema 2 when he 
notes that the characteristic features of the time-image were already apparent 
in the early stages of the classical cinema. How then, he asks, “are we to 
delineate a modern cinema which would be distinct from ‘classical’ cinema or 
from the indirect representation of time?”453 His answer is that the aberrations 
of movement produced by the disjunction of camera and projector were 
recognised at this stage, but ‘warded off’ via the introduction of sensory-motor 
schemata as a principle of composition of images. Although on the one hand, 
the decentring effects of this disjunction introduces a ‘disproportion’ between 
a received movement and an executed movement (a perception-image and 
an action-image), on the other, such schemata work to recentre the cinema, 
not at the level of individual images or shots,454 but at the level of the 
relationship between shots. That is to say, the gap or interval between shots 
is ordered such that the relationship between perception and action is 
constrained to causal and coherent linkages from one to the next:  
What was aberration in relation to the movement-image 
ceases to be so in relation to these two images [perception 
and action images]: the interval [between received and 
executed movement] now plays the role of centre, and the 
sensory-motor schema restores the lost proportion, re-
establishes it in a new mode between perception and 
action.455 
The centred perspective of natural perception disrupted by montage and 
the mobile camera is thus restored in this ‘new mode’ in terms of the linkage 
                                                
453 Cinema 2, 39. 
454 Which would be equivalent to natural perception as reflected in the conditions of the ‘primitive’ 
cinema. 
455 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 40. 
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of perception and action in terms of cause and effect, which ensures the 
commensurability of relations between shots. Movement is ‘saved’ from its 
aberration by becoming relative rather than absolute,456 by being restored to a 
translation in space that is also a spatialisation of time – an indirect image of 
time as a function of movement, rather than a direct image of time, duration, 
transformation for itself. In other words, while the decentring effects of 
montage do indeed ‘correct’ the cinematographic illusion and provide the 
cinema with the means or capacity to express real movement (to produce the 
cinematic equivalent of Bergsonian intuition), the organisation of montage in 
the classical cinema according to sensory-motor schemata ‘wards off’ this 
correction by recentring cinematic perception, reimposing the 
cinematographic illusion at the level of the relation between shots, rather than 
that of the identity of the point of view of camera and projector.  
Deleuze notes that in philosophy, “aberrations of movement were 
recognised at an early stage … [but] were in some sense corrected, 
normalised, ‘elevated’ and brought in line with laws which … maintained the 
subordination of time”.457 In the same fashion, sensory-motor schemata 
suppress aberration and subordinate time to movement by constraining 
relations between images to rational, causal and linear links, which reimpose 
a centred and thus cinematographic perspective at the level of montage, 
rather than the shot. For philosophy, the history of this suppression lasts 
centuries (“from the Greeks to Kant”458). The cinema repeats this trajectory in 
                                                
456 Ibid. 
457 Ibid., 39. 
458 Ibid., xi. One might argue that the ‘minor tradition’ Deleuze articulates in his work on the history of 
philosophy represents his attempts to foreground and connect diverse, fragmentary or partial attempts 
to subvert this suppression from within philosophy itself. 
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“more fast-moving circumstances”,459 such that the ‘great Kantian reversal’ of 
the relation between movement and time occurs within the cinema in the 
collapse of such schemata, allowing real movement to appear once more. 
However, the relationship between the real movement of being and merely 
human and cinematographic thought this reversal articulates is more complex 
than the simple overcoming or surpassing of the limits of the human that 
Bergsonian intuition requires. Rather than giving rise to thought as a power 
adequate to the real movement of being (the thought of the whole as the 
open,) the modern cinema – the cinema of the time-image − gives rise to the 
confrontation of thought with its own ‘inpower’ (impouvoir),460 its 
“powerlessness to think the whole and to think oneself, thought which is 
always fossilized, dislocated, collapsed”.461  
This confrontation is the confrontation of thought with its own inability to 
think, and with it the cinema offers Deleuze a way to concretely explore the 
relation between all too human cinematographic thought and the unthought 
which haunts it − real movement, or duration as the being of difference. This 
relation appears within the Cinema books as or in terms of the break between 
classical and modern cinemas, movement and time image, and between the 
two volumes of Cinema 1 and 2 − a relation which, as we have seen in the 
first chapter of this thesis, is precisely impossible. Where the ‘mystical leap’ of 
intuition seeks to overcome or leave the human behind, the Cinema books 
foreground the human in its relation to being, in the exposure of human 
thought to being as the impossibility of thought. In this exposure thought 
                                                
459 Ibid. 
460 Ibid., 168. 
461 Ibid., 167. 
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reveals itself as a suffering we undergo, rather than a power we possess, 
which:  
can only think one thing, the fact that we are not yet thinking, 
the powerlessness to think the whole and to think oneself, 
thought which is always fossilized, dislocated, collapsed … 
[such that] what forces us to think is ‘the inpower’ [impouvoir] 
of thought’, the figure of nothingness, the inexistence of a 
whole which could be thought.462  
Thought as a relation to the outside, thought outside itself and the 
unthought within thought: all this returns us to the central paradox of the 
Cinema books, in terms of the passage from Cinema 1 to Cinema 2 and the 
shift in the characterisation of the whole from Bergson’s ‘open’ to the ‘outside’ 
mapped in the work of Blanchot. Resolving this paradox means accounting for 
it in Bergsonian terms (we must ‘reach’ Blanchot on the basis of Bergson). As 
we shall see, Deleuze’s reformulation of the cinematographic illusion in terms 
of movement-images as mobile sections of duration provides us with the tools 
to do just that. However, in order to do so, we must pass by way of the 
paradoxes internal to Cinema 1, starting with the tendency of the classical 
cinema to construct a closed, totalised and transcendent image of the whole 
on the basis of the movement image, despite the inherently decentring force 
which opens them onto the real movement of being as the open. 
6.2 The Classical Cinema as Totalisation 
Rodowick argues out that there is an ‘inherent tension’ within Deleuze’s 
account of the movement-image which Deleuze himself does not make clear, 
between “the movement-image considered in itself as Image of universal 
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variation”463, and what Rodowick refers to as “the cinematic movement-image” 
– in other words, action-, perception- and affection-images. The former is the 
ontological premise that founds the problematic of both Bergsonian and 
Deleuzian philosophy. Whether we call it the virtual, duration, internal 
difference, concrete or real movement, the open or the whole of relations, it 
amounts in each case to a nuance of the same fundamental premise: that 
being is that which differs from itself first of all. In other words, it is the basic 
premise of all of Deleuze’s work, including the Cinema books, even if the 
terminology may differ from book to book or argument to argument.  
It is not this ontological premise that is in question in the Cinema books, 
but rather the cinema’s capacity to ‘think’ in terms adequate to it – and 
‘cinematic movement-images’ are the materials by which it seeks to do so. 
The ‘tension’ between the two that Rodowick refers to lies in the fact that, 
although it is the ontological premise of the open whole that grounds the 
capacity of cinematic movement-images to think in terms of real movement, 
the sensory-motor composition of cinematic movement-images characteristic 
of the classical cinema tends towards the construction of an image of the 
whole as totality (or at least totalisable in principle) – that is to say, a closed, 
rather than open, whole. Thus: 
The whole history of cinematic movement-images is marked 
by this paradoxical position: the desire to build an image of 
organic totality out of a force that assures the openness of 
the whole, or the inability of any set to close except in a 
partial way.464 
                                                
463 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, 73. 
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This ‘tension’ is a direct function of Deleuze’s identification of the 
movement image with the shot,465 which in turn is defined as: 
the intermediary between the framing of the set and the 
montage of the whole, sometimes tending towards the pole 
of framing, sometimes tending towards the pole of montage. 
The shot is movement considered from this dual point of 
view: the translation of the parts of a set which spreads out 
in space, the change of a whole which is transformed in 
duration.”466 
As I’ve argued, insofar as the shot tends towards the determination of an 
arbitrarily closed set, it emphasises the cinematographic aspect of movement 
(the translation of the elements of the shot in space), but where it tends 
towards montage, it opens that set to the real movement of being (the 
transformation of relations between elements as an expression of duration). 
Moreover, the tendency of a given shot towards one or the other of these two 
poles emphasises one or the other of two qualitatively different aspects of the 
out-of-field (that which exists beyond the boundaries of the shot). On the one 
hand, there is an “absolute aspect by which the closed system opens on to a 
duration which is immanent to the whole universe, which is no longer a set 
and does not belong to the order of the visible.467 In this case, the shot opens 
onto the open whole as the unceasing variation of being. On the other, there 
is “a relative aspect by means of which a closed system refers in space to a 
set which is not seen, and which can in turn be seen, even if this gives rise to 
                                                
465 “The shot is the movement-image .” Deleuze, Cinema 1, 22. 
466 Ibid., 19−20. 
467 Ibid., 17. 
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a new unseen set, onto infinity”.468 From this perspective, the whole is simply 
an infinitely expandable or expanding set, “a universe or plane of genuinely 
unlimited content”,469 which nevertheless remains closed insofar as it remains 
at any given moment a set of determined elements. As Deleuze points out, 
these two aspects are necessarily intermingled in any given shot, but 
depending on the nature of the ‘thread’ of duration which links shot to shot:  
when we consider a framed image as a closed system, we 
can say that one aspect prevails over the other … The 
thicker the thread which links the seen set to other unseen 
sets the better the out-of-field fulfils its first function, which is 
the adding of space to space.470 
What is central here is that the tendency of cinematic movement-images 
towards a totalisation of the whole that Rodowick refers to is a direct function 
of the tendency of the shot towards the determination of the elements of a set 
on the one hand, and of the tendency of the ‘relative’ out-of-field such sets 
imply to construct an image of the whole as an infinitely expandable but 
nevertheless in principle closed set on the other. Such a set both is “genuinely 
unlimited” insofar as it continues to expand, and constitutes a closed or 
totalised whole insofar as, at any given moment, it nevertheless determines 
the elements of a finite set. If one grasps the whole only in terms of this 
continual expansion, one is in danger of confusing the whole with this ever 
expanding set − a totalised or totalisable whole, closed and in some sense 
given in advance. It is only the openness of the whole – the fact that it is “not 
                                                
468 Ibid. 
469 Ibid., 16. 
470 Ibid., 17. 
6.#The#Thought#of#the#World#/#233#
a set and does not have parts” – which prevents this closure and opens the 
set/shot onto the real movement of being.  
The ‘tension’ Rodowick refers to thus exists not between the cinematic 
movement-image and the ontological premise of being as that which differs 
from itself (this premise necessarily underpins Deleuze’s analysis of the 
cinema as a whole). Rather, it concerns the manner in which the cinema’s 
thought of the whole (its mode of ontological speculation) is pulled between 
the two poles of the construction of an image of the whole corresponding to 
that ontological premise (the whole as the open) and an image of the whole 
as an infinitely expandable, but nevertheless closed and thus totalised or 
totalisable set.471  
What the organisation of shots according to sensory-motor schemata 
does, however, is precisely to limit relations between shots to those that 
emphasise the simple expansion of the set. Such schemata ‘ward off’ the 
decentring power of montage (as an opening onto the universal variation of 
the whole) by constraining it to a merely additive rather than transformative 
power. Each shot is ‘added’ to the next, merely expanding the set of elements 
acting on each other in a coherent space and in linear time – a set that 
remains finite, no matter how large it gets. In other words, the mode of 
narration of the classical cinema tends towards a concept of the whole as a 
closed or closable totality given in terms of the rule or rules governing the 
linkage of images, and limiting them to relations of perception and action, 
cause and effect.  
                                                
471 Deleuze suggests that the ‘signature’ of a cinematic auteur, and even of entire ‘schools’ of montage 
can be analysed in terms of an examination of how the relevant films negotiate the tension between 
these two poles and between the conception of movement and of the whole thus implied. Such 
movements, he suggests, express “genuine Ideas in the ‘filmic space’”. Ibid., 21−23. 
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Sensory-motor schemata thus define or construct a cinematic Idea of the 
whole given or giveable to human thought in terms of a rule or rules of action 
and reaction, of causality, which define the possibilities of the world those 
rules construct. Deleuze tells us that “We can say of duration itself or of time, 
that it is the whole of relations”,472 but the coherence and commensurability of 
shots imposed by sensory-motor schemata derive from the way in which it 
restricts possible relations between images to ones which are directly or 
indirectly ones of cause and effect, action and reaction. As Rodowick puts it  
Throughout this schema, the rational interval is the 
guarantee of continuity and commensurability, both in the 
extension of the referent into an image and in the linking of 
one image to another in causal chains … While associated 
images are linked horizontally, they also expand vertically 
through a dialectic of integration and differentiation. The 
linked images form an image or concept of the whole 
(integration), which is extended in turn as part of a set of a 
higher order (differentiation).473 
The whole is thus ‘given’ to thought in terms of causality as a ‘rule’ for 
the potentially infinite extension or differentiation of the set (this causes this, 
causes this, causes this …). The sensory-motor schema is an ‘agent of 
abstraction’ precisely insofar as it constructs a concept or Idea of the whole in 
spatialised terms, which constrain our grasp of its openness to the unceasing 
expansion of a set of actual elements, thereby divorcing these elements from 
the virtual and properly open whole of which they are the actualisation474 (and 
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473 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, 184. 
474 And to the extent that it does so, it runs the risk of reintroduces the error of defining the whole as the 
set of all sets. 
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in doing so it repeats or dramatises the error philosophy falls into when it 
divorces the actual from its actualisation – the errors of identity, 
representation and negation).  
For all that this set may be potentially infinite, it nevertheless remains 
closed insofar as the rule or principle by which it expands is given in or as that 
Idea. Thus the coherence, commensurability and continuity of images 
imposed or restored to cinematic movement-images by sensory-motor 
schemata articulates the reciprocal determination of both an Idea of the world 
graspable in thought and a mode of relation to that world as masterable in 
action. We derive an Idea of the world on the basis of sensory-motor 
schemata (integration) and that Idea in turn justifies and assures the 
coherence and effectiveness of our action in and on the world (differentiation). 
Thus Deleuze’s description of the classical cinema as the articulation of the 
“unity of nature and man … the sensory-motor relationship between man and 
world, nature and thought”.475 
What is vital to note here is that in reimposing the centred perspective of 
natural or human perception in this new ‘mode’, via the composition of shots 
according to the causal and linear principles of a sensory-motor schema, the 
non-human spiritual automaton of the classical cinema not only restricts its 
thought to a merely human (cinematographic) perspective, it raises that 
perspective to the level of a transcendent principle. That is to say, the whole 
derived by the sensory-motor schemata of the classical cinema constitutes 
the cinematic equivalent of a transcendent Idea of the world, in the Kantian 
sense.  
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As Smith summarises with admirable clarity, such Ideas present us with 
a concept of an object that goes beyond any possible experience. We cannot 
perceive or experience the world or the whole as such, but rather derive the 
Idea of it indirectly:  
through the extension of the category of causality: that is 
through the use of the hypothetical syllogism (if A, then B) – 
if A causes B, and B causes C, and C causes D, and so on. 
This series constitutes a kind of problem for us. We can 
continue working through this problem, continuing through 
the series indefinitely, until we final reach the ‘Idea’ of the 
totality of everything that is: the causal nexus of the world, or 
the Universe. But in fact we can never, ever, have a 
perception or intuition of the world, or the totality of what is. 
To use a famous Kantian distinction, we can think the world 
as if it were real, as if it were an object, but we can never 
know it. Strictly speaking, the world is not an object of our 
experience; what we actually know is the problematic of 
causality, a series of causal relations that we can extend 
indefinitely.476  
Within the cinema, the ‘problematic of causality’ that is given to us in 
experience corresponds to the sensory-motor schemata governing the 
relation between shots in montage, that is to say, narrative (in the terms 
Deleuze defines it). All films end, of course, but the rules or montage 
principles governing relations between shots are, like the principle of 
causality, infinitely extensible and subject to the same hypothetical extension 
that Kant argues gives rise to an “Idea of the World.” Thus, as Deleuze puts it, 
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“what originates from montage, or from the composition of movement-images 
is the Idea”.477  
Taken from this perspective, Deleuze’s treatment of the classical cinema 
and of its sensory-motor organisation of images performs or recapitulates in 
cinematic terms the Kantian critique of the limits of reason’s legitimate 
application. The sensory-motor schemata of the classical cinema are, as 
Deleuze’s choice of terminology suggests, the cinematic equivalent of the 
schematism whereby the objects of experience are related to and subsumed 
under the categories of the understanding – most especially, in this case, that 
of causality. As Deleuze puts in in his book on Kant:  
The schema is a spatio-temporal determination which itself 
corresponds to the category, everywhere and at all times: it 
does not consist in an image, but in spatio-temporal relations 
which embody or realise relations which are in fact 
conceptual.478 
The operation of such schemata remains legitimate so long at it is applied to 
the objects of experience, to the phenomenal world of appearance. But the 
world is not, and cannot be, given to experience in this fashion. By extending 
its sensory-motor schemata to the construction of an Idea of the world, the 
cinema thus produces or repeats in its own terms the transcendental illusion 
that leads thought to conceive the world as an object of thought, subject to 
reason’s powers in the same terms as the phenomena given to us in 
experience. 
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 As Henry Somers-Hall notes, this illusion is not itself fallacious: 
“Knowledge requires the Idea of a totality, and the necessity of the Idea of a 
totality makes it appear as if such a totality could actually be given”.479 The 
Idea of the world derived hypothetically in the classical cinema by means of 
sensory-motor schemata does precisely this: insofar as it offers the whole as 
a closed totality, it presents that totality as given or giveable as an Idea. But 
as Kant argues, such transcendent Ideas are illegitimate precisely because 
they posit the world as a definite object corresponding to an indefinite causal 
series, one we might ask questions about as if it were something we could 
actually experience: “For instance, did the world have a beginning in time, or 
is it eternal? Does it have boundaries in space, or does it go on forever?”480 
Such Ideas, Kant argues, lead reason into aporias or ‘logical paradoxes’, 
(specifically, the ‘antinomy of the world’) because they are asked of something 
that not only does not, but cannot exist as an object of our experience – the 
noumenal realm of the world as it is in and for itself.  
There is, however, a fundamental difference in the ways in which Kant 
and Deleuze conceive of ‘the world as it is for itself’. As Somers-Hall point out, 
what Kant calls the noumenal serves a strictly negative, limiting and regulative 
role, “preventing the pretensions of sensibility from applying beyond their 
legitimate ground”,481 and remains necessarily undetermined (it is because it 
is undetermined that it cannot be ‘incorporated’ into the totality of the Idea of 
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the world482). Indeed “for Kant, the antinomies represent an indirect proof of 
transcendental idealism, as it is only with the additional assumption of the 
noumenon, as that which falls outside of appearance, that we are able to 
resolve the antinomies”.483 For Deleuze, however, what lies outside things as 
they appear for us is difference itself. In these terms, the world as it is for itself 
is simply the being of difference − in the Bergsonian terminology of the 
Cinema books, the openness of the whole. Thus Somers-Hall argues that 
Kant’s antinomies of the world are reconfigured by Deleuze into the antinomy 
of representation, which lies in “the inability of representation to think 
difference apart from as purely representational [and thus as strictly external] 
or as undifferenciated abyss”.484  
The resolution of this antinomy requires a positive characterisation of the 
noumenal in non-representational terms, that is to say, in terms of (internal) 
difference.485 Both Smith and Somers-Hall present Deleuze’s interpretation of 
the differential calculus as a direct rejoinder to Kant’s treatment of 
transcendental Ideas in these terms, insofar as it allows Deleuze to 
demonstrate how difference as the undetermined nevertheless constitutes the 
terms of a reciprocal determination capable of determining specified or actual 
elements.486  
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486 A very condensed version of this argument might look like this: insofar as Deleuze identifies the 
noumenal with difference-in-itself, it is characterised as the relation of difference to itself insofar as it 
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To put it in terms more familiar from this thesis, what Deleuze describes 
in terms of the calculus can be seen as a development and variation of the 
discussion of the passage from the virtual (the undetermined) in its movement 
of actualisation (determination) to the actual (the determined) that Deleuze 
presents in Bergsonism. As we have seen, this is itself a variation and 
development of the logic of the relation of internal and external difference he 
outlines in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”. In that relation, the strictly 
external difference of difference in degree (the actual or determined element) 
is produced by (deduced from) the differing from itself of internal difference 
(the undetermined), and thus accounted for in strictly positive terms as the 
greatest (most extreme) degree of difference. Deleuze’s interpretation of the 
calculus allows him to apply this logic to his critique of the strictly negative and 
limiting regulative function the noumenal has for thought under Kant, and to 
reframe it in terms of a positive, generative and creative genesis of thought for 
which the noumenal must be understood as the difference from itself of 
being.487 Thus where for Kant the Idea of the world marks the limits (or the 
‘off-limits’) of the possible conditions of experience, for Deleuze it constitutes 
the ground of a genetic account of the real conditions of experience.488 
Thus the ‘thought of the world’ constructed by the classical cinema in 
terms of sensory-motor schemata must ultimately be understood as 
constituting a transcendental illusion in Deleuzian, rather than Kantian, terms. 
                                                                                                                                      
to determine in turn the complete set of values of dx/dy. Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 115; Somers-Hall, 
"Transcendental Illusion and Antinomy," 145−47. 
487 In other words his critique of Kant’s treatment of transcendental Ideas via the calculus is a nuance or 
differing from itself of the logic of the relation of internal and external difference Deleuze presents in 
“Bergson’s Conception of Difference”. 
488 As Smith points out, in this Deleuze fulfils the demands of Maimon’s critique of Kant: “the search for 
the genetic elements of real experience (and not merely the conditions of possible experience), and the 
positing of a principle of difference as the fulfilment of this condition”. Essays on Deleuze, 111. 
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Such schemata misconstrue the openness of the whole as a function of an 
infinitely expanding set of actual elements, rather than as that which maintains 
the openness of the set to the acentred universal variation of the virtual. By 
construing the world or the whole as an object of thought, they divorce the 
whole from the openness that is its most essential characteristic and treat it as 
a ‘thing’ subject to thought and thought’s mastery – a totality that is closed or 
closable in principle. Moreover, this determination of the whole by and for 
thought is reflected in the mastery of the whole in action it makes possible, 
insofar as it justifies and assures action’s effectiveness and coherence.  
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze puts it this way:  
In effect, the undetermined object, or object as it exists in the 
Idea [the World insofar as it can never be an object of 
experience], allows us to represent other objects (those of 
experience) which it endows with a maximum of systematic 
unity … the object of the Idea becomes indirectly 
determined: it is determined by analogy with those objects of 
experience upon which it confers unity, but which in return 
offer it a determination ‘analogous’ to the relations it 
entertains with them.489 
 In the terms under consideration here, the world is not given or determined 
directly (it can never be a object of experience), but rather is determined 
indirectly (as an Idea) through the hypothetical extension of the sensory-motor 
schema or ‘montage school’ governing relations between images in a given 
film. That Idea in turn endows the objects of experience given in that film (the 
shots it is composed of) with a ‘maximum of systematic unity’ (the assurance 
of rational and coherent relations between those shots) insofar as the 
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montage rules governing their narrative organisation have been raised to the 
level of a transcendent principle in the form of an Idea of the World. This 
reciprocal determination is of course premised on a (transcendental) illusion. 
Its cinematographic basis divorces the thought of the classical cinema from 
the very openness of the whole that montage offers to open it up to, and 
constitutes a closed totality, a unity of world and action which separates and 
isolates it from real movement and real being.  
This movement of reciprocal determination has a vital connection to the 
‘organic’ image of thought or ‘plane of immanence’ that underpins the 
classical cinema. The plane of immanence, as Deleuze and Guattari describe 
it, “has two facets, as Thought and Nature, as Nous and as Physis”.490 On the 
one hand, it is “always single, being itself pure variation”,491 a chaos of infinite 
speed in which every determination is lost before it can be found492 (pure 
acentred variation). This movement is both the image of thought and the 
substance of being493 (the two ‘facets’ of the plane of immanence as Nous 
and Physis). But on the other, the plane of immanence is also the multiple 
‘sections’ or planes of consistency that philosophy extracts from that chaos 
(like a ‘sieve’) insofar as it attempts to “acquire a consistency without losing 
the infinite into which thought plunges”.494  
The attempt to do so is, according to Deleuze and Guattari, the very 
problem of philosophy itself, and the history of philosophy can be mapped in 
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493 Ibid., 38. 
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terms of its ‘solutions’ to this problem.495 The movements philosophy selects, 
and the consistency it thereby acquires, construct:  
varied and distinct planes of immanence that, depending on 
which infinite movements are selected, succeed and contest 
each other in history. The plane is certainly not the same in 
the time of the Greeks, in the seventeenth century, and 
today … there is neither the same image of thought or 
substance of being.496 
Such planes, however, are neither the philosophies in question nor the 
concepts those philosophies create. Rather they constitute in each case “the 
image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to 
find one’s bearings in thought”.497 Such an image is a pre- or non-
philosophical ‘presupposition’ or ‘non-conceptual understanding’ which 
nevertheless “does not exist outside philosophy”,498 but grounds the concepts 
which that it is philosophy’s task to create: 
Philosophy is at once concept creation and instituting of the 
plane. The concept is the beginning of philosophy, but the 
plane is its instituting. The plane is clearly not a program, 
design, end or means: it is a plane of immanence that 
constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy … the 
foundation on which it creates its concepts.499 
In the Cinema books, Deleuze argues that the classical and modern 
cinemas each constitute their own distinct (pre-philosophical) image of 
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thought. For the classical cinema, thought is a power that we possess, 
modelled on and derived from our action in the world, which both (indirectly) 
produces and is justified by the linking of shots according to “rational 
divisions, projecting a model of truth in relation to totality”.500 This image of 
thought is the target of critique for Bergson for its cinematographic and 
totalising tendencies, but also for Kant, for its transcendent orientation (and as 
we will see in a moment, Deleuze’s treatment of the cinema brings these two 
critiques together in a single movement).  
By contrast, the modern cinema, by reversing the subordination of time 
to movement in the classical cinema, disorder and decentres thought via the 
irrational linkages it constructs between images: “narration [the organisation of 
such images in montage] ceases to be truthful, that is, to claim to be true, and 
becomes fundamentally falsifying … It is a power of the false which replaces 
and supersedes the form of the true”.501 Far from being a power we possess, 
the time-image of the modern cinema “affirms a specific power, or rather 
‘impower’ of thought: ‘we are not yet thinking’.502  
We will return to this ‘impower’ of thought in the final chapter of this 
thesis. For now, however, what is important is that the image of thought that 
the classical cinema ‘presupposes’ is premised on a fundamental illusion: it 
treats movement as if it were something immanent to the whole (as if the 
whole were a container in which things moved to and fro) rather than 
recognising real movement (pure variation) as the being of the whole (and 
                                                
500 Rodowick, Gilles Deleuze's Time Machine, 12. 
501 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 131. 
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movement-images as ‘mobile sections’ or ‘presentations’ of the plane of 
immanence503). As Deleuze and Guattari argue:  
Whenever immanence is interpreted as immanence “to” 
something a confusion of plane and concept results, so that 
the concept becomes a transcendent universal and the plane 
becomes an attribute in the concept. When misunderstood in 
this way, the plane of immanence revives the transcendent 
again: it is a simple field of phenomena.”504  
The Idea of the world that the classical cinema derives indirectly via sensory-
motor schemata conflates the plane of immanence (the openness of the 
whole as acentred universal variation) with the infinite expansion of a closed 
set constructed in terms of the hypothetical syllogism governing its expansion 
(if this, then this, then this and so on to infinity). Such Ideas construct a plane 
of immanence in terms relative to the human, as a horizon which (as 
Rodowick puts it) is “terrestrial and human centred … grounded in a stable, 
geometric perspective that assures the continuity of vision”.505 In doing so it 
raises the effects of the cinematographic illusion to the level of a 
‘transcendent universal’ and reduces the plane of immanence to a world of 
perception and action played out across a ‘simple field of phenomena’. 
As Smith points out, it is the ‘ruthless critique’ of transcendence implied 
by Kantian philosophy that allows Deleuze to “align himself with Kant’s critical 
philosophy, despite their obvious differences”.506 The appearance of such 
transcendent Ideas in cinematic form within the classical cinema must thus be 
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understood in the context of Deleuze’s claim that the cinema ‘repeats’ the 
history of philosophy, including the philosophies of transcendence that are the 
objects of this ‘ruthless critique’. Deleuze’s treatment of the classical cinema 
is from this perspective an extension and development of the critique of the 
dominant tendencies of the Western philosophical tradition that is the main 
target of Bergson’s metaphor of the cinematographic illusion.  
And as Pearson notes, this critique is presented by Bergson himself as a 
development of, response to and correction of the terms of Kant’s own critique 
of the transcendent orientation of this tradition.507 The ontological speculation 
manifest in the classical cinema’s articulation of the relation of man and world 
corresponds in this light to such philosophies insofar as the spatialised 
conception of movement they both share grasps time indirectly as a function 
of movement, and in turn seeks to grasp being in strictly transcendent 
terms.508  
The collapse of the sensory-motor schemata that underpin the classical 
cinema and of the image of thought that accompanies them frees the 
cinematic articulation of time from its subordination to movement and 
constitutes in turn an explicit recapitulation of the “first great Kantian reversal 
[of] the Critique of Pure Reason” in which “Time is no longer related to the 
movement which it measures, but movement is related to the time which 
conditions it”.509 It is important to recognise, however, that the terms in which 
Kant and Deleuze characterise or ‘produce’ this reversal are not the same. 
                                                
507Pearson, "Beyond the Human Condition," 63 in particular and 61−65 more generally. 
508 To be precise, the ‘hypothetical syllogism’ that the causal coordination of images in the classical 
cinema implies gives rise to an Idea of the world derived in strictly cinematographic terms, as a function 
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Most significantly, the difference between their accounts is integral to the 
critical response to Kant that aligns Deleuze with the post-Kantian tradition 
inaugurated by Maimon.  
For classical philosophy (as Deleuze glosses it), time is grasped as the 
order of succession, an ordered series of points in space (this, then this, then 
this, and so on) such that “time is fundamentally subordinated to something 
which happens in it … [and there is] a subordination of time to change, to 
movement, to the course of the world”.510 The ‘great Kantian reversal’ of this 
subordination is a function of the way that Kant treats time and movement as 
separate and distinct a priori conditions for any possible experience, such that 
time is thus not grasped as the measure of movement but rather as “the form 
of everything that changes and moves … It is not an eternal form, but in fact 
the form of that which is not eternal, the immutable form of change and 
movement”.511 Deleuze follows Kant in this definition, but where for Kant time 
and space “are the forms of appearing, or the forms of presentation of what 
appears”512 (the a priori forms of being known of phenomena), for Deleuze, 
the temporalisation of difference he effects in “Bergson’s Conception of 
Difference”513 means that time as the form of change is simply the being of 
difference itself (or, in terms of the Cinema books, the openness of the 
whole). If we accept Somers-Hall’s argument that Deleuze replaces the 
Kantian ‘noumenal as undetermined and unknowable’ with ‘difference as 
                                                
510 "Second Lecture on Kant, Cours Vincennes, 21/3/1978,"  
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511 Kant's Critical Philosophy, viii. 
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undetermined but determinable’ then the significance of the definition of time 
as the form of change must therefore be decidedly different for Kant and 
Deleuze. Specifically, where for Kant time constitutes a condition of possible 
experience, for Deleuze it becomes the condition of real experience.  
Deleuze’s reconfiguration of the terms of the reversal of time’s 
subordination of movement thus responds directly to the demands of 
Maimon’s critique of Kant. As Smith points out, Kant’s assumption of the 
“facts” of reason produces:  
a vicious circle that makes the condition (the possible) refer 
to the conditioned (the real) while reproducing its image. 
Maimon argues that Kant cannot simply assume these facts, 
but has to show that they can be deduced or engendered 
immanently from reason alone as the necessary modes of its 
manifestation.514  
According to Maimon this vicious circle can only be overcome if the genetic 
condition of thought is located in difference itself − a task that “reappears like 
a leitmotif in almost every one of Deleuze’s books up through 1969, even if 
Maimon’s name is not always explicitly mentioned”.515 As Smith points out, 
while Maimon seeks to meet this demand by incorporating “elements of 
Spinoza, Leibniz and Hume … Deleuze begins to trace out an alternate post-
Kantian tradition that will ultimately link up Maimon with later philosophers 
such as Nietzsche and Bergson”516 and that it “is not difficult to trace out the 
same Maimonian influences in Deleuze’s work on Bergson [as one finds in his 
                                                
514 Smith, Essays on Deleuze, 67. It's worth noting that Bergson's critique of 'the possible and the real' 
(and Deleuze's appropriation thereof) resonates strongly with this critique.  
515 Ibid., 66. 
516 Ibid., 68. It should be easy to see how Bergson's critique of the possible and the real bears directly 
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work on Nietzsche]”.517 Likewise, Pearson notes that Deleuze’s 1960 lecture 
course on Bergson “indicates precisely where Bergson’s importance lies, 
namely in the effort to radicalise the post-Kantian project commenced by 
Solomon Maimon”.518  
In this context, I argue that the otherwise startling appearance of Kant at 
the heart of (and break or crack between) the two volumes of Deleuze’s 
Bergsonian account of the cinema should thus be understood in the context of 
them as a continuation and nuance of the post-Kantian project of Deleuzian 
philosophy. The deduction of the brain/screen (and thus of the 
cinematographic condition of the human on the basis of the metacinematic 
universal variation of light − being as difference, the open whole) corresponds 
precisely to the Maimonian demand for a genetic deduction of the conditions 
of real thought on the basis of difference. In doing so, the limits Kant ascribes 
to reason are ‘repositioned’ by Deleuze such that it is not the undetermined 
and undeterminable character of the noumenal that places it beyond the 
reach of reason, but rather the cinematographic genesis of human on the 
basis of difference (as undetermined but determinable) that forms the barrier 
or limit to the human thought of being as it is for itself.  
Furthermore, on this basis, Deleuze is able to retain the force of Kant’s 
critique of the transcendental illusions that thought falls into, insofar as 
thought constructs for itself an Idea of the world on the basis of the 
problematic of causality. That is, those illusions are accounted for as a 
consequence of the cinematographic genesis of human thought. They are 
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dramatised in the classical cinema’s recapitulation of the errors of 
transcendence that philosophy falls into when it fails to overcome (or even 
recognise) that genesis. In other words, the classical cinema dramatises and 
demonstrates how the transcendental illusion of a world, given to thought as 
Idea, is constructed in and for thought on the basis of difference as the 
genetic condition of thought.  
In this context, one might reasonably expect the collapse of sensory 
motor schemata that marks the end of the classical, and the reversal of the 
subordination of time to movement this collapse marks, to give rise to a 
cinematic thought free of the cinematographic chains those schemata had 
imposed, and thus adequate in some sense to the task of thinking the 
difference of the world, or the world as difference. Instead, we find something 
quite different. The terms of this reversal are not those of a ‘freeing from’ or 
‘correction’ of the cinematographic and transcendent illusions of philosophy 
and of thought, as if it simply put them on the correct footing to proceed 
henceforth without error. Neither can we speak here of a simple continuation 
of the cinema’s ‘recapitulation’ of the history of philosophy, if by history we 
mean the linear and causal passage from one moment to the next. Rather, 
‘history’ and thought too collapse: thought as a power we possess is replaced 
only by thought as a suffering we undergo, a fundamental powerlessness of 
thought confronted by being as that which we cannot think.  
As we have seen, the ‘passage’ from the classical to the modern 
cinema, from movement-image to time-image, and indeed from the first 
volume of the Cinema books to the second, is strictly speaking impossible, 
disastrous, taking place only as an event which in some sense erases the 
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event of its own ‘taking place’. This is the ‘great Kantian reversal’ as a disaster 
in and for thought, insofar as the only thought it leaves us with is that we are 
not yet thinking. It must be said that there is an undeniable oddity about 
placing Kant’s name in proximity with a term drawn from the work of Blanchot. 
However, as we shall see, it is precisely Deleuze’s Bergsonian revision of 
Kant, and of Kant’s treatment of the relation of thought to time, that produces 
this conjunction in terms of the break between the classical and modern 
cinemas. And the consequences of this break are articulated in the cinematic 
dramatisation of the vicissitudes of thought and philosophy. 
However, the consequences of this reversal for cinema, for thought and 
for the relation between the two must, however, be put to one side until the 
final chapter of this thesis. To get there, we must first of all account for this 
‘reversal’ within the cinema in cinematic terms – that is to say, in terms of film 
form. The key here lies in the nature of the Idea of the whole that sensory-
motor schemata produce. Deleuze is explicit that there is not one sensory-
motor schema for the whole of classical cinema, but several, and the 
difference between them lies fundamentally in the nature of the whole derived 
from their specific mode of organisation of causal relations between images – 
that is to say, in the terms of the ‘hypothetical syllogism’ by means of which 
they derive their Idea of the world.  
Thus we find the ‘great organic unity’ of the American cinema 
(represented by Griffith), in which the whole is defined by analogy with the 
‘unity in diversity’ of an organism, expressed in terms of parallel alternating 
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montage;519 the mathematical and intensive sublime of French Impressionist 
film and German Expressionism respectively, where “what constitutes the 
sublime is that the imagination suffers a shock which pushes it to the limit and 
forces thought to think the whole as intellectual totality which goes beyond the 
imagination”;520 and the dialectical unity of the Soviet cinema’s montage of 
opposition “under the dialectical law of the One which divides itself in order to 
form the new, higher unity”.521 In each case, the given montage Idea, or Idea 
of the world, reciprocally determines the whole as an object of thought 
through a ‘hypothetical syllogism’ that in turn constitutes the ‘laws of thought’ 
governing the passage from one idea to the next in parallel with the laws of 
causality governing action in the world (this is the cinematic equivalent of 
Spinoza’s spiritual automaton522).  
Deleuze’s concern at this point is not to critique or evaluate these 
montage Ideas, but simply to demonstrate that the organisation of images via 
montage in each case:  
puts the cinematographic image into a relationship with the 
whole; that is, with time conceived as the Open. In this way it 
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gives an indirect image of time, simultaneously in the 
individual movement-image and in the whole of the film.523 
It’s important to note that Deleuze does not draw our attention to the role of 
sensory-motor schemata in ‘closing’ the openness of the whole at this point in 
his argument (early in Cinema 1). Indeed, such schemata are not introduced 
into his argument until his ‘recapitulation of images and signs’ in Cinema 2. 
Nevertheless, their effects are implied by the role of these montage principles 
(organic, extensive and intensive sublime, dialectical) in determining the 
relationship of the image (the shot) with the whole. Insofar as they give us an 
indirect image of time – an image of time derived from the causal, linear and 
rational movement determined by those principles – the ‘relationship with the 
whole’ they articulate can only grasp its openness in closed terms.  
Just as ontological speculation which starts from the human (from our 
cinematographic grasp of actual elements divorced from the virtual) is 
inadequate to the task of thinking being in its own terms, so the sensory-motor 
montage principles which govern the classical cinema can only give rise to an 
image of the whole as an ultimately closed or closeable totality. By limiting 
relations between images to those of action and reaction (and thus reinstating 
the cinematographic illusion in a new mode), they lose the capacity montage 
offers of opening onto the unceasing variation of the whole, and constrain it to 
the construction of an ever expanding, but always finite and closed, set.  
In Cinema 2, by introducing the role of sensory-motor schemata in 
reimposing the cinematographic illusion within the classical cinema (albeit in a 
new mode,) Deleuze reorients and reframes his treatment of the cinema of 
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the movement-image, so much so that Ropars-Wuilleumier is led to argue that 
“the very foundations of the first volume tumble down in the second.”524 This 
‘tumbling down’ is, as I’ve argued, one of the fundamental interpretative 
challenges that the reader of the Cinema books faces, insofar as the 
arguments of the second volume derive from and extend those of the first, 
while simultaneously radically reshaping them. The ‘impossibility’ of reading 
the two volumes together (either as coherent or incoherent) derives directly 
from this re-reading (the arguments of Cinema 1 found those of Cinema 2, but 
at the same time those of Cinema 2 unseat the earlier arguments they depend 
on). What we are now in a position to see is that this tension and this 
‘impossibility’ turn on the shift in the characterisation of the classical cinema’s 
relation to the whole announced by Cinema 2’s introduction of sensory-motor 
schemata as the organising principle of montage/narrative within the classical 
cinema.  
The first four chapters of Cinema 1 in particular focus on setting up the 
(Bergsonian) terms in which Deleuze approaches the cinema as such, and 
map out the in-principle power or capacity of the cinema to think in terms of 
real movement, and its capacity to articulate and explore thought’s relation to 
being (to the whole as the open). These chapters emphasise the role that 
montage plays in decentring the cinematographic orientation of the primitive 
cinema (and, in principle, generating disproportions and aberrations of 
movement), and thus opening the closed set of the shot onto the whole as the 
open. He does not, however, introduce the role sensory-motor schemata play 
in the organisation of the classical cinema in that volume, such that his 
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analysis of the signs of that cinema (Chapter five and onwards) downplays the 
way in which it suppresses the very aberration of movement that montage 
makes possible, and so reintroduces the cinematographic illusion into 
cinematic thought (this time at the level of relations between shots, rather than 
that of the static frames of the film strip).525  
Nevertheless, as we progress through these signs and chapters, we do 
find indications of what is to come. Deleuze briefly introduces the notion of a 
‘sensory-motor link’ between perception and action specific to the ‘large form’ 
of the action-image (where the situation leads to action which transforms the 
situation), but it is not until the final paragraph of the book that he speaks of a 
new image (in the post-war cinema) which ‘discovered’:  
a requirement which was enough to smash the whole 
system, to cut perception off from its motor extension, action, 
from the thread which joined it to a situation … The new 
image would therefore not be a bringing to completion of the 
cinema, but a mutation of it.526 
It is this tension – between ‘bringing to completion’ and ‘mutation’ − that 
is at stake in the impossibility of reading the Cinema books as a whole. 
‘Bringing to completion’ posits the post-war cinema as an end – both a 
(teleological) goal and as a completion, finality or closure. But it is this very 
end or closure which creates the conditions for the ‘mutation’ Deleuze speaks 
of, which is not merely that of the ‘new’ post-war cinema but of the classical 
cinema as well, whose dreams or goals ‘complete’ it in terms which 
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retrospectively reveal a completely different cinema to the one we thought we 
were dealing with throughout Cinema 1.  
What I want to argue is that the ‘mutation’ Deleuze speaks of affects not 
only what comes ‘after’ (the post-war cinema) but also retrospectively 
‘mutates’ the classical cinema as well, insofar as the break between classical 
and modern cinemas reveals “the power or capacity of cinema [to become 
adequate to the thought of the whole as open] … to be only a pure or logical 
possibility”.527 It is the capacity for the production of aberrant movement 
implicit in montage528 that presents this possibility: it is the recentring of 
movement imposed by sensory-motor schemata that wards it off. At the same 
time, however, it is the tendency towards totalisation implicit within such 
schemata that establishes the conditions for the completion or closure of the 
classical cinema, and in doing so sets up the terms in which the break 
between the classical and the modern cinemas imposes itself, ‘mutating’ the 
cinema in both directions.  
6.3 Cinema as “Art of the Masses” 
The force of my argument throughout this thesis has been that the task 
of the Cinema books fundamentally concerns thought and, more precisely, the 
adequacy (or otherwise) of thought to real movement, and thus to being as 
real difference. The cinema thus engages the ontological problematic 
articulated by Heidegger in terms of the adequacy of merely human thought to 
the thought of being – the question of how, and in what terms, the thought of 
mere beings might confront the task of grasping or mastering or opening onto 
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being as that which exceeds them in every sense. As Benoît Dillet points out, 
Deleuze’s relationship with this problematic is an ongoing and persistent one 
throughout his work, figured in his “constant reference to a phrase from 
Heidegger’s lecture course What is Called Thinking?: ‘We are not yet 
thinking”.529 Dillet notes that Deleuze’s appropriation of this Heideggerian 
theme foregrounds a conception of thought as a practice which is both 
involuntary and political, and that Deleuze’s treatment of the cinema in 
particular explores this relationship in terms of cinema as the “art of the 
masses”.530  
For the casual reader of the Cinema books, this claim may come as a 
surprise, inasmuch as Deleuze does not bring these themes to the fore until 
deep into the arguments of Cinema 2, in the chapter appropriately titled 
‘Thought and Cinema’.531 However, in doing so he crystallises arguments and 
problems which have heretofore remained ‘in suspension’, implicit but 
unresolved throughout his treatment of cinematic movement and its relation to 
the whole (the very arguments I have tried to foreground and extract 
throughout this thesis). That chapter is thus, for my purposes at least, the 
hinge on which the argument of the Cinema books turns. 
It begins with Deleuze’s statement of what he identifies as the goal or 
dream of the cinema from its very beginnings: “Those who first made and 
thought about cinema began from a simple idea: cinema as industrial art 
achieves self-movement, automatic movement, it makes movement the 
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immediate given of the image”.532 This is a conception of the cinema as 
movement-image: not a representation of things that move, but movement as 
something in itself, movement as the image itself. Such movement is 
profoundly aberrant insofar as it is no longer merely relative to a centred and 
human perspective, but absolute: a mobile section of the real movement of 
being itself.  
When we go to the movies, the cinema replaces our head with its own: 
our point of view or centred perspective is overlaid with that of the projector, 
and the disjunction of the point of view of the projector that screens from that 
of the camera that films thereby decentres our own thought, replaces our 
neurons with shots, our synapses with montage. Our exposure to this mobility 
‘shocks’ thought into movement precisely because it decentres the brain and 
places it into movement, into variation and forces thought to think movement 
itself by opening it onto the acentred universal variation of being: “Automatic 
movement gives rise to a spiritual automaton in us, which reacts in turn on 
movement”.533  
Thus where Heidegger claims that man possesses the mere logical 
possibility of thinking, with no guarantee that he actually does so, the cinema 
claims as its right and power the capacity to shock us into thought, to push 
our thought into movement. “It is as if cinema were telling us: with me, with 
the movement-image, you can’t escape the shock which arouses the thinker 
in you”.534 Moreover, as Deleuze emphasises, the collective nature of this 
experience (both in terms of the audience in the cinema together, and in 
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terms of cinema as a popular or mass art) is such that this ‘shock’, this 
thought concerns the people, the masses directly: the cinema constructs “A 
subjective and collective automaton for an automatic movement: the art of the 
‘masses’”.535  
Deleuze unpacks these claims through an analysis of Eisenstein’s 
conception of the cinema, because its dialectical formation can be broken 
down into clearly determined ‘moments’ while still being “valid for the classical 
cinema, the cinema of the movement-image in general”.536 Eisenstein’s 
cinema (and indeed that of the Soviet school of the 20s and 30s as a whole) 
is dominated by a fundamentally dialectical conception of montage. The 
‘shock’ the cinema imposes on thought is conceived in terms of the clash or 
opposition between shots (which may take many forms) which gives rise to 
synthesis at a higher level – that of the concept (“‘From the shock of two 
factors a concept is born’”537). The dialectical conflict generated by montage 
forces thought to think – to produce the synthesis of opposites which at its 
end is unity of the whole itself: “The whole is the concept … Montage is in 
thought ‘the intellectual process’ itself, or that which, under the shock, thinks 
the shock”.538  
But if this conflict gives rise to the Idea or concept of the dialectical unity 
of the whole, this Idea in turn governs the relations between images and the 
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terms of passage from one image to the next in a cycle of reciprocal 
determination: “The whole is produced by the parts, but also the opposite … 
The whole as dynamic effect is also the presupposition of its cause”.539 The 
product of the dialectical synthesis of two shots constitutes one pole or term of 
the next opposition, the next shock, the next synthesis and so on in turn – this 
is the ‘dialectical circle or spiral’ which constitutes the operation of thought in 
and through images. Thus we go from image to concept or Idea, but also from 
the Idea to its expression in images. On the one hand we go “from the 
movement-image to the clear thinking of the whole that it expresses”;540 on 
the other “we go from a thinking of the whole which is presupposed and 
obscure to the agitated, mixed-up images which express it”.541  
The former is the montage Idea (the Idea of the world): the latter is the 
expression or thinking of this Idea in images – “Internal monologue … [which] 
constitutes the segments or links of a truly collective thought”. 542 The (in this 
case dialectical) Idea of the world is the indirect product of ‘hypothetical 
syllogism’ implied by the terms in which relations between images are 
articulated by the specific sensory-motor schema governing a given ‘school’ of 
montage, giving the whole to thought as intellectual totality. But at the level of 
relations between individual shots as we experience them, this Idea is implicit 
and unconscious. This Idea is given in experience as the affective charge that 
internalises the passage from perception to action “giving ‘emotional fullness’ 
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or ‘passion’ back to the intellectual process”.543 Thus with the Idea of the 
whole: 
we went from the shock image to the formal and conscious 
concept, but now [we go] from the unconscious concept to 
the material image, the figure image which embodies it and 
produces shock in turn.544  
If internal monologue constitutes a ‘truly collective thought’ it is because the 
internalisation of the affective or pathetic charge (the sensory-motor 
experience of the film as a passage of images) is governed by the Idea of the 
World that orders and justifies the links that join and relate them. The 
cinematic brain or thought of the cinema is a thought of the whole which links 
experience, pathos, affect, to being itself as it is given in and by that Idea. 
Thus there is a final moment in Eistenstein’s dialectical schema, 
embedded in the previous two:  
Not from image to concept, or from concept to image, but the 
identity of concept and image. The concept is in itself in the 
image, and the image is for itself in the concept. This is no 
longer organic and pathetic, but dramatic, pragmatic, praxis 
or action thought. This action thought indicates the relation 
between man and the world, between man and nature, the 
sensory-motor unity, but by raising it to a supreme power.545 
The adequacy of merely human thought to the thought of the whole, of being, 
is resolved in terms of this sensory-motor unity: man’s action expresses and 
reveals the whole, which in turn governs and unifies man’s action, such that 
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individual pathos (the affective internalisation of action as quality) is raised to 
a truly collective level: “A subjective and collective automaton for an automatic 
movement: the art of the ‘masses’”.546 The thought of the whole is given as 
the whole as thought: it is no longer a question of an individual thinking, but 
the whole (the masses, the people) as subject in itself: the whole of thought 
as the thought of the masses.  
The ‘intellectual montage’ of the final sequence of Eisenstein’s Strike547 
offers a concrete example of this schema at work. The sequence cuts 
between shots of a bull being slaughtered and shots of striking workers 
fleeing from the forces of their capitalist oppressors, who kill the workers as 
they run, shooting them in the back and murdering them en masse. There is 
no narrative or spatial connection between these two elements, such that the 
conjunction between them created through montage is essentially arbitrary. 
This is the kino-fist, the punch to the head which forces thought to think, to 
seek the intellectual connection between the images as a whole which gives 
their conjunction its meaning: ‘the bosses are slaughtering the workers like 
animals.’  
This shock to thought is not enough, however. Merely to introduce the 
idea of capitalist oppression is not enough to revolutionise an audience, to 
move them into action: cinema must work on the heart and the body as well 
as the mind. Hence the pathos of the bull’s suffering. The shots of its killing 
are not merely documentary in nature (there is no question that the image is 
one of a real bull actually being killed), they foreground the violence and 
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suffering of the moment: the hammer blow to the head which stuns it, the 
repeated slashing of the knife that tears its throat wide open, the blood that 
gushes, the violent flailing of its body as it dies. There is no avoiding the pure 
visceral sensation, the affective charge these shot generate. By comparison, 
the shots of the workers being killed is mere performance, a staged and acted 
moment all to easy to distance oneself from, even (or especially) if one grasps 
the political ‘message’.  
The montage of bull and workers together, the cutting back and forth 
between them, however, pushes the audience beyond the merely intellectual 
by transferring the affective, visceral charge of the bull’s actual slaughter onto 
the performed massacre of the workers, “giving ‘emotional fullness’ or 
‘passion’ back to the intellectual process”548 as Deleuze puts it, so that we 
feel, rather than merely think, the suffering of the workers. From the shock to 
thought which moves from image to concept, to the affective charge that the 
image returns to the concept, the suffering of the workers moves from 
abstract idea to felt suffering which calls for action. This is the final movement 
of Eisenstein’s dialectical schema: the identity of concept and image, idea and 
pathos as ‘action-thought’, in which: 
there is a sensory-motor unity of nature and man, which 
means that nature must be named the non-indifferent … But 
it is also man who passes to a new quality, in becoming the 
collective subject of his own reaction, whilst nature becomes 
the objective human relation. Action-thought simultaneously 
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posits the unity of nature and man, of the individual and the 
mass: cinema as art of the masses.549 
For Eisenstein, this action-thought is nothing other than the 
revolutionising of the masses – he seeks not to tell the story of the revolution, 
or to ‘raise consciousness’, but to shock his audience into a revolutionary 
thought which is inseparable from revolutionary action. For man to become 
the ‘collective subject of his own reaction’ here means to create a class-
consciousness inseparable from a class-action, a proletarianising of his 
audience in which the people become adequate to the revolution as an 
expression of the dialectical movement of world history, or of being itself. This 
is the unity of the one and the many, the people as a mass subject whose 
actions are the material (and materialist) manifestation of a dialectical ‘thought 
of the world’.  
Thus for Eisenstein, “cinema does not have the individual as its subject, 
nor a plot or history as its object; its object is nature, and its subject the 
masses, the individuation of mass and not that of a person”.550 This is the 
telos or finality which orients and governs Eisenstein’s dialectical montage: 
not the mere idealism of the world thinking itself in its movement towards 
absolute knowledge, but rather a concrete and material action-thought (a 
properly Marxist dialectical materialism) whose end is not merely revolution, 
or the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the institution of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, but, rather, the final withering away of the state and with it the 
realisation of the people as the collective subject of their own action in or as a 
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‘higher’ or fully realised communism.551 This goal or end orients and 
determines sensory-motor ‘action-thought’ as a movement towards ultimate 
knowledge and/as ultimate unity, which in turn justifies that movement 
according to the dialectical laws which construct that unity, ordering 
movement and thought as the rational and coherent (dialectical) passage from 
one image/thought to the next.552 It is, as Rodowick says, “an image of Truth 
as globalizing or totalizing apperception, linking humanity and the world as 
commensurable points in a sensorimotor whole”.553 
Deleuze does not offer any equivalently detailed analysis of relationship 
between ‘man and world, world and man’ articulated by the organic, extensive 
or intensive sublime montage Ideas governing American, French 
Impressionist or German Expressionist cinemas respectively. Nevertheless he 
makes it clear that his analysis of the operation of Eisenstein’s dialectical 
montage Idea is valid for the whole of the classical cinema in general.554 In 
each case:  
the concept as whole does not become differentiated without 
externalising itself in a sequence of images, and the images 
do not associate without being internalised in a concept as 
the whole which integrates them. Hence the ideal of 
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knowledge as harmonious totality, which sustains this 
classical representation.555 
Irrespective of the ‘school’ of montage in question, the classical cinema seeks 
to offer the world to man as an object of thought, and as the basis for his 
action within that world as meaningful, rational and effective: the thought of 
the world as a totalised or totalisable whole which unifies and justifies man’s 
action in the world. Interiority and exteriority, thought and action, man and 
world, are reconciled at the level of this Idea, such that the unity of the one 
and the many, of being and beings, is at hand, even if only in principle or as 
possibility.  
Although the terms in which this ‘harmonious totality’ is constructed may 
differ, in each case the classical cinema articulates the same dream, ‘from 
Eisenstein or Gance to Elie Faure’: that of “cinema as a new Art and a new 
Thought … bound up with a metaphysical optimism, a total art for the 
masses”.556 For Eisenstein this is the raising of the masses to the status of 
revolutionary subject adequate to and realising itself in the dialectical 
movement of being towards complete determination or ultimate self-
knowledge: the whole as telos, finality, end of history. The American, French 
and German montage Ideas Deleuze outlines articulate this ‘dream’ in 
different terms, but what unifies this vision in its various manifestations is its 
underlying image of thought as an image of Truth: the adequation of thought 
to being takes the form of the unity of man and world wherein the 
correspondence and coherence of our perceptions and actions (the rational 
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interval between them) both reveal and are justified by the Idea of the World 
as totalised or totalisable whole. As Rodowick puts it, “The movement-image 
is defined by an organic will to truth, or a fundamental philosophical belief in 
the representabilty of the whole”.557 
The ‘metaphysical optimism’ Deleuze refers to is precisely the 
identification of the thought of being with “the accession of the masses to the 
level of true subject”558 whose unity is given in and realised by its thinking of 
the whole: the unity of the people as one given in the sensorimotor unity of 
thought and being, “the unity of nature and man, of the individual and the 
mass”.559 Sadly, however, as Deleuze points out, this dream or idea of the 
cinema proves itself in the end to be not only naïve, but false:  
Everyone knows that, if an art necessarily imposed the 
shock or vibration, the world would have changed a long 
time ago, and men would have been thinking for a long time. 
So this pretension of the cinema, at least amongst the 
greatest pioneers, raises a smile today.560 
The aberrant movement that montage and the mobile camera put at the 
cinema’s disposal reveal themselves in the classical cinema as a mere logical 
possibility, its power or capacity to produce a shock to thought suppressed or 
warded off by the imposition of a thought of the whole or thought of the world 
given as a transcendent totality. By reducing the openness of the whole to an 
Idea of the World representable in thought and masterable in action the 
philosophical consequences of the cinematographic illusion are raised to the 
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level of transcendent principle, and the plane of immanence is reduced to a 
mere field of action.  
Worse still, the action-thought or sensorimotor unity of man and world 
embedded in this image of thought is such that these consequences concern 
action in the world as much as they do the thought of the world. Rather than 
giving rise to an art and a thought of the masses − a ‘subjective or collective 
automaton’ shocking the masses into thought – “the spiritual automaton [of 
the classical cinema] was in danger of becoming the dummy of every kind of 
propaganda: the art of the masses was already showing a disquieting face”.561 
The ‘metaphysical optimism’ attached to the ‘unity of man and nature, 
individual and mass’ founders on the recognition that the ontological 
dimension of this totalisation overlaps with a political dimension tending 
towards the totalitarian:  
How strangely the great declarations of Eisenstein, of 
Gance, ring today; we put them to one side like declarations 
worthy of a museum, all the hopes put into cinema, art of the 
masses and new thought … the mass-art, the treatment of 
the masses, which should not have been separable from an 
accession of the masses to the status of true subject, has 
degenerated into state propaganda and manipulation, into a 
kind fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood, 
Hollywood and Hitler. The spiritual automaton become 
fascist man.562 
The disruptive power of cinematic (and philosophical) aberration is 
warded off precisely because of its capacity to decentre man, to disturb his 
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mastery of and power over the world, to place his thought and action in 
question. Such decentring leaves thought, and man, in a truly impossible 
situation: impossibility of thought, impossibility of action, disorientation, 
disruption, destabilisation of every identity, power, unity (of individual or 
mass). Who would desire such a fate, if such a fate left it possible to desire at 
all? Surely better to assert that power, to seek the unity of the people in or as 
the active expression of the world’s thought, or thought of the world − to be as 
one with each other and the world in thought and action?  
What the fate of the classical cinema warns us is that such a dream 
comes at a cost, that its fundamental underlying premise – the very Idea of 
the World in terms of which our mastery is granted – realises the unity it 
promises not in terms of the people raised to the level of mass subject, but 
rather as the people subjected (Eisenstein’s dialectical optimism come face to 
face with Stalin.) ‘ 
The “spiritual automaton become fascist man” means simply that a 
thought governed by an Idea of the World as one (totalised or totalisable 
whole) in its end or finality thinks only the One. The unity of the one and the 
many, world and man that the classical cinema offers reveals itself as the 
subsumption of the many to the one, the people to the state, the leader, the 
master: the classical cinema is ‘Hitler and Hollywood, Hollywood and Hitler’. In 
the end, as Deleuze says to, or with, Serge Daney, “The organic whole [of the 
classical cinema] was simply totalitarianism”563 and if the classical cinema 
‘dies’ in the war, it is because the war reveals its ‘dream’ as horror:  
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‘the great political mises en scène, state propaganda turning 
into tableaux vivants, the first mass human detentions’ 
realised cinema’s dream, in circumstances where horror 
penetrated everything, where ‘behind’ the image there was 
nothing to be seen but concentration camps, and the only 
remaining bodily link was torture.564  
If this is the ‘death’ of the classical cinema, it is also its completion and 
fulfilment. The action-thought articulated in its sensory-motor schemata 
construes thought as a power we possess, and the whole as a totality or unity 
within our grasp. The relation between man and world, world and man that it 
constructs is figured at or in its extremity in terms of absolute knowledge, the 
adequation of thought to being: telos as completion and closure, the end of 
the world, the Hegelian dead end. Thought as mastery, thought as a power 
we possess, would be a thought oriented to and by its own end, a thought 
whose movement is one towards completion, finality, death. If the sensory-
motor schemata of the classical cinema produce an image of thought as 
adequate to being – if they articulate the relation between man and world as 
one of man’s power in and over the world – they are tied in some sense to this 
finality, this closure, this death.  
Thus Deleuze argues that far from raising thought from a mere 
possibility to a reality, far from imposing a shock to thought and imposing 
thought on the masses as its early practitioners had hoped, the cinema of the 
movement-image is from its very beginning linked historically and essentially 
to the organisation of war, state propaganda and ordinary fascism.565 War, 
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violence, death as the expression of a fascist totalisation of thought and 
action; the unity of the one and the many, of man and world, revealed as the 
subsumption the many to the one, the people to the state, a unity whose final 
image is the mass grave, the gas chamber, the ovens: Hegelian finality, 
Hegelian fatality. 
The bleakness of this conclusion concerns more than simply Deleuze’s 
analysis of the classical cinema and its failed dreams. Insofar as that cinema 
constitutes a recapitulation of the history of philosophies of transcendence – 
any philosophy whose image of thought is premised on the subordination of 
time to movement – then its conclusions bear directly on such philosophy as 
well. As we’ve seen, Deleuze’s analysis of the cinema starts from and with 
Bergson’s critique of finalism and mechanism within philosophy, a critique 
figured in the metaphor of the cinematographic illusion itself. But for the 
classical cinema, this illusion has been raised to a new level. It is no longer 
merely a question of a centred perspective on acentred universal variation 
(this is ‘already’ decentred within cinema by the disjunction of camera and 
projector).  
The illusion is reintroduced in a new form and at a new level, through the 
introduction of sensory-motor schemata that limit relations between shots to 
causal, linear and coherent links, thereby warding off the aberrant movement 
that montage and the mobile camera threaten to give rise to. The capacity of 
montage to both de- and recentre perception is a direct function of Deleuze’s 
reformulation of the cinematographic illusion in terms of relations between 
movement-images rather than static frames. The shot is the movement-
image, but the shot has two faces – turned out towards the openness of the 
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whole (power of decentring) and turned inwards towards the determination of 
a closed set. Sensory-motor schemata serve to link shots based on relations 
derived from the determination of the shot as set, such that montage only 
serves to expand that set, and not to open it to the acentred variation of the 
whole (power of recentring). It is in terms of such schemata and the 
transcendent Idea(s) of the world inferred on their basis that Deleuze is able 
to analyse and explore the operations of human thought and philosophy ‘from 
without’ as it were, using the tools provided by the strictly non-human formal 
capacities of the cinema (frame, shot and montage).  
In other words, the cinematic ‘analysis’ of human thought embedded in 
Deleuze’s treatment of the classical cinema characterises that thought as 
cinematographic in its operation and transcendent in its ‘natural’ metaphysics 
(‘natural’ insofar as such metaphysics are derived from its cinematographic 
genesis). The transcendent character of the Idea of the World derived from 
this orientation towards action (the ‘hypothetical syllogism’ of causality) grasps 
being as a totality or totalisable whole. And insofar as the Idea of the World as 
a totalisable whole (whatever form it takes) returns in a movement of 
reciprocal determination to organise and give justification, coherence and 
unity to our action in the world, the politics of totality and of totalitarianism are 
never far away: totalitarianism as the political correlate of ontological 
totalisation. Deleuze’s analysis of the cinema thus raises Bergson’s critique of 
the cinematographic errors of philosophy to the level of a political critique of 
the metaphysical orientation of human nature. 
This is not quite the same as saying we are totalitarian by nature or 
doomed to fascism. Deleuze does not regard the work of Eisenstein, or 
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Gance or Griffith or Lang as totalitarian; neither are the philosophies of 
transcendence necessarily precursors for or justifications of political 
repression and violence (although some – including Bergson himself − have 
suggested something along these lines566).  
Nevertheless, if thought and deed are shaped by and oriented towards 
the demands of action, they are always already on a trajectory towards such 
political and actual violence (even if that violence is never realised). Action 
demands the power to, and if thought is power we possess, it is a power that 
seeks mastery. And insofar as it seeks to master the world, action exists 
within a tendency that at its extreme finds its realisation in or as death. When 
Daney tells us that in the end, behind the image of the classical cinema ‘there 
is nothing to be seen but concentration camps’, it is because this horror is the 
point towards which the action-thought of the classical cinema flows – and this 
action-thought models nothing other than the natural metaphysics of human 
thought. The “spiritual automaton become fascist man” is not a divergence or 
error in thought, but the end towards which thought as power points us, even 
if that end may sometimes seem far away.  
The entanglement ontological and political critique embedded in 
Deleuze’s treatment of the cinema offers an interesting riposte of sorts to 
Hallward’s claim that Deleuzian philosophy defines itself through its attempt to 
escape from the human, and is thus “essentially indifferent to the politics of 
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this world … [offering] only the most immaterial and evanescent grip on the 
mechanisms of exploitation and domination that continue to condition so 
much of what happens in our world”.567 Contra Hallward, Deleuze identifies 
the human as that which must be escaped from in order to respond 
adequately to the politics of this world. If the “spiritual automaton become 
fascist man” is the ultimate trajectory of the cinematographic orientation of 
human thought and action, and that orientation is nothing other than the 
genesis of our human nature, then the ‘mechanisms of exploitation and 
domination’ Hallward refers to are so entwined with that nature that to correct 
them in human terms is simply to risk recreating them in another form. The 
intolerability of the world demands our action, but it is our action that paves 
the path on which the intolerable treads.  
Nevertheless, the force of Hallward’s critique remains: even if our 
attempts to alter the politics of this world in this world are doomed by our 
nature, freedom from the human still seems to offer little to the problem of the 
freedom of the human. What is at stake here is precisely the question of the 
relation between human being and being itself: if the cinematographic nature 
of the human condemns it to a politics of violence, and ‘freedom’ lies only in 
the realm of the creative self-differing of being, then the freedom of the human 
rest on the possibility of a relation to being as it is for itself, and not for us. 
This relation cannot be built on the overcoming of the human (there can be no 
relation if one of the two terms is dissolved): it can only be constructed in 
terms of the human experience of being. This is, of course, the problem that 
drives Deleuze to the cinema and is articulated directly in the Cinema books 
                                                
567 Hallward, Out of This World, 162. 
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through the relationship they articulate between the classical and the modern 
cinemas, and between their respective images of thought. 
However, as we saw in the first chapter of this thesis, this relationship is, 
in a very specific sense, impossible. The relationship between Cinema 1 and 
Cinema 2, and thus between the world as it is for man and as it is for itself, is 
figured as a gap or break which is simultaneously historical (between pre and 
post-war cinema), formal (between rational and irrational modes of montage) 
and conceptual (between their respective images of thought). But to grasp the 
break between these terms in terms of either side is to erase the other and so 
lose the gap, the relationship that is to be accounted for. The impossibility of 
this relation, then, is that relationship. The human experience of being is the 
experience of impossibility itself.  
Here the problem that Deleuze turns to the cinema to resolve dovetails 
with the interpretive challenge posed by the impossible relation between the 
two volumes of the Cinema books. In Chapter One I argued that this 
challenge could only be resolved by accounting for the passage and break 
between those volumes on the basis of the same Bergsonian foundations that 
Cinema 2 seems to turn against − a displacement figured in the shift in the 
characterisation of the whole from the Bergsonian open to Blanchot’s 
‘outside.’ What should now be apparent is that this difficulty is in fact the 
formal expression (in and as the break or gap between the Cinema books 
themselves) of the problem that drives Deleuze to the cinema in the first 
place: how or in what sense we can think the human experience of being as it 
is for itself, and not for us? So if we want to know how the cinema allows him 
to resolve this problem, we need to map the path he follows in order to get 
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from Bergson to Blanchot, on the basis of the same Bergsonian principles that 
underpin both Cinema 1 and 2. This is the task of the final chapter of this 
thesis. 
 7. The Night, the Rain 
7.1 Film, Death (the “Reverse Proof”) 
As the previous chapter makes clear, there are not two conceptions of 
the whole at work in the Cinema books (one for each volume), but three: the 
whole as the open, the whole as closed totality, and the whole as the outside. 
The addition of the totalised whole provides us with the key to understanding 
the transition from Bergson to Blanchot, and thus from the Open to the 
outside: it is the totalised whole that provides us with the terms in which to 
understand how cinematographic thought gives rise to the conditions of its 
own collapse, in its confrontation with its own limits. As such, it seems worth 
offering a summary account of the articulation of these concepts and their 
relation to each other, precisely because in this form they offer an outline or 
sketch of how Deleuze is able to move from Bergson to Blanchot on the basis 
of strictly Bergsonian principles. 
The whole as the open is a Bergsonian characterisation of the 
fundamental proposition of Deleuzian thought: that being is that which differs 
from itself first of all. The cinematographic character of human thought is such 
that it can only grasp the whole in this sense to the extent that the human 
condition itself is overcome. However, by characterising the cinematographic 
illusion in terms derived from Matter and Memory, rather than those of 
Creative Evolution, Deleuze is able to deduce the cinematographic genesis of 
the human from and on the basis of this open whole, rather than presenting it 
as a given (as Bergson does). He is able to bring the formal resources of the 
cinema to bear on the analysis of this illusion and its consequences because 
this deduction of the material moments of human subjectivity is also and on 
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the same basis the deduction of the primary divisions of his taxonomy of 
cinematic signs. Thus insofar as the cinema offers a correction to the 
cinematographic illusion, this correction is not a function of movement-images 
(on their own they remain strictly cinematographic), but rather of the 
disjunction of projector and camera effected by montage and the mobile 
camera, and the aberration of movement this disjunction produces.  
However, although the classical cinema arises with the introduction of 
this power, the products of that cinema are nevertheless characterised by 
their rejection or warding off of that power, that aberration. By ordering 
montage according to sensory-motor schemata, the classical cinema 
reintroduces the effects of the cinematographic illusion at the level of the 
relations between images (rather than those between individual frames of the 
film strip, as in Bergson’s original metaphor). Such schemata give rise in turn 
to an Idea of the world as a closed totality. In doing so they raise the 
cinematographic illusion to the level of a transcendent principle. By limiting 
relations between images to linear, causal and rational connections, the 
classical cinema is able to construct in strictly cinematic and non-human 
terms the cinematographic orientation of human thought and the products 
thereof. It is on this basis that the classical cinema can be said to recapitulate 
the history of philosophies of transcendence, identity and representation. 
Where Bergson merely critiques the cinematographic orientation of Western 
philosophy, Deleuze is thus able to deduce that orientation and its 
philosophical consequences on the basis of Bergsonian principles (the open 
whole as self-differing difference). 
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If this tendency towards totalisation and closure thus represents the 
natural metaphysics of human thought, it also confronts that thought with its 
own limits. The totality it constructs assures the coherence and unity of our 
actions in that world, but the unity it offers is ultimately the stillness and 
silence of death, by way of the violence that underpins our own action and 
power. We ‘reach’ the intolerable, the impossible, the disaster, on the basis of 
our very own powers of thought and action: it is our cinematographic nature 
itself that orients the human towards and by the intolerable, violence and 
death. The historical dynamic of Deleuze’s account of the cinema posits the 
experience of the war, of fascism and the revelations of the camps as the 
break between the classical and modern cinemas. The sensory-motor 
schemata governing the cinema of the movement-image collapse here as a 
consequence of cinematographic thought’s exposure to those limits. In its 
confrontation with those horrors, with the intolerable as the product of its own 
powers, thought collapses, unable to comprehend that horror in thought, or to 
act in response to it in any adequate or meaningful way. Thought becomes 
powerless, disastrous, impossible, and with this impossibility, a third concept 
or image of the whole comes to the fore: the whole as the outside.  
Something very important has happened here in my argument that 
provides a solution to the paradox posed by the break and relation between 
the two volumes of the Cinema books. The gap between the two volumes 
appeared impossible to bridge because the two images of thought that 
governed them seemed irreconcilable. On the one hand, to treat this gap in 
terms of classical cinema risked reducing the modern cinema to a 
consequence and extension of the causal logic of the former, thus reducing 
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the time-image to another instance and variation of the movement-image. On 
the other hand, to grasp that gap in terms of the time-image risked disrupting 
the very chains of causality that defined the classical cinema and erasing it in 
turn. But insofar as the totalisation of the whole is a reciprocal consequence 
and ground of the causal logic of the classical cinema, it is the classical 
cinema itself that produces the conditions of its own disruption. The 
consequences of the totalisation of the whole that the classical cinema ‘adds’ 
to division between the whole as the open and as the outside are such that it 
bridges the gap between the open and the outside, in the sense that the gap 
between them is no longer impossible, but has taken the form of impossibility 
itself as the terms of the human relation to being.  
The human is not ‘overcome’ in this relation: it does not ascend to being 
in being’s own terms, but remains human. Rather, the cinematographic 
orientation of the human is exposed to its own impossibility: the experience is 
that of the exposure of the human and of human thought to being as the 
outside, of thought outside itself and the outside of thought. This experience is 
that of the modern cinema itself: the disjunctive linkage of shots according to 
irrational montage we find therein are the formal expression in cinematic 
terms of the experience of cinematographic thought exposed to its own limits. 
What we can see, then, is that the passage between Cinema 1 and 2, 
between the open and the outside, between Bergson and Blanchot, passes by 
way of the totalisation of the whole constructed by the cinematographic 
orientation of human thought. It is this totalisation that thereby creates the 
conditions for the exposure of human thought to its own limits, and to the 
impossibility those limits open onto. The image of thought that governs both 
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the modern cinema and the account thereof in Cinema 2 is given directly in 
that impossibility: thought as the outside, thought as disaster, thought as the 
confrontation with the impossible itself. 
This outline offers a sketch of how we might account for the impossibility 
that attends the break or gap between the Cinema books, and how this break 
bears on the question of the human relation to being. However, the limitations 
of this account should be clear. The exposure of thought to its limits mapped 
out here relies on historical events that are strictly external to thought, and to 
cinema itself: the war, fascism, the death camps as the ‘cause’ of thought’s 
exposure to the intolerable and to thought’s own impossibility. Even if thought 
as power orients human life towards action, violence and death, this cannot 
account for the particular form this violence takes at any given moment. The 
specific historical events in question cannot, and should not, be regarded as 
something that could be deduced or accounted for on the basis of either the 
conditions of human thought or the cinema’s articulation thereof – not least 
because it would be morally repugnant to do so.  
The task of this chapter, then, is to show how the exposure of human 
thought to its own limits, to impossibility and to death can be derived on the 
basis of thought’s own cinematographic genesis, and how the cinema is able 
to think these limits in its own non-cinematographic terms. Moreover, the 
terms in which this is done must also account for how the ‘historical’ events 
surrounding the break between classical and modern cinemas can be 
accounted for in non-historical terms without denying or dismissing the moral 
significance of their historical reality. 
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Deleuze offers us the initial key to these tasks early in Cinema 1, at the 
end of his deduction of cinematic movement-images (and thus of the material 
moments of human subjectivity) on the basis of the acentred universal 
variation of being. He concludes this deduction with what he calls a “reverse 
proof”, in which he attempts to:  
retrace the lines of differentiation of these three types of 
images, and try to discover the matrix or the movement-
image as it is in itself, and in its acentred purity, in its primary 
regime of variation, in its heat and light, while it is still 
untroubled by any centre of variation.568 
The terms in which he poses the question of how to effect this ‘retracing’ 
reinforce that the product of the differentiation he has mapped out is nothing 
other than human subjectivity and thought: “How can we rid ourselves of 
ourselves, and demolish ourselves?”569 In other words, having ‘descended’ 
from the universal variation and difference from itself of being to the 
differentiated movement-images (perception, action and affection-images) 
that constitute the material moments of human subjectivity (the centred 
perspective of a brain/screen), he now seeks to reverse this movement and 
‘ascend’ once more towards the acentred variation of THE movement-image, 
via the dissolution of man, of ourselves as a centre of perception on an 
acentred universal movement-image. 
As if to emphasis the identity of the identity of his taxonomy of cinematic 
movement-images with his deduction of those images as the material 
moments of human subjectivity, this ‘reverse proof’ is offered in terms derived 
                                                
568 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 66. 
569 Ibid. 
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not from philosophy, but from cinema. More specifically it is presented through 
an analysis of Samuel Beckett’s Film (1965).570 Despite being released well 
after the break Deleuze posits between the classical and the modern 
cinemas, his account of Film positions it firmly in the classical mode, insofar 
as it organises perception-, action- and affection-images according to a 
sensory-motor schema − even if its goal is ultimately to bring this schema to 
an end, to its end. Beckett’s project presents itself under the banner of Bishop 
Berkeley’s ‘formula of the image’,571 esse est percipi – to be is to be 
perceived. Deleuze argues that the ‘demolishing of self’ undertaken according 
to this formula takes the form of a series of conventions governing the relation 
of camera and subject, the goal of which is to dramatise the escape of the 
protagonist (O, played by Buster Keaton) from existence by progressively 
escaping the tyranny of perception itself.572  
The film ends with O immobile in a stilled rocking chair (exclusion of 
action and the perception of action), having masked or excluded anything in 
his room which might ‘perceive’ him − animals, mirrors, even pictures 
(exclusion of perception and the perception of perception) and leaving only 
the perception of the camera itself (OE). Having by various conventions 
remained out of his (and our) view, behind his back, until now, the camera 
finally comes face to face with the protagonist – and is revealed as the 
protagonist himself, with the only exception that one eye is covered with a 
                                                
570 Alan Schneider, "Film," (USA 1965).To be precise, Film’s end credits identify it as ‘by Samuel 
Beckett’ but directed by Alan Schneider. Convention would normally dictate that Film be credited to 
Schneider. To avoid unnecessary complication or confusion, I follow Deleuze’s attribution of the film to 
Beckett.  
571 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 66. This ‘formula’ appears at the beginning of Beckett’s screenplay for the 
project, which he intended to be read along with the viewing of the film. Katherine Waugh and Fergus 
Daly, "Film by Samuel Beckett,"  Film West, no. 20 (1995), www.iol.ie/~galfilm/filmwest/20beckett.htm. 
572 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 67. 
7.#The#Night,#the#Rain#/#284#
patch (mirroring the monocular vision of the camera). Here, Deleuze says, 
“We are in the domain of the perception of affection, the most terrifying, that 
which still survives when all the others have been destroyed: it is the 
perception of self by self, the affection-image”.573  
Deleuze reads the progressive extinction of action, perception and 
affection-images throughout Film as taking us from the world given to us in 
experience towards the conditions of that experience: “Beckett ascends once 
more towards the luminous plane of immanence, the plane of matter … he 
traces the three varieties of image back to the mother movement-image”.574 
But what is most striking about the reascension Beckett effects, this reverse 
movement towards the conditions of experience starting from the world as 
experience, and as experienced, is that what it returns us to is not light, 
movement and the creative vitality of difference differing from itself, but rather 
what appears as its opposite. Deleuze projects the trajectory of Film beyond 
its end, beyond the subjective finality of a world reduced to a centre of 
perception perceiving only itself, toward the extinction of even this final image: 
“Will it die out and will everything stop, even the rocking of the rocking chair, 
when the double face [O/OE] slips into nothingness? This is what the end 
suggests – death, immobility, blackness”.575 ‘Death, immobility, blackness’: a 
‘proof’ then, that in its reversal seems to return it to the antithesis of its 
luminous origin.  
                                                
573 Ibid., 67−68. Emphasis in original. 
574 Ibid., 68. 
575 Ibid. 
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Deleuze does go on to argue that even the darkness and death Beckett 
points towards in his elimination of the human is merely a ‘subjective finality’, 
a “means in relation to a more profound end”, that of:  
attaining once more the world before man, before our dawn, 
the position where movement was, on the contrary, under 
the regime of universal variation, and where light, always 
propagating itself, had no need to be revealed … the 
luminous plane of immanence, the plane of matter and its 
cosmic eddying of movement-images.576 
However, the gap between this ‘subjective finality’ and ‘the world before man’, 
and more particularly the leap Deleuze makes across this gap, seem to me in 
need of a fuller account than he offers here, not least because it remains 
unclear how ‘death, immobility, darkness’ can serve as a means towards an 
end given in terms of a ‘cosmic eddying’ of movement=light. Deleuze does 
give the fuller account this gaps demands, I think, but only insofar as it lies at 
the heart of the Cinema books, and of philosophy itself.  
To be precise, I think that the Cinema books as a whole are that 
account, manifested concretely in the (impossible) gap between those books, 
and that the gap in question is ultimately the gap between the 
cinematographic character of human nature and the universal variation of 
being as it exists for itself. If Beckett’s Film speaks to this gap, it is because 
the elimination of the human Deleuze finds in therein, and the ‘death, 
immobility, blackness’ to be found at or beyond its end, constitute the finality 
towards and by which the classical cinema is oriented. This finality reveals 
itself in or as the impossible gap between the Cinema books, between the 
                                                
576 Ibid. 
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classical and modern cinemas, between the movement-image and the time-
image, the open and the outside. As such an examination of the ‘reverse 
proof’ Deleuze finds in Beckett’s Film can offer us an entry point into 
understanding the impossible relation that exists between its two volumes as 
a reflection or expression of the philosophical problems that Deleuze turns to 
the cinema in order to explore. 
The comparison between the analysis Deleuze offers of Beckett’s Film 
and the analysis he offers of experimental cinema is instructive in this regard. 
Where Beckett’s path to the ‘world before man’ must travel by way of the dark, 
by Deleuze’s account, experimental cinema seeks to establish itself in that 
world directly.577 This difference is a direct product of the different formal 
techniques that each deploys, and how these techniques bear on the status of 
the human therein. Beckett starts with a strictly classical organisation of 
perception-, action- and affection-images organised by a sensory-motor 
schema and then proceeds to eliminate those images step by step, and in 
doing so collapses the sensory-motor schema which orders them (he 
removes both the sensory=perception and the motor=action images, leaving 
only the affection of self by self). By this elimination he seeks to reascend to a 
world before man.  
By Deleuze’s account, experimental cinema on the other hand 
(especially as exemplified in the American tradition represented by the work of 
                                                
577 The presentation I am offering here is a condensation of several typically dense pages of argument 
on Deleuze’s part. Nevertheless, it must be said that Deleuze’s account of experimental cinema remains 
schematic. This is perhaps unavoidable, given that the history of the experimental is more or less 
coextensive with that of cinema itself (an argument might be made for its origins in Georges Méliès 
fascination with cinema as ‘special effect’, but if not there, then at the very least we can find it certain 
aspects of French and Soviet cinema in the 1920s). Deleuze does respond to this complexity in his 
account. See, for example, his discussion of Vertov as the ‘father’ of experimental cinema. Ibid., 81−86. 
Nevertheless, Deleuze’s analysis is oriented by and towards a treatment of experimental cinema in the 
terms I deploy throughout this section.  
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Stan Brakhage or Michael Snow) imposes no sensory-motor constraint on its 
images. It draws immediately and directly on the capacity of montage and the 
mobile camera to produce aberrant movement by correlating images that are 
“incommensurable from the viewpoint of our human perception”.578 This non-
human perception abandons the presentation of perception as it is for 
someone, in order “to reach ‘another’ perception which is also the genetic 
element of all perception”.579 This ‘genetic element of all perception’ is simply 
the movement-image for itself, as that from which perception, action and 
affection images (and thus the cinematographic human condition) are 
deduced.  
Insofar as it seeks to install itself directly in a world before man, 
experimental cinema understood in this fashion fulfils in an immediate sense 
what Bergson demands of intuition: it grasps being in being’s own terms.580 
But where intuition must overcome the human to do so, the cinema’s non-
human thought shares no such barrier. It need neither ‘descend’ nor 
‘reascend, but has the capacity to install itself directly in the real movement of 
being, since montage and the mobile camera, and thus aberrant movement, 
are (for Deleuze) the very essence of the cinema. Thus: 
if from the point of view of the human eye, montage is 
undoubtedly a construction, from the point of view of another 
eye, it ceases to be one; it is the pure vision of a non-human 
                                                
578 Ibid., 82.  
579 Ibid., 85.  
580 Although there’s no evidence of a direct Bergsonian influence on Brakhage, R. Bruce Elder is 
nevertheless able to outline a chain of influence trickling down from Bergson to Alfred North Whitehead, 
to Charles Olson, and finally to Brakhage, placing the latter firmly in an ‘American tradition’ with 
substantive, albeit second hand, links to Bergsonian philosophy. R Bruce Elder, The Films of Stan 
Brakhage in the American Tradition of Ezra Pound, Gertrud Stein and Charles Olson (Ontario, Canada: 
Wilfrid Laurier UP, 1998), 511, n444 and more generally 75-99, and 146-57. 
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eye, of an eye which would be in things. Universal variation, 
universal interaction (modulation) is what Cézanne had 
already called the world before man, ‘dawn of ourselves’, 
‘iridescent chaos’, ‘virginity of the world’. It is not surprising 
that we have to construct it since it is given only to the eye 
which we do not have.581 
The ‘non-human eye’ which would be ‘in things’ is perception-for-itself, the 
unrevealed luminosity of being. That is, the aberrant movement that montage 
constructs enters directly into the movement of being as it is for itself. It is for 
this reason that experimental cinema, under the sign of the gramme, 
constitutes the ‘degree zero’ of Deleuze’s taxonomy of cinematic signs: “the 
genetic element of all possible perception, that is, the point which changes, 
and which makes perception change, the differential of perception itself”.582 
Just as beings, and human beings, ‘descend’ from the unrevealed luminosity 
of being into and as a world of action and reaction, Deleuze’s taxonomy 
descends from this aberrant genesis into the signs of classical cinema, into 
the realm of perception-, action- and affection-images constrained by sensory-
motor schemata to a cinematographic construction of the world as a closed 
totality (and this ‘descent’ is the cinematic dramatisation or enactment of the 
genesis of beings, and human beings, immanent to being). 
Thus where the classical cinema constructs an Idea of the whole as a 
closed totality, and the modern presents the whole as the outside, 
experimental cinema alone seeks to grasp the whole in and as the real 
differing from itself of the Open. However, there is no doubt where Deleuze’s 
                                                
581 Deleuze, Cinema 1, 81. 
582 Ibid., 83. 
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interests lie in the Cinema books: his treatment of experimental cinema 
constitutes a handful of pages in several hundred devoted to the classical 
cinema. The dramatisation or construction of the human by the latter is of 
more interest to him here than ‘the world before man’. It is here that the 
contrast of experimental cinema with Beckett’s Film becomes significant. If the 
classical cinema marks the ‘descent’ of cinema from the ‘world before man’ to 
the world for man, Beckett’s film marks a conscious attempt to reverse that 
descent, to reascend to the world before man by the elimination of man.  
But this ascent is more challenging that it might at first seem. To treat 
this relation as transitive – as if ‘to ascend’ were a simple reversal of ‘to 
descend’ – would amount to mistaking a transformation in duration for a 
translation in space, treating time itself as if it were reversible, and thus both 
abstract and unreal. If to ascend were the merely the reverse of to descend, 
then at the conclusion of this double movement things would be precisely as 
they were: in effect, nothing would have happened, nothing would have 
moved. If, rather, movement expresses a transformation in the whole, then in 
the descent from acentred variation to a centred perspective on that variation 
– in the actualisation of the virtual – we must recognise that the whole itself is 
transformed, real duration is expressed. To reascend the path is not to return 
to a point of departure which remains ‘in place’, as it were, but to attempt to 
decentre a properly human perspective in order to open onto being as that 
which is never what it is, but rather only the becoming other of difference 
differing from itself. It is to expose the human to the in- or non-human, beings 
to being, from the perspective of beings, which is not identical to a being 
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‘before’ beings, since what has been added is, precisely, beings themselves 
(even if the task at hand is to ‘eliminate’ them).  
Thus if the gap between the ‘more profound end’ of acentred universal 
variation and the ‘subjective finality’ of ‘death, immobility, blackness’ bears 
further exploration, it is because it marks the difference between a ‘world 
before man’ and man’s attempt to regain this world – the difference between 
the descent from the unrevealed luminosity of the image-for-itself into distinct 
images-for-someone, and the attempt to reascend from the position of a 
centred perspective on variation towards the pure variation for itself. What 
returns, or seeks to return in this reascension is man, that is to say, the very 
elements that must be eliminated in order TO return, and this is precisely the 
paradox of Bergsonian intuition.583  
Beckett’s reverse proof suggests that for all that the plenitude of THE 
movement-image, or being-for-itself, ‘descends’ into the signs that constitute 
the material moments of human subjectivity (the avatars of the movement-
image), retracing this path from the centred perspective of all too human 
thought does not return us to this plenitude ‘as it is in itself’, but rather to the 
‘subjective finality’ of death, stillness, the dark as the human experience of the 
in- or non-human, that is, of being. Being as it is for itself is not deathly: it is 
creation, acentred universal variation, unrevealed luminosity of the world. 
Neither is being as it exists for someone deathly as such (although death no 
doubt bears heavily on the living): human beings ‘screen’ the light of being 
only in order to reveal it, to construct a world of beings on which to act and so 
                                                
583 If the tendency of experimental cinema that Deleuze focuses on is capable of fulfilling the conditions 
for Bergsonian intuition, it is to the extent that it seeks to install itself directly within the aberrant 
movement that is the product of the cinema’s non-human eye.  
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live. But having descended into this world, to reverse this genesis is to 
abandon action, power, and the world as it is for us. It is, in this sense, to turn 
towards death. 
This reversal is nothing other than the attempt to abandon the human 
condition and, insofar as this can be an experience, it is one in which thought 
and action fail us, our power no longer serves, in which the world of things 
withdraws itself from us leaving only silence and the dark. For the human as 
human, the unrevealed luminosity of being is simply the absence of light, the 
absence of things: to reascend towards being is to expose oneself to the 
absence of beings, to an existence without existents. Such an experience 
would be akin to what Emmanuel Levinas, drawing on Blanchot, calls the il y 
a, the ‘there is’: what there is when there is nothing, presence of absence, the 
silent murmuring of insomniac night.584  
This is precisely the movement of Beckett’s Film: the re-ascension of 
beings towards being in the elimination of the material moments of human 
subjectivity and thus the elimination of the world as it is for that subjectivity, 
leaving only the experience of the absence of the world. Levinas unfolds this 
experience for us in the following terms:  
Let us imagine all beings, things and persons, reverting to 
nothingness. One cannot put this return to nothingness 
outside of all events. But what of this nothingness itself? 
                                                
584 Levinas uses this particular phrase in relation to Blanchot’s Thomas l’Obscure, and the latter’s 
account of the il y a there in terms of “The presence of absence, the night, the dissolution of the subject 
in the night, the horror of being, the return of being to the heart of every negative moment, the reality of 
irreality.” Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), n.1, 58. 
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Something would happen, if only the night and the silence of 
nothingness.585  
The asymmetry we see here between the luminous creativity that 
‘descends’ into or as beings, and the deathly stillness that comes to meet 
those beings if and as they seek to reascend is an expression or nuance of 
the underlying logic that runs throughout and grounds all of Deleuze’s 
thinking. That is to say, it is isomorphic with the asymmetry between internal 
and external difference he unpacks in “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”. 
Internal difference differs with itself all the way to external difference, and can 
thus account for, or perhaps descend all the way to, external difference. But 
since external difference can only differ from some other thing, some other 
determined identity, it cannot account for internal difference, cannot 
‘reascend’ to that difference without finding some means to overcome or 
cease being itself, and so differ from itself (the human cannot reverse its 
cinematographic genesis without ceasing to be human).  
This kind of asymmetrical binary, where one of the two terms 
nevertheless provides for the genesis or deduction of the other, appears 
repeatedly throughout Deleuze’s work. For instance, the virtual grounds, 
produces and accounts for the actual, likewise the active for the reactive, the 
schizophrenic for the paranoid, non-sense for sense, active force for reactive 
force, the molecular for the molar, deterritorialisation for reterritorialisation and 
so on.586 We must be careful to note, however, that repetition produces 
                                                
585 Ibid., 51−52. 
586 This underlying logic is what I think Hallward is pointing towards when he argues that “one of the 
most characteristic features of Deleuze’s work is his tendency to present what initially appears as a 
binary relation in such a way as to show that this relation is in fact determined by only one of its two 
‘terms’.” Out of This World, 82 and 156-57.  
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difference, not identity: although the logical topography of the argument may 
be the same, the case in question is not. The heterogenesis of Deleuzian 
philosophy is such that what is deduced in each case is a nuance (and thus 
difference) of the differing from itself of difference (all the way to identity) and 
what might be counter-actualised of or in each case likewise cannot be 
considered the ‘same’ concept.  
What is distinctive in this case, in Deleuze’s treatment of the cinema, is 
the focus on the human within this ascent. Whether we look at Bergsonian 
intuition, or Deleuze’s development of it into his cinematic practice of concept 
creation, the ascent towards being (the concept as counter-actualisation of 
the event, montage thought, symptomatology) requires the overcoming, the 
elimination, the decentring of the human. It is the ascent to being and the 
techniques or means by which this might be achieved that is the focal point in 
these cases: the human is present only as that which must be overcome or 
discarded for in order to do so.587 Experimental cinema constitutes a kind of 
‘ideal’ form of this attempt, insofar its construction of a ‘world without man’ 
need not even overcome the human but merely draws on the resources laid 
up by the already non-human aberration of movement produced by montage 
and the mobile camera.  
It is this aberration that Deleuzian philosophy, insofar as it is cinematic, 
seeks to emulate in order to free itself from the lures of representation and 
identity, of the cinematographic illusion raised to the level of transcendent 
Idea. But it is not what Deleuze seeks to explore in the Cinema books, which 
                                                
587 The case of experimental cinema differs from these cases inasmuch as it does not need to overcome 
the human, since the cinema is non-human to begin with. Rather, the cinema begins with being and 
then deduces beings on that basis (experimental cinema/the gramme as the point of genesis of the 
taxonomy of cinematic signs=material moments of human subjectivity).  
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is why experimental cinema occupies only a few pages therein.588 The nuance 
that Deleuze draws out of Beckett’s Film is the focus it places on the human 
experience of this overcoming: the attempt by the human to reascend to a 
‘world before man’ in human terms, and thus the foregrounding of the 
impossibility of such an ascent as an experience, such that experience is 
given as impossibility. To reascend to a world before man is to expose the 
very identity that would think the difference of the world to its own absence.  
‘To be exposed to one’s own absence’ is a paradoxical formation, to be 
sure, but the terms in which Beckett’s Film constructs this experience as an 
experience enable us to construct a precise characterisation of it, and of the 
terms in which it takes place. Perception, action and affection images are the 
material moments of subjectivity, and it is their organisation and correlation 
that puts a world at our disposal. As the ‘coincidence of subject and object’, 
affect internalises perception as pure quality, and it is this quality that we act 
in response to, such that perception “extends into action through the 
intermediary of affections”.589  
But if perception is internalised as affection, and that affection is 
externalised as action, having eliminated both perception and action, Film 
removes both the world and any possible response to it, and leaves us with 
only the affection of self by self, ‘the most terrifying’. This is where the film 
ends, but this is not yet ‘death, immobility, blackness’. To get there Deleuze 
must project the trajectory Beckett has described beyond its end, beyond the 
                                                
588 Were the task of the Cinema books to provide a full accounting of the possibilities of the cinema, this 
would constitute a serious omission. Its absence reflects the nature of the properly philosophical task 
Deleuze essays therein, which as we will see in a moment concerns the human in its relation to being 
(where experimental cinema treats of the cinema’s capacity to construct a ‘world without man’). 
589 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 272. 
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end of the film (“Will it die out, will everything stop … when the double face 
slips into nothingness?”590) The reason for this is perhaps obvious: where 
there is darkness there is no image; where there is stillness there is no 
movement; there where my death is I am not. This is what I would say: what 
Beckett’s Film offers us in the end, as its end, is neither darkness nor stillness 
nor death, but the exposure (or the experience of the exposure) of experience 
to them. In the absence of world and movement, perception and action, all 
that is left to the affection of self by self is the experience of the absence of 
the world, which must include the absence of self insofar as the self is an 
agent of action. The only perception that could be internalised as affect, the 
only affect that could be extended into action under these circumstances is 
the interminable experience of absence, of nothing happening, endlessly.  
In his discussion of the affect-image in Cinema 1, Deleuze notes that:  
Maine de Biran had already spoken of pure affections, 
unplaceable because they have no relation to determinate 
space, present in the sole form of a ‘there is’ … because 
they have no relations to an ego [moi] … The affect is 
impersonal and is distinct form every individuated state of 
things.591 
If there is more than an accident of terminology connecting de Biran’s ‘there 
is’ and Levinas’ il y a, it would be the invocation of an experience which 
subsists even in or perhaps as the absence of any moi, any ‘determined 
space’ or ‘individuated state of things’. What is essential here is that it is an 
experience: the presence of absence as the exposure of experience to the 
                                                
590 Cinema 1, 68. 
591 Ibid., 98.  
7.#The#Night,#the#Rain#/#296#
impossibility of experience. In the reascent towards being and the conditions 
of its own genesis, what the human comes face to face with is the exposure to 
one’s own absence as the experience of the impossibility of possibility (since 
in this relation the possibility that is ‘my own’ death is taken away too, since 
where my death is I am not.) The human experience of this absence can only 
take one form: not death (there is no experience to be had there) but the 
relationship to death.  
The treatment of this relation within Deleuze’s account of the cinema 
locates that account within one of the fundamental recurring themes of 
philosophy. Death, and man’s relation to death, is one of the primordial figures 
of philosophical thought, and of thought insofar as it is philosophical, although 
the manner in which that relation is itself thought no doubt takes many forms. 
As Ullrich Haase and William Large summarise the historical recurrence of 
this figure, for Plato, death is the realm of the “never changing essence of 
things”592 such that it is in our relation to death that we grasp the eternal. For 
Hegel, it is the sovereign power of the negative by which “consciousness 
‘vanquishes’ the destructive power of death” (negativity as ‘creative 
destruction’);593 for Heidegger, this relation presents itself as ‘being towards 
death’ and thus as the possibility of impossibility, which offers the authenticity 
of dasein as individuation.594 Deleuze invokes this relation between 
philosophy and death directly in Cinema 2 when he notes that:  
                                                
592 Ullrich Haase and William Large, Maurice Blanchot, Routledge Critical Thinkers (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2001), 38. 
593 Ibid., 43. 
594 Ibid., 47−48. 
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The philosopher is someone who believes he has returned 
from the dead, rightly or wrongly, and who returns to the 
dead in full consciousness. The philosopher has returned 
from the dead and goes back there. This has been the living 
formulation of philosophy since Plato.595  
If the cinema dramatises the history of philosophy by its own means, it 
should hardly be surprising that this figure should find its place there too, or 
that its passage throughout the Cinema books should bear on the question of 
thought and thought’s adequacy to being. Thus the Idea of the whole as a 
totality echoes in its own terms the most ‘classical’ formulation of thought’s 
relation to death, in the following terms. The whole as totality, as end or 
completion (as closed set), is that which corrects or stabilises the potential for 
aberration inherent in montage, ‘donates’ a determinate content (and thus 
identity) to being as the discrete and actual elements which make up the 
closed set. This totality (the Idea of the whole or world) is what ensures the 
coherence of the relations between the elements of its set in terms of their 
causal linkages.  
For man as a centre of perception and action within this world, the 
closed totality within which action is possible is circumscribed by the figure of 
death as a border or boundary, that which completes one’s life, finishes it or 
brings it to an end, but also delimits it and so give it a determinate content 
such that its meaning finally reveals itself, for good or ill. This donation of 
coherence, identity and significance is what the ancient Greeks express with 
                                                
595 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 209. 
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admirable clarity in the injunction to ‘call no man happy until he dies’ (which 
perhaps belongs as much to drama as it does to philosophy596).  
However, as Jacques Derrida points out, the figure of death as a border 
or boundary also constitutes an aporia, insofar as it marks or extends itself as 
a line which cannot be crossed, and which in a sense has only one side (there 
is no ‘beyond’ of death for the one who dies.) Travelling from the Greeks 
‘towards’ a questioning or interrogation of Heidegger by way of Levinas and 
Blanchot, Derrida notes that although ‘my death’ certainly concerns me in the 
most personal of ways, and even if it imposes on my being a ‘being towards 
death’ as the possibility of impossibility (the authenticity of dasein as 
individuation), it is nevertheless precisely that which I cannot experience as 
such. I cannot die as or for myself, for there where my death is I am not.  
Death thus constitutes a boundary that can neither be found nor crossed 
for oneself or as oneself, such that any determination or authenticity it might 
offer is immediately taken away in or as the same gesture by which it is 
imposed.597 This is, Derrida says, Blanchot’s constant theme: “the impossible 
                                                
596 Variants of this figure appear in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex and the Histories 
of Herodotus. Lines 1078-1080; Line 1529; Book 1, Chapters 30-34. For all that this formulation is 
ancient, it retains an absolutely contemporary currency. By way of strictly autobiographical evidence, my 
first encounter with it was in a song by Tom Waits: “The higher that the monkey can climb, the more he 
shows his tail / call no man happy till he dies / there’s no milk at the bottom of the pail”. Tom Waits, 
"Misery's the River of the World," in Blood Money (USA: Anti, 2002), Track 1. 
597 The account I have offered here is necessarily a traduction of Derrida’s characteristically subtle, 
elusive and complex analysis of this theme, and particularly of his treatment of Heidegger. 
Nevertheless, the following passage captures what is essential for my purposes:  
I cannot consider myself happy, or even believe myself to have been happy, before having crossed, 
passed, and surpassed the last instant of my own life, even if up to that point I have been happy in a 
life that will have been, in any case, so short. What, then, is it to cross the ultimate border? What is it 
to pass the term of one's life (terma tou biou)? Is it possible? Who has ever done it and who can 
testify to it? The ‘I enter’, crossing the threshold, this ‘I pass’ (perao) puts us on the path, if I may 
say, of the aporos or of the aporia: the difficult or the impracticable, here the impossible, passage, 
the refused, denied, or prohibited passage, indeed the nonpassage, which can in fact be something 
else, the event of a coming or of a future advent, which no longer has the form of the movement that 
consists in passing, traversing, or transiting. It would be the ‘coming to pass’ of an event that would 
no longer have the form or the appearance of a pas: in sum, a coming without pas. 
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dying, the impossibility, alas, of dying”,598 the ‘impossibility of possibility’ in 
which (as Haase and Large put it) “ ‘my’ death … exposes me to the 
dissipation of myself, to an experience of insufferable anonymity”.599 The 
experience of the exposure to death that Beckett constructs through his 
elimination or reduction of the material moments of subjectivity is, I think, 
precisely the experience of this non-border or non-passage. The ‘terror’ of the 
affection of self by self that Beckett leaves us with is precisely that of man’s 
exposure to impossibility as the ungrounding ground of his possibility.600 This 
is no longer thought as mastery, but rather as its own impossibility. 
7.2 The Suspension of the World 
If Deleuze’s treatment of Beckett’s Film offers us a coherent account of 
what it might mean to understand the human relation to being in terms of 
man’s relation to death, that account is and can only be valid for Film itself, 
and not for the cinema as a whole. It turns on the very specific means by 
which Beckett seeks to eliminate perception- and action-images in order to 
reduce human experience to the affection of self by self: the experience of the 
presence of absence as the terms of the relation of human being to death. It is 
thus particular to this case, and this case only. In order to bring the analysis 
unfolded in it to bear on the whole of cinema, we must therefore be able to 
                                                                                                                                      
Aporias: Dying − Awaiting (One Another at) the 'Limits of Truth', trans. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 7−8. 
598 Ibid., 77. 
599 Haase and Large, Maurice Blanchot, 53. 
600 The correlation between totalisation as a general condition for action, and my death as that which is 
most particular, most especially ‘mine’ (even if and as it removes the possibility of any possession) may 
seem an unfortunate slippage. But this is part of death’s particularity: it is my uttermost possibility, and 
thus absolutely and particularly mine, and yet it is the most banal of generalities, since everything that 
lives must die.  
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locate the ‘affection of self by self’ that Beckett constructs in Film in relation to 
the condition of the cinema as a whole. 
The key to doing so lies in the collapse of the sensory-motor schemata 
that constrain the classical cinema to a cinematographic and totalising grasp 
of the world. Insofar as such schemata constitute the cinematic articulation of 
human (and thus cinematographic) thought, we must understand the collapse 
of such schemata as the fragmentation or failure of the human itself. Where 
Beckett sets out consciously and deliberately to eliminate the human, the 
collapse of such schemata cannot be regarded as an individual aesthetic or 
creative choice. Rather, it concerns the whole of the classical cinema, and is 
entwined with something like generalised loss of faith in the capacity of 
perception to apprehend the horrors it sees, all unwilling, or of action to 
respond adequately to a world in which such things are possible. 
Nevertheless, the consequences of this collapse are the same as Beckett’s 
conscious elimination of the human. That is to say, the trajectory is the same 
in both cases: it draws the image towards silence and the dark, the exposure 
of the human to the absence of the human. As such, for the cinema as a 
whole, the exposure of human being to being, to death is marked by the break 
or gap between the classical and modern cinemas. 
Here we can return to an element of Deleuze’s argument that has been 
put to one side in the second half of this thesis: his identification of this break 
with the ‘great reversal’ Kant effects within philosophy, in which “Time is no 
longer related to the movement which it measures, but movement is related to 
7.#The#Night,#the#Rain#/#301#
the time which conditions it”.601 Kant’s appearance at this pivotal point in 
Deleuze’s argument has a startling and potentially arbitrary quality to it, 
insofar as Kant appears to play no significant role elsewhere in the argument 
of the Cinema books.602 As such, one might justly wonder ‘why Kant? And 
why here?’ As we shall see, however, this is less a case of a sudden and 
unwarranted appearance by Kant in the middle of a Bergsonian treatise on 
the cinema than it is an instance of Deleuze effecting a strictly Bergsonian 
revision of Kant by means of the cinema.  
The first step in demonstrating this is to note that the correlation I am 
proposing here of the ‘affection of self by self’ with the break between 
classical and modern cinemas can only be fully justified through and in terms 
of Deleuze’s identification of that break with the Kantian reversal in 
philosophy. Most importantly, this reversal is articulated not in Kantian terms 
as such, but in those of a properly Bergsonian account or revision of Kant. 
With Kant’s reversal, time is no longer grasped indirectly as a function of 
movement (time grasped in terms of the linear and unidirectional succession 
of cause and effect), but rather appears directly as “the immutable form of 
change and movement”.603 The Bergsonian parallels here are clear. On the 
one hand, the latter’s critique of the cinematographic orientation of Western 
philosophy is precisely a critique of its subordination of time to movement. On 
the other, movement grasped as a ‘mobile section of duration’ is simply 
                                                
601 Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy, vii. 
602 It is all the more so for the fact that it only ‘appears’ explicitly and directly in the respective 
introductions to Cinema 1, and Cinema 2. 
603 Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy, viii. 
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movement understood as an expression of time, or in Kantian terms, time as 
“the form of everything that changes and moves”.604  
In other words, the reversal that Kant effects in philosophy is precisely 
what Bergson calls for in his critique of the cinematographic limits of 
Platonism and mechanism. But for Bergson, the cinematographic illusion is 
not just a figure of philosophical critique, or of a critique of philosophy: it 
governs thought, perception and language. Moreover, as Deleuze 
demonstrates, this illusion is constitutive of human nature, by virtue of the 
latter’s genesis in terms of a centred perspective on acentred universal 
variation. As such, in the terms Deleuze adopts from Bergson, the ‘great 
Kantian reversal’ can only take place with or as the elimination of the human 
as a centre of perception and action. Beckett’s progressive purging of 
perception and action thus offers a figure for this ‘reversal’ given in terms of 
human experience and human thought, as the affection of self by self, the 
‘most terrifying’. 
What Kant shows us is that this ‘terror’ is precisely the experience of 
time as change, as transformation. The doubling or duality of ‘self’ in the 
phrase ‘the affection of self by self’ presents this ‘experience’ in the form of a 
fracture or crack in thought and in the ‘I’ which thinks. This ‘fracture’ is 
analysed by Deleuze in Kant’s Critical Philosophy in terms of Rimbaud’s 
formula ‘I is another’.605 On the one hand, Deleuze says, there is the I of ‘I 
think’, for which thought appears as spontaneity, as “an act which constantly 
carries out a synthesis of time, and of that which happens in time, by dividing 
                                                
604 Ibid. 
605 Ibid., viii−ix. 
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up the present, the past and the future at every instant”.606 But on the other 
hand, however, the ‘I’ also exists in time, and thus as that which changes 
constantly, not as a function of my own action but because time is the form of 
change and movement itself. This ‘I’ experiences ‘my’ thoughts not as 
spontaneous action or power, but as an expression of time (time as the form 
of change, which the ‘I’ suffers or undergoes): “I cannot therefore constitute 
myself as a unique and active subject, but as a passive ego which represents 
to itself only the activity of its own thought; that is to say, the I, as an other 
which affects it”.607 Thus (as Deleuze explains in his account of this ‘fractured 
I’ in Difference and Repetition) 
the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the ‘I think’ 
cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and 
spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self 
which experiences its own thought – its own intelligence, that 
by virtue of which it can say I – being exercised in it and 
upon it but not by it.608  
The ‘affection of self by self’ is thus the experience of the ‘I think’ not as 
spontaneous action or power, but as something imposed from ‘without’ by or 
as time as the form of that which changes: thought as powerlessness or pure 
passivity, the exposure of the ‘I’ to time as transformation or self-differing 
difference. The affection of self by self as the ‘most terrifying’: thought as a 
suffering of time. 
If Deleuze is able to place the Kantian reversal of the subordination of 
time to movement at the centre of his Bergsonian account of the cinema, it is 
                                                
606 Ibid., viii. 
607 Ibid., viii−ix. 
608 Difference and Repetition, 86. 
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because he finds or reaches that reversal in terms derived from Bergson, and 
not from Kant. He thus reconstructs or enters into the movement of Kantian 
thought in Bergsonian terms. This task must be understood in the context of 
Deleuze’s wider project of rethinking or correcting Kant’s transcendental 
idealism in line with Maimon’s critique thereof (a project which finds its 
positive articulation in the form of Deleuze’s own transcendental 
empiricism609). As Smith points out, “Maimon’s primary objection was that 
Kant had ignored the demands of a genetic method”610 which, rather than 
assuming the ‘facts of reason’ a priori (as Kant does), would show how they 
are “engendered immanently from reason alone as the necessary modes of 
its manifestation”.611 Such a method “requires the positing of a principle of 
difference in order to function … [since] it is difference that constitutes the 
genetic condition of real thought”.612  
Bergson’s role in Deleuze’s response to Maimon’s critique is by no 
means limited to the Cinema books, and lies in the very roots of the Deleuzian 
philosophical project. As Pearson points out, Bergson’s importance to 
Deleuze was from the start tied to Deleuze’s “effort to radicalise the post-
Kantian project commenced by Solomon Maimon … [and] to pass from a 
transcendental philosophy to a genetic one”.613 Indeed, we can trace this 
theme of genesis back to “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” itself, where it 
                                                
609 As Smith puts it, the “two demands laid down by Maimon – the search for the genetic elements of 
real experience and the positing of a principle of difference as the fulfilment of this condition – could be 
said to be the two primary components of what Deleuze came to call his transcendental empiricism”. 
Essays on Deleuze, 238. Emphasis in original. 
610 Ibid., 111. 
611 Ibid. 
612 Ibid. 
613 Pearson, "Beyond the Human Condition," 58. 
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plays a role which is on the one hand indirect (in its relation to Kant) and 
utterly foundational (in its relation to the underlying principles of Deleuzian 
thought). The treatment offered in that essay of the relation between internal 
and external difference constitutes a genetic account of external difference, 
whereby it is ‘deduced’ from internal difference insofar as the former is a 
‘product’ of the differing from itself of internal difference all the way to external 
difference. As we have seen, this pattern is pervasive in Deleuze’s work, so 
much so that it might be called the ur-form of Deleuzian logic. 
It should be no surprise then that Deleuze’s return to Bergson in the 
Cinema books should also entail a return to this theme of genesis. Deleuze’s 
deduction of perception-, action- and affection-images as products of a 
centred perspective on acentred universal variation must be understood in 
this context as the application of just such a genetic method. In particular, it 
offers itself as a genetic account of the human, and of the limits of the intellect 
in relation to the being of difference, that is nevertheless deduced on the basis 
of that being. Thus we can see that the emphasis Deleuze places in Cinema 1 
on the necessity of deducing the cinematographic illusion, rather than simply 
describing or asserting it, is a direct response to the demand for a genetic 
account of the human and of human thought.  
But the ‘facts of reason’ that can be derived from this genesis are those 
of the dogmatic image of thought and the indirect image of time imposed by 
the cinematographic illusion. As such, the genesis of the human and of 
human thought in difference is obscured, suppressed, hidden behind that 
illusion. It is only with the stripping away of this mask that time as the form of 
change and as a principle of difference reveals itself to thought. In terms of 
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this Bergsonian reformulation of Kant, the spontaneity of the ‘I think’, of 
thought as an active power, is cinematographic thought. It is an illusion that 
masks from thought the passivity of the ‘I’ that changes under the force of 
time. But where that power fails, this passivity begins to surface: the ‘facts of 
reason’ proper to the ‘I think’ are exposed to their genetic condition, to time as 
change, to the differing of being from itself. The ‘affection of self by self’ is 
precisely the experience of the exposure of the ‘I think’ to the passivity of the 
‘I’ subject to time as change (to self-differing difference) as its very condition. 
The ‘I think’ here remains, but all that remains for it to think is its own absence 
from itself and the incapacity of its thought. In other words, the reversal 
enacted in Beckett’s ‘reverse proof’ is nothing other than the ‘great Kantian 
reversal’, offered here not as a moment in the history of philosophy, but as the 
drama of thought itself in its struggle to think. 
As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, the terms of relation 
between the classical and modern cinemas articulated by the totalisation of 
the whole are such that the thought of the modern cinema is given in terms of 
the impossibility of thought. In other words, the affection of self by self, and 
thus the crack in thought effected in the Kantian reversal of the relation of 
movement and time, must therefore be characteristic not only of the break 
between classical and modern cinemas, but of the modern cinema itself. This 
experience of thought no longer as power one possesses, but as an 
incapacity or suffering one undergoes, is precisely what Deleuze finds in 
Antonin Artaud’s conception of the cinema, which he argues prefigures that of 
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the modern cinema, despite originating in the 1920s.614 Artaud, he says, 
argues that the image “has as its object the functioning of thought, and that 
the functioning of thought is also the real subject that brings us back to 
images”.615  
In this Artaud shares a superficial similarity with Eisenstein, but where 
the latter attributes to montage the power of thinking the whole (as montage 
idea,) and expressing that idea in images (internal monologue) Artaud 
‘overturns’ the totality of cinema-thought relations such that “on the one hand 
there is no longer a whole which is thinkable through montage, on the other 
hand there is no longer an internal monologue utterable through image”.616 
Far from thought thinking the whole under the shock of montage, for him this 
shock takes the form of a fundamental dissociation or dislocation of images 
and of thought, a delinking which in which the “spiritual automaton has 
become the Mummy, this dismantled, paralysed, petrified, frozen instance 
which testifies to ‘the impossibility of thinking that is thought’”.617 This, 
according to Delueze, is what Artaud ‘recognises’ as 
the real subject-object of the cinema. What cinema advances 
is not the power of thought, but its ‘impower’, and thought 
                                                
614 Deleuze notes that Artaud rejects as a dead end both abstract experimental and classical narrative 
cinema (both of which were developing in the 1920s as Artaud was working through his ideas on 
cinema). In this he shares a certain commonality with Deleuze. As we’ve seen, the latter finds the 
experimental cinema of only minor relevance to his project in the Cinema books (notwithstanding the 
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cinema constructs. Cinema 2, 165. 
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has never had any other problem … [than] this difficulty of 
being, this powerlessness at the heart of thought.618 
Where Eisenstein sees in the cinema a means of constructing “the 
sensory-motor relationship between world and man, nature and thought”619 
that gives the whole to thought and expresses it in thought, for Artaud, the 
brain’s “innermost reality is not the Whole, but on the contrary a fissure, a 
crack”.620 This constitutes a precise formulation of the ‘fractured I’ of the 
Kantian reversal and of the ‘affection of self by self’, or thought as the 
suffering of time (despite the fact that Kantian philosophy is most certainly not 
what is at stake here for Artaud). Thus:  
It might be said that Artaud turns round Eisenstein’s 
argument: if it is true that thought depends on a shock which 
gives birth to it (the nerve, brain matter), it can only think one 
thing, the fact that we are not thinking, the powerlessness to 
think the whole and to think oneself, thought which is always 
fossilized, dislocated, collapsed. 621 
Deleuze notes that “A being of thought which is always to come is what 
Heidegger discovered in universal form, but it is what Artaud lived as the most 
singular problem, his own problem.”622 That is to say, where Heidegger 
approaches this problem at a distance, abstractly and via (existential) 
analysis, for Artaud it concerns ‘his own’ lived experience, even if that 
experience is one of a fundamental dislocation of ‘himself’ and of thought, the 
anguish of which he describes as an “absence like a gap, a kind of cold, 
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619 Ibid., 163. 
620 Ibid., 167. 
621 Ibid. 
622 Ibid.  
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imageless suffering, without feeling”.623 To the extent that Heidegger places 
this experience at a distance as an object of his thought, he remains on the 
side of the illusory spontaneity of the ‘I think’ (he chooses to think about the 
impossibility of thought, but does not suffer it, does not suffer the thought 
which is not his own to think in him). It is the illusion of spontaneity that must 
be fractured for thought to think, even if all that is then left to thought is its own 
impossibility. It must be given as experience, not abstraction (that is, under 
the condition of real, rather than possible experience).  
The limits of Heidegger’s approach are simply those of the 
cinematographic limits of thought and language. Artaud’s poetry takes the 
form of language, to be sure − Deleuze’s treatment of Artaud draws heavily 
on Blanchot’s account of the famous correspondence between Artaud and 
Jacques Rivière concerning Artaud’s poems624 − but it is precisely the failure 
of those poems to think and to think the impossibility of thought, despite or as 
his anguish, that opens them onto the crack in thought and in the brain.625 The 
value of the cinema insofar as it approaches this territory is that it does so 
without abstraction, in strictly concrete terms as image and in the relation 
between images (that is to say, montage).  
Thus where Beckett achieves the ‘affection of self by self’ by means of 
the elimination of perception and action, the cinema of the time-image does 
so by means of their delinking. With the modern cinema, montage no longer 
                                                
623 Quoted in Blanchot, The Book to Come, 36. 
624Ibid., 34−40. 
625 And as his notorious translation of Lewis Carroll’s Jabberwocky demonstrates, Artaud’s struggle to 
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constitutes itself as a gap that is crossed, no longer constructs a link and 
continuity between images that can be extended all the way to an Idea of the 
world as totality. The centre no longer holds and the aberration of movement 
returns to the cinema, not in the form of a world without man, but as man’s 
experience of the absence of both the world and himself, the affection of self 
by self: 
It is here that the reversal is produced: movement is no 
longer simply aberrant, aberration is now valid in itself and 
designates time as its direct cause. 'Time is out of joint': it is 
off the hinges assigned to it by behaviour in the world, but 
also by movements of world.626 
The ‘fractured I’ or ‘crack in the brain’ thus appears in the modern cinema in 
the form of the interstice, or ‘irrational cut', that opens up between images 
once they are no longer constrained by sensory-motor schemata, a crack 
which swallows both world and thought. Under these conditions:  
the cinematographic image … carries out a suspension of 
the world or affects the visible with a disturbance, which far 
from making thought visible, as Eisenstein wanted, are on 
the contrary directed to what does not let itself be thought in 
thought, and equally to what does not let itself be seen in 
vision.627 
With this suspension of the world, it is not just the ‘I’ that is fractured, it is the 
relationship between world and man, man and world itself. In or for the 
cinema of the time-image, the human is no longer an agent of action in a field 
                                                
626 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 41. 
627 Deleuze attributes this formulation to Jean-Louis Schefer. Ibid., 168. Emphasis in original. 
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of possibility, but a ‘seer’, “prey to a vision, pursued by it or pursuing it, rather 
than engaged in an action”.628  
If we can now justify the correlation of Beckett’s elimination of perception 
and affection-images with the collapse of sensory-motor schemata, and the 
‘affection of self by self’ with the ‘great Kantian reversal’ that gives rise to the 
classical cinema, there nevertheless remains the problem of history. As I’ve 
argued, if we locate the war and its attendant horrors as the concrete 
expression of the totalisation of the whole expressed in the classical cinema’s 
articulation of cinematographic thought, we risk characterising those horrors 
as the direct result of that totalisation. We would then be left with the absurd 
and repugnant conclusion that the Holocaust could somehow be deduced on 
the basis of the powers of thought or cinema alone. We might justly reject this 
proposition and argue instead that the war, fascism, the death camps are the 
cause of thought’s exposure to its own limits, and of the break between the 
classical and modern cinemas. However, to do so would be to act as if this 
exposure, this break, were a consequence, a reflection or representation of 
those events, and thus to subject the powers of both thought and cinema to a 
strictly external determination (that of the world historical events ‘outside’ 
both, which the they are said to reflect or respond to). In other words, it would 
reduce both to a mere reflection or representation of world historical events.  
To resolve this twofold problem, we must turn once more to Kant and to 
the ‘great reversal’ he effects within philosophy. This reversal is a historical 
event: it takes place as a moment in history, and particularly the history of 
philosophy: Kant is sitting at his desk one day, has an idea and writes it down. 
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This is the spontaneity of the ‘I think’ acting in history and ‘making history’, 
and thus an articulation of thought as a power we (or in this case, Kant) 
possess. But what he thinks is this: the ‘fractured I’, thought not as 
spontaneity, but as a suffering of time. The reversal of the relation of time and 
movement that Kant thinks at this moment in history dislocates both history as 
linear progression and thought as power. This event of thought disrupts both 
philosophy (and especially the history of philosophy) and the spontaneity of 
thought proper to the philosopher who thinks it. It comes as no surprise then 
that “Kant shrank away from the consequences of his discovery”,629 as 
Rodowick puts it. However, Deleuze’s Bergsonian/cinematic reformulation of 
the Kantian project can, I think, be read as an attempt to follow through what 
Kant shies away from, by showing how both history and the spontaneity of 
thought and their dislocation can be deduced in genetic terms on the basis of 
the self-differing difference of being As such this ‘Bergsonian/cinematic 
reformulation’ bears directly on Deleuze’s genetic and Maimonian 
reformulation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. 
Deleuze begins, of course, by deducing not the ‘fractured I’ or the 
reversal, but rather the human as centred perspective on acentred universal 
variation. The cinematographic condition of human being or human nature is 
such that it lives in and thinks the world as a field of action in which time is 
experienced as a passage from one moment to the next, a causal and linear 
chain of action and reaction. In other words, the mode of existence of the 
human as cinematographic is historical: we live ‘in’ history, as agents of 
history. Deleuze is thus able to account for ‘history’ and ‘the historical’ not in 
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the form of the events of history as such, but rather as a mode of existence 
deduced from and on the basis of difference. Moreover, this mode of 
existence is inextricably intertwined with the (illusory) spontaneity of the ‘I 
think’: the spontaneity of thought (thought as a power we possess) is a 
product of the cinematographic condition of the human. That is to say, the 
spontaneity of the ‘I think’ only appears as a possibility, or as possibility, on 
the basis of the subordination of time to movement and thus as a moment in 
history itself. Here the sense of Deleuze’s claim that the Cinema books do not 
constitute a history of the cinema becomes clear: insofar as ‘history’ plays a 
role therein, it does so in the form of a deduction of the historical as a product 
of the cinematographic genesis of the human.  
Likewise, if the cinema recapitulates the history of philosophy, this is not 
because it reflects or represents that history: the spiritual automaton of the 
cinema enters into the movement of actualisation, of the genesis of the 
human and of human thought and philosophy by its own means and as a 
consequence of its own powers. History (including that of philosophy), and a 
grasp of the world in terms of history, is a product of the cinematographic 
human condition, of a world constructed in causal terms. Non-human cinema 
may dramatise or enter into that historical movement by its own means, but 
those means are non-cinematographic in essence. As such, they are non-
historical, even if the products of cinema enter into history as a series of 
events in historical time − this or that film released in particular year, watched 
at a certain day and time in a particular cinema, and written about by a given 
author, whose words are read by someone else at some later date.  
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As Brenez puts it, the cinema exists “not as a simple reflection, the 
redoubling of something that already existed, but as the emergence of a 
visionary critical activity”630 and thus as an exemplar of the ‘metaphysical 
auscultation’ or ‘diagnostic power’ that Bergson and Deleuze respectively 
attribute to art in general. If the cinema is indeed such an activity, it is 
because its deduction of the human, and of the relation between man and 
world it explores in its diverse modes, constitutes the production not just of an 
experimental brain or brains, but also of experimental worlds (even when 
those worlds are ones of totality and closure). The products of the cinema and 
of the philosophical and ontological speculation they recapitulate neither 
cause nor represent the world, but envision it: if those visions bear on the 
historical world in which we live and act, it is only because they are deduced 
and constructed on the same basis as that world – on the basis of real 
difference as the genetic condition of experience. 
The outcomes of these arguments are twofold. We can now see that the 
exposure to being that Beckett constructs by means of the reduction of the 
human to the experience of ‘the affection of self by self’ is reflected in terms 
valid for the whole of cinema, in terms of the collapse of sensory-motor 
schemata that precipitate the break between classical and modern cinemas. 
The gap between the two is constituted in terms of the fracturing of the 
spontaneity of thought under the force of time as change, given as the 
exposure to death as the human experience of the real difference of being. 
Furthermore, we can show that Deleuze’s cinematic account of the trajectory 
of human thought towards its own fracture is able to deduce the historical 
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mode of existence (and not the events of history as such) without being 
subject to strictly external historical determinations and thus reduced to a 
reflection or representation of the events of history. 
But if the events of history cannot account for the trajectory of thought 
towards its own fracture − if it is not the experience of the war as such that 
exposes thought to the consequences of its totalising tendencies, nor the 
Holocaust that reveals the limits of cinematographic human thought in and as 
death – then what does? We must account for this trajectory and this 
exposure strictly in terms of the powers of thought itself, as derived from its 
cinematographic genesis. And since it is through the formal capacities of the 
cinema as such that Deleuze demonstrates this genesis and these powers, 
we must therefore do so in terms of these formal capacities alone. In other 
words rather than the history of the cinema reflecting or expressing the war 
and its attendant horrors, that horror must be in some sense be found internal 
to the cinema, envisioned by it independent of the historical events of the 
world, and as a product of the cinema’s own formal properties. The cinema 
must come face to face with ‘death, immobility, blackness’ on terms internal to 
it, and as a consequence of those terms. 
7.3 “The Image, the Remains” 
The key to this task lies in montage itself, and in the consequences of its 
organisation within the classical cinema according to sensory-motor 
schemata. That is to say, it is in terms of such schemata that cinematographic 
human being must be confronted with or exposed to its own limit or boundary 
in or as death. We can start by noting Deleuze’s claim that the cinema of the 
movement-image “was from the beginning linked to the organisation of war, 
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state propaganda, ordinary fascism” not only historically, but as a function of 
its own essence.631 He extends this claim on the basis of the thesis of Paul 
Virilio’s War and Cinema, which agues that technologies of perception are 
necessarily technologies of war, since for something to become a target it 
must first of all be seen.632 In consequence, Deleuze says, “the system of war 
mobilises perception as much as arms and actions: thus photo and cinema 
pass through war and are coupled together with arms”.633  
This not only means that the space of conflict presents a veritable 
theatre of mise en scène and counter-mise en scène, which seeks to hide or 
reveal, display or dissemble the image as a (real or potential) target, but that 
the exercise of power and control in its broadest sense is tied essentially to 
visibility. You can’t shoot, control or master what you can’t see. Virilio cites 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty: “The problem of knowing who is the subject of the 
state and war will be of exactly the same kind as the problem of knowing who 
is the subject of perception”.634 This means not only that the subject of the 
state must be visible to the state if they are to be subjected, but that that 
control itself is exercised in and as the visible. For Deleuze, fascist Germany 
constitutes a key figure of this system of the visible: 
it is the whole of civil life which passes into the mode of the 
mise-en-scène, in the fascist system: ‘real power is 
henceforth shared between the logistics of arms and that of 
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images and sounds’; and, to the very end, Goebbels dreamt 
of going beyond Hollywood.635 
This ‘fascism of images’ means not only that every subject is a target, but that 
the organisation of images (Virilio’s ‘logistics of perception’) renders ‘civil life’ 
as indiscernible from the organisation of war. But if the cinema is indeed 
linked essentially, and not just historically, to the organisation of war from its 
beginning, it is not enough account for this link in terms of a merely historical 
example (in this case, that of the ‘cinematic’ organisation of relations of state 
and subject in fascist Germany). Rather, it must be justified at the level of film 
form itself, in terms of the powers of frame, shot and montage and the 
composition of images they effect. 
If, as Virilio suggests, ‘to see’ is merely a point along a trajectory towards 
‘to kill’, then the proto-cinematic technology of Étienne-Jules Marey’s 
chronophotographic rifle of 1892 serves as a figure for this violence at the 
heart of the cinema, as both “precursor of the Lumière brothers’ camera and 
direct descendent of the Colt revolvers and cylindrical guns”.636 In it, the 
technological apparatus of seeing (the camera) and killing (the rifle) are fused 
in a pre-figuration of the motion picture camera (insofar as its capacity to 
capture a sequence of images in rapid succession gives rise to a pre-
cinematic analogue of the twenty-four frames a second captured by the 
motion picture camera). In fusing ‘to see’ with ‘to kill’, it poses the line of flight 
of the bullet as a figure for the classical cinema’s organisation of images into a 
system of action and reaction whose principle of organisation is that of death. 
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The perception of the camera, its point of view or perspective, inscribes the 
line of flight of the bullet as it speeds towards its victim, such that the 
perspective so constructed is the organisation of a space of action as much 
as it is one of perception. 
Massumi points out in his translation of Thousand Plateaus that, in the 
context of the system of perspective associated with Renaissance painting, a 
‘line of flight’ (or ligne de fuite) refers to the lines of perspective converging 
towards a painting’s vanishing point, its point de fuite or ‘point of flight’.637 A 
line of flight, in this sense, is a principle of organisation that determines 
relations between elements as coherent; it keeps things quite literally ‘in 
proportion’. If the bullet's line of flight is thus also a line of perspective, then its 
vanishing point, its point of flight, is the bullet-raddled body of its victim; 
gunman and prey are joined in a perspectival system, which, as much as it 
determines a scheme of vision, also determines a scheme of action and 
reaction: I shoot, you die. Thus where the Renaissance system of spatial 
perspective maintains a proportionality of perception within a single image, 
the cinema seeks to maintain the coherence and proportion between 
perception and action, across multiple shots and angles: “Perception is 
organised in obstacles and distances to be crossed, while action invents the 
means to cross and surmount them”.638  
It is in this sense that the line of flight of a bullet is a line of perspective; it 
determines the relation between a perception-image (the view through the 
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gun sight) that gives the distance to be crossed, and an action-image (the 
firing of the gun) as the invention of the means to cross that distance. But 
where the perspectival system of painting produces an indirect image of 
spatial depth as a function of size (large things are nearer than things that are 
far away), the coherence of the classical cinema lies in the fact that it 
organises the plane of movement-images into an indirect image of time as a 
function of movement or, as Deleuze says, a temporal perspective.639 The line 
of flight of the bullet is the articulation of a passage of time, an orderly causal 
procession from one moment to the next, one present to the next, so that the 
coherence of action and reaction from one shot to the next is temporal rather 
than spatial. You live, and then you die, in that order.640  
The line of flight of the bullet thus serves as a figure for the sensory-
motor organisation of images and for the cinematic dramatisation of the 
causal/historical mode of existence. The purpose of this sensory-motor mode 
of organisation is precisely to maintain the coherence of the relations between 
images – to ward off the aberration of movement – by constraining the 
disruptive force of time as change to a linear temporal perspective. The 
narrative space of the classical cinema, in its widest sense as the organisation 
of the space and time of action, is determined and organised in relation to the 
corpse that is the bullet’s point of flight. As the point to which all lines of 
perspective flow, the vanishing point, the corpse, is a principle of 
determination, orienting all possible relations between images in relation to 
that point and delimiting them as a function of it.  
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Of course, just as the vanishing point of a painting does not appear in 
that painting, but rather ‘behind’ it (and even then virtually) the ‘corpse as 
vanishing point’ does not refer to any specific image of violence or death that 
might appear on screen. Rather, it serves as both limit and principle of 
coherence. The line of flight of the bullet and the corpse towards which it flies 
thus offers a figure for the organising principle of a romantic comedy as much 
as a western or a war film (that is to say, for the classical cinema in its 
entirety) insofar as the action each presents is equally organised in sensory-
motor terms as a causal series of action and reaction.  
It’s also worth noting that Deleuze and Guattari insist that the 
proportionality of images that the spatial perspective of a painting organises 
does not represent a pre-existing spatial order, but rather constructs it: “Lines 
of flight as perspective lines, far from being made to represent depth, 
themselves invent the possibility of such a representation”.641 This invention of 
depth is by the same measure the invention of a world ordered or constructed 
in spatial terms (the world of the painting), in the same way sense that the 
classical cinema ‘invents’ the temporal order that constructs its worlds as 
coherent spaces of action and reaction.  
Moreover, what we find with the spatial perspective constructed in 
painting is that this construction is also and unavoidably the construction of 
the eye to and for which that world is given. Imagine a rectangular canvas 
with a line drawn from each corner towards the vanishing point which lies 
behind it; now extend those lines in the other direction, ‘proceeding’ in front of 
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the canvas, rather than receding behind: the eye/I of the viewer constructed 
by the painting lies at the point where those lines intersect. The vanishing 
point towards which a painting’s lines of perspective recede, which maintains 
the coherence of the spatial depth so constructed, is thus mirrored on the ‘far’ 
side of the image plane in the eye/I of an ideal viewer, in relation to whom the 
ordering of space effected in the image is constructed. The effect of this is, as 
John Berger points out, to centre:  
everything on the eye of the beholder … Perspective makes 
the single eye the centre of the visible world. Everything 
converges on to the eye as to the vanishing point of infinity. 
The visible world is arranged for the spectator as the 
universe was once thought to be arranged for God.642 
The cinema repeats this same dynamic in terms not of space, but of time. In 
the system of temporal perspective organised by the classical cinema, the 
vanishing point of that perspective is mirrored in the genesis of the human as 
a centre of action. With this genesis, the world is organised around and in 
relation to the human as a centre of perception and action, just as the spatial 
perspective of painting ‘centres everything on the eye of the beholder’. Thus 
this genesis constitutes the mirror image of corpse as vanishing point, such 
that genesis and corpse exist in or as a condition of mutual presupposition (all 
that lives must die, and only those that die will have lived). 
The bullet’s line of flight and the corpse towards which it flies should thus 
be understood as serving to maintain or, more properly, restore or construct a 
properly human temporal order and continuity of perception and action within 
the cinema. Unlike the images of natural perception, those of the cinema are 
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divorced from any centre of perception and thus lacking in any common scale 
or principle of organisation, and so inherently aberrant. Sensory-motor 
schemata (figured as a linear temporal perspective) serve to re-establish this 
lost proportion in a new mode or level, restoring normality to aberrant 
movement and coherence to perception and action in relation to their point de 
fuite. Deleuze notes that “Time as progression derives from the movement-
image or successive shots. But time as unity or as totality depends on 
montage which still relates it back to movement or to the succession of 
shots”.643 This mutual presupposition of succession and totality is simply the 
‘sensory-motor unity of man and world’.  
As I’ve argued, this unity is articulated in the classical cinema in terms of 
an Idea of the world derived on the basis of sensory-motor schemata, which in 
turn justifies and assures the coherence and effectiveness of our action in and 
on the world. In doing so, it construes the whole as a closed totality in which 
action finds its principle of coherence in stillness and death: the unity of man 
and world, of the one and the many in the figure of the corpse (the mass 
graves and the ovens). What the figure of the line of flight of the bullet as a 
line of temporal perspective, and the corpse as its vanishing point, brings out 
is that this unity, this death, is a function of the indirect image of time 
constructed by the classical cinema. The montage Idea of the world as closed 
totality (the deathly stillness of Hegelian finality/fatality) is not a reproduction 
of the world, but neither is it the constitution of an autonomous world; it is the 
production or creation of the world as an object of our thought and subject of 
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our action. This is what we find figured in the corpse, as the organising 
principle or vanishing point of the bullet’s line of flight. 
To suggest that the corpse serves to orient or determine the world as 
something which is both at our disposal and subject to our comprehension is 
simply to reiterate Blanchot’s proposition that “as contemporary philosophies 
would have it, comprehension and knowing in man are linked to what we call 
finitude”644 and that this finitude is given us by death as a border which 
delimits life and its world, and orients the passage of life’s time in relation to 
that border. The corpse, as the organising and orienting principle of a 
sensory-motor schema is in this sense an image of action as mastery and of 
thought as a power at our disposal. But where, Blanchot asks:  
is the finish? Granted, it is taken in or understood as the 
possibility which is death. But it is also ‘taken back’ by this 
possibility, inasmuch as in death the possibility which is 
death dies too.645  
We can recognise in this the same paradox located via Derrida in relation to 
the exposure to death constructed in Beckett’s Film.646 But where Beckett 
constructs this relation to death through the elimination of perception and 
action-images, and the reduction of the human to the ‘terror’ of the affection of 
self by self, here (with the figure of the corpse as vanishing point) ‘death, 
immobility, blackness’ are embedded in, derived from, the system of the 
classical cinema itself, in and as its formal principle of organisation. The 
corpse as vanishing point is that which organises the images of that cinema 
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into a coherent temporal perspective, and towards which it moves in time (to 
live is to move, step by step, towards death). The Idea of the whole as totality 
derived from such schemata reveals the boundaries that determine the world 
of living action and give it its coherence as those of death (“‘behind’ the image 
[at the vanishing point] there was nothing to be seen but concentration 
camps”647). It implies that, at the literal unifying point of the sensory-motor 
schema (its vanishing point), there is an absence: the corpse not as a figure 
of death as the sovereign power of the negative, but as the ‘impossibility of 
possibility' itself. The unity of the open whole, which is constitutive of a world 
in which one knows how to act and react, rests finally on a gap, a “hole in 
appearances”648 opening onto the indeterminate, interminable presence of 
absence which corresponds to what Blanchot refers to as the “outside”. 
Blanchot says of the ‘cadaverous presence’ that death:  
suspends the relation to place, even though the deceased 
rests heavily in his spot as if upon the only basis that is left to 
him. To be precise, this basis lacks, the place is missing, the 
corpse is not in its place. Where is it? It is not here, and yet it 
is not anywhere else. Nowhere? But then nowhere is here. 
The cadaverous presence establishes a relation between 
here and nowhere.649  
It is precisely this relation between here and nowhere that is to be found at the 
vanishing point: the presence of absence, the ‘suspension of the world’ 
nevertheless present as an image in the world.  
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Blanchot makes his comments on the corpse, and the ambivalence of its 
relation to the space it occupies in a short essay titled “The Two Versions of 
the Imaginary”.650 The first version in question grasps the image as the “life 
giving negation”651 of the thing, which places that thing at thought’s disposal 
and thus subject to our mastery. Insofar as the corpse bears on such an 
image, it is as a figure of finitude, of closure and totalisation, and thus “a 
formidable resource, reason’s fecund power”.652 The second version of the 
imaginary, and of the image, which haunts the first as its indivisible double, is 
precisely that which withdraws this ‘fecund power’ and leaves both action and 
thought bereft, disoriented, adrift.  
The corpse that lies before us is, in this sense, infinitely far from the 
individual we once knew, despite being nothing other than that same person. 
In many respects it is the collapse of all the possibilities that once expanded 
before them, of the world organised around them as a space of actions and 
things at one’s disposal. This corpse “is neither the same person who was 
alive, nor is it any other person, nor is it anything else”.653 It is in this sense 
that Blanchot tells us that “the mourned deceased begins to resemble 
himself”.654 Inasmuch as himself is no longer, all that remains is the cadaver, 
which is not him and yet is nothing else. All that remains, all that his remains 
are, is the resemblance, the image of himself. Thus: 
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The corpse is a reflection becoming master of the life it 
reflects − absorbing it, identifying substantively with it by 
moving it from its use value and from its truth value to 
something incredible - something neutral which there is no 
getting used to ... It is the likeness, like to an absolute 
degree, overwhelming and marvelous. But what is it like? 
Nothing.655 
The image, in this sense, is that which “threatens constantly to relegate us, 
not to the absent thing, but to its absence as presence, to the neutral double 
of the object in which all belonging to the world is dissipated”.656 
Blanchot likens it to the way a damaged tool ceases to be subsumed 
into its function and becomes its own image, insofar as it appears for itself 
rather than for its use or engagement with the world. Since it no longer refers 
or is referred to the world as a place of action, in its appearing as image there 
is no possibility of a response, an action or reaction by it or to it; the image is 
passive, indifferent, neutral. Moreover, inasmuch as the image is withdrawn or 
detached from what Blanchot calls “Practical life and the accomplishment of 
true tasks”,657 it is also withdrawn from any system of signification or meaning; 
it floats anonymous, indifferent, existing or more properly appearing solely for 
itself, with neither connection nor relation nor reference. The corpse 
establishes a relation between here and nowhere: appearing before us as its 
own image and yet infinitely or absolutely distant, it presses against us with 
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“the gaping intimacy of an undifferentiated nowhere which must nevertheless 
be located here”.658  
What is essential in Blanchot’s account is that these two versions of the 
image appear in the corpse as the same and single image. The name ‘image’ 
pertains to both versions in equal measure and neither can they be separated. 
Moreover, although it is the corpse that serves as his figure for the image, the 
‘two versions of the imaginary’ in question describe the condition of the image 
as such, and not merely that of the corpse. This doubling or duplicity of the 
image is the condition of its appearing, and appears with and as the image: 
It is as if the choice between death as understanding’s 
possibility and death as the horror of impossibility had also to 
be the choice between sterile truth and the prolixity of the 
non-true. It is as if comprehension were linked to penury and 
horror to fecundity.659 
Hence the ambivalence of the figure of the corpse which is the vanishing point 
of the bullet’s line of flight: on the one hand, as a figure of finitude, it puts the 
image at our disposal as a tool; it is a figure of thought as a power man 
possesses, and through which he possesses the world. Despite all this, 
however, the corpse is, on the other hand, precisely that which has ceased to 
be a thing, to be anything; no longer attached to or engaged with the world of 
action and reaction, the corpse is abandoned to the pure passivity of the 
image, dislocated from any system of signification, meaning or truth. It is the 
pure appearing of the image for itself, rather than for us, outside of all other 
reference, but nevertheless as an image, as an appearing within the 
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phenomenal world of man’s action in terms that disrupt, destabilise, disfigure 
the possibility of that action. Indeed, what is essential in it is that it be an 
experience, a presence: the presence of absence, the experience of nothing 
taking place, taking our place, and any place or basis on which we might act 
or respond. To ‘live an event as image’ is: 
is to be taken: to pass from the region of the real where we 
hold ourselves at a distance from things the better to order 
and use them into that other region where the distance holds 
us … It keeps us outside; it makes of this outside a presence 
where ‘I’ does not recognize itself.660 
Both time as passage and time as the form of change appear in and as the 
same ‘vanishing point’. The living move step by step towards death, but their 
death, as their own, is impossible, “‘taken back’ by this possibility, inasmuch 
as in death the possibility which is death dies too”.661 
But if the genesis of the human as a centred perspective on acentred 
universal variation is the ‘mirror image’ and presupposition of the corpse as 
vanishing point, this means that that centre, and that perspective, are given 
no less equally in relation to the corpse as a figure of the interminable, of 
prolixity and horror, the decentring of all centres: that which works to “efface 
the living truth proper to every place and make it equivalent to the absolute 
neutrality of death”.662 The foundation of our action, our condition of 
possibility, the constitution of ourselves as a centre, has as its immanent 
double unfounding, impossibility, dislocation; the spontaneity of the ‘I think’ is 
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irremediably fractured, appearing to and for itself as pure passivity, the 
suffering of time. Thought as a power we possess is hollowed out by a 
thought outside itself, and an unthought within thought. In the Cinema books, 
Deleuze calls this doubling or duplicity of the image in or as the single and 
same image the crystal-image, “the most fundamental operation of time”.663 
No doubt this claim requires some unpacking. The acentred universal 
variation of being is what Bergson calls ‘pure recollection’ or ‘pure past’, which 
exists for itself as pure virtuality.664 This is, as Rodowick puts it, the primary 
form of time, time in its pure state.665 The actual, on the other hand, “is always 
a present”.666 The problem lies, of course, in how the present becomes the 
past, unless it is always and already in the past at the same time it is present 
in or as the present. Thus: 
the image has to be present and past, still present and 
already past, at once and at the same time. If it was not 
already past at the same time as present, the present would 
never pass on. The past does not follow the present that it is 
no longer, it coexists with the present it was. The present is 
the actual image, and its contemporaneous past is the virtual 
image, the image in the mirror.667 
‘The present’ is thus given as a split or fracture; on one side, the present as 
actual, which is constantly replaced or renewed as a present opening onto the 
future which is not yet; on the other the present which passes and is 
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preserved in and as the (virtual) past. Deleuze describes it as a splitting of 
time into “two dissymmetrical jets, one of which makes all the presents pass 
on [the actual], while the other preserves all the past [the virtual]. Time 
consists of this split, and it is this, it is time that we see in the crystal-
image”.668 What is essential here, however, is that these two ‘states’ of the 
present (that which passes and that which is preserved) cannot be 
distinguished from each other. Time as passage, and time as the form of 
change are indiscernible, indistinguishable, unassignable as actual and 
virtual. This is the crystal-image, the ‘genetic element of opsigns:669  
the point of indiscernibility of the two distinct images, the 
actual and the virtual … a bit of time in the pure state, the 
very distinction between the two which keeps on 
reconstituting itself.670 
Deleuze also makes it clear that the crystal-image corresponds directly 
to the ‘fractured I’ and the affection of self by self that ‘appears’ in and with the 
Kantian reversal of the relation of movement and time: “The actual is always 
objective, but the virtual is subjective … time itself, pure virtuality which 
divides itself in two as affector and affected, ‘the affection of self by self as 
definition of time”.671 The indiscernibility of time as passage and time as the 
form of change (the corpse as finitude and the corpse as dislocation or 
decentring) is such that the spontaneity of the ‘I think’ experiences its own 
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thought as something “exercised in it and upon it but not by it”.672 As Bergson 
describes it:  
Whoever becomes conscious of the continual duplicating of 
his present into perception and memory [the present which 
passes, and the present which is preserved] … will compare 
himself to an actor playing his part automatically, listening to 
himself and beholding himself play.673 
Under these circumstances, the ‘I think’ is given to itself as the experience of 
the failure of thought to think, as the suffering of something outside itself 
which nevertheless can only be located inside the self, as the affection of self 
by self: “what forces us to think is the ‘inpower of thought,’ the figure of 
nothingness, the inexistence of a whole which could be thought”.674  
Insofar as the cinema of the time-image finds its genesis in this cracked 
or fractured ‘I’, the spiritual automaton or experimental brain of the cinema is 
no longer (as in the classical cinema) constituted in the causal and rational 
linking of images or thoughts which follow each other in their place (‘if this 
image, then this, then this,’ extended, even if only hypothetically, to the whole 
as totality). It offers instead the delinking of images and the irrational cuts 
which divides those images as much as it joins them (this image and this 
image and this image ...). The modern cinema thus constitutes thought as that 
which “seizes [thought] from the outside, as the unthinkable in thought … It is 
the spiritual automatism of images which produces from the outside a thought 
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which it imposes, as the unthinkable in our intellectual automatism”.675 This 
constitutes an entirely new sense of relation between man and world, nature 
and man. Where for the classical cinema the whole was the open (even if it 
was constrained or limited the whole as totality), for the modern cinema the 
whole is the outside:  
The whole undergoes a mutation, because it has ceased to 
be One-Being, in order to become the constitutive ‘and’ of 
things … The whole thus merges with that Blanchot calls 
force of ‘dispersal of the Outside’, or ‘the vertigo of spacing’: 
that void which is no longer a motor part of the image, and 
which the image would cross in order to continue, but is the 
radical calling into question of the image.676 
The indiscernibility of the two versions of the imaginary, of the mutual 
presupposition of centre and vanishing point on the one hand, and that 
vanishing point as the dislocation of action, self and thought on the other, thus 
means that:  
What Blanchot diagnoses everywhere in literature is 
particularly clear in cinema: on the on hand the presence of 
an unthinkable in thought, which would be both its source 
and barrier; on the other hand, the presence to infinity of 
another thinker in the thinker, who shatters every monologue 
of a thinking self.677 
It is in these terms that the impossibility of reading the two volumes of 
the Cinema books, either together or apart, as coherent or incoherent is to be 
accounted for simultaneously in terms of film form, of the powers of thought, 
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and in terms of both world and film history. The ‘great reversal’ of the relation 
of movement and time (in philosophy as in cinema) exists as an event in 
history (Kant at his desk, the war and the horrors of the camps). But in this 
reversal, history, and the events of history, are unfounded, dislocated, 
disordered, such that in its happening the eventuality of the reversal cannot 
happen, does not happen. There is no history there where this reversal is: the 
disaster, “advent of what does not happen, of what would come without 
arriving”678 (the disaster, the outside: two of the “names of thought, when it 
lets itself come undone”679).  
The relation between the Cinema books themselves constitutes a 
crystal-image in which the tension between the classical cinema’s indirect 
image of time (time as causality, as history) and the modern cinema’s direct 
image of time (time as the form of change) must be grasped in or as the 
indiscernibility of these respective images (the indiscernibility of founding and 
unfounding). Deleuze is able to deduce the human as a historical mode of 
existence on the basis of the formal properties of the cinema (which he has 
demonstrated correspond to the conceptual parameters of Bergsonian 
philosophy). But this deduction also demonstrates that this mode of existence 
is given its coherence and order only by treating the whole as a closed totality 
– that is to say, as finitude that is lived by the human in its relation to death as 
a boundary or border (the vanishing point figured in the image of the corpse). 
And this figure or image of death is also and indivisibly that of the disruptive 
form of time as change. History (causality, the classical cinema, the indirect 
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image of time) opens itself to the outside, to the disaster, not as a result of 
history (“the Holocaust is not a species of the disaster”680) but on the basis of 
its own duplicitous condition. 
It is not that ‘history’ is founded by finitude, and then unfounded by its 
dislocation. This would simply mark another historical passage of time 
between those two moments. Rather, the ‘events’ of history are doubled by 
their own absence from themselves and by their disordering in time. In The 
Logic of Sense, Deleuze offers us a different name for this eventuality of what 
does not happen, which is also perhaps another name for the crystal-image: 
the event. On the one hand, there is “the event embodied in a state of affairs, 
an individual or person, the moment we designate by saying “here, the 
moment has come”.681 On the other hand, we find the event as counter-
actualisation: “the event considered in itself, sidestepping each present, being 
free of the limitations of a state of affairs, impersonal and pre-individual, 
neutral”.682 Deleuze identifies this double structure or ambiguity of the event 
explicitly with death, and with Blanchot’s analysis thereof: 
No one has shown better than Maurice Blanchot that this 
ambiguity is essentially that of the wound and of death, of 
the mortal wound … Every event is like death, double and 
impersonal in its double. ‘It is the abyss of the present, the 
time without present with which I have no relation, toward 
which I am unable to project myself. For in it I do not die. I 
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forfeit the power of dying. In this abyss they die – they never 
cease to die, and they never succeed in dying’.683 
‘They die’ here marks the impersonality, the dislocation of the ‘I think’ from 
itself in the exposure of the human to time as the form of change: the 
dispersal and fragmentation of the self in its confrontation with a death which 
can never be my own. In a striking figure, Deleuze compares this experience 
of the absence of and from self with the impersonality of ‘it rains’: 
How different is this ‘they’ from that which we encounter in 
everyday banality. It is the ‘they’ of impersonal and pre-
individual singularities, the ‘they’ of the pure event wherein it 
dies in the same way that it rains.684 
He returns to this figure in the Cinema books (attributing it this time to 
the cinema itself, by way of French film theorist Jean-Louis Schefer) to 
suggest that “the condition of the cinema has only one equivalent, not 
imaginary participation, but the rain when you leave the auditorium: not 
dream, but the blackness and insomnia”.685 In this summoning of insomnia, of 
the night and the rain as the condition of the cinema and of the event, we can 
hear the imperceptible voice of Levinas’ Il y a, the ‘there is’’ present in its 
absence.686 “There is”, Levinas tells us, “is an impersonal form, like in it rains 
… Its anonymity is essential”.687 One of the key characteristics of Levinas’ 
account is that it presents itself as an existential analysis of the ‘there is’ as a 
phenomenon within the field of experience. But that phenomenon, that 
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experience, is one of anonymity, dispersal, dislocation, in which any ‘I’ that 
might be the subject of that experience is lost. The night as rest is given over 
to the day, as restoration and preparation for its labours; but in the night 
without sleep (the night which does not sleep) “the vigilance of insomnia 
which keeps our eyes open has no subject. It is not the return of some 
presence into the void left by absence – not the return of some thing, but of a 
presence: it is the reawakening of the there is”.688 It is the experience of an 
existence without existents: the presence of absence, and thus the absence 
of the world and of oneself.  
It is impossible not to hear in Levinas’ description of this experience the 
presence of the ‘fractured I’, the crystal-image, the absence of the world and 
of oneself. In the depths of insomniac night, in the ‘there is’:  
The mind does not find itself faced with an apprehended 
exterior. The exterior – if one insists on this term – remains 
uncorrelated with an interior. It is no longer given. It is no 
longer a world. What we call the I is itself submerged by the 
night, invaded depersonalised, stifled by it. The 
disappearance of all things and of the I leaves what cannot 
disappear, the sheer fact of being in which one participates, 
whether one wants to or not, without having taken the 
initiative, anonymously.689 
As I have pointed out, in his discussion of Beckett’s Film, Deleuze notes 
in passing that the ‘death, immobility, blackness’ he projects beyond the end 
of the film is merely a “means in relation to a more profound end. It is a 
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question of attaining once more the world before man”,690 that is to say, being 
as real difference, being as it exists for itself and as itself. Beckett’s 
elimination of the material moments of human subjectivity can never reach the 
‘world before man’’ since ‘man’ is already there as that which he seeks to 
eliminate. Indeed, he cannot even reach ‘death, immobility, blackness’ within 
his film, or as image: these must be ‘projected’ beyond its end.  
What Beckett constructs in miniature is what Deleuze dramatises across 
the whole of the Cinema books, and particularly in the ‘great reversal’ that lies 
between their two volumes: the drama of thought in its attempts to think, and 
most especially to think being in terms of being, and adequate to being (to 
attain the ‘world before man’). This attempt is hobbled from the start by the 
cinematographic genesis of the human; overcoming this genesis requires the 
overcoming of the human, and thus the absence of the human and of human 
thought.  
But the experience of the ‘there is’ (the fractured I, the crystal-image) 
offers another path (which is perhaps a non-path). Beginning with and from 
the human (or the cinematic construction thereof) Deleuze is able to show that 
the human (that is to say, the cinematographic) has as its duplicitous 
condition both finitude and prolixity, and that that condition is capable of 
presenting itself as an image, as an experience: this is the modern cinema, 
the cinema of the time-image – the experience of movement subordinated to 
time, of the great reversal, of the anonymity of the event (the event of one’s 
own absence). And these are the only terms in which the human might be 
said to grasp the ‘more profound end’ of being in or as thought − not in its own 
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terms, but in terms of the failure or incapacity of thought in its exposure to 
being, to time as the form of change.  
The dramatisation of thought that Deleuze constructs by means of the 
cinema (the dramatisation of the struggle of thought to think, to become 
adequate to real movement) arrives at the cinema of the time-image as the 
experience of this exposure constructed in and as image: it is the drama of 
the unfounding of thought, the relation of man and world, world and man 
appearing in and as the suspension of the world and the absence from 
oneself, presented in and as image:  
it is the suspension of the world, rather than movement, 
which gives the visible to thought, not as its object, but as an 
act which is constantly arising and being revealed in thought: 
‘not that it is here a matter of thought become visible, the 
visible is irremediably infected by the initial incoherence of 
thought, this inchoate quality’.691 
The experience of the absence of oneself is as close as human being or 
the ‘I think’ can come to the overcoming of the human. This is not the 
experience of being as being, but of the exposure of human being to that 
being: the cinema, the night, the rain. 
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 8. Conclusion: The Crystal-Image of Philosophy 
Why does Deleuze write about the cinema, as a philosopher? What are 
the properly philosophical problems in relation to which the cinema offers him 
the means to respond in a way that philosophy itself cannot? Put simply, 
these problems concern the relation of man and world, world and man. The 
problem here turns on the adequacy or otherwise of thought to the task of 
thinking the world in its own terms. For Deleuze these terms are those of 
difference itself, of movement insofar as it is an expression of duration, or time 
as the form of change. The terms of this problem are figured in the 
cinematographic illusion insofar as it is a consequence of the genesis of the 
human as a centred perspective on the acentred universal variation of being. 
Since the cinematographic condition of the human is such that we grasp the 
world in relation to our own needs, and not as it is for itself, the natural 
metaphysics of human thought is thereby oriented towards totalisation and a 
grasp of being as a closed totality, even if the genesis of that thought is 
deduced on the basis of difference and the openness of the whole. To think 
the world in its own terms thus requires the overcoming of the human, and of 
the cinematographic limits of human thought.  
Deleuzian philosophy offers a direct response to this demand in terms of 
a montage thought that seeks to enter into the real movement of being. By 
fragmenting and recomposing the elements given cinematographically in 
experience, it seeks to enter into their movement of actualisation in ‘reverse’, 
and so counter-actualise them in order to reascend towards the differing from 
itself of the virtual. But although this ‘cinematic’ philosophical method offers 
philosophy the means by which it might overcome the human and so 
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approach being in its own terms, in doing so it leaves the human ‘behind’ and 
positions it simply as a barrier to thought that thought must seek to surpass. 
As such, it leaves Deleuzian philosophy open to the criticisms that Hallward 
directs at it: that the human has no place there, such that it offers nothing to 
the human, or to properly human concerns. The nuance, or specificity, of the 
Cinema books within the heterogenesis of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference 
is precisely the focus it offers on the human as human, and on the ‘thought of 
the world’ understood in terms of the human relation to difference, to being as 
acentred universal variation.  
Thus the problem that the Cinema books address is, in a sense, the 
inverse of that which requires Deleuzian philosophy to overcome the 
cinematographic limits of human thought: how can the relation of the human 
to being, to difference, be accounted for and thought in terms of the human 
and of human thought rather than those of its overcoming? The cinema offers 
Deleuze the means to respond to this problem because it is able to deduce 
the human and the operations of human thought on the basis of its own non-
human mode of thought, the essence of which is to think in terms of real 
movement and thus of real difference. In other words, it can think the problem 
of human thought and its relation to being in terms not subject to the limits of 
that thought. Through the composition of its formal elements – frame, shot 
and montage – the cinema possesses the tools to dramatise not only human 
thought, but the relation of that thought to being as difference, the relation of 
man and world, world and man. 
Insofar as it thinks human thought in non-human terms, the cinema 
enables Deleuze to account for the products of the dogmatic image of thought 
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in the terms of his own philosophy of difference. This is what we find in the 
classical cinema’s recapitulation of classical philosophy in cinematic terms. In 
a certain sense the argument of the Cinema books repeats the logic by which 
he accounts for external difference in terms of the differing from itself of 
internal difference, and thereby accounts for finalism, mechanism and 
ultimately the Hegelian dialectic in terms of real difference. But where the 
latter presents this relation abstractly or ‘in principle’, the former does so 
concretely and directly, as and in the history of the classical cinema itself.  
This history – the history of thought as spontaneity and as power – is 
oriented by and towards the thought of the whole as totality. But what it 
reveals is that this totality constitutes the unfounding of that power and 
spontaneity: to the extent that it completes its goal or end in the totality of the 
one, it exposes thought to its own horror, the failure and incapacity of thought 
to respond to, master or think its own end. Action, the historical as the mode 
of being of the human, moves on a trajectory towards death as that which 
both determines and delimits life and meaning, and at the same time exposes 
the human and human thought to its own absence, in terms that disrupt and 
decentre both thought and history itself. This is the Deleuzian formulation of 
the relation of philosophy to death: the exposure of the human and of human 
thought to being as it is for itself and not for us.  
If the cinema thus offers Deleuze the non-human means to think the 
human relation to being, what the cinema’s recapitulation of the history of 
philosophy reveals is that this exposure is also (contra Hallward) profoundly 
and utterly political. Totality, totalisation, are realised in the realm of the 
human in the presence of the people: the ‘dream’ of the people as One, as 
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unity and totality realised in totalitarianism and as fascism. The Holocaust lies 
at the centre and break between the cinemas of the movement-image and 
time-image and between the two volumes of the Cinema books as a figure of 
totality itself, of the people as one in the deathly stillness and unity of the 
mass grave. If philosophy is constituted in the relation to death as thought’s 
vanishing point (its point de fuite) and thus as both the ground of its possibility 
and its exposure to the impossibility of possibility itself, what the cinema 
reveals is that the political, as the organisation of the world of human action, is 
in its turn constituted in relation to totalitarianism as its completion and its 
horror. It is here, Blanchot tells us, at or with this completion:  
outside the sovereignty of the One and the Whole, outside of 
the Universe and also of its beyond, and when all is 
accomplished (when death comes, in the form of a life 
fulfilled), the demand without any rights, the demand of the 
other (the multiple, the impoverished, the lost) presses as 
never before, as that which has always escaped 
realization.692  
The philosophy of difference bears on the political not in terms of 
proscriptions for action or the search for justice, but in the form of this 
‘demand without rights’, the demand of the other which not only has escaped 
realisation, but must – for to do so would be to fall once again into the realm 
of always totalised or totalisable action and power. When Deleuze tells us that 
‘the people are missing’,693 this absence is not a void to be filled, a project yet 
to be completed. It is the condition for the confrontation of the political itself, of 
identity and dominion with the demand of the other, which cannot be met or 
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affirmed in any unity or presence of the people joined together ‘as one’. Thus, 
to summon up Blanchot once more: 
for thought which has reached its culmination – for thought 
whose completion has put it to sleep – the wakeful and 
incessant obsession with others is confirmed. The affirmation 
is void, and the obsession is with others in their un-presence. 
Moreover thought does not know how to acknowledge this 
obsession. But it knows that this nocturnal disaster is 
thought’s due and is conferred upon thought in order that 
thought might be assigned a disjointed perpetuity.694 
We wait for the people to arrive, for possibility or for the possibility of thought, 
but our waiting is and must be interminable, never to be met by any arrival – 
the ‘obsession with others in their un-presence’ as thought’s ‘disjointed 
perpetuity’.  
If Kant’s ‘great reversal’ of the relation of movement and time lies at the 
heart of the philosophical problem that Deleuze turns to the cinema to resolve, 
and of the Cinema books themselves as the break or gap that joins and 
divides them, it is because this reversal is in itself disastrous, experienced in 
and for thought as the suffering of time, as the impossibility and impower of 
thought figured in the fractured ‘I’. But this fracture is also that of the unity of 
man and world, of the reciprocal determination of thought as a power we 
possess and the Idea of the world as totality on the basis of which that 
thought is derived and justified. As Deleuze puts it, in the ‘modern world’: 
the link between man and world is broken. Henceforth this 
link must become an object of belief: it is the impossible 
which can only be restored within a faith. Belief is no longer 
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addressed to a different or transformed world. Man is in the 
world as if in a pure optical and sound situation. The reaction 
of which man has been dispossessed can only be replaced 
by belief. Only belief in the world can reconnect man to what 
he sees and hears. The cinema must film, not the world, but 
belief in this world, our only link.”695 
If this belief concerns the modern cinema, as man’s only relation to the 
pure optical and sound situations that have replaced the Idea of the world as 
totality, it concerns philosophy no less. Deleuze points out that this 
‘transformation in belief’ within the cinema “was already a great turning-point 
in philosophy, from Pascal to Nietzsche: to replace the model of knowledge 
with belief. But belief replaces knowledge only when it becomes belief in this 
world, as it is”.696 The Nietzschean character Deleuze attributes to the modern 
cinema is articulated at the level of film form in its transformation of narrative – 
that is to say, in its mode of composition of images. Classical narration sought 
to construct an Idea of the world as closed totality, and thus as an object of 
thought, subject to man’s knowledge and power in the form of truth or 
judgement. However, insofar as thought presents itself in the modern cinema 
as the passive experience of time as the form of change, we:  
no longer have a chronological time which can be overturned 
by movements which are contingently abnormal; we have a 
chronic non-chronological time which produces movements 
necessarily 'abnormal', essentially 'false'.697  
                                                
695 Deleuze, Cinema 2, 171−72. Emphasis added. 
696 Ibid., 172. 
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Narration thus takes on a ‘new status’ and “ceases to be truthful, that is, to 
claim to be true, and becomes fundamentally falsifying”.698 The ‘crack’ in 
thought produced by the reversal of the relation of movement and time is such 
that man’s relation to the world presents itself in the form of the powers of the 
false, which “cannot be separated from an irreducible multiplicity. 'I is another' 
… has replaced Ego=Ego.699  
Insofar as the ‘great Kantian reversal’ that gives rise to the modern 
cinema substitutes knowledge as a power we possess with a Nietzschean 
affirmation of belief, it turns this reversal against Kantian philosophy itself, as 
a continuation of Deleuze’s post-Kantian and Maimonian response to it.700 For 
Kant, it is the noumenon, the world as it is, that cannot be known, while time 
(and space) constitute the a priori form of being known of things as they 
appear. It is on this basis that the entire architectonic of human knowledge 
and of philosophy unfolds. For Deleuze, however, time itself (or more 
precisely, duration as temporalised difference) takes the place of the Kantian 
noumenal. The (Bergsonian) terms in which the cinematographic genesis of 
the human and of human thought are deduced on the basis of this 
temporalised difference are such that, just as with Kant, the world (the being 
of difference) cannot be known in human terms. But where for Kant this 
eliminates any possible relation of thought to the world as it is, for Deleuze it 
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opens up the possibility of a relation based not on knowledge, truth or 
adequation but rather on the affirmation of the powers of the false, and of 
belief in this world as the link, the relation between man and world, world and 
man. The thought of the world cannot, for Deleuze, take the form of 
judgement or truth, but can only become adequate to the world in the form of 
the affirmation of the world as it is. This is not the affirmation of things as they 
appear (the actual, the present) but, rather, of the becoming other of the now: 
time as the form of change, the unceasing creation of the being of difference.  
To believe in this world as it is, then, means neither submission to the 
existing reality or the cynicism of realpolitik, nor a messianic faith in a world or 
a people to come. It is, rather, to affirm being as vital difference, as creation. 
Against the powers of horror, of the totalisation of thought and world and the 
totalitarianism of politics, we must place a belief in creation and difference not 
as the possibility of the new, but as the condition of its reality. To believe in 
the world is to affirm the people, not in their presence now or to come, but in 
or as their absence, understood as their unceasing becoming other. To 
believe in the people to come is not to put one’s faith in the future, but in the 
becoming other of the present, in time as the form of change.  
The cinematographic genesis of human nature and human being is such 
that we will always grasp the new in terms of the possibilities of action it 
presents, grasp it as an object of knowledge, a tool to be deployed within the 
realms of closure and finitude (in other words, to treat it as merely actual, and 
thereby divorce it from its real movement of actualisation). But ‘to believe in 
the world as it is’ is to believe not in this or that new thing, event or idea, but 
rather to affirm the differing from itself of being. It is to affirm the openness of 
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the whole, to hold that openness against the human and cinematographic 
orientation towards totalisation and closure, towards violence and death. We 
must believe in the world, in the people, not as unity or totality given or 
possible to us, but as the differing from itself in which we find the condition for 
the creation of the new: the new as a becoming other which of necessity 
escapes us, our mastery, our totalising grasp.  
The relation of human being and human thought to being as difference, 
the relation of man to the world as it is, thus constitutes a problem for Deleuze 
not in the form of something to be solved or overcome, but rather as the 
impossibility of thought that forces thought to think what it cannot know but 
can only affirm. This is the disaster at the heart of thought, the fracturing of 
the ‘I’, not as an event belonging to me or to my thought, but to “‘they’ of 
impersonal and pre-individual singularities, the ‘they’ of the pure event 
wherein it dies in the same way it rains”.701 Here the ‘impersonality of dying’ 
indicates “the event in which death loses itself in itself, and also the figure 
which the most singular life takes on in order to substitute itself for me”.702 
This problem, this event, this exposure of the human to being is what Deleuze 
finds in the modern cinema that arises in or with the collapse of the sensory-
motor whole of the classical cinema: 
the sensory-motor break makes man a seer who finds 
himself struck by something intolerable in the world, and 
confronted by something unthinkable in thought … For it is 
not in the name of a better or truer world that thought 
captures the intolerable in this world, but on the contrary, it is 
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because this world is intolerable that it can no longer think a 
world or itself … Which then is the subtle way out? To 
believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man 
and the world, in love or life, to believe in this as in the 
impossible, the unthinkable, which nonetheless cannot but 
be thought … it is this belief that makes the unthought the 
specific power of thought.703 
The cinema’s thought of the world, then, constitutes the dramatisation of 
thought’s struggle to think, to become adequate to being and the thought of 
being, not as mastery or power unto death, but as belief in the world as the 
creation of the new. If the modern cinema offers this to us, to our thought and 
to philosophy, it is as the exposure to being, to difference, to time as the form 
of change: the event as a ‘most singular life’ which substitutes itself for me, for 
my thought.  
In his final essay, “Immanence: a Life”, Deleuze takes up the theme of 
this ‘singular life’ that reveals itself in or as the exposure to death. Here, at the 
end, we find what might be read as an obscure or indirect commentary on an 
approach to a death that will never have been his own. There is no biography 
here, no attempt at a final summation of his life, his achievements, his 
failures, to determine whether he, like the ancient Greeks, might at last call 
himself happy. We shouldn’t, he says, seek to “enclose life in the single 
moment when individual life confronts universal death”.704 Rather, in 
approaching death, “individuality fades away in favor of the singular life 
immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken 
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for no other”.705 This ‘singular life’ is not my life, but a life. The impersonality of 
the indefinite article here, like that of ‘it dies’ or ‘it rains’, marks the exposure 
of ‘my’ life to a pure becoming other in or as my relation to death.  
The relationship posed in “Immanence: a Life” between ‘my’ life and a 
life mirrors the relation I have posited in this thesis between the life of action, 
the life of actual events and death as ‘the figure which the most singular life 
takes on in order to substitute itself for me’. In other words, what Deleuze 
offers us in this essay is another figure for the cracked ‘I’, for the affection of 
self by self and for the crystal-image. Just as time, as the form of change, 
imposes on the spontaneity of the ‘I’ a thought exercised in it and on it but not 
by it, in the approach towards death, my life, my name find themselves 
substituted for by the impersonality of a life which nevertheless “can be 
mistaken for no other”. Death figures here not in the bleakness of an end that 
will always have come too soon, but in or as the crystalline relation in which 
‘my’ life becomes indiscernible from a life, from the creative power of the 
unceasing becoming other of being itself. The substitution of belief for 
knowledge here takes the form of the indiscernibility of the ‘I’ that thinks its 
own power and the I that experiences its own thought as the suffering of time 
in the affection of self by self.  
But as such, this relation also serves as a final, properly Deleuzian 
formulation of the figure of philosophy itself as thought’s relation to death. 
Philosophy as a thought driven by the impossibility of its own thinking cannot 
know its own thought, but can only affirm the becoming other of a thought it 
can never grasp or master as its own. And this is precisely the drama of 
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thought enacted by the Cinema books themselves. In the crystal-image 
constructed by the impossible relation between its two volumes, between the 
movement-image and the time-image, between the classical and modern 
cinemas, we are given the drama of thought in its struggle to think. Here, 
then, is what Deleuze offers us in and with the Cinema books: the montage 
thought of the cinema and its thought of the world as the crystal-image of 
philosophy itself. 
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